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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the European Union’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the 
field of cultural policy. The OMC, a method of intergovernmental policy coordination 
that is centrally coordinated by the European Commission, was introduced in the cultural 
field in 2008. Using a case study of Policy Priority A  in the 2011-2014 Work Plan for 
Culture, this thesis examines how the OMC operates as well as what outcomes it 
produces. It does so using a sociological institutionalism theoretical framework, 
supplemented with insights from the literatures on multi-level governance and policy 
learning. It uses a combination of research methods including document analysis, 
interviews with key actors, and participant observation, ultimately leading to new insights 
into the processes and practices of EU policy coordination. 
 
Findings on the processes of coordination reveal insights into the EU’s inter-institutional 
dynamics and demonstrate that the European Commission is a key player in the culture 
OMC. They also indicate considerable heterogeneity in how Member States ‘approach’ 
participation in the OMC and indicate that ultimately there is a weak connection between 
the OMC and national-level politics. Findings also show that the outcomes of 
coordination are multifaceted; while few examples of direct political and programmatic 
change were found, there is a complex set of other outcomes, including increased vertical 
coordination, socialisation and networking, and heuristic learning and concept usage. 
 
The thesis’ findings make contributions to several multi-disciplinary areas of academic 
research. They add most directly to the literatures on EU cultural policy, specifically on 
the processes and outcomes of policy coordination in the field, and contribute a new 
sectoral case study to the existing literature on the Open Method of Coordination as well. 
They also make broader contributions to the study of cultural policy (in particular cultural 
policy approached from a political science/public policy perspective), policy learning, 
and European governance and integration.  
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PART  I: T HE  R E SE AR CH 
FOUNDAT IONS 
 
CHAPT E R  1: INT R ODUCT ION 
 
 
“I strongly believe in this idea of culture being really the soul of Europe – and 
not just saying that! It’s not appealing if we say we’re together just because of 
finances! We have to have something deeper that connects us. I strongly hope that 
it’s culture and cultural heritage.”  
V iktoria (interviewee), interview, October 2014 
 
 
1.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This research project began in October 2012. Since then, the European Union has faced 
several crises: recovery from the 2008 financial crash, austerity, Greece, Russia, ISIS, 
the 2014 European Parliament elections and the rise of anti-EU/European sentiments 
and far right parties across the continent, the heart-breaking tales of migrants who risk 
their lives to come to the EU, the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership…  the list goes 
on. These are political, economic, and social challenges, but cultural ones too. Because 
of this climate, I often received “wows” and looks of incredulity when strangers asked 
me the subject of my PhD. Typical responses included “cultural policy in the European 
Union – can’t think of a better and more relevant time to be studying that!” Or, “wow, 
how topical.” Yet what struck me every single time I heard these responses is how isolated 
and removed what I was studying actually was from these observations. Strangers’ 
perceptions were nowhere near what was really going on in the day-to-day conversations 
about culture in the EU. 
 
 
This thesis examines the process and outcomes of cultural policy coordination in the 
European Union. Culture
1
 became a European Union competence in the 1992 Treaty of 
                                                          
1
 The European Union does not explicitly define cultural policy, but it is generally agreed to be policies 
associated with the arts (museums, the visual arts, the performing arts, heritage and historic preservation, 
and humanities programs such as literature poetry), and may also extend to other areas such as libraries, 
zoos, botanical gardens, fairs and festivals, folklore, and crafts (Mulcahy 2006). Craik, Davis, and 
Sunderland (2000) have identified four key areas that cultural policy can encompass; these are arts and 
culture (including cultural institutions), communications and media (including, for example, broadcasting 
12 
 
Maastricht.
2
 Since then, the EU has been involved in a variety of programmes, funding 
opportunities, and initiatives in the field. In 2008, the European Commission initiated a 
process of policy coordination between Member States, in the form of the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC), a method of intergovernmental coordination already in use in 
other policy areas and associated primarily with the 2000-2010 L isbon Strategy. The 
introduction of an OMC, along with the solidification of an overall EU cultural strategy 
in the 2007 Agenda for Culture, represented a turning point in the EU’s cultural agenda 
(CEC 2010a, McDonald et al. 2013a). Y et, until now, no one has asked crucial questions 
about the OMC: how does it work? Who participates in the coordination process and what 
do they discuss? Does it produce any results? The objective of this research is to thus 
examine the process – why and how do Member States coordinate cultural policies and 
how is this facilitated by the EU – as well as the outcomes of the EU’s culture OMC. This 
research thus seeks to bring cultural policy ‘out of the dark’ by providing a detailed public 
policy study of a policy sector in the EU that has in general been the subject of little 
scrutiny, particularly from a public policy perspective. 
 
The European Union has been described as the most unique and complex system of 
governance in the world because of its exceedingly complicated bureaucratic and multi-
level structure and the wide variety of internal and external actors involved in its policy-
making: “[i]n few areas of interstate politics are ideals so often invoked, identities so 
clearly at stake, and interests so complex, challenging, and uncertain” (Moravcsik 2001, 
p.176). However, while there has been unprecedented interest in the study of the EU, and 
in particular of European integration, among a variety of academic disciplines, EU 
cultural policy – and particularly the processes of policy-making in this sector – still sits 
on the sidelines. It is true that the European Union is first and foremost a union of 
economics and trade; “[c]ulture has never been at the core of European integration” 
(Bozoki n.d., p.1). Y et, since the Maastricht Treaty, the cultural and the social have played 
a more prominent, if still ill-defined, role in European integration. Therefore, it is 
somewhat surprising that cultural policy has received so little attention in the literature 
                                                          
and publishing), citizenship and identity, and spatial culture (urban policy and cultural planning, and 
cultural heritage). 
2
 Note, however, that there was informal action in the field prior to this, which occurred without legal 
grounding (see more on this in chapter 2). Before Maastricht, the treaties contained only “fleeting” 
references to culture (Sandell 1996, p.268), such as article 36 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which 
concerns the protection of national treasures with “artistic, historic or archaeological value.” 
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on European public policy, even more so because this sits in direct opposition to the 
attention it has been given by EU public figures as well as what appears in policy 
documents (Langen 2010), where its many “integrative powers” are strongly stressed 
(Staiger 2009, p.2).
3
 
 
Culture is a competence that “entered the arena of EU jurisdiction under complex and 
contradictory conditions” (Sarikakis 2007b, p.14). It is a ‘functional’ policy area in the 
European Union, meaning that the EU has a narrow and specific remit (V ersluis, van 
K eulen, and Stephenson 2011). It is also a supporting competence: the EU supplements 
but does not override the cultural policies of the Member States (and/or regions).
4
 There 
is strong adherence to the principle of subsidiarity,
5
 which means that EU involvement in 
the field must be continuously justified. EU cultural policy faces unique challenges in 
that culture is a policy sector imbued with symbolic and political tensions, and is often 
used rhetorically and symbolically as a catalyst for European integration. Uta Staiger 
(2013) also identifies the polysemic nature of culture, the range of cultural policy 
traditions in the Member States, and thus the form and legitimacy of EU involvement in 
the field as complexities of cultural policy at the supranational level (see also Barnett 
2001). It is these challenges that make EU cultural policy such a fascinating object of 
study. 
 
In their book on analysing EU policy processes, V ersluis, van K eulen, and Stephenson 
(2011) designate culture as a policy area in which ‘the EU’ (perhaps left vague due to 
competing positions among main institutions) would like to have more involvement but 
is met by resistance from Member States, who still see culture as best handled at the 
national or even sub-national level. Similarly, L ittoz-Monnet (2007, p.2), says that culture 
                                                          
3
 Consider this excerpt from a speech by Past President of the European Commission Jose Manuel 
Barroso at the opening of the 2013 EU Culture Forum in Brussels: “[c]ulture is, and always has been, the 
cement that binds Europe together. It is an essential part of the very foundations of our European project 
and must remain firmly entrenched in our ideals if we are to succeed in achieving a more united, a 
stronger and open Europe” (Barroso 2013). 
4
 Differing from other areas of EU competence which are exclusive (such as competition policy related to 
the common marker) or shared (such as agriculture and fisheries). 
5
 Subsidiarity, outlined in article 5(3) of Maastricht (TEU) is a principle of EU law based on taking 
decisions as close to the citizen as possible “and that constant checks are made to verify that action at EU 
level is justified in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. [… ] Specifically, 
it is the principle whereby the EU does not take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive 
competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level” (EUR-Lex 
[n.d.]). 
14 
 
has been a field that Member States have been “particularly disinclined” to transfer 
competence to the EU. Simply put, culture is a controversial policy area in the EU. Indeed, 
it is not obvious as to why there should be a cultural competence at the EU level; the 
existence of a competence does not necessarily mean that intervention in it is rationally 
justified or explained. This is especially true for the OMC, which is a process initiated by 
the Commission but in theory ‘by and for’ Member States. For a student interested in 
everyday decision-making processes, this raises many important questions about how 
decisions are made and who they are made by in a system as complex as the European 
Union whereby 28 Member States must work together with each other and with 
supranational institutions to achieve consensus.
6
  
 
Because of its interdisciplinary nature combining EU public policy and cultural policy, 
this work has, in essence, two audiences. First of all, it speaks to public policy scholars, 
in particular those who study EU public policy, because of its focus on the processes and 
institutions. It thus directly contributes to the ‘governance turn’ within European Union 
studies (K ohler-K och and Rittberger 2006; see also chapter 3 of this thesis), particularly 
to the literature on institutions from a sociological institutionalism perspective It also 
speaks to cultural policy scholars, a multidisciplinary and diverse group that comprises a 
variety of methodological and theoretical approaches within a wide umbrella of research. 
Even within a diverse body of work, political science and/or public policy approaches to 
cultural policy remain in the minority.
7
 However, this thesis makes use of insights from 
cultural policy studies, which tends to treat the sector as sui generis (see chapter 3), and 
thus speaks to this discipline as well. As both disciplines are marked by theoretical and 
methodological pluralism, this allows for scope in combining insights from other 
disciplines.
8
 Every effort has been made so that this thesis is comprehensible to both 
groups and thus there is some theoretical and conceptual ‘bridging’ involved throughout. 
 
                                                          
6
 By ‘everyday’ practices I mean not the ‘high politics’ of the European Council or Commissioners, but 
the actions of policy officers (Lewis 2003). 
7
 Note that in North America, these are two distinct fields; the former concentrating more on political 
parties, interest groups, and behaviour, the latter on why and how specific policies are chosen (the study 
of public policy tends  to be a graduate-only program). In the UK , the distinction is much more blurred, 
and the use of ‘political studies’ is a broader term that encompasses the study of both. I use the term 
‘public policy’ for sake of consistency throughout. 
8
 Indeed, “one of the explicit challenges of cultural policy research is the variety of audiences than can 
(and, perhaps, must) be addressed” (Scullion and Garcia 2005, p.114). 
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1.2 R E SE ARCH PUZZL E S AND QUE ST IONS 
 
The reasons for undertaking this study can be split into two closely linked areas of inquiry, 
the empirical puzzle and the theoretical and methodological puzzles. These are discussed 
in turn below, relating to both the study of cultural policy and the study of EU 
governance/policy coordination. 
 
1.2.1 T he empirical puzzle 
The basic goal at the beginning of this research project was to discover more about how 
a controversial, sensitive, and little-studied policy area was governed in the EU. It is not 
obvious, in a union of 28 Member States, how ‘culture’ should be treated, approached, or 
governed (or even defined). More specifically, while academic research exists on many 
aspects of EU cultural policy (see chapter 3), there is no existing work on the EU’s policy 
coordination efforts in this field. I was interested in both how the OMC worked and also 
in what effects it had and whether participants felt that ‘progress’ had been made. Who 
controls and manages this process? Is it driven by the Member States? Had dialogue 
advanced on these topics? Are the norms and ideas emanating from the European Union 
being “appropriated by national actors and diffused to national discourses and identities” 
(Meyer, L insenmann, and Wessels 2007a, p.21-22)? Had any domestic policies changed 
as a result of the OMC? 
 
The direct coming-together of 20+ Member States discussing cultural matters needs to be 
examined from both a process and content point of view: not only the content and themes 
that are discussed, but how policy is coordinated. Policy coordination is not a simple 
matter of administrative decision-making; these are political choices (Lascoumes and Le 
Gales 2007). Too many existing studies on both EU cultural policy and cultural policy 
more generally obfuscate the everyday ‘nitty gritty’ of policy-making – how policy is 
made and who is responsible for decision-making. These micro-level details are the 
subject of study for many other policy fields but have been overlooked in the cultural 
field, generally in favour of analysing the content of policies rather than the processes by 
which they come together.  
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Attention to process is important, as it helps “us uncover new terrains which could not be 
appraised by looking only at outcomes; this approach stresses the activities of actors 
rather than their accomplishments… ” (Ripoll Servent and Busby 2013, p.8). It reveals 
vital details about power relations and dynamics within a political system. Focusing on 
process also illuminates the inherent challenges of multi-level governance. The EU “is 
characterised by constant interaction and negotiation, where borders between national and 
supranational, but also between politics and administration, are blurred” (Jacobsson and 
V ifell 2007, p. 164). In the case of cultural policy, we know little about the ramifications 
of MLG. Nowhere can we see these tensions so clearly as in a process such as the OMC, 
which involves the participation of EU, national, and subnational actors as well as civil 
society platforms, external experts, and non-government organisations (NGOs). 
 
The second puzzle concerns the study of policy coordination, one of five modes of 
governance in the EU.
9
 Each mode differs in the way that policy is made – the actors, 
institutions, and procedures involved. In policy coordination, understood to be an 
interactive process that, in its ideal form, involves a “common search for optimal solutions 
through openness, sharing information, and cooperation rather than through applying 
authority and control” (Ben-Gera 2009, p.2), no law is made and decisions are not legally-
binding.
10
 Rather, it is a non-hierarchical system based on voluntarism, subsidiarity, 
sharing, socialisation, and collective problem solving (Héritier 2001, de la Porte 2002, 
Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). These coordination mechanisms are used when Member 
States are unwilling to transfer further competences to the EU but where there is a shared 
commitment to act. Policy coordination is “part of a more abstract move from 
‘government’ to ‘governance’… based on procedures that are voluntary, open, 
consensual, deliberative, informative” (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 2006, p.471-474, as 
quoted in Twena 2012, p.50).
11
 This approach thus stands outside of the traditional 
regulatory-focused Community model whereby law is passed that must then be 
transposed within the Member States. 
 
                                                          
9
 The others are the traditional Community method, EU regulatory mode, EU distributional mode, and 
intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace and Wallace 2007). 
10
 Coordination involves “a division of labour, the development of standard operating procedures and a 
programme, the creation of transmission channels for decisions, the provision of communication channels 
for information and means of training and ‘indoctrination’” (Simon 1957[1997], p.112, as quoted in 
Lodge 2007, p.347). 
11
 See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of governance. 
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The Open Method of Coordination is one type of coordination, based on an 
intergovernmental logic of Member States coordinating policies outside of the traditional 
Community method. However, in defining and delineating the OMC, agreement ends 
there. Zeitlin refers to the OMC as an ‘unidentified political object’ (2005a). There is a 
lack of clarity both in the academic literature but more crucially within the EU itself. It is 
not clear how to define the Open Method of Coordination, nor what it is exactly meant 
to achieve, nor indeed when it should be used. It thus seems best to categorise the OMC 
as a process of policy coordination that is continually evolving and being re-defined, with 
the knowledge that “variability may actually be an inherent and intentional characteristic 
of the OMC, reflecting the need to adapt the OMC to different contexts and over time” 
(van Homeyer 2007, p.46, as quoted in Twena 2012, p.28). 
 
Despite this conceptual lack of clarity, “[t]he growing political salience, proliferation, and 
variety of OMC processes has elicited a bewildering array of contradictory assessments 
from both academic researchers and EU policy actors alike” (Zeitlin 2005a, p.22). Much 
of this research emerged in the first half of the last decade, in the midst of the Lisbon 
Strategy (see more on this in chapter 3). There are two gaps within the OMC literature 
that this thesis seeks to fill. The first is empirical in nature in that, in a cultural policy 
context, there is little known about why and how cultural policy is coordinated among the 
EU-28. This needs to be further interrogated, as, as Armstrong (2010) discusses, just 
because policy coordination exists in a given field does not mean that there is a rational 
reason for its existence. As a fairly new working method in the cultural field, representing 
a new form of consultation, participation, and representation (Barnett 2001), there is very 
little available information on the culture OMC, its rationale, and the way it works in 
practice. Thus, exploring this “cognitive and normative tool for defining and building 
consensus around a distinctive European social [cultural] model and policy paradigm 
based on common objectives and values” (Zeitlin 2005a, p.22) is the basis of this research, 
representing as well a novel contribution to the literature on the OMC. 
 
The second (partial) gap in the OMC literature is a conceptual one. Too many existing 
studies of the OMC obfuscate how the OMC works in favour of whether it works. The 
result is that while we are much wiser about many of the OMC’s benefits and flaws, there 
is not a lot known about how exactly coordination functions (for exceptions see K röger 
2008’s book and 2009 edited special edition and Armstrong 2010). This is important 
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because working methods are not neutral (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, Lascoumes and 
Le Gales 2007); they are political choices, even though the selection of policy tools and 
instruments is “generally presented, in a functionalist manner, as a matter of simple 
technical choices” (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, p.8). We thus need to interrogate the 
OMC as a tool of governance and examine both how it operates and what, if any, 
outcomes it produces. In this vein, the thesis offers, in the conclusion, some ideas on how 
the OMC could be modified. This thesis thus contributes to what Mark Dawson (2011) 
calls the ‘third wave’ of OMC research, where the focus is on empirical inquiry and detail. 
 
1.2.2 T he theoretical and methodological puzzles 
The second part of the research puzzle concerns the theoretical and methodological 
dimensions. Both the study of public policy and cultural policy are marked by theoretical 
and methodological diversity (Scullion and Garcia 2005, Gray 2010, Cairney and 
Heikkila 2014). By applying under-used theoretical and methodological approaches this 
research represents advancements in both disciplines. 
 
First of all, one of the underlying arguments of this thesis is that in order to better 
understand cultural policy, more in-depth analysis is needed into the processes by which 
decisions on policy are made. This is a line of investigation that has to date been under-
utilised in the disparate field of cultural policy studies (see chapter 3): much existing 
cultural policy literature focuses on the content of policy, presuming rationality in policy-
making (Gaio 2015) and thus neglecting the inherent ‘messiness’ of politics. However, 
like any other policy area, making cultural policy presents difficult questions, of “values, 
judgments, tastes, and preferences, rather than facts” (Cummings and K atz 1987b, p.15), 
and, “… with limited resources, decisions must be made” (Ibid.). Too much existing 
cultural policy research neglects these conditions. Politics is about power, choices, and 
constraints. It is humans making choices and operating within these constraints, and they 
are made within a specific setting; in other words, decisions are made within a particular 
institutional context and must be studied in situ. Thus, by using research methods that 
allow in-depth exploration of process, deeply contextualising it, I show how useful 
theories from the discipline of public policy can be in studying cultural policy. A  
sociological institutionalism perspective, covered in much more detail in chapter 4, is 
interested in role of institutions, broadly defined to encompass social and cultural norms 
within a given organisational setting, and their roles in political outcomes. 
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Secondly, the literature on the Open Method of Coordination is noted for its theoretical 
and methodological pluralism (see Borrás and Radaelli 2010), which there is certainly 
room for in studies of EU governance (see Zahariadis 2013; Lynggaard, Manners, 
and Löfgren 2015). New institutionalism, particularly the sociological strand, is an under-
used method in the study of the OMC. It is concerned with the socio-cultural 
characteristics of political action and therefore allows an explicit focus on organisational 
practices, both formal and informal, within the operation of the OMC. In terms of research 
methods, research that uses original data in the study of the OMC is in the minority: in a 
2010 literature review of 52 studies, 21 used original data or survey methods, while 29 
articles did not use any original data (two were missing) (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.28). 
This means that a large percentage of the literature makes normative statements about the 
effectiveness of the OMC but is often imprecise on details and in some cases does not use 
primary sources to come to these conclusions. The “need to ground policy co-ordination 
processes in better analytical and normative frameworks” (Armstrong 2008, p.414) is 
therefore a very real one. 
 
1.2.3 R esearch questions 
The overall research question that this project deals with is What are the processes and 
outcomes of cultural policy coordination in the European Union? 
 
T able 1.1 T hesis research questions 
Main research question: How is cultural policy coordinated in the 
European Union and what are the outcomes of EU cultural policy 
coordination? 
 
Sub-questions 
1. What are the roles of the European Commission and Council of the 
European Union in the OMC?  
2. What are the roles of the Member States in the operation of the 
OMC? 
3. Does the culture OMC result in any policy learning or change? 
 
 
These questions contribute to existing literatures in both a narrow and broad sense. 
Results will add to our understanding of EU policy coordination in the field of culture, 
by exposing how and why policy is coordinated and also whether learning and change 
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occurs as a result of this (and, if so, how). More broadly,  because of the interdisciplinary 
nature of the research, findings also contribute to our understanding of cultural policy 
more generally, to the study of EU cultural policy, to the study of the Open Method of 
Coordination, to the study of EU governance and integration, and finally to the study of 
policy learning. 
 
1.3 R E SE ARCH DE SIGN 
 
The overall objective of this research is therefore to determine how the culture OMC 
works and what outcomes it produces. The goal of this study is not to determine causal 
predictive relationships but rather to construct a narrative surrounding the processes and 
outcomes of policy coordination. 
 
1.3.1 T heoretical and methodological approaches 
The ontological base of this research is one that that favours constructivist explanations. 
This allows for an in-depth exploration of institutions and structures, based on the 
argument that the EU is “so complex and unpredictable, [that] institutional and structural 
factors are more influential than calculated rational action in determining policy 
outcomes” (Hix 1998, p.54). This perspective is thus a step forward in trying to combine 
insights from different scholarly traditions, EU public policy and cultural policy, that 
unite in methodological approaches (Rosamond 2015).  
 
The thesis sits within the body of work known as ‘the governance turn’ in EU studies. 
The focus of this perspective is not on theorising Member State behaviour in terms of 
international relations theory and bargaining according to Member State preferences, but 
the everyday processes of policy-making in a multi-level system, reflecting that whereas 
a modern state was characterised by its unitary nature,  
“[p]ost-modern European states operate within a much more complex, cross-cutting 
network of governance, based upon the breakdown of the distinction between domestic 
and foreign affairs, on mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, on increasing 
mutual transparency, and on the emergence of a sufficiently strong sense of community 
to guarantee mutual security” (Wallace 1999, p.519). 
 
My focus is thus how policy is coordinated, who it is coordinated by, and what outcomes 
emerge from coordination. Analysing governance is “not just a matter of the macro or 
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trans-sectoral level. Rather it is also necessary to take into account the policy- or issue-
specific level” (Bulmer 1993, p.353) and place analytical primacy on institutions, 
decision-making procedures, and rules (Ibid.) 
 
As mentioned above, the thesis is theoretically rooted in a sociological new 
institutionalism (SI) perspective (March and Olsen 1989,
12
 Powell and DiMaggio 1991) 
with added insights from the literatures on multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 
2001, Bache and Flinders 2004) and policy learning and change (Zeitlin 2005b, 2009, 
2011). This perspective is an interpretivist one that focuses on both process (analysed 
from an SI perspective) and outcomes (using Zeitlin’s categorisations of learning and 
change). An institutional perspective is concerned primarily with the structure of political 
activity and argues that institutions – defined as stable, regularly occurring norms, rules, 
and patterns of behaviour – are the most important part of political life (March and Olsen 
1989). Institutions both constrain and enable actors, who behave according to a logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1984). Institutions also create opportunities for and 
constrain learning. Institutional approaches are suited to studying policy coordination 
given their pliability (in that they do not make strict predictions) and their focus on the 
differentiation between formal and informal institutions as well as on socially-embedded 
norms and beliefs within these institutions (Bulmer 1993). 
 
The sociological strand, one of the three ‘main’ strands of institutionalism (discussed in 
much more detail in chapter 4), originated in the study of organisations in sociology. This 
framework, 
“comprises a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent 
variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties 
of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct 
consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p.8) 
 
In this perspective, institutions are defined broadly to include not only unwritten norms 
and rules but also “symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates” (Hall and 
Taylor 1996, p.14). Actors behave according to a logic of appropriateness, which is based 
on ‘acceptable’ behaviour in a socially-constructed setting. In order to move past one of 
the main criticisms of sociological institutionalism, my conceptualisation of the logic of 
                                                          
12
 March and Olsen’s work is sometimes classified as normative institutionalism rather than sociological. 
This distinction will be covered in more detail in chapter 4. 
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appropriateness extends to the logic of practices (J enson and Mérand 2010), a concept 
developed in some work in EU studies which links appropriate behaviour with 
organisational and professional practices. This allows us to conceptualise agents not as 
simply blindly following rules but able to effect change as ‘change agents.’ 
 
A  sociological institutional lens is supplemented by additional insights from the 
literatures on multi-level governance and policy learning. These two sets of frameworks 
help to further contextualise the complexity of EU policy coordination. Multi-level 
governance (Marks 1993) focuses on the relationships between nested levels of 
government and changes in sovereignty that come about as a result of supranational 
governance. Because it moves beyond the dialectic of integration theory (supranationalist 
versus intergovernmentalist), it is particularly useful for analysing the relationships 
between Member States and supranational institutions such as the European Commission; 
one of the tenets of MLG is that there is a loss of power to the Member States due to the 
nature of cooperation and co-decision in EU policy-making. 
 
In order to analyse the outcomes of policy coordination, I also draw on the literature on 
policy learning, and, more specifically, J onathan Zeitlin’s work on policy learning and 
change in the OMC. Learning in the OMC happens via deliberation, whereby “actors’ 
initial preferences are transformed through discussion by the force of the better argument” 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, p.272). Zeitlin’s categories of outcomes encompass a wider 
variety of influences and more comprehensively reflects the diverse potential of impacts 
that the OMC has. His framework is adopted in order to, 
“draw attention to a wider range of potential influences, including not only procedural 
changes in governance processes, but also ideational and discursive shifts, along with 
changes in issue salience and political agendas, through which the OMC may affect 
policies and policymaking at both national and European levels” (Zeitlin, Barcevičius, 
and Weishaupt 2014, p.8). 
 
Coupled with an SI perspective, this approach produces a much more comprehensive 
understanding of learning and change as processes which are socially constructed. 
 
The information that is relevant to answer the research question above pertains to the 
institutional environment of the Open Method of Coordination and includes routines, 
processes, contexts, constraints, and procedures. Because only a certain amount of 
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information can be gleaned from official documents, to get insider information one must 
go to more direct sources. The thesis therefore draws on three connected research 
methods: document analysis, semi-structured interviews with key actors, and participant 
observation. Each of these methods has its own strengths and weaknesses, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Due to the challenges of studying the OMC (also 
covered in chapter 5), the triangulation of information through different research methods 
helps to ensure its validity and reliability.  
 
Desk research in the form of document analysis involves a detailed review of relevant 
policy documents in order to become familiar with the policy language and main debates 
of EU cultural policy. Secondly, the collection of primary data took place in two different 
ways. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with key policy actors. The purpose of 
the interviews was to learn new information that is not attainable elsewhere; to get behind 
official narratives of policy documents and expose the ‘behind the scenes’ day-to-day 
elements of policy-making – aspects of managing the OMC that are not described in 
textbooks. However, interviews still “maintain distance” between the object of study and 
scholarly practices; therefore, participant observation “adds value because it opens black 
boxes of elite behaviour… that would otherwise stay closed” (Rhodes, ‘t Hart, and 
Noordegraaf 2007b, p.2). The result is that I am able to get ‘up close and personal’ to a 
specific process. This approach follows a subset of the public policy literature that is 
interested in ethnographic methods to study political outcomes (see, for example, Gains 
2011; Rhodes, ‘t Hart, and Noordegraaf 2007a). 
 
1.3.2 Case study approach
13
 
In order to focus this study and to set boundaries, a case study approach was also adopted 
(Stake 2000, Cresswell 2007, Y in 2009). This research is concerned with the Council of 
the European Union’s 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture. This document set out foci for 
the EU’s policies and programming in the field of culture for this period. It was divided 
into six priority areas (see appendix 2). These priorities build on the Council’s previous 
Work Plan (2008-2010) and were developed in conjunction with the European 
Commission’s 2007 Agenda for Culture. They also directly relate to objectives for the 
EU’s Europe 2020 strategy. 
                                                          
13
 Please note that the methodological implications of case studies will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
24 
 
 
Specifically, Priority A  of the 2011-2014 Work Plan is the focus of this research. Priority 
A  is ‘Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and accessible and inclusive culture’ (for 
more information on these themes, see chapter 2). More specifically, its topics of focus 
identify the following more concrete sub-priorities: 
1. better access to and wider participation in culture; 
2. cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (these first two via the role of public 
arts and cultural institutions); 
3. development of a key competence ‘cultural awareness and expression,’ following 
a recommendation from a 2010 OMC group; 
4. promotion of culturally inclusive cities; and 
5. promotion of multilingualism. 
 
These five points represent areas of interest and priority but do not refer to or mandate 
specific policies. Instead, they act as guidelines for both national and EU cultural 
programmes. The priorities are created at EU level and lie in a shared jurisdiction of EU 
and Member States. They are ‘assigned’ to a jurisdiction; in the five areas listed above, 
Member States are responsible for the first three and the European Commission the 
second two. The OMC is the main working method for those in the jurisdiction of the 
Member States and so the first three topics have OMC groups associated with them 
(herein referred to as groups 1, 2, and 3): 
 
T able 1.2 Priority A’s Open Method of Coordination Working Groups, Work Plan 
for Culture 2011-2014 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Name The role of public arts 
and cultural institutions 
in the promotion of 
better access to and 
wider participation in 
culture 
The role of public arts and 
cultural institutions in the 
promotion of cultural 
diversity and intercultural 
dialogue 
Development of the key 
competence ‘Cultural 
awareness and 
expression’ 
T ask Experts will identify 
policies and good 
practices of public arts 
and cultural institutions 
to promote better access 
to and wider 
participation in culture, 
Experts will identify 
policies and good 
practices in creating 
spaces in public arts and 
cultural institutions to 
facilitate exchanges 
among cultures and 
Experts will identify good 
practices for the 
development of this key 
competence and its 
integration into education 
policies, on the basis of 
knowledge and attitudes 
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including by 
disadvantaged groups 
and groups experiencing 
poverty and social 
exclusion 
between social groups, in 
particular by highlighting 
the intercultural 
dimension of the heritage 
and by promoting artistic 
and cultural education 
and developing 
intercultural 
competences. 
identified in the 
Recommendation of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 
December 2006 on key 
competences for lifelong 
learning 
Output Identification of policies 
and good practice 
manual for public arts 
and cultural institutions. 
Identification of policies 
and good practice manual 
for public arts and cultural 
institutions. 
Good practice manual for 
culture and education 
authorities at national and 
European level. 
 Source: Council of the European Union (2010); see also appendix 2. 
 
 
To date, two out of the three reports have been published. Group 1’s report was published 
in October 2012. This group was composed of 33 individuals from 24 Member States. 
The second report was published in May 2014 and was composed of 34 individuals from 
24 Member States. The third report is currently being written. 
 
This priority area and its subthemes concern pluralism and diversity in society; they fit 
into two of the four core area of cultural policy identified by Craik, Davis, and Sunderland 
(2000) – arts and culture (which includes cultural institutions) and citizenship and 
identity. Priority A  is directly linked to the 2007 Agenda for Culture’s first strategic 
objective, promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, as well as the 
‘inclusive growth’ priority (priority three) of Europe 2020. The theme refers to 
participation in arts and cultural activities (and in the case of Group 3 more widely in 
society) by groups of society who may not otherwise choose or get the opportunity to do 
so.  
 
Priority A  is the most symbolic, intangible priority area of the 2011-2014 Work Plan. It 
was chosen as a case study for this research because of its interconnectedness with 
European cultural identity and diversity, which has come to be a symbolic, politically-
charged, and strategic narrative for the European Union (see Sassatelli 2002, Shore 
2006).
14
 It also has close linkages with typical justifications for government involvement 
                                                          
14
 As one Member State expert I interviewed put it, “they are very much about values… these types of 
themes have high symbolic value” (Oskar, interview, June 2014). 
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in the arts and culture at the national level, based on the idea of promoting and fostering 
‘good’ citizenship via support for cultural institutions, the regulation of production and 
distribution of cultural products, and influencing the market for cultural goods (Craik, 
Davis, and Sunderland 2000). However, in the case of the EU, there is an assumption 
“that culture can be harnessed unproblematically as a tool to promote the project of 
European construction” (Shore 2001, p.117). The purpose of investigating Priority A  is 
therefore to gain more insight into the politics of European cultural identity and diversity 
and more importantly how these issues are conceptualised and discussed in a 
supranational context (the process) and what kind of influence they have (the outcomes). 
 
1.3.3 L imitations 
Equally important as acknowledging what questions the research answers is those it does 
not. First and foremost, and most fundamentally, because the case study is Priority A  in 
the 2011-2014 Work Plan, results concerning the outcomes of coordination cannot be 
generalisable to the OMC in the field of culture.
15
 This is a weakness, but can be explained 
through tracing the development of the project, which necessitates going back in time to 
explain how its focus changed to place the process, rather than the content of the OMC, 
at the centre of analysis. I was initially interested in how issues of cultural identity and 
diversity were represented in policy and how they were handled administratively – who 
got to talk about these issues and how were they discussed. The choice of Priority A , 
“Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and accessible and inclusive culture,” was 
therefore strategic.  
 
However, I soon realised, when I began speaking to key actors, that individuals spoke 
much more about how (and by whom) the issues were discussed, rather than the content 
of the discussions themselves. This is not something I anticipated before the beginning of 
my fieldwork, but is telling because for most participants and even EU staff, process 
dominated content. Interview subjects had much more to say on the process of 
participating in the working groups than on their thematic content, even when the subjects 
were quite political and divisive, and even if they had an intense personal interest in them 
(the reasons for this are ultimately linked with the design of policy coordination and will 
become apparent throughout the thesis). 
                                                          
15
 Here I distinguish findings on process and findings on outcomes; this is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
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L ikewise, the findings cannot be generalised to EU cultural policy as a whole. As will be 
described throughout chapters 2 and 3, ‘EU cultural policy’ is an extremely fragmented 
set of programmes and decisions. While my findings on the OMC can lend support to 
various arguments, it still has to be seen as separate, having different goals altogether than 
many of the EU’s other cultural programmes. 
 
In addition, the design of this research means that the outcomes of policy coordination in 
the Member States are not addressed in-depth. This would have required a different 
research design and the selection of case study Member States. I have therefore prized 
breadth over depth when it comes to the outcomes (chapter 8). However, respondents 
came from 15 different EU states – and represent the west, east, north, south, ‘old’ and 
‘new’ EU members – so thus represent a good spectrum from which numerous 
conclusions can be drawn. Finally, the focus of analysis is not the OMC reports 
themselves. While these reports are fascinating documents, the analytical focus has been 
to concentrate on the process of forming and writing the reports, not specifically on what 
they say (although, in the context of outcomes, this is covered briefly in chapter 8). 
 
1.4 OV E R V IEW OF T HE  T HE SIS 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts – Part I, the Research Foundations, and Part II, 
the Empirical Contributions. 
 
Part I begins with Chapter 2, entitled Contextualising the research puzzles. This chapter 
provides important background information concerning the European Union competence 
of culture. It shows the development of the competence, including what I identify as three 
important turning points, the inclusion of a cultural competence in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, the adoption of the 2007 Agenda for Culture, and the creation of an Open Method 
of Coordination in 2008. It also describes the development of the Open Method of 
Coordination in general, having emerged at a specific time in the history of European 
integration. The chapter also discusses the policy themes of Priority A  in the 2011-2014 
Work Plan for Culture.  
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The role of chapter 3 is to situate the research questions within existing literature, which 
is does in three categories: European Union governance, cultural policy, and EU cultural 
policy. This division was created in order to situate the research interdisciplinarily and 
describe what gaps the thesis fills and how. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical frameworks, which is based, as discussed above, on a 
sociological institutionalism approach to policy coordination, along with added insights 
from multi-level governance and policy learning. The goal of this chapter is to explain 
the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical approach chosen. 
 
Chapter 5 lays out the methodological approaches to the research and describes what 
steps I took to answer my research questions. It discusses the methodological limitations 
of case study research as well as the challenges of access in researching bureaucracies. It 
also covers in detail how I analysed my data and what kind of results this produces. 
 
Part II is the empirical contributions, which draws on the extensive fieldwork undertaken 
for this study. Chapters 6 and 7 are the first two findings chapters and work together to 
reveal the process of cultural policy coordination. Chapter 6 tackles the OMC from the 
perspective of the European Union (European Commission and Council of Ministers) and 
chapter 7 from the perspective of the Member States, which is separated into three levels 
of analysis, encompassing the Council, the ministry level, and the expert level).  
 
Chapter 8 is the third and final analysis chapter. It discusses the outcomes of 
coordination, which are determined by the information gathered for chapters 6 and 7. This 
chapter makes use of Jonathan Zeitlin’s categories of OMC influence and demonstrates 
the various types of effects that the OMC has. It also directly addresses the logic and 
design of EU cultural policy coordination. 
 
Finally, chapter 9 provides concluding thoughts on the thesis’ main findings and 
discusses its main contributions to existing academic literature. It also discusses practical 
policy implications of the findings and offers directions for future research. 
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1.5 CONCL USIONS 
 
This thesis ultimately offers fresh insights to both the study of European Union cultural 
policy coordination as well as the Open Method of Coordination more generally. It thus 
makes contributions to the field of cultural policy studies, in particular cultural policy 
approached from a political science/public policy perspective, as well as to the literature 
on EU governance. The contribution to the cultural policy field is in two ways; first of 
all, the focus of a governance perspective is on the day-to-day processes and procedures 
of policy-making, an area that has been neglected in the study of cultural policy. 
Secondly, the contribution adds a European dimension to the study of cultural policy, 
which has traditionally been focused at the nation-state level; this work leads to new 
knowledge on the administration and governance of cultural policy in the EU. In addition, 
the research is also a contribution to the OMC literature by representing both an addition 
to debates on everyday decision-making (and, more specifically, that on policy 
coordination, i.e. how policy is coordination and not only what the outcomes of 
coordination are) as well as a novel contribution from a policy area that to date has not 
been studied. Finally, the research also adds a voice to debates on culture’s role in 
European integration. 
 
Research always takes place in a certain time and place context, and since the 2008 
financial crisis, “the European Union has been hit by what most observers… describe as 
a series of interlocking and seemingly intractable crises at home and abroad” (Copsey and 
Haughton 2015, p.1).
16
 The years since 2008 have seen extraordinary challenges, leading 
one commentator to decry that “Europe is beset by so many crises that it can be hard to 
remember them all” (Porter 2016, p.62). 2014, the year that I completed my fieldwork for 
this project, was indeed a fascinating year to be studying the EU: the European Parliament 
elections in May, the ‘election’ of the new Commission president under the L isbon Treaty 
rules, the new Commission, and a general rise in ‘Euroscepticism’ and nationalistic 
movements across the continent.  
 
                                                          
16
 The J ournal of Common Market Studies’ annual European Union reviews, published in September each 
year, are a good marker of years gone by. See also chapter 11 in Bache et al. (2015). 
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The difficulties and ironies of finishing a thesis on culture and the European Union in 
2016 are not lost on me. Any thesis being written on the EU in 2016 cannot ignore the 
unprecedented and challenging reality currently facing the continent. As the 2015 Ward 
Report on the Role of Intercultural Dialogue, Cultural Diversity and Education in 
Promoting EU Fundamental V alues expresses, 
“The European Union is at a particular point in history where notions of identity and 
belonging are being contested, reconfigured and defended, with strong feelings from a 
diversity of voices and divergent political perspectives” (European Parliament 2015, 
p.13). 
 
This thesis indirectly addresses issues such as integration, interculturalism, and identity: 
all three of the OMC groups have investigated ways that arts and cultural institutions can 
respond to these challenges. These expansive issues have almost contradictory 
implications for this research; in one sense, culture has never been more important, as the 
EU struggles institutionally and politically to move forward as a cohesive body. However, 
in another, ‘culture’ is frequently deemed an inconsequential policy area. When cultural 
cohesion, diplomacy, and intercultural dialogue are mentioned, it is nearly always 
encased in symbolism, myth-making, and grandiose statements, which renders it so vague 
as to be almost meaningless. These tensions embedded in the cultural competence are 
becoming more obvious as the EU faces numerous crises; if the social and the cultural 
dimensions of the EU are to ‘work,’ it follows logically that they need to be more properly 
defined and delineated, which is a matter of political will. The “challenges Europe is 
facing are predominantly of a cultural nature” (Hassemer 2006, p.137), and yet, the nature 
of current political cooperation and coordination in the field of culture is at odds with this 
reality. 
 
To set these issues in better context, I now move on to tackling the historical progression 
of the EU competence in culture, as well as the Open Method of Coordination, the subject 
of chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
CHAPT E R  2: CONT E X T UAL ISING 
T HE  R E SE AR CH PUZZL E S  
 
“It is very difficult, if not impossible, to describe the policy of the European Union 
towards culture. Some authors, taking a lead from the dominance of the 
subsidiarity principle in matters of EU cultural policy, maintain that there is no 
such policy. There are others who have recognized that even though this policy is 
not explicitly formulated, it exists and has a significant impact on EU member 
countries.” 
Nina Obuljen (2004, p.29) 
 
 
2.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This chapter contextualises my research questions by providing important background 
information on cultural policy in the European Union as well as the Open Method of 
Coordination. It is divided into five main sections. The first, 2.2, briefly tackles the rather 
expansive theme of the history of the European Union and discusses how we can 
understand it as an imagined community. Section 2.3 then looks at the history of cultural 
policy in the EU, focusing on a post-Maastricht (1992) narrative. This section 
contextualises the cultural competence by outlining the EU’s legal powers. It also 
discusses the roles of the main actors in EU cultural policy. Section 2.4 changes direction 
by looking at the development of the Open Method of Coordination in the context of its 
genesis at the March 2000 Lisbon Summit and its use as a working method of the 2000-
2010 Lisbon Strategy. In section 2.5, the development of the culture OMC, a moment 
which represents deeper cooperation among Member States in the field, is discussed, and 
section 2.6 details the case study focus for this research, Policy Priority A  in the 2011-
2014 Work Plan for Culture. 
 
2.2 MAK ING SE NSE  OF T HE  E UR OPE AN UNION 
 
Although the focus of this research is a small-scale process, the culture Open Method of 
Coordination is part of a much wider ‘project,’ the European Union. This section thus 
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situates the research topic within its wider political and historical contexts, which is 
necessary in order to understand how and why the EU became involved in the cultural 
field. Indeed, in order to properly understand the culture OMC, one must understand 
culture’s role in European integration more generally. Themes introduced in this section, 
such as the ‘imagined’ nature of the EU, therefore run throughout the thesis.  
 
The European Union has been described as a state-like political system above state level, 
a quasi-state, an international state, a “post-modern pattern of government in a post-
modern European order” (Wallace 1999, p.519), a post-national polity, a network polity 
– the list goes on. At its most basic level it is “a process of voluntary integration between 
the nation-states of Europe” (Hix and Høyland 2011, p.1) and is characterised by a  
“complex, cross-cutting network of governance, [… ] on mutual interference in each 
other’s domestic affairs, on increasing mutual transparency, and on the emergence of a 
sufficiently strong sense of community to guarantee mutual security” (Wallace 1999, 
p.519).  
 
In April 1951, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, and Italy 
signed the Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
As historian Tony Judt (2005, p.158) put it, “[a]ll six member countries of the new ECSC 
had only recently seen their sovereignty ignored and trampled on, in war and occupation: 
they had little enough sovereignty left to lose.” This was the beginning of what would 
eventually, with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, become the European 
Union. Today, the EU encompasses 28 Member States and 503 million inhabitants. 
 
In the period between 1951 and 1992, there are usually two key periods identified as 
‘turning points’ for European integration. The first, in the mid-1960s, saw the beginnings 
of a customs union, a common agricultural policy, and a common market. In the mid-
1980s, the Single European Act was signed, which continued momentum towards an 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
The EU, and its previous incarnations as the European Community, has been primarily a 
union of economics and trade as opposed to a social or cultural one. Social and cultural 
policies have sat uneasily in a framework that is heavily guided by a legal division of 
competences and subsidiarity. Culture is a policy field in which the subsidiarity principle 
is applied because it is a supporting competence only; Member States still want to retain 
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control over their own cultural policies. However,  the development of a cultural 
competence must be seen as a part of the drive for popular support for further integration 
(Shore 2000). Underlying the concept of an EU that is involved in the social and the 
cultural is a fundamental tension of how to bridge divides between Member States. Is 
there some short of shared European identity? Or is it rather ‘united in diversity’? What 
does Europe have in common? Do flags, anthems, and currencies unite, or is the nation-
state still the primary level of political and cultural attachment? 
 
Insight from Anderson’s (1991) imagined communities thesis and Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s (1992) work on invented traditions helps to shed light on these difficult 
questions. Taken together these theories examine the socio-political characteristics of 
societies and how they are defined and formed. Anderson (p. 6) defines a nation as “an 
imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” 
Hobsbawm and Ranger’s arguments centre on demystifying tradition, elements of which 
often form the basis of nationalism and legitimise political power in modern nation-states. 
Certain ‘traditions’ which seem to be old may in fact be both recent and invented. In the 
case of the European Union, symbols such as the flag, passports, and anthem, as well as 
the creation of the notion of ‘European citizenship’ are all symbols that are meant to unite 
its citizens in some way.
17
 
 
At the beginning of his Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, Gerard Delanty writes 
that ‘Europe’ is a contested concept – an idea as much as reality (Delanty 1995, p.1). 
Defining Europe is “not something self-evident” (p.3). Echoing Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
he writes that Europe is an “interpretation of community: a fantasy homeland that goes 
hand in hand with a retrospective invention of history as well as a moralisation of 
geography’ (Ibid., p.8). Indeed, underlying the project of European integration is an 
unspoken assertion that there are certain shared values among this population, such as 
freedom, reason, and progress (Shore 2000, Calligaro 2013). But a part of delineating 
what is shared is defining what ‘Europe’ is and what is not, since “[t]he very concept of 
a European union makes little sense if something is not going to be excluded.” (Delanty 
1995, p.157). Indeed, 
“The construction of this ‘Europe’ has depended on the parallel construction of ‘others’ 
(variously located in the East, South, West or in Europe’s past) against which a separate 
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 Oriane Calligaro (2013) refers to this as “designing Europeanness.” 
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European identity is seen as being constructed, created or invented” (Christiansen, 
Jorgensen, and Wiener 2001, p.14).  
 
 
This begins to highlight a key tension in the study of ‘culture’ and the European Union. 
Cultural symbols and policies have been implemented in order to encourage popular 
support for the European project (see more below), but there is a paradox in that these 
shared traits are never explicitly defined. And, implicitly or explicitly, “[m]ost attempts 
to define Europe ‘from a cultural perspective’ are laden with ethnocentric and elitist 
assumptions about what constitutes Europe’s ‘cultural heritage’” (Shore 2000, p.63). 
More specifically on the question of its cultural governance, Shore (2001, p.117), asserts 
that the European cultural model “does little to acknowledge the cultural diversity that 
now exists in Europe’s increasingly multicultural societies.” A  discussion of EU cultural 
policy coordination, therefore, cannot be divorced from the broader picture of European 
identity and society. With these insights in mind, I now turn to a historical overview of 
the cultural competence in the EU. 
 
2.3 CUL T UR AL  POL ICY  AND T HE  E UR OPE AN UNION
18
 
 
This section gives a brief overview of the history of the EU’s competence in culture.
19
 
This background information is necessary in order to properly set the Open Method of 
Coordination in context with the development of the competence in general, to understand 
the fragmentation of the competence in terms of its programmes, as well as the complex 
and competing ‘positions’ among the Union’s various institutions. 
 
One of the difficulties in studying cultural policy is knowing where cultural policy begins 
and ends, since cultural policies can be both implicit and explicit (Ahearne 2009). As 
Langen (2010) has pointed out, nowhere is this more challenging than in the European 
Union, with much existing research on EU cultural policy encompassing a huge range of 
‘policies’ that take us far beyond activity in the Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Education and Culture. Therefore, in order to better focus this discussion, ‘cultural policy’ 
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 Parts of this section draw on Mattocks (2017). 
19
 Note that throughout this section I use ‘the EU’ for simplicity, even though throughout much of this 
period of history it was the European Economic Community. 
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is defined as the areas and activities encompassing DG-EAC’s remit. This excludes 
audiovisual policy, which has its own historical trajectory (see Collins 1994, Wheeler 
2004, Harcourt 2006, Sarikakis 2007a, and Erickson and Dewey 2011), copyright and 
intellectual property, and the structural funds used for regional cultural projects (see 
Delgado-Moreira 2000).
20
 
 
Legally and officially, culture made its first appearance in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, 
the treaty that created the Union and represented a “watershed” moment in EU integration 
(Puetter 2014, p.9). However, before it was formally included, there were several 
Community cultural initiatives that occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In order 
for the cultural competence to develop, two ‘lines of argument’, or justifications for 
intervention, dominated throughout the pre-Maastricht era. One was an economic 
argument, which focused on industrial aspects of cultural production and consumption 
such as training, working conditions, and the distribution of cultural goods. The second 
was the political rhetoric of a shared European identity. Both of these narratives co-
existed and developed in the 1970s and 1980s and to some extent are still present today, 
although the economic argument has since gained considerably more ground (see Bruell 
2013, Littoz-Monnet 2015).  
 
Pre-Maastricht cultural actions that were framed around the economic/industry argument 
(driven by both the Commission and European Parliament) included rules about the 
exports of cultural goods, cultural exchanges, training, translation, and sponsorship of the 
arts (Shore 2000). This framing (K ingdon 1984) was a “successful agenda-setting 
exercise,” which led to “extending the reach of its competence to the cultural sector when 
its formal powers were limited to the economic sphere” (L ittoz-Monnet 2007, p.43-4). 
The European Court of Justice also made judgements on topics such as copyright and 
book trade in this period (Ibid.).  
 
At the same time, framing was also political, focusing on identity – “a crucial necessity 
for integration, which hitherto had barely been touched upon” (Urwin 1996, p.9). 
Sentiments expressed in a series of high-profile reports throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
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 The importance of indirect funding in the form of cohesion policy monies cannot be understated, 
although a full discussion of this lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In general, the Structural Funds’ 
impacts on the cultural sector would benefit from much more scholarly attention. 
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advocated a deepening of cultural action in the Community in order to encourage popular 
support for European integration. Leo Tindemans, in his 1975 Report on European 
Union, outlined several ideas for implementing a ‘Citizen’s Europe’ such as fundamental 
rights and consumer rights. Similarly, the 1985 Committee on a People’s Europe 
(Adonnino report) recommended various developments concerning television, an 
Academy of Science, Technology, and Art, a Euro-lottery (“to make Europe come alive 
for the Europeans” [p.12]), and access to museums and cultural events. The report argued 
that culture and communication can contribute to “support for the advancement of 
Europe” which “can and must be sought” (p.21) in order to “strengthen and promote 
[European Community] identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the 
world” (p.5). While the ideas articulated in these reports had few direct impacts on 
cultural policy (Craufurd Smith 2004b), this momentum laid the ground for more 
cooperation in the field.  
 
In the early 1980s, the EU’s cultural ministers began meeting, first informally and then 
formally. Early cultural programmes, including the European Y outh Orchestra and the 
European City (now Capital) of Culture programme emerged, respectively, in 1976 and 
1985. In the 1987 Communication A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European 
Community, the Commission argued for a deepening in cultural cooperation in advance 
of the Maastricht Treaty, arguing that “… it is this sense of being part of a European 
culture which is one of the prerequisites for the solidarity which is vital if the advent of 
the large market …  is to secure the popular support it needs” (CEC 1987, p.5). 
 
While most of the intergovernmental cultural initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s were 
modest and symbolic, they demonstrated a certain acknowledgement on behalf of the EU 
institutions and Member States that intervention in the cultural field was acceptable 
(Langen 2010). The European Parliament, Council, and Commission all played a role in 
advancing the competence, to varying extents at different time periods,
21
 and these 
initiatives thus paved the way for culture’s more formal introduction in the early 1990s. 
The lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty was the first time that “sufficient opposition” to 
Europe had been placed on national agendas (Judt 2005, p.716). In this context, with 
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 The Council of Europe (CoE) – an entirely separate supranational institution – had also been involved 
in the cultural field since just after the Second World War, and the development of EU cultural policy 
should be seen in conjunction with the CoE’s development (see Sassatelli 2009). 
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many citizens ‘waking up’ to the presence of the EU, the development of the competence 
focused on the intrinsic value of culture and initiatives to promote a European identity. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 
1993, created a “new social-political framework within an accelerated economic and 
monetary union” (Nectoux 1996, p.31).
22
 Article 128 of the Treaty on European Union 
(now 167 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) stated that, 
 
“1. The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, 
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage to the fore. 
2. Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member 
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas: 
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the 
European peoples, 
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance, 
- non-commercial cultural exchanges, 
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector. 
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the 
competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council 
of Europe. 
4. The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions 
of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its 
cultures.”
23
 
 
 
The article both legitimised the EU’s prior activities in the field and paved the way for 
new ones (Shore 2001). It was a compromise: 
“While the broader and historically more significant principle of culture being a 
legitimate area of Community competence was secured by the countries which took a 
maximalist approach, the minimalist countries built into the drafting various restraining, 
defensive elements… ” (Sandell 1996, p.270). 
 
Because of the need to please a large number of Member States and thus competing 
positions, the article is imbued with controversies (see Shore 2000). The full discussion 
of these lays outside the scope of this thesis, however one important one is whether in 
fact the article is restrictive or enabling; some see it as paving the way for expansionist 
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 Maastricht also created the concept of European citizenship. 
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 Article 167 also contains a fifth paragraph referring to legal and policy-making procedures, which 
explicitly excludes policy harmonisation in the field of culture (see appendix 1). 
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intervention in the sector where as others view the prohibition of harmonisation as a 
clause protecting the further development of the competence. Another contradiction is 
about the nature of culture itself. Because it is not defined, many have argued that it is 
open to different interpretations, again, both restrictive and expansive. A  final 
contradiction, which has already been mentioned, concerns cultural identity and its 
explicit making into a political object. As Shore argues sceptically, “European culture 
and identity already exist in the ‘collective conscience of its peoples’, but bureaucratic 
intervention is nevertheless needed to ‘defend’ it from assault and to make Europeans 
‘more aware’ of their cultural identity” (Shore 2000, p.52).  
 
2.3.1 L egal powers and current cultural programmes 
The introduction of a cultural competence was therefore “not to establish a ‘common’ 
cultural policy but to bring to the forefront Community efforts rooted in the protection 
and promotion of Member States’ diverse cultural systems” (Psychogiopoulou 2006, 
p.583). Member States thus maintain full autonomy over their own cultural policies: 
“[l]egally speaking, it is not for the EU to take the lead or to control” in this sector (Sandell 
1996, p.271). According to the European Commission,  
“[the] work done by the EU complements [… ] and adds a different dimension. 
Information gathered from the EU as a whole can be used to support national policy 
decisions or provide examples of best practice that others can share. Programmes run 
across the EU can have a greater overall impact than those just run on national grounds, 
and policies put in place throughout the EU can help further national goals” (CEC 2013, 
p.3). 
 
The EU has three main powers related to cultural policy: (1) encouraging and facilitating 
cooperation between Member States; (2) promoting the incorporation of culture into other 
areas of EU jurisdiction; and (3) cooperating with Member States on cultural action.  
 
An overview of the EU’s current overarching cultural policy priorities can be found in 
the 2007 Agenda for Culture. This outlines the three main strategic objectives around 
which it bases its activities: 
1. Promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;  
2. Promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the L isbon 
Strategy for growth and jobs;
 24
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 The L isbon Strategy (2000-2010) has been succeeded by Europe 2020 (2010-2020), emphasising 
“smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth.” 
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3. Promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union’s international relations (CEC 
2007).  
 
Current cultural programmes and initiatives encompass a wide variety of areas and scope. 
These can be classified into three categories: supporting, coordination and 
communicative, and supplementary measures. This does not necessarily mean that these 
initiatives represent a congruent ‘policy’ or set of policies. Rather, they should be seen as 
a series of co-existing programmes, projects, and initiatives that operate in relative 
isolation to one another. Each programme has a very different history, having emerged at 
various points throughout the past 40 years.  
 
Supporting measures are programmes like Creative Europe, the EU’s current arts and 
culture funding programme (see K andyla 2015). The EU began funding arts and cultural 
activity in 1996. In this current programme, between 2014 and 2020 Creative Europe will 
award €1.46 billion within its two sub-strands, MEDIA and Culture, used to support 
cooperation projects involving three or more Member States. The other supporting 
measures are annual prizes in the fields of literature, music, heritage, and contemporary 
architecture, as well as the EU’s ongoing efforts in heritage protection, including annual 
heritage days and the heritage label (see Lähdesmäki 2014). 
 
The second category is policy coordination and communication measures. The OMC is 
a part of this category, along with Structured Dialogue, which is a formal exchange 
between the cultural sector and the EU via a series of transnational platforms and a 
biennial Culture Forum. As part of its dialogue with the sector, the EU also supports a 
transnational network of experts, the European Expert Network on Culture. The 
Commission has also undertaken or commissioned a large number of studies about 
various issues relating to the cultural sector and it also cooperates with other European 
networks on information dissemination and networking. 
 
The final category is supplementary measures. These include the European Capital of 
Culture programme, perhaps the most well-known of all of the EU’s cultural programmes, 
which began in 1985 (see Palmer-Rae Associates 2004, Sassatelli 2009, Garcia et al. 
2013, Patel 2013a). It also includes cultural mainstreaming whereby the Commission 
works with other EU and external organisations to ‘incorporate’ culture in other areas, 
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such as external relations and European Neighbourhood Policy (for more on this see 
Craufurd Smith 2004b, Psychogiopoulou 2006, Isar 2015). 
 
2.3.2 Governance and institutions 
Of the seven official European Union institutions, the most important ones for cultural 
policy are the European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council of the 
European Union (Council of Ministers).
25
 This subsection gives a brief overview of these 
bodies and their roles in cultural policy. As described in chapter 1, due to the complexity 
of the European Union, quite a bit of organisational ‘unpacking’ is required in order to 
clarify the roles of the various bodies, agencies, and individuals involved. Determining 
exactly how subsidiarity works in practice, and who does what, it is not immediately 
evident (Dewey 2008). The discussion also highlights fragmentation between EU 
institutions. 
 
European Commission 
The Commission is the executive institution of the European Union. It is composed of a 
core appointed College of Commissioners (one President, seven V ice-Presidents, and 20 
Commissioners – one individual per Member State), as well as an administrative 
bureaucracy of Directorate-Generals (DGs), of which each Commissioner is head. The 
Commission employs approximately 32,000 staff (CEC 2016a). Each DG contains its 
own micro-level bureaucratic structure within it, consisting of directorates and units 
within those directorates.  
 
Culture is part of the Directorate-General for Education and Culture, known informally 
as DG-EAC.
26
 The main personnel within DG-EAC consists of the Commissioner 
(currently Tibor Navracsics of Hungary), a Director-General, and a network of civil 
servants. The role of the Commissioner is a public and political one but the hierarchical 
structure underneath the Commission is rather akin to a national civil service. The DG is 
split into five directorates; culture is part of Directorate D, Culture and Creativity. The 
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 Note that scholars have also shown the importance of the European Court of Justice in the cultural field 
in areas such as book pricing and copyright. See Craufurd Smith (2004a) and L ittoz-Monnet (2007). 
26
 Although DG-EAC is the main DG for culture, other DGs’ remits fall into the cultural realm as well, 
reinforcing both the fragmented nature of organisation as well as the often controversial breakdown of 
where culture ‘starts and ends.’ For example, DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology 
(DG-CONNECT) is responsible for audiovisual policy; DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, 
& SMEs (DG-GROWTH) for copyright; and DG Regional Policy (DG-REGIO), for regional funding. 
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two units within the Directorate are Cultural diversity and innovation and Creative 
Europe programme.
27
 According to DG-EAC’s website, 
“…  the role of the European Commission is to help address common challenges, such as 
the impact of the digital shift, changing models of cultural governance, and the need to 
support the innovation potential of the cultural and creative sectors. The Commission is 
also committed to promoting cultural diversity, protecting cultural heritage, easing 
obstacles to the mobility of cultural professionals, and supporting the contribution of 
cultural and creative industries to boosting growth and jobs across the EU” (CEC 2016b, 
n.p.).
28
 
 
The Commission enjoys substantial policy-initiation powers within the Community 
method. There are competing views on whether this is the case with regards to culture, 
which does not enjoy ‘full’ competence and has a comparatively low budget to other DGs 
(see Sassatelli 2006, Gordon 2010, Littoz-Monnet 2012). For example, Gordon (2010) 
argues that the DG has failed to adopt a ‘systematic’ approach to the way culture’s legal 
justification for EU involvement, Article 167 in the 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, can best be used to their advantage. Langen (2010), meanwhile, 
taking a historical approach, shows that, pre-Maastricht, the Commission, Parliament, and 
Council of Ministers all occupied agenda-setting positions, depending on the context and 
the resources at hand. 
 
Others have identified the Commission as the main agenda-setter and driver of further 
European cooperation in the cultural field. The work of L ittoz-Monnet (2007, 2012), for 
example, shows how the DG took an active stance in advancing cultural action by framing 
intervention in terms of the power of culture to foster economic growth and 
competitiveness. Langen (2010) has also shown that since the 1990s the Commission has 
been instrumental in deepening cultural cooperation through its funding programmes, 
creation of cultural networks and exchanges, and the strengthening of programmes via 
the instrumentalisation of culture in socio-economic goals and contexts. 
 
Insight from two of the DG-EAC’s policy officers helps to contextualise their position: 
“…  we are restricted by the treaty’s non-competence. We’re already doing quite a lot in 
terms of coordinating – everything that we can do which has an added value and is okay 
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 These units were established in fall 2014 with the appointment of the Juncker Commission. When the 
fieldwork for this project was undertaken, in spring and summer 2014, the units were called Culture 
programme and actions and Culture policy and intercultural dialogue. 
28
 Many of the programmes outlined above are administered by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency (EACEA), which is an administrative agency within the DG. 
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with the subsidiarity principle. We’re really trying to exploit all matters we can and any 
action we can at the EU level to help cultural policy, but of course we are limited” 
(Corrine, interview, April 2014). 
 
 “[w]hat the Commission can do is to support [Member States’]  policies, complement 
them, but the purpose is not to have ONE policy because it’s not in the treaty, it’s not an 
EU competence” (Fatima, interview, May 2014). 
 
These statements therefore show that while the DG’s objective is not policy 
harmonisation, which is explicitly prohibited in the treaty, this does not mean that they 
are not able to maximise the competence within their limits. The Commission is 
constantly engaged in negotiation with the Parliament, Council, and external 
stakeholders, regarding the extent to which the EU should be involved in this policy field 
and what that involvement might look like. Anything the Commission presents must be 
approved by the Council and Parliament, the former which has historically been more 
restrained, the latter which has pushed for a more expansive agenda. It therefore has “very 
little to gain” by proposing something which has little or no chance of being approved by 
these bodies (Langen 2010, p.59).  
 
Historically, the DG’s cultural policy agenda has fluctuated between “an economic 
approach, which could be better justified under the EU Treaty principles, and promoting 
a cultural policy in its own name” (L ittoz-Monnet 2012, p.506). The lines of argument 
developed throughout the 1990s were both economic and political, as discussed above. 
L ittoz-Monnet’s work has demonstrated how the DG adopted a dual approach to increase 
the visibility and prominence of its portfolio. It first framed its policy objectives 
strategically in order to be justified under the subsidiarity principle. This was done by 
emphasising the discourse of the creative economy and job creation potential. (This 
brought it in line with competition and economic policy that the L isbon Strategy 
specified). The second part of the strategy was collaboration with other DGs and external 
cultural networks (Sassatelli 2006, Littoz-Monnet 2012). 
 
European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) shares legislative power with the Council of the European 
Union. It is composed of 751 directly elected representatives from the Member States. 
Legislation is brought to the EP and is then sent to one of 22 parliamentary standing 
committees, where it is evaluated. The decision-making system in the EP operates entirely 
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on negotiation and consensus-building because by design there is not a majority political 
party: to achieve anything, compromises must be made (V ersluis, V an K eulen, and 
Stephenson 2011). 
 
Culture is represented in the standing committee on Culture and Education, composed of 
31 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The committee outlines its priorities as 
such: 
“the cultural aspects of the European Union, and in particular: (a) improving the 
knowledge and dissemination of culture, (b) the protection and promotion of cultural and 
linguistic diversity, (c) the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage, cultural 
exchanges and artistic creation” (European Parliament 2015, p.144). 
 
There is not much research dedicated to the role of the EP in cultural policy-making, 
although the consensus from what does exist is that the Culture and Education Committee 
has in general advocated for an increased role for the EU in this field (European 
Parliament 2001, L ittoz-Monnet 2007, Staiger 2013). The EP has argued that EU cultural 
action must go beyond a symbolic role for culture and has emphasised the “specificity of 
culture and the need for special laws” to govern it (L ittoz-Monnet 2007, p.34). It has often 
focused on specific problems, such as labour market issues for artists in Europe (Gordon 
and Adams 2007). Barnett’s (2001) findings also indicate that the EP has tried over the 
years to expand the EU’s cultural programme but has not met with much success. His 
findings are supported by Gordon and Adams (2007), who argue that more robust 
proposals from both the Parliament and Commission are often stymied by the Council of 
Ministers, and in particular the larger Member States. 
 
Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) 
The Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers, represents 
the interests of Member States. It is composed of current ministers from Member States’ 
national governments. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, within the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the Council has shared legislative powers with the European Parliament. 
Broadly, its role is to evaluate legislation from the point of view of perceived benefits or 
losses to citizens in their Member State.
29
 The Council’s Presidency also rotates every six 
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 In some policy areas, such as the common foreign and security policy, defence, justice and home 
affairs, and some aspects of the monetary union, the Council of Ministers has much stronger powers and 
controls the agenda (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
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months, allowing limited agenda-setting power for that particular Member State. The 
Council is split into ten groups, or formations. What this means is that “the Council” is 
actually several policy sector-specific “Councils.”  
 
Cultural policy is the responsibility of the Education, Y outh, Culture, and Sport Council 
(EY CS). This Council, which would include in it national ministers of culture, typically 
meets three to four times a year to debate relevant issues. However, outside of these 
meetings, there is an extensive system of work that is done by permanent representatives 
in both ad hoc and permanent committees and workings parties, and a high percentage of 
decisions are ‘settled’ at the level of permanent representatives, rather than by the EU-28 
Culture Ministers themselves (V ersluis, van K eulen, and Stephenson 2011). The Cultural 
Affairs Committee (CAC), composed of seconded representatives from the Member 
States, prepares the work of EU ministers for culture. One member of the CAC describes 
her role as such: 
“I am trying to coordinate all cultural files that have a European angle to them, and 
trying to be the mediator between the European policy and the <country’s>  policy” 
(Darya, Member State representative, April 2014) 
 
The members of the CAC, like many EU officials in general, thus work with two hats on. 
They represent their Member State but work in a transnational environment.
30
 
 
Most legislation in the field of culture is non-binding, and does not legally require national 
Parliaments to adopt it. Until November 2014, decisions on cultural policy matters had to 
be taken by unanimity. This changed with the introduction of Qualified Majority V oting 
(QMV ) as a part of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, though in practice the decisions taken this 
way are mostly to do with the funding programmes. According to the official Council 
website,  
“The policy areas covered by the EY CS Council are the responsibility of member states. 
The EU’s role in areas of education, youth, culture and sport is therefore to provide 
a framework for cooperation between member states, for exchange of information and 
experience on areas of common interest” (Council of the European Union 2015a, n.p.; 
emphasis added). 
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 For insights into how this works both practically and in terms of identity as a ‘Eurocrat,’ see chapters 
by Geuijen, ‘t Hart and Y esilkagit, and Thedvall in Rhodes, ‘t Hart, and Noordegraaf (2007a)’s edited 
volume. 
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With decisions taken in the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council co-legislates, 
along with the Parliament, the proposals that are received from the Commission. Most 
legislation in the field of culture is non-binding, and does not legally require national 
Parliaments to adopt it (bindings agreements are known as regulations, directives, and 
decisions; cultural policy is mostly decided upon via recommendations – which are not 
binding yet have political force – and opinions).
31
  
 
The two ways of theorising the Council’s role tread the 
intergovernmentalist/supranationalist line (see chapter 4). There are those who believe 
that the Council ‘gets in the way’ of the dynamism of European integration, representing 
the Member States who ‘hold back,’ and a second group which believes that the Council 
‘saves’ the Member States from unnecessary and overly integrationist proposals (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006). The Council can therefore be thought of as both an EU and 
national actor, which presents analytical challenges in conceptualising both of these roles 
(this is discussed in more detail in chapter 7). 
 
There is little empirical work devoted to the current role of the EY CS Council and how 
it works. One of the biggest challenges in studying the Council is that meetings take place 
behind closed doors and only conclusions are in the public domain, meaning that it is 
difficult to observe how consensus-building works in practice. Historically, the Council 
played a role in the development of early cultural activity at the EU level. Culture 
ministers first started meeting informally in the early 1980s, and in 1985, the European 
City of Culture programme was initiated in the Council by then Greek Minister for 
Culture Melina Mercouri. The founding principles were based on culture as a vehicle of 
cohesion, along with the special role of cities as locales of cultural exchange. However, 
in general, the Council, acting in the interests of the Member States, is deeply respectful 
of subsidiarity and cannot be considered an agenda-setter in the field. 
 
Other actors 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
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 Exceptions to this include the 2008 regulation on the export of cultural goods and the 1993 directive on 
the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of an EU country. The former is a 
binding act that must be applied across the EU; the latter is also binding, however it is up to the individual 
state as to how they achieve it. 
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The Committee of the Regions is an advisory body composed of 350 members that are 
regionally and locally elected in the Member States. Its role is to represent regional 
interests at the European level and to provide a local viewpoint on relevant legislation 
that impacts regions – to bring regional and local perspectives into EU policy-making. 
For a competence like cultural policy, this is important, as cultural policy is a subnational 
competence in some EU Member States. The CoR is consulted on all cultural policy 
proposals. 
 
The CoR is divided into six ‘Commissions,’ one of which is Education, Y outh, Culture, 
and Research. The body has, since its inception in 1992, argued for an enhanced role for 
local and regional actors in the design of cultural policy (Barnett 2001). Barnett outlines 
that the CoR has had some influence in helping strengthen networking systems within the 
cultural field through increased dialogue. It has also questioned the meaning of 
subsidiarity and argued that cultural action is not necessarily the responsibility of the 
Member States (since this incorrectly assumes homogenous national cultures within 
them), and that culture is best handled at the sub-national level. Despite this, since the 
CoR is an advisory body and not a decision-making one, their overall influence has been 
relatively limited (Gordon 2010; V ersluis, van K eulen, and Stephenson 2011). 
  
Lobby groups and civil society platforms 
Brussels is the second most lobbied city in the world after Washington (V ersluis, van 
K eulen, and Stephenson 2011), and lobbying has been the subject of a large amount of 
research regarding the role it plays in agenda setting and policy making, particularly 
within the European Parliament. The role and influence of lobbying is better understood 
in other sectors because it has been the subject of more scrutiny. However, it is often 
difficult to determine the precise role that lobby groups play, particularly as politicians 
may be reluctant to admit how much they are influenced by them. There is even less 
known about relatively smaller lobbying presence of cultural groups and organisations 
and the amount that they may or may not influence decision making. Historically, 
professional cultural networks in Europe have been critical of the sector’s slow 
development and fragmented funding schemes within the EU (Barnett 2001). This gave 
rise to the mobilisation of arts and cultural advocacy organisations, particularly after the 
inclusion of the competence in the Treaty of Maastricht, who have generally advocated a 
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greater role for culture in European integration.
32
 However, while they have participated 
in a great deal of dialogue and cooperation concerning cultural matters, particularly with 
the Commission, it is more difficult to trace the precise impact this has had in EU 
decision-making. 
 
2.4 T HE  OPE N ME T HOD OF COOR DINAT ION 
 
This section departs from a focus on cultural policy specifically and outlines the evolution 
of the Open Method of Coordination as a mode of European Union governance. This is 
in order to set the origins of the OMC in a historical context. ‘New’ modes of governance 
in the EU are associated with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the development of the L isbon Strategy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
L isbon aimed to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world” (European Council 2000, p.2), and had as its core issues of 
competitiveness and social cohesion (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). Because some of these 
policy areas fell outside the EU’s jurisdiction, the Community Method – ‘traditional’ 
legally binding policy-making – was not appropriate. As a way of attempting a 
coordinated effort at some of these challenges, new strategies of political coordination 
were created; the Open Method of Coordination was one of them. 
 
The conclusions of the L isbon summit stated that, 
“Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying a new open method 
of coordination as the means of spreading best practice and achieving greater 
convergence towards the main EU goals. This method, which is designed to help Member 
States to progressively develop their own policies, involves: 
• fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving 
the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different 
Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; 
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by 
setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and 
regional differences; 
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 According to Culture Action Europe, one of the main lobby groups in the arts and cultural sector, 
created in 1992, their aim is to “be the leading platform for representing the diverse interests of the sector 
with a coherent and clear message.” 
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• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning 
processes” (European Council 2000, para.37) 
 
The OMC is thus a non-legally binding mode of governance guided by the principles of 
voluntarism, subsidiarity, and inclusion (Héritier 2001). It works on the basis of 
benchmarking and the sharing of best practices (borrowing this approach from the 
Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development [OECD]) that is coordinated 
by a central actor, the European Commission. The OMC is a  
“fully decentralised approach… in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which the 
Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and 
civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership” (European 
Council 2000, para.38). 
 
Policy coordination is a much more flexible approach than traditional legislation via the 
Community method. It is attractive to Member States “because of its low degree of 
legalization and limited potential for unintended consequences” (Schäfer 2004, p.13), 
therefore respecting subsidiarity.
33
 In theory, it seeks to “put the EU Member States on a 
path towards achieving common objectives, while respecting different underlying values 
and arrangements” (de la Porte 2002, p.39). The OMC initially began in six fields – 
information society, research and development (R&D), enterprises, economic reforms, 
education, and employment and social inclusion (European Council 2000). It has since 
expanded to other areas including youth, cohesion, security, and innovation policy (see 
chapter 3 and also Borrás and Radaelli 2010, ch.2). 
 
The OMC works as follows (the procedures are slightly different for the cultural field, 
which will be explained in more detail in the next section). Member States in the Council 
agree on a common set of targets. Each Member State then decides how to best achieve 
the targets, which may involve reforms and changes to domestic policies and 
programmes. Member States report back on progress, which is monitored by the 
European Commission. The cycle then continues with new targets set on the basis of 
previous results. 
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 Lodge (2007) discusses how Spain and the UK , agenda-setting countries at the 2000 L isbon Summit, 
advocated for the OMC because it would increase the role of the Council, reduce input from the 
Commission, and eliminate the European Parliament. 
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The introduction of this mode of governance can be seen along two parallel lines: it was 
a way for Member States to cooperate on shared goals without transferring more powers 
to the EU and by mechanisms that did not involve legislative changes. But it was also a 
response to a call for greater transparency and legitimacy in EU decision-making more 
generally, in the period post Maastricht, a time where a “large gap” appeared between the 
public and European elites, “a gap concerning the most appropriate contents and tempo 
of European integration” (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, p.186). This is reflected in the 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance (CEC 2001), which outlined five principles 
of ‘good governance’: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and 
coherence. The OMC, with its emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ coordination and civil society 
participation, thus in theory increases the ‘input-based’ legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) of the 
EU’s actions in policy sectors where it has a supporting competence. The participation of 
civil society is thus a key factor in the OMC’s operation,  
 
2.4.1 T he philosophy of coordination 
Before the development of the culture OMC is outlined, it is important to take a step back 
and ask why Member States coordinate policy in the first place. After all, as K enneth 
Armstrong (2010, p. 41) argues, “the mere resort to ‘coordination’ as a technique of 
governance does not itself resolve debates about the allocation and exercise of 
competence: coordination still demands justification.” It is in fact not obvious why states 
coordinate policy, particularly in sectors that the EU has no or limited jurisdiction in. 
 
According to the White Paper on EU Governance (CEC 2001, p.18), there are four 
circumstances for the use of the OMC: 
“—  it should be used to achieve defined Treaty objectives, 
—  regular mechanisms for reporting to the European Parliament should be established, 
—  the Commission should be closely involved and play a coordinating role, 
—  the data and information generated should be widely available. It should provide the 
basis for determining whether legislative or programme-based action is needed to 
overcome particular problems highlighted.” 
 
In general, the ‘push’ for common action may be driven by various forces, including 
external shocks, policy-related objectives (for example, in relation to the Lisbon 
Strategy), institutional and constitutional factors, or normative impulses to improve 
decision-making due to, for example, concerns about legitimacy (Diedrichs, Reiners, and 
Wessels 2011). The treaty bases of policy fields operating with an OMC vary. In some 
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areas, such as employment or immigration policy, the EU operates alongside a legislative 
approach; in others, such as cultural policy, the OMC “adds value at a European level 
where there is little scope for legislative solutions” (CEC 2001, p.18).  
 
Armstrong (2010), referencing the work of Iain Begg (2008), discusses a ‘spectrum’ of 
rationales for EU-level coordination. These range from a ‘damage control’ model of 
minimising spillover effects in the case of, for example, common economic or monetary 
policy (where individual states have ‘something to lose’ if things go wrong), to looser 
coordination such as capacity-building and learning facilitation. However, as Armstrong 
identifies, the multitude of reasons suggest different logics of coordination. Similarly, 
Biagi (1998)’s work, which Armstrong builds on, differentiates between coordination as 
cooperation and coordination as convergence. The former “works with the autonomy of 
states to define their policies but promotes elective and selective learning across states” 
(Armstrong 2010, p.41). This is indeed what we see in the case of the culture OMC, 
whereas other OMCs promote ‘convergent coordination.’ This is an important distinction 
as it influences the goals of the group, the way that success is evaluated, and indeed how 
policy learning (and change) is conceptualised. 
 
2.5 T HE  CUL T UR E  OMC 
 
The first ‘official’ mention of an Open Method of Coordination in culture is in the 
European Commission’s 2007 Agenda for Culture. Referencing the first Work Plan for 
Culture in 2005-2007, the Agenda stated that “the Commission believes that the time is 
ripe for Member States to take their cooperation one step further, by using the open 
method of coordination (OMC) as a mechanism to do so, in a spirit of partnership” (CEC 
2007, p.12). It goes on to say that the OMC is “an appropriate framework for cooperation 
in the field of culture” because “[i]t is a non-binding, intergovernmental framework for 
policy exchange and concerted action suitable for a field such as this, where competence 
remains very much at Member State level” (Ibid.). 
 
From June-December 2007, Portugal held the presidency of the Council of the EU. As a 
basis for consultation on the Commission’s Agenda for Culture proposal, the Portuguese 
presidency prepared a questionnaire which contained specific questions on the proposed 
51 
 
Agenda. On the OMC, the question was “Do you agree with the setting up of an open 
method of coordination in the field of culture, in the way that is suggested by the 
Commission?” (Council of the European Union 2007, p.3). Based on discussions in the 
Council, it was decided that the culture OMC would be a ‘soft’ version of policy 
coordination, due to subsidiarity and the sensitivity of the policy area.
34
 Most other fields 
(the one other exception being youth policy
35
) feature guidelines, target-setting, peer 
review, benchmarking, and reporting; ‘naming and shaming’ based on targets and 
progress is a key component. However, these elements are absent in the cultural field. 
According to the Agenda for Culture, 
“It is essential …  for the special features of the cultural sector to be fully taken into 
account in the design of an OMC in this area. In a spirit of partnership with Member 
States, this implies adopting a flexible approach, entailing the setting of general 
objectives with a light regular reporting system” (CEC 2007, p.12; emphasis added). 
 
The culture OMC is thus an example of cooperative coordination. Because of subsidiarity 
and the difficulties in establishing benchmarks in the cultural field, it is very unlikely that 
the culture OMCs will ever move towards convergent coordination. However, there is 
weak coordination in the field of culture to begin with. In other OMCs that have a ‘very 
strong’ or ‘strong’ level of institutionalisation, these areas often, although not always, 
have treaty bases (for example, macro-economic policy and fiscal surveillance).
36
 They 
also have been in existence for longer periods of time and are supported by other EU 
coordination processes in the same field (Laffan and Shaw 2005).  
 
The emphasis in the culture OMC is learning and exchange. Even so, it is not always clear 
what is expected to be learned and/or exchanged. The purpose of the culture OMC is a 
tricky question because one must dig deep to find an articulation of its aims and goals.
37
 
These aims are never explicitly addressed in policy and documents from the Commission. 
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 There is no straightforward answer as to why this is the case. Indeed, the ‘culture is different’ discourse 
is prevalent in policy documents and from Commission officials. This is explored in more detail in 
chapters 6 and 8. 
35
 Y outh policy enjoys a higher position on the political agenda than culture due to rampant youth 
unemployment in the EU since the 2008 financial crisis, and this being identified as a target in the Europe 
2020 program. On the youth OMC, see ter Haar and Copeland (2011). 
36
 One example of an exception is the OMC in education and training. Though education is a Member 
State competence lacking a treaty base, it has managed to become strongly institutionalised and moreover 
observable impact is occurring in Member States. This OMC also benefits from a parallel coordination 
process, the Bologna process (Laffan and Shaw 2005). 
37
 In addition, as logics of policy coordination differ depending on the policy field in question (Armstrong 
2010), it is not appropriate to look to other OMCs to infer goals or aims. 
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The closest justifications can be found in two main policy documents, the 2011-2014 
Work Plan and the 2007 Agenda for Culture: 
“…  the Council Work Plan for Culture 2008- 2010, in particular through its use of the 
open method of coordination (OMC), constituted a new and important stage in the 
development of Member State cooperation on culture, improving the coherence and 
visibility of European action in this field, while underlining the horizontal role of culture” 
(Council of the European Union 2010, p.1). 
 
“The OMC offers an appropriate framework for cooperation in the field of culture 
between the Member States. It is a non-binding, intergovernmental framework for policy 
exchange and concerted action suitable for a field such as this, where competence remains 
very much at Member State level” (CEC 2007, p.12). 
 
These statements do not address why the OMC is introduced and what goals it expects to 
achieve. However, after some digging, I found three aims in the commissioning document 
that the Commission signed with the private consultancy firm Ecorys (McDonald et al. 
2013b), which carried out an evaluation for the Commission, in 2012: 
 Foster exchange of best practice between Member States with a view to improve 
policymaking. This is done in the culture OMC via a best practice report, which 
each group produces. 
 Structure cooperation around the strategic objectives of the European Agenda for 
Culture, as defined in the Council Work Plans for Culture 2008-2010 and 2011-
2014. 
 Generate policy recommendations to feed EU and national policy-making.
38
 
 
T able 2.1 Features of the culture OMC 
T reaty basis Indirectly, article 167 (TFEU) 
Instruments Best practice reports 
Policy goals Outlined in Work Plans for Culture 
Sanction mechanisms Not applicable 
L earning mechanisms Information exchange, deliberation (no 
benchmarking) 
V oting procedures and policy cycles 
(Council) 
QMV , three-year cycle 
R ole of Commission Drafts reports and monitors 
Involvement of non-governmental 
actors 
Involved directly in meetings 
Source: Adapted for the culture OMC using Borrás and Jacobsson’s (2004) classifications. 
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 See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of policy transfer. 
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The adoption of the Agenda for Culture and its new working methods thus “opened a new 
chapter of cooperation on culture policy at European level” (McDonald et al. 2013b, p.2), 
building on the development of the competence that had taken place over the past decade 
and a half. The first OMC groups started in 2008 under the 2008-2010 Work Plan for 
Culture (the ‘first generation’). This cycle featured four groups. The 2011-2014 Work 
Plan was unveiled in December 2010 and included ten OMC groups under six more 
concretely laid out ‘Priority Areas’ (see more detail on this below). The current plan, 
2015-2018, contains nine OMC groups under four priority areas. The groups’ primary 
instrument of working (see Table 2.1 above) is via best practice reports, which is the 
‘output’ of each group. The reports contain recommendations, examples of best practice 
from the Member States, as well as some analysis (see more on this in chapters 7 and 8). 
 
2.6 2011-2014 WORK  PL AN AND PR IOR IT Y  A 
 
The Work Plans for Culture outline the EU’s strategic priority themes for the period 
concerned. The Work Plans are developed within the overarching Agenda for Culture 
(still considered the ‘baseline’ policy document for EU cultural action) in mind. The Plans 
contain priority areas and sub-priorities within them. Each sub-priority is assigned a 
jurisdiction; some are the provenance of the Member States, some the European 
Commission’s, and some are shared. The 2011-2014 Work Plan featured six priority 
themes (see appendix 2).
 
Within this there are ten OMC groups – three under Priority A , 
three under B, three under C, and one under D.  
 
Priority A  of the 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture is Cultural diversity, intercultural 
dialogue and accessible and inclusive culture. A ll of the themes in Priority A  are linked 
to wider objectives in both Europe 2020 and the Agenda for Culture. Because it is 
politically difficult for the EU to operate a cultural programme on cultural grounds, a 
theme which will be discussed throughout this thesis, culture is instrumentalised and 
expected to achieve other goals, often relating to social or economic aims (in the case of 
Priority A , this is often social inclusion). Priority A’s themes, as mentioned in chapter 1, 
are closely linked to what one might refer to as the citizenship and cultural identity aspects 
of cultural policies, which differs from the current dominant discourse of ‘the cultural and 
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creative industries’ (CCI; CCI policies often share more similarities with industrial 
policies [Pratt 2009b]). 
 
In order to address the ‘state of the union’ of Priority A’s themes, the subsections below 
give a brief outline of the themes of each OMC group. They are all wide, interdisciplinary 
topics and there is an extensive literature on each of them (as well as on closely related 
areas, such as the European public sphere and European citizenship). Space has therefore 
constrained the depth of the overview.  
 
2.6.1 Group 1: Better access to and wider participation in culture 
This working group, the first under Priority A , was tasked with identifying “policies and 
good practices of public arts and cultural institution to promote better access to and wider 
participation in culture, including by disadvantaged groups and groups experiencing 
poverty and social exclusion” (Council of the European Union 2010, p.3). According to 
the group’s final manual, 
“Policies for access and participation aim to ensure equal opportunities of enjoyment of 
culture through the identification of underrepresented groups, the design and 
implementation of initiatives or programmes aimed at increasing their participation, and 
the removal of barriers” (European Union 2012, p.7). 
 
Access to culture is a cultural policy concern across many countries worldwide among 
not only public administrations but arts and cultural institutions as well. Public funding 
for the arts and culture is also linked in many jurisdictions to plans for access and 
participation.  
 
The underlying assumption of the group’s work is that there are intangible social benefits 
associated with participation in arts and cultural activities.
39
 The report links the group’s 
work closely with social inclusion and social innovation, two ‘themes’ that permeated the 
EU’s justifications for intervention particularly through the earlier years of the new 
millennium: 
“Culture is a positive element that can facilitate social inclusion by breaking isolation, 
allowing for self-expression, supporting the sharing of emotions, and bringing a ‘soul’ to 
measures tackling material deprivation” (European Union 2012, p.12). 
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 For an overview of this debate, see Belfiore and Bennett (2007).  
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Greater access to culture leads, in the EU’s view, to more inclusive societies and more 
inclusive growth, a goal of the Europe 2020.
40
 
 
2.6.2 Group 2: Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue 
Priority A’s second group was responsible for identifying  
“policies and good practice in creating spaces in public arts and cultural institutions to 
facilitate exchanges among cultures and between social groups in particular by 
highlighting the intercultural dimension of the [sic] heritage and by promoting artistic 
and cultural education and developing intercultural competences” (European Union 2014, 
p.3; emphasis added). 
 
The basis for including such a subtheme can be found in the Agenda for Culture: 
“…  cultural diversity needs to be nurtured in a context of openness and exchanges 
between different cultures. As we live in increasingly multicultural societies, we need 
therefore to promote intercultural dialogue and intercultural competences” (CEC 2007, 
p.8). 
 
This extract from the Agenda for Culture exemplifies some of the biggest tensions in EU 
cultural policy, as discussed above. Is there a common heritage? If so, what is this built 
on? Both cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue need further unpacking and are 
discussed in turn below. These themes are, of course, combined in the group’s final report, 
with cultural diversity positioned as a precursor to intercultural dialogue. 
 
Cultural diversity 
The inclusion of cultural diversity in the Work Plan is based on the belief that “unity in 
diversity, respect for cultural and linguistic diversity and promotion of a common cultural 
heritage lies at the very heart of the European project” (CEC 2007, p.2).
41
 The OMC group 
took cues from UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) and the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(2005). They did not define diversity, but rather say that, 
“Cultural diversity implies the existence of common characteristics of a group of people, 
such as language, religion, lifestyle, artistic expressions, relations between men and 
women, young and old, etc. But cultural diversity is also present in the characteristics of 
each individual in modern society, [… ] it is a mix that everyone experiences in his life 
                                                          
40
 Other priority areas are associated with economic benefits. For example, Priority Area C, Skills and 
Mobility, is linked to all three of Europe 2020’s goals: smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. 
41
 There is a whole literature dedicated to the study of the political uses of cultural identity rhetoric in the 
EU, which space does not allow a thorough examination of (but see Delanty 1995; Shore 2000, 2006; 
Sassatelli 2002, 2009; Eder 2009, V idmar-Horvat 2012, and also chapter 3).  
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through meetings, travel or migration, reading, projects and examinations” (European 
Union 2014, p.10). 
 
According to ERICarts, “there is no uniform approach to implementing or interpreting 
cultural diversity in national policy frameworks and structures” (ERICarts n.d.).
42
 In some 
countries, cultural diversity is referred to as the openness and inclusion of third country 
nationals, while in others it means the acceptance and advancement of minorities within 
a country (for example the Basque in Spain). Finding common ground and meaning 
within such a broad theme and a large diverse group is a challenge, and, indeed, it is 
difficult to separate a discussion on cultural diversity from one on cultural identity/ies. 
Scholars studying European identity have long remarked on the contradictory nature of 
rhetoric found in various EU documents: unity, diversity, and unity in diversity. The latter 
has been a focus over the last decade or so, although, as discussed above, there is no 
official articulation of what this means or how to operates in practice. 
 
Intercultural dialogue 
The concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ has it genesis in the Council of Europe and its 
discourse is well-supported by international bodies such as UNESCO and the Council 
of Europe. ‘Intercultural’ arose from multicultural, which gained traction in the 1960s in 
North America and in the 1970s in parts of Europe. While multiculturalism is generally 
understood in terms of coexistence, interculturalism emphasises sharing, transfer, and 
exchange among cultures (Saez 2008).
43
 Saez (Ibid., p.14) argues that while 
intercultural dialogue was first recognised and promoted at UNESCO, the EU “gave it a 
special symbolic dimension showing a glimpse into what needs achieving in order to 
move from the preservation of cultural diversity to the meeting of cultures.”  
 
The definition of intercultural dialogue is notoriously prickly to pin down, and, like 
cultural diversity, can be interpreted in many ways. ERICarts defines it as,  
“a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange or interaction between 
individuals, groups and organisations with different cultural backgrounds or world 
views. Among its aims are: to develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives 
and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to 
foster equality; and to enhance creative processes” (ERICarts 2008, p.13). 
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 To compare countries’ approaches to cultural diversity, see: 
http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/cultural-diversity-policies.php [accessed 3 June 2016]. 
43
 For an example of indicators to measure national approaches to intercultural dialogue, see 
http://www.ericarts.org/web/files/131/en/intercultural_dialogue_indicators.pdf (Cliche 2004). 
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Meanwhile, Group 2’s report says that, “[b]eing intercultural means questioning the 
content of what one transmits, the works of art one puts up for display, and the memories 
and stories that education favours or disregards” (European Union 2014, p.10). Debates 
concerning intercultural dialogue often go deep to the roots of a nation’s identity and 
history, and are thus sensitive, normative, and political discussions. 
 
Intercultural dialogue is a fairly well-established concept in the European Union (see 
V idmar-Horvat 2012), particularly within cultural, communication, and education 
programmes and discourse, but its transposition into national policy varies considerably 
within Member States (for a now outdated but comprehensive overview, see Autissier 
2008). 2008, the official ‘European Y ear of Intercultural Dialogue,’ brought much 
spotlight on the theme, and the Commission has commissioned several reports, including 
a special Eurobarometer, on the topic since then (see, for example ERICarts 2008). 
V idmar-Horvat (2012, p.31) argues that since 2006, “[b]y being placed on the 
intercultural dialogue’s agenda of combating the rise of racism, xenophobia and 
discrimination, the notion of cultural diversity was reformulated into a political tool for 
furthering social solidarity and cohesion on the home front.” Intercultural dialogue is thus 
positioned as a strategy, with associated networks and resources, to be harnessed for 
social and political advancement.  
 
2.6.3 Group 3: T he development of a competence in cultural awareness 
The final group in Priority A  was tasked with identifying “good practices for the 
development of this key competence and its integration into education policies” (Council 
of the European Union 2010, p.3). This group is a bit different from the other two, being 
first of all closely linked with education policy and secondly emerging out of a 
recommendation from the European Parliament (which traditionally has very little to do 
with the OMC) and Council of Ministers. Group 3 was listed under the 2011-2014 Work 
Plan but did not meet until March 2014, so it is also included in the current 2015-2018 
Work Plan. 
 
In December 2006, the Parliament and Council released their Recommendation on key 
competences for lifelong learning, which is based on the following rationale:  
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“As globalisation continues to confront the European Union with new challenges, each 
citizen will need a wide range of key competences to adapt flexibly to a rapidly changing 
and highly interconnected world. Education in its dual role, both social and economic, 
has a key role to play in ensuring that Europe's citizens acquire the key competences 
needed to enable them to adapt flexibly to such changes” (European Parliament and 
Council recommendation 2006, p.13). 
 
It sets out eight key competences, one of which is cultural awareness and expression,
44
 
defined as “[a]ppreciation of the importance of the creative expression of ideas, 
experiences and emotions in a range of media, including music, performing arts, 
literature, and the visual arts” (p.18). The group is tasked with creating a good practice 
manual for culture and education authorities at national and European level, a 
monumental task, especially for such a broad subject. It also builds on a previous OMC 
group’s work on developing synergies with education (June 2010). 
  
2.7 CONCL USIONS 
 
This chapter has contextualised the development of the European Union’s cultural 
competence, framed around the key theme of culture as a tool to promote deeper European 
integration (Shore 2000), as well as the development of the Open Method of Coordination 
as a tool of the Lisbon Strategy. The discussion has primarily focused on the development 
of the cultural competence since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in the 
history of EU cultural policy, and has discussed the various roles of the key European 
institutions as well as given an overview of the EU’s current programmes and actions in 
the field. In doing so it has also demonstrated the fragmented nature of EU cultural policy 
as well as its controversial nature as a supporting competence. The discussion in the latter 
part of the chapter on Priority A’s working groups’ topics links closely with the chapter’s 
opening section, which discussed the social and cultural construction of ‘Europe’ and 
‘European identity.’ The chapter has highlighted tensions in both article 167, outlining 
the EU’s competences in the field, as well as the notions of identity and diversity, which 
all of Priority A’s groups deal with directly. Incorporating insight from work on sociology 
and anthropology of Europe, it has also shown that by very definition there is an ‘us 
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 The others are 1) Communication in the mother tongue; 2) Communication in foreign languages; 3) 
Mathematical competence and basic competences in science and technology; 4) Digital competence; 5) 
Learning to learn; 6) Social and civic competences; 7) Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship. 
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versus them’ mentality built into the EU’s construction and that the precise definition of 
European identity is never explicitly defined by the EU. 
 
While this chapter has provided an historical overview of EU cultural policy, it has not 
addressed where the culture OMC sits within existing academic literature on the European 
Union or on cultural policy. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPT E R  3: SIT UAT ING T HE  
AR GUME NT AND R E V IE WING T HE  
L IT E R AT UR E   
 
 
“Europe is not just an economic project, but ‘a state of mind.’”  
Androulla V assilou (2013, p.36) 
 
 
3.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This chapter builds on reflections developed in the introduction and lays the foundations 
for this study by introducing relevant literature and situating the culture Open Method of 
Coordination within it. In doing so it also exposes the gaps in the literature and how they 
are addressed with this project. The chapter situates the research within the framework of 
European Union governance as well as cultural policy studies. As discussed in more detail 
in the opening chapter, this dual framing is essential in order for the research to be relevant 
to both public policy/political science and cultural policy scholars, the latter who may be 
coming from varied disciplinary backgrounds, the former who mostly will be unfamiliar 
with culture as a policy sector. 
 
The culture OMC can therefore be considered an interdisciplinary topic, and determining 
which literature to ‘start’ with is not immediately obvious; it fits as a part of the literature 
on European Union governance (or more specifically as a part of the study of non-
legislative modes of governance and policy coordination), as a part of policy coordination 
exercises more generally (within and outside of an EU context), as a subset of European 
Union cultural policy, or as a part of the study of cultural policy more generally. This is 
a multi-disciplinary challenge not only for the researcher but for the reader as well: the 
task is to find coherence in a subject that can be approached from a variety of academic 
perspectives. 
 
The chapter situates the research within the framework of EU integration and governance 
as well as cultural policy studies. It highlights the empirical gaps that the research fills, 
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including the lack of attention to cultural policy within the study of the European Union 
and the lack of focus on policy coordination measures within existing studies on EU 
cultural policy, as well as a more general theoretical gap of public policy approaches to 
the study of cultural policy, more particularly those focusing on topics of policy-making 
and day-to-day processes within cultural governance. This positioning builds up to the 
choice of a sociological institutionalism approach. 
 
The chapter is organised into three main sections. The first two position the research 
within two much larger bodies of work: that on European Union governance and that on 
cultural policy. Since both of these areas are such broad topics, they are broken down into 
relevant subthemes. Section 3.2 positions the research within governance and integration 
studies of the European Union (3.2.1) and non-legislative policy-making and the Open 
Method of Coordination (3.2.2). Section 3.3 situates this work within the disparate area 
of ‘cultural policy studies’ and discusses the field more generally before specifically 
addressing cultural policy from a public policy perspective. Finally, section 3.4 brings 
these two broader subject areas together and directly addresses cultural policy in the 
European Union, situating the study of the OMC within existing studies on EU cultural 
policy-making and programmes. 
 
3.2 SIT UAT ING T HE  R E SE AR CH WIT HIN T HE  ST UDY  OF T HE  
E UROPE AN UNION 
 
Scholars have been studying the supranational polity now known as the European Union 
since the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951. For political 
scientists, the main areas of inquiry have been questions of European integration and 
governance. The objective of this section is to situate the study of the culture OMC within 
the study of EU governance. 
 
3.2.1 T he E uropean Union: integration and governance  
The culture OMC fits within a small part of an expansive literature on EU integration and 
governance. A lthough there is a lot of overlap between these two areas, their analytical 
focus is slightly different: integration looks at how political matters are being transferred 
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to the EU whereas a governance perspective focuses on how everyday decisions are made 
by looking at decision-making processes. 
 
Until the 1990s, integration was the primary lens from which the EU was studied. It was 
dominated by two main approaches, supranationalism (also known as 
neofunctionalism
45
), pioneered by Ernst Haas (1958), and intergovernmentalism, 
associated with Stanley Hoffmann (1966) and Alan Milward (1984, 1992). These theories 
focused on how the Member States were theorised and conceived and how political 
matters were being transferred to the EU. The EU ultimately contains both 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalist elements and mechanisms of rule-making 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012); how one explains the theory of integration is where 
these theories have a much bigger role to play: while supranationalists posit that 
supranational institutions have “autonomous capacity to resolve disputes and to make 
rules” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012, p.20), intergovernmentalists believe that it is 
the Member States, bargaining and operating at an intergovernmental level according to 
domestic preferences, that control the agenda. 
 
In recent years, various scholars have ‘updated’ these grand theories. Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet (1998) have refreshed supranationalism with a strong institutionalist bend; for 
them, there are three important elements: that actors have transnational interests, that 
supranational institutions have autonomous capacity to change law, and finally that the 
rule system defines the polity. Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998), meanwhile, has 
expanded upon the original intergovernmentalism and argued that Member States’ 
positions can be traced to their national economic interests. In his ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism’ thesis, Member States aim to maximise their gains in negotiations.  
 
By the early 1990s, a ‘governance turn’ began to emerge alongside the study of EU 
integration. This occurred in response to the perceived inadequacy of the grand theories 
in explaining everyday decision-making, as well as an increased in Community 
competences and decision-making as a result of the Single European Act (K ohler-K och 
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 The name ‘neofunctionalism’ is so because of the functional spillover that happens when nation-states 
collaborate. 
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and Rittberger 2006).
46
 Governance, a notoriously difficult word to define (Rhodes 1996, 
2000), is here interpreted to mean the combination of the act of governing combining 
institutions, instruments, and actors: “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising 
control and coordination” (Rhodes 1996, p.653). In the case of the EU, argues Simon 
Bulmer, it is an appropriate term to use because “the EU represents governance without 
a formal government and it is not just concerned with formal institutions but can 
encompass procedures, norms, conventions and policy instruments as a core around 
which interest groups and other actors cluster” (Bulmer 1993, p.371). 
 
A  governance perspective moves beyond the integration debate and treats the EU as a 
political system that is neither a quasi-federalist state nor an international playing field. 
The focus is on the EU as a system of governance (Hix 1998, Eberlein and K erwer 2004): 
“First, [the governance turn] has an elaborate process dimension that explores the 
patterns, instruments and conditions of policy formulation and implementation and the 
diversity of actor constellations. Second, it reflects the different aspects of ‘system 
transformation’ (at both EU and national levels) and its likely impact on problem-solving 
capacity and democratic accountability” (K ohler-K och and Rittberger 2006, p.33). 
 
The turn ultimately represented “renewed interest in the impact of institutions, the role of 
ideas and the place of symbols, norms and rules in political life” (Rosamond 2000, p.189). 
Processes of day-to-day policy-making are the focus. The complexity of the EU, with 
decision-making including both internal and external networks (non-state actors) (Bache 
and Flinders 2004), is also taken into account.
47
 Scholars within this camp ultimately 
therefore argue that the emphasis on policy-making represents a “fuller account of EU 
politics” (Jupille and Caporaso 1999, p.440).  
  
3.2.2 Policy coordination and the Open Method of Coordination 
A subsection of the literature on EU governance focuses on policy coordination 
mechanisms, sometimes known as non-legislative or ‘new’ modes of governance. Policy 
coordination is one of five distinct modes of governance in the EU (Wallace and Wallace 
2007). There are key differences between modes regarding the actors involved, their 
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 In addition, both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism have been criticized by different camps 
for inadequately addressing the nuances, complexity, and sui generis characteristics of the EU (some also 
argue that the way the supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism debate is presented, often as a 
duality, is too simplified [Schneider and Aspinwall 2001]). 
47
 There are many ways to theorise actors and behaviour within the governance turn (see Zahariadis 
2013). This is addressed in more detail in chapter 3. 
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roles, in the approaches to policy dilemmas, in the policy instruments used
48
 (Ibid.), and 
most importantly in legal and treaty-based differences. Policy coordination involves non-
hierarchical relations, policy learning and deliberation, and “example rather than 
negotiation” (Ibid., p.350). 
 
A lmost as soon as the Open Method of Coordination was formalised in March 2000, it 
began to be the subject of academic attention. In the academic literature, the OMC has 
been called a tool, a method, a mode, an instrument, and a methodology, among others. 
The OMC exists in many policy fields and has been the subject of a vast number of studies 
over the years: “[t]he growing political salience, proliferation, and variety of OMC 
processes has elicited a bewildering array of contradictory assessments from both 
academic researchers and EU policy actors alike” (Zeitlin 2005a, p.22).
49
 Much of this 
scholarship is from the fields of political science and law. There is also a sectoral 
majority: the balance of studies have been on the original OMCs: social (O’Connor 2005, 
Pochet 2006, K röger 2008, Dawson 2009, Horvath 2009, Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009, 
V anhercke 2009, Armstrong 2010, Zeitlin 2010, Zeitlin, Barcevičius and Weishaupt 
2014), employment (de la Porte 2002, Regent 2003, Nedergaard 2006, Trubek and Trubek 
2005, Deganis 2006, Hartlapp 2009), and economic (Casey and Gold 2005, Pochet 2006, 
Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008, Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009). Other sectors have been 
studied too: see Criado 2009 and Harcourt 2013 on the information policy OMC; ter Haar 
and Copeland 2011 and Banjac 2014 on youth policy; Souto‐Otero, Fleckenstein, and 
Dacombe 2008, Normand 2010, A lexiadou, Fink-Hafner, and Lange 2010, Serrano-
V alverde 2015 on education policy; Begg 2003, Dasi 2007, Faludi 2007 on cohesion 
policy; K ay and Ackrill 2007 on social and cohesion; von Homeyer 2007 on environment; 
Prange and K aiser 2005 and Y oung 2012 on research policy; Ekengren 2006 on security 
policy; Caviedes 2004 and V elluti 2007 on immigration policy; and K aiser and Prange 
2004 and García Manjón 2010 on innovation policy. 
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 Terminology can be confusing. According to Borrás and Radaelli (2010, p. 12), “…  ‘modes of 
governance’ is a concept defining the general processes of policy-making (e.g., Community Method, or 
Open Method of Coordination), whereas ‘policy instruments’ is about the concrete tools that enfold those 
in particular mixes (e.g., regulatory practices, benchmarking, best practices etc.). Having said that, 
however, the distinction between both these concepts might be difficult to pin down in the day-to-day 
practice of policy-making.” 
49
 See also the now outdated OMC database compiled by the University of Wisconsin-Madison: 
http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/index.htm  
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Beyond sector-specific analyses, the OMC has also been the subject of other studies, 
many of which revolve around its properties as a method or tool of coordination that is 
based on non-hierarchical governance and civil society participation. V arious foci in the 
literature have included the OMC’s democratic legitimacy (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 
Büchs 2008, Smismans 2008, Borrás and Ejrnaes 2011, Borrás and Radaelli 2015); its 
origins in relation to the EMU (Schäfer 2004); its role in the governance architectures 
(Borrás and Radaelli 2011) of the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 (Zeitlin 2008, 2010); 
its use in national parliamentary debates (de Ruiter 2010); as a form of experimentalist 
governance (Zeitlin 2005c, Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, Zeitlin and Sabel 2010, Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2012); its prospects for policy learning (Nedergaard 2005, K erber and Eckardt 
2007); and its propensity as a soft law instrument (Zeitlin 2011).
50
 There are also Member 
State-specific analyses, but most of these are n=1 as opposed to comparative cases (for 
an exception, see K röger 2008). 
 
The OMC literature, diverse as it is, shares a few characteristics. First of all, discussions 
often take an implicit or explicit normative tone (K röger 2009), with opinion divided as 
to whether the OMC is ‘bad’ or ‘good.’ The second is that most of the literature aims to 
evaluate the OMC in terms of effectiveness, with ‘effectiveness’ most often 
conceptualised referring to national-level policy change. How this is done and according 
to what criteria differs, but many scholars are primarily interested in whether the OMC 
‘works’ as opposed to how it does. A  focus on civil society participation, a unique aspect 
of the OMC’s operation, is also apparent. Another characteristic is that some of the OMC 
literature lacks empirical detail (Borrás and Radaelli 2010), explicit theoretical 
positionings (Idema and K elemen 2006), and is not situated in time and place (Armstrong 
2010). This is significant because discussions tend to be decontextualised and micro-level 
details about the OMC’s day-to-day management and operationalisation left out. This has 
led to what Mark Dawson (2011) refers to as the need for a ‘third wave’ of OMC research 
which is engaged in empirical work and looks at the OMC’s effects at a micro level. 
Finally, much of the literature conceptualises learning, whether about ideas, policies, or 
procedures, as a positive and desirable outcome of the OMC (K röger 2009). (Learning is 
addressed separately in the next subsection). 
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 These categories are not mutually exclusive. They have been categorised according to their main focus, 
but many studies touch on more than one theme and/or Member State and sector. 
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Beyond these characteristics, the OMC literature is rather diverse, although Borrás and 
Radaelli (2010) have identified three main analytic perspectives in the study of the OMC 
into which most although not all work can be categorised. The first is the experimental 
governance lens (exemplified in Jonathan Zeitlin and Charles Sabel’s work referenced 
above). Here, the focus is on policy innovation, deliberation, and new ways of exploring 
policy solutions. The second perspective is principal-agent theory and looks at the 
relationship between the Commission and the Member States. The third perspective sees 
the OMC with a post-regulatory politics lens (Lodge 2007). While this research has 
elements of all three perspectives, it fits best within the experimental governance lens, 
looking at a wide range of possible outcomes of coordination and a comprehensive 
explanation of them (see chapter 8). The OMC thus operates in its ideal form as a 
“deliberative polyarchy” (Dorf and Sabel 1998, p.321, in Héritier 2001, p.5). 
 
One crucial factor to highlight in the study of the OMC is that OMCs in different policy 
fields have vastly different histories and degrees of institutionalisation. There is no such 
thing as ‘the’ OMC; rather, important differences exist in terms of compliance 
mechanisms, treaty bases, the nature of objectives (loose or strict), and the involvement 
of actors (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). There is a tendency to assume that the OMCs all 
operate in the same way when in fact ‘the’ OMC is a multitude of different processes in 
different policy fields. 
 
There are different methods of categorising the OMCs. One way is to separate them into 
‘large’ and ‘small’ OMCs – the former closely connected to governance architectures 
such as L isbon and Europe 2020, the latter “which are not explicitly or procedurally 
linked” to these strategies but “are nonetheless following a similar OMC philosophy and 
similar normative logic” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.49). According to this, economic 
and social OMCs would be large, and OMCs such as research and development, 
education, and culture, small. This categorisation has its weaknesses though, as 
boundaries of justifications and goals – the culture OMC, for example, is linked to Europe 
2020, but it has not received anywhere near the attention that the social or economics 
OMCs have.  
 
To more effectively categorise OMCs we must examine the reasons for policy 
coordination in the first place. There are a range of reasons why states may coordinate 
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policy (see earlier discussion in chapter 2 and Begg 2008), which indicates different 
logics of coordination (Armstrong 2010). Biagi (1998) distinguishes between 
coordination as cooperation and coordination as convergence. The former “works with 
the autonomy of states to define their policies but promotes elective and selective learning 
across states” (Armstrong 2010, p.41). This is indeed what we see in the case of the 
culture OMC, whereas most other OMCs promote convergent coordination. This is an 
important distinction as it influences the goals of the group, the way that success is 
evaluated, and indeed how policy learning (and change) is conceptualised. The culture 
OMC is an example of cooperative coordination and is therefore a looser type of 
coordination (along with, for example, youth policy [ter Haar and Copeland 2011]).  
 
Since part of this research involves the analysis of the roles of two key EU institutions, 
the European Commission and the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) 
within the operation of the OMC, it is important to situate this perspective within the 
OMC literature. As detailed above, the vast majority of the literature examines whether 
the OMC has worked, not how it works. A  focus on the OMC’s everyday 
operationalisation, the subjects of chapters 6 and 7, therefore means looking in-depth at 
the actors and institutions that are involved. 
 
While the European Commission has been the subject of numerous studies, this work 
mostly focuses on its role within the traditional Community method; this body of research 
has added valuable insight into the Commission and the way it works, most notably with 
regards to its agenda-setting powers. However, simply extrapolating this body of work to 
study policy coordination is not appropriate: the institutions do not have the same 
responsibilities and the products of coordination are legally very different to the 
traditional Community Method. Within the OMC literature, there is also a lack of 
empirical focus devoted exclusively to the Commission’s role (for an exception see 
Deganis 2006). It is sometimes often only mentioned in passing, typically in regards to 
its role of target monitoring and reporting (see, for example, de la Porte 2002, Nedergaard 
2005, Deganis 2006). There is also some work that has looked at the Commission’s 
coordination capacities more generally (see Jordan and Schout 2006). 
 
The situation with the Council of Ministers is similar. Much of the (small body of) 
literature on the Council focuses on its role within the Community method and focuses 
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on a few of its defining features: the multi-level nature of bargaining; the role of 
committees (Häge 2008), COREPER, and the comitology system; voting and 
representation; and the rotating presidencies. The most comprehensive empirically-rich 
study on the Council to date is Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace’s 2006 
volume.
51
 The authors lament the lack of academic attention to the Council and partially 
blame the lack of transparency of the body, as, with a few exceptions, activity in the 
Council takes place behind closed doors. To date there has been very little research that 
looks at the Council’s role within non-legislative modes of governance such as policy 
coordination (Puetter 2014). Again, within the OMC literature, the Council is usually 
referred to in passing as the body responsible for setting overarching aims and goals. 
 
The lack of focus on the EU institutions within the OMC literature is something that I 
address directly in my research, for several reasons. The first is that examining roles and 
actors moves away from the tendency to gloss over micro everyday aspects of the 
management of the OMC. Secondly, by studying these roles, we have a much better idea 
of the agenda-setting power dynamics within the EU. For example, there currently exists 
a debate in the literature on whether coordination in supporting policy areas, such as social 
and cultural policy, ‘empowers’ the Commission or takes away from it (see Puetter 2014; 
Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015). Some believe that the stronger intergovernmental 
position of the Council diminishes the Commission’s role whereas others comment that 
the Commission, despite the rising importance of the European Council, is still in the 
driving seat. Addressing these roles therefore enables contributions to wider debates 
about the dynamics of supranational agenda-setting. 
 
A  final angle to approach the OMC literature from is its treatment of policy learning.
52
 
Learning is an important part of the literature on non-legislative modes of governance and 
indeed the OMC because it is a desired outcome of coordination. The EU has been 
described as “a platform for learning and policy transfer” (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004b, 
p.372) and the study of policy learning, transfer, and change is now one of the major foci 
within the governance turn (see Schmidt and Radaelli 2004a and 2004b, Dunlop and 
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 Note that this volume is now out of date due to the ever-changing organisational and legal structure of 
the EU. It does not include changes made under the L isbon Treaty, the most important of which (for the 
Council) are changes in voting procedures from unanimity to Qualified Majority V oting, increased 
visibility of Council’s proceedings, and the “Trio” presidency system. 
52
 Theories of learning will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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Radaelli 2013, Citi and Rhodes 2007). This is largely because of the potential for 
diffusion and cooperation in a transnational environment (see Egan 2009). Within the 
OMC literature, learning is addressed both explicitly and implicitly, but often “without 
specifying its scope or questioning its utility – or even considering the conditions under 
which it might actually function” (Citi and Rhodes 2007, p.15). This is a weakness of 
some of the existing literature, which tends to evaluate outcomes without explicitly 
discussing learning (for exceptions, see Nedergaard 2005, K röger 2008, Zeitlin 2011). In 
order to overcome this I have made learning a key point of analysis. With the OMC, 
learning is a deliberative process that is cooperative and reflexive. It also done in a 
collective setting. Ultimately, learning is a highly complex process “affected by 
organizational resources, institutional structures and the dispersion of authority, the logic 
of membership and the logic of access, and whether the policy mandate is statutory, 
advisory or deliberative” (Egan 2009, p.1246-7). Thus, while learning is present but 
implicit in much existing research on the OMC, within this research it is explicitly 
addressed.  
 
3.3 SIT UAT ING T HE  R E SE ARCH WIT HIN T HE  ST UDY  OF 
CUL T UR AL  POL ICY  
 
The next task in situating my research is to explain how it relates to existing work on 
cultural policy. I do this is in two categories. First of all, I look at an overview of the field 
and discuss one of the main approaches to cultural policy, that from a critical cultural 
studies lens. I then contrast this approach with the one I adopt, a public policy perspective. 
 
3.3.1 Cultural policy studies: an overview 
Cultural policy studies is an interdisciplinary and imprecise area of study, encompassing 
approaches from a variety of disciplinary angles such as cultural studies (Bennett 1998, 
Miller and Y údice 2002, Lewis and Miller 2002, McGuigan 2004), sociology (Hall, 
Grindstaff, and Lo 2012; O’Brien 2014) political science (see below), economics 
(Throsby 2000, 2010; Hutter and Throsby 2008), urban planning (Landry and Bianchini 
1996, Schuster 2002, Bloomfield and Bianchini 2004, Wood and Landry 2008), and many 
others (for overviews, see Scullion and Garcia 2005 and Gray 2010). There is also 
sometimes overlap between these disciplinary approaches as well as some cultural policy 
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research that does not explicitly position itself within a particular academic discipline. 
Separating the research disciplinarily is therefore only one way to categorise it but I have 
done it in this chapter in order to impose some order on this vast body of work.  
 
Cultural policy research is interested in many questions; in particular, some of the major 
themes over the past ten years have included the impacts of the cultural and creative 
industries (Garnham 2005, Pratt 2005, Galloway and Dunlop 2007, Cunningham 2008, 
Hesmondhalgh 2012), the social impacts of culture and the arts (Belfiore 2002, Belfiore 
and Bennett 2007), cultural heritage (Hoffman 2006, Pyykkönen 2012, V an der Auwera
 
2013, Falser 2015), culture and urban regeneration (Pratt 2009a, Grodach and Silver 
2013, Stevenson 2014), the connections between cultural policy and cultural identity 
(Craik, Davis, and Sunderland 2000; Mercer 2006), cultural value (Holden 2006, O’Brien 
2010, Warwick Commission 2015), cultural labour (Gill and Pratt 2008, Ross 2009), and 
cultural diplomacy (Nisbett 2013; Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015). 
 
Within these thematic areas there is a great deal of methodological and theoretical 
pluralism, largely stemming from disciplinary cleavages. Each discipline has its own 
theoretical approaches, definitions of culture and cultural policy, goals, and ontological 
and epistemological assumptions; there are no agreed-upon definitions or approaches 
within cultural policy studies, which is also marked by a strong applied research tradition. 
This wide range makes cultural policy an area of study “predicated on competing (and 
sometimes contradictory) audiences, purposes and even academic traditions” (Scullion 
and Garcia 2005, p.122), but an intellectually rich one. It is both the discipline’s biggest 
challenge and advantage: the field lacks an agreed-upon set of theories and 
methodologies, but this leaves room for its scope and development as well as the 
incorporation of insight from a variety of perspectives (Gray 2010).  
 
The study of cultural policy is mired by a number of distinct challenges, such as problems 
with definition, causality, measurement, attribution, and questions related to the degree 
with which governments should be involved in the sector (Gray 2009). This is not to say 
that other policy sectors do not share the same challenges, but these, coupled with 
culture’s small budget and perceptions of its relative unimportance as a policy sector 
(Littoz-Monnet 2007, Gray and Wingfield 2011) make it an unconventional area in the 
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wider field of policy studies. Indeed “the foundations and aspirations of research in this 
field remain unclear to many” (Scullion and Garcia 2005, p.113).  
 
Do these varying perspectives converge anywhere that we might be able to make 
comments about them, given the plethora of definitions of culture and cultural policy 
(Gray 2010)? Cultural policy studies, 
“draws on the social sciences for both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies 
and to articulate its social and economic role, its models of application and territorial 
difference. From the arts/humanities it draws on history and historiography – to 
understand policy making in the past and influence its future development and 
implementation – as well as cultural studies, from which come a concern with sign, 
representation and identity and, indeed, definitions and experiences of culture and its role 
in society” (Scullion and Garcia 2005, p.122).  
 
The categorisations are not necessarily as clear-cut as Scullion and Garcia make them out 
to be because there are overlaps in these two research traditions. (Moreover, this 
polarisation can discourage the cross- and interdisciplinary dialogue needed to further 
refine the parameters of the field). As Gray (2010) shows, cultural policy scholars 
ultimately differ in three main ways: in how culture is defined, in how cultural policy is 
understood, and in what methodologies are used to investigate the research question(s). 
Space constrains what I am able to offer in terms of the main views within the variety of 
approaches. For this reason I have decided to contrast one main disciplinary approach – 
cultural studies – with that of my own, which is informed by theories in the discipline of 
public policy, discussed below. 
 
A  cultural studies approach to cultural policy is concerned with “examining cultural 
practices from the point of view of their intrication with, and within, relations of power” 
(Bennett 1992, p.23): there is usually an overt political and critical agenda (Miller and 
Y údice 2002, McGuigan 2004), reflecting the discipline’s concerns with critiquing 
hegemonic influences in society. This perspective is “driven by the major strands of neo-
Marxist, structuralist, poststructuralist and postmodern thought, which treat film, the arts, 
media and communication, as well as lived, everyday culture” (Cunningham 2003, p.14).  
 
Within the discipline, there has been an ongoing debate concerning the nature of and 
degree to which cultural studies should engage with policy, and where it fits within the 
field. Prior to the 1990s, “questions of policy had previously been largely absent from 
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both theoretical discussions about cultural studies and programmatic statements made on 
its behalf” (Bennett 1998, p. 5). The debate,  mostly played out in Australian, British, and 
American discussions (O’Brien 2014), was a response to a disciplinary attitude in 
(British) cultural studies not to study policy: 
[p]ractical engagement with a politics of culture, including policy analysis and policy 
formulation, however, has been restrained… , due perhaps to an excessive critical purity 
and a suspicion of becoming involved with regulatory processes (McGuigan 2003, p.23).  
 
 
Broadly we can divide the main positions into two camps – an engagement with 
government (Tony Bennett) versus a critical approach (J im McGuigan) (O’Brien 2014). 
Bennett, in an extension of Foucault’s (1979) concept of governmentality, argued that 
cultural studies should take a more active role in the formation of policy. In the 
introduction of his 1998 book, he states that, 
“… a cultural studies that does not take account of the varying and complex forms in 
which culture is managed and administered in modern societies will be considerably 
impoverished in terms of both its historical understanding and it theoretical capacities” 
(Bennett 1998, p.4).  
 
McGuigan sees this activist stance defined quite broadly as power in the sense of 
“disputation over cultural issues” (McGuigan 2004, p.5). His position is that cultural 
analysts must continue to probe into the wide-reaching echelons of power and cultural 
control, particularly in the context of neoliberalism. 
 
Cultural studies has added vast and sophisticated theoretical frameworks to the study of 
cultural policy as an object (Colebatch 2002). However, what is neglected from this 
approach is attention to policy as processes - policy-making and formulation, or, in other 
words, policy before it appears in its ‘final form.’ It is not enough to study what is already 
there. This perspective involves asking questions such as, who creates policies and under 
what circumstances? What is the division of power within and between levels of 
government? How are policies negotiated and managed? These questions still concern 
the politics of cultural policy but concentrate on the structure, practices, and process of 
governance and administration; in other words, how (and why) policy is made, which is 
done in specific organisational and institutional environments. They can be answered with 
insight from public policy theories, moving away from the presumption that policy-
making is a rational process and accounting for the messiness of politics and policy-
making. 
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3.3.2 Cultural policy from a public policy perspective 
Culture is an under-researched policy sector in the fields of political science and public 
policy. Writing of the cultural industries, Pratt (2005, p.31) asserts that cultural policies 
“sit uneasily within the public policy framework.” Why is this? Possible reasons include 
an argument that culture is a symbolic policy area with little impact. Another is the 
proliferation of controversial debates surrounding involvement and the degrees to which 
governments should support culture and the arts. Finally, culture is seen by many as 
intangible, subjective, and elusive, and it presents numerous methodological challenges 
in quantification and determining outcomes (Selwood 2006). It is also an area that usually 
does not represent a large percentage of government budgets. It is perhaps for these 
reasons that culture has been largely ignored in mainstream public policy analyses. 
 
However, one of the goals of this research is to illuminate the ways in which cultural 
policy has something to offer policy scholars. Studying public policy is the “examination 
of the creation, by the government, of the rules, laws, goals, and standards that determine 
what government does or does not do to create resources, benefits, costs, and burdens” 
(Birkland 2005, p.5). As David Throsby comments, 
“political scientists, economics and self-styled ‘policy analysts’ … have studied processes 
of cultural production and consumption, the collection and interpretation of cultural data, 
and the purposes and mechanics of government involvement with the arts and culture in 
order to draw theoretical and applied conclusions, both positive and normative, 
concerning the practical administration of cultural policy in the contemporary world” 
(Throsby 2010, p.232). 
 
The essence of politics is about who gets what, when, where, and how. As a policy sector, 
culture is no different in this respect. But culture, like any sector, also has its own 
peculiarities. Culture is an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956), meaning that there 
are numerous definitions of the word and any of them can be plausibly argued for or 
against. As a policy sector culture is often viewed as symbolic, elusive, and imprecise. 
But investigating how this manifests itself in policy – and the justifications governments 
give for intervention – is a rich area of exploration for policy scholars. For analysts 
interested in policy evaluation, cultural policy also presents many challenges regarding 
evaluation as its outputs are difficult to quantify (Selwood 2006, Warwick Commission 
2015). Finally, cultural policy is often intertwined with notions of cultural identity 
(Mulcahy 2006), which deserves closer analysis because of its symbolic role in 
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citizenship and political legitimacy (Habermas 1989, Shore 2000, Delanty and Rumford 
2005), raising important questions on the intermingling of political goals and the 
treatment of culture and cultural issues by policy-makers. Simply put, the cultural is 
political: “[c]ultural politics make salient issue of identity and expression, inclusion and 
exclusion, voice and silence, and the power of symbols” (Singh 2010, p.2). 
 
From a public policy perspective, studying culture is not necessarily about defining it, but 
knowing that how a particular government conceptualises culture (and/or the arts) will in 
part shape the types of policies that it implements (Bell and Oakley 2015).
53
 Gray’s 
definition is a useful one: cultural policy is “the range of activities that governments 
undertake – or do not undertake – in the arena of ‘culture’” (Gray 2010, p.222). This, in 
turn, “can also be seen to provide an image of the underlying values and/or ideologies 
that governments support, and are certainly the product of political choices amongst a 
range of potential forms and levels of support that governments can provide” (Ibid., 
p.222-3). While this definition may be regarded as narrow by some, it reflects public 
policy definitions used in other sectors. 
 
The existing body of work that looks at various aspects of cultural policy from a political 
science/public policy perspective is rather wide-ranging.
54
 For example, in the US, this 
work has looked the arts and public policy (Mulcahy and Swaim 1982; Mulcahy and 
Wyzsormirski 1995; Cummings and K atz 1987a).
55
 In the UK , at governance issues in 
museums and galleries sector (Gray 2011, 2015; McCall and Gray 2014), the state’s role 
in cultural policy (Gray 2000, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2011), democracy and cultural policy 
(Gray 2012), and commodification in arts policy (Gray 2007). In Canada, cultural policy, 
labour, and identity (Paquette 2012a), neoliberalism in provincial cultural policy 
(Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2010), mentoring and change in arts institutions (Paquette 
2012b), colonialism in Canadian cultural policy (Paquette, Beauregard, and Gunter 2015), 
and provincial cultural policy and policy analysis (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2008, 2011; 
Gattinger, Saint-Pierre, and Gagnon 2008), and cultural citizenship (Andrew et al. 2005). 
In the Nordic context, Anita K angas and Geir V estheim have made contributions, looking 
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 Of course, ‘culture’ is rarely defined so straightforwardly by policy-makers (Stevenson, Rowe, and 
McK ay 2010). 
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 This is not an exhaustive list but aims to highlight some of the main scholars and works in the area. 
55
 Again, categorising by country is only one such way of doing so. 
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at Nordic cultural policy (K angas and V estheim 2010) and the ‘who’ of cultural policy-
making (V estheim 2012). In supranational context, contributions from Annabelle Littoz-
Monnet (2007, 2012, 2015) have examined agenda-setting and framing in EU cultural 
policy. 
 
A  strand of Clive Gray’s work has looked at the ontology and methodology of the study 
of cultural policy (Gray 2010, 2015). This work is valuable because it clearly 
acknowledges the disparate approaches to the subject. Gray is also explicit about the 
advantages of a ‘generalised’ public policy perspective: the use of “features of policy that 
have been developed within the larger public policy field may be more helpful as these 
are concerned with policy as policy, rather than with the specificities of individual policy 
sectors” (Gray 2012, p.4) and most characteristics of policy-making apply across all areas 
of public governance. The objective of using political theory is to leverage the advanced 
theoretical work that has been done in the discipline, and apply this knowledge to the 
cultural policy sector. K nowledge accrued through studying policy processes can 
therefore aid in influencing policy (how can you influence it if you do not know who it is 
made by and how?). 
 
J im McGuigan writes that “[c]ultural policy, from the point of view of cultural and media 
studies, is about culture and power” (McGuigan 2004, p.5). The same could be said about 
a political science/public policy perspective: the making of policy is an inherently 
political process because politics is about who gets what, when, why, and how. In their 
2002 Cultural Policy, Miller and Y údice explain that they position themselves “within 
the committed norms of cultural studies rather than the objective claims of orthodox 
policy research” (p.5), and are concerned with theory, history, and politics, rather than 
efficiency, effectiveness, and description. Similarly, Rothfield (1999, p.2) claims, 
“To study policies, we imagine, is to deal with measurable aggregates rather than 
aesthetic particularities; costs and benefits rather than pleasures and values; objective 
facts and figures rather than subjective experiences and meanings; institutions rather than 
texts or images – at least that’s the way we like to think about what ‘they’ do versus what 
‘we’ do.” 
 
These passages read true for anti-rational choice and anti-behaviouralist perspectives, 
both of which have their roots in neoclassical economics and tend to prize parsimonious 
explanations from a rationalist ontology. However, there are many different perspectives 
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within political science and public policy theory – critical ones, even – that are rooted in 
a long history of political theory. Interpretivist and constructivist approaches are enjoying 
a revival in policy studies (see chapter 4) and offer more comprehensive explanations of 
the policy process and its analysis.  
 
Ultimately, cultural policy research is an interdisciplinary and multifaceted field. Each 
disciplinary approach brings with it its own strengths, weaknesses, and gaps. The 
challenge is to situate cultural policy research within a tight theoretical framework, 
something that, especially in the case of an interdisciplinary approach, is not always 
straightforward. While cultural policy is a relatively ignored topic in public policy studies, 
the theoretical frameworks of the discipline are useful in helping to understand the 
dynamics of the policy process. 
 
3.4 SIT UAT ING T HE  R E SE ARCH WIT HIN T HE  ST UDY  OF 
CUL T UR E , CUL T UR AL  POL ICY , AND T HE  E UROPE AN UNION  
 
The final literature to discuss is that on cultural policy and the European Union, which 
combines the two larger surveys outlined above. To think about ‘culture’ and ‘European 
Union’ brings to mind innumerable themes, from big questions on European identity, to 
sociological constructions of Europe, to the narrower remit of specific cultural 
programmes administered by the EU. In addition, as Langen (2010, p.26) notes, the work 
on “EU cultural policy” encompasses a very broad notion of what might be considered 
‘cultural,’ showing once again the difficulties of where cultural policy stops and where 
other closely related areas, such as education and communication policy, begin. In both 
the study of cultural policy and the study of the EU, EU cultural policy is a marginalised 
area of study.  
 
The objective of this section is to situate my research on EU policy coordination within 
the existing literature on EU cultural policy. This body of work encompasses a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives including politics, sociology, anthropology, and law. This 
section is separated into three subsections which serve to outline where the majority of 
the literature to date has been concentrated. The first looks more generally at cultural 
policy beyond the nation-state. The second, 3.4.2, reviews the literature on cultural policy 
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and identity and European integration. Finally, 3.4.3 looks at narratives of EU cultural 
policy.  
 
3.4.1 Cultural policy beyond the nation-state 
Before I address the EU specifically, it is worthwhile to pause to think about the 
development of cultural policy analyses that move beyond the methodological focus of 
the nation-state (Beck and Sznaider 2006). This has traditionally been the most common 
level of analysis of cultural policy, due to the relationship between culture, cultural 
identity, and political legitimacy and its symbolic association with nation-building, 
stability, and boundary-marking (in both a literal and metaphorical sense). This historical 
relationship between citizenship, sovereignty, and nationalism helps us to understand the 
nature of governments’ interventions in this field (Flew 2005). Cultural features, 
including language policies, education, and media, are indeed crucial to understanding 
nation-states and their societies (Schudson 1994, in Flew 2005). In an extension of Jürgen 
Habermas’ work, K alberg (1993, in Shore 2001, p.108) notes that the cultural foundations 
of modern citizenship are civic responsibility and social trust. Both of these, in turn, 
“depend upon the sense people have of belonging to a political community” (Shore 2001, 
p. 108). From a historical standpoint, cultural policy has “constantly affirmed and re-
affirmed, produced and reproduced, the deepest and most embedded sense of the nation 
and the national: what is inside and what is outside, the borders” (Mercer 2006, p.1). 
 
Moving beyond this methodological nationalism raises interesting questions about 
territory, identity, and governance. While the nation-state is still the most dominant locus 
of identity and thus cultural policy, the role of the European Union and other 
supranational institutions is becoming increasingly important. The influence of 
international cultural policies, such as those of United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of Europe, while not legally binding, 
is increasing due to interdependence and the ‘transnationalisation’ of governance – 
activity that cuts across traditional territorially-bound societies and forges links between 
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government and society.
56
 Their importance is evident in terms of setting standards and 
creating and sustaining discourse.
57
 
 
3.4.2 Cultural identity and E uropean Union integration 
As discussed in chapter 2, cultural policies in the EU “cannot be understood outside of 
the wider context of the political project for European integration” (Shore 2001, p.107). 
There is also considerable overlap with the complex notion of European cultural 
identity.
58
 As these discussions showed, the development of the first Community cultural 
actions in the 1970s and 1980s and the formal introduction of culture as a Community 
competence were closely, formally, and explicitly linked with a desire to deepen 
European integration (Delanty 1995, Shore 2000, Fossum and Schlesinger 2007): 
… it is this sense of being part of a European culture which is one of the prerequisites for 
the solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market - and the resulting radical 
changes in living conditions within the Community - is to secure the popular support it 
needs (CEC 1987, p.5). 
 
Even in the study of the most minute cultural programmes or processes, this link to 
integration cannot be forgotten. 
 
As such, the idea of ‘Europe’ can be considered an elite-driven project. Symbols such as 
the flag and anthem were ‘invented’ with the purpose of achieving a closer union in order 
to garner more political support for the ‘project’ of European integration (Shore 2000). 
Europe is indeed a contested concept – it is an idea as much as reality, and is not 
something that is self-evident (Delanty 1995). As per the discussion in chapter 2, we can 
think of it as an imagined community (Anderson 1991) with invented traditions and 
symbols (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). It is an “interpretation of community: a fantasy 
homeland that goes hand in hand with a retrospective invention of history as well as a 
moralisation of geography” (Delanty 1995, p.8). This discussion is closely linked with 
the ideas of a European public sphere and European civil society, often associated with 
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 This is part of a broader trend moving from government to governance (Stoker 1998) and the hollowing 
out of the state (Rhodes 1994), whereby government has moved away from centralised control to de-
centralised governance in regions, as well as to non-departmental agencies. 
57
 In addition, forms of cultural identity in a globalised world are very fluid; modes of self- and group-
identification are no longer confined to the realm of the nation-state. Beck and Sznaider (2006, p.6) argue 
that, given globalisation, establishing a “convincing contrast” between two homogenous units is no longer 
possible. 
58
 Here I do not address all works on European cultural identity, of which there are many (for an 
overview see Sassatelli 2009, p.25-39, and Bourne 2015), but rather those that are explicitly linked to 
cultural policy (see Bonet and Négrier 2011). 
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the work of Jürgen Habermas. For Habermas (1989, 2012), a public sphere is about space 
for talking and communicating, and it is a key element of democracy. In the case of the 
European Union, a public sphere is challenging because of linguistic diversity and the 
absence of EU-wide media (Schimmelfennig 2012); the EU’s public sphere is indeed 
“largely a national sphere” (CEC 2006, p.4), hence the perceived need by European elite 
to ‘invent’ traditions to increase popular support for integration (Shore 2000). This has 
led Gerard Delanty to argue that ‘unity in diversity’ is an idea(l) driven by the political 
elite: “… when the idea of Europe emerged as a cultural idea it became associated with 
structures of power and [elites’] identity projects” (Delanty 1995, p.16).
59
 
 
Contributions on European identity come from a range of fields, but are particularly 
strong from anthropology and sociology. A  number of these focus on the contradictory 
nature of ‘European identity’ articulated in policy – unity, diversity, or unity in diversity 
(Shore 2001, 2006, Mokre 2007, Sassatelli 2009, Nӓss 2010). Shore has studied 
representations of identity in EU cultural policy and has published on the dualism of 
identity discourses and its problematisation (Shore 2001, 2006).
60
 He has also written 
about culture being used instrumentally as a mechanism to further integration (Shore 
2000). On a similar topic but taking a different approach, Monica Sassatelli’s work has 
examined the concept of European identity from a sociological lens (with a particular 
focus on the notion of its creation and rhetoric in the European Cities of Culture program) 
within the broader context of Europeanisation (Sassatelli 2002, 2006, 2009). Sassatelli 
approaches identity as that created through the ‘peoples’ of Europe within established 
programs.
61
 Philip Schlesinger (2007) has explored the relationship between cultural 
identity and the European public sphere, arguing that nations and regions remain 
“crucially important” (p.424) as locations of debate and identity. Meanwhile, Monika 
Mokre’s work (2003, 2007) has looked at the notion of cultural democracy and its 
application to the EU case; she argues that the EU should be focused on encouraging 
conceptualisations of identity that are plural and dynamic, rather than a unified approach. 
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 Consider this: “The public sphere is a central feature of modern society. So much so that, even where it 
is in fact suppressed or manipulated, it has to be faked” (Taylor 1995, p.260, as quoted in Fossum and 
Schlesinger 2007, p.1). 
60
 The contradictory nature is emphasized in varying approaches to European cultural identity: unity, 
unity in diversity, or simply diversity (Shore 2001). See also the short essay by Picht (1994) on diversity 
and European cultural identity. 
61
 Methodologically, students of EU cultural policy from a public policy perspective can learn a lot from 
both Shore and Sassatelli’s work. Their use of interviews in particular highlights the richness that this 
method can bring. 
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While this body of work is strong in articulating the various ways that the EU has co-
opted the discourse on European identity over the years (the content of policies), in 
general it has not been as strong on the processes by which these narratives came about, 
nor on specific programmes and how they may (or may not) contribute to narratives of 
EU identity. 
 
3.4.3 Narratives of E U cultural policy 
The second major area of concentration in the literature has been narratives of various 
aspects of EU cultural policy, although this is a diverse categorisation and body of work. 
Until recently, a holistic picture of EU cultural governance was difficult to find (see 
Psychogiopoulou 2015a and Mattocks 2017).
62
 This is perhaps due to the intense 
fragmentation of the competence which has translated into a variety of different academic 
approaches. To better categorise the interventions, I have divided them below into 
agenda-setting, framing, and historical progress; legal perspectives; and those on specific 
programmes and actions. 
 
Agenda setting and historical progression 
Several scholars have examined the origins and general development of EU cultural 
policy (see also chapter 2). Forrest (1994) and Sandell (1996) have examined how the 
culture competence came into being, while Annabelle Littoz-Monnet has looked at the 
role of the French government (2003) and agenda setting and power relations within the 
competence since Maastricht (2007, 2012, 2015). The period around the Maastricht treaty 
also produced some ad hoc commentary on the notion of European cultural policy and 
what its future involvement might be (see Duelund 1992, Picht 1994), while Littoz-
Monnet has studied the Education and Culture Directorate-General’s agenda setting 
dynamics and shown that by strategically framing debates in terms of economic gain, the 
DG has brought increased attention to what was previously a small inconsequential policy 
area. Her work has been valuable because it has been one of the few to study the 
innerworkings of the DG (see also Shore 2000). 
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 It should be noted that this applies to English-speaking academic work only. The EU’s cultural policies 
have received a lot of attention in the French-speaking world. See, for example, Forrest (1987), Doutriaux 
(1992), Esmein (1999), and Granturco (1999). 
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Legal perspectives 
A  second category of scholarship on EU cultural policy comes from the field of law, from 
which there have been several interesting and valuable contributions. Culture has 
attracted attention from legal scholars in part because of its unique constitutional position 
and in part because of the role of the European Court of Justice in further defining the 
parameters of the competence (Craufurd Smith 2004a). This work is useful because – as 
the EU is governed by its treaties, by its very nature as a supranational body – 
understanding culture’s legal place is essential for any scholar looking at EU cultural 
policy, irrespective of their discipline. Craufurd Smith’s 2004 edited volume, for 
example, is an excellent overview of culture’s place in legal terms and a good starting 
place. Chapters in this volume explore where exactly culture sits legally and also look at 
the role of the European Court of Justice. Another area that has received some attention 
from the legal field is ‘cultural mainstreaming’ (article 167.4), the incorporation of 
cultural concerns into other areas of EU policy (see Craufurd Smith 2004b, 
Psychogiopoulou 2006, and on culture in EU external relations specifically, Isar 2015). 
Legal contributions have contributed a lot to understanding the role of the treaties and the 
limitations of the competence. 
 
Specific programmes and actions 
From chapter 2, we know that the EU is involved in a variety of different programmes, 
some prominent ones with long histories, such as the European Capital of Culture, some 
small and recent, such as the European prizes in architecture and film. Perhaps 
surprisingly, specific programmes and actions have actually not received much attention 
within the literature on EU cultural policy (Langen 2010), although that is starting to 
change. 
 
In terms of supplementary measures, the emphasis by far has been the European Capital 
of Culture, which, has been the subject of rather a lot of attention over the past couple of 
decades years (see, generally, Myerscough 1994; Palmer-Rae Associates 2004; Garcia 
2005; Sassatelli 2002, 2008, 2009; Garcia et al. 2013; Patel 2013a, 2013b)
63
 – not 
surprising given its prominent symbolic position and long history in comparison to other 
programs. Much of this literature, among other goals, is critical of the program’s bold 
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 These sources offer general commentary and overviews but see also city-specific analyses of the 
programme. 
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claims, as the ECOC has suffered from unclear justification and purpose, resulting in 
varying and ambiguous outcomes since its inception. Economic and social benefits are 
now a key element of the programme, and there is some evidence that hosting the cultural 
year can lead to strategic investment and development of infrastructure that may not 
otherwise have taken place (Garcia 2005, CEC 2010b). Some of these issues transcend 
EU cultural policy in general, but given the highly fragmented nature of the EU’s 
involvement in the sector, this work cannot be said to be emblematic of EU cultural policy 
as a whole. 
 
Another supplementary action is audiovisual policy. Traditionally this has been treated 
as slightly separate from cultural policy as it has had a different historical development – 
having, in the initial days (the 1980s), been much easier to justify from an economic and 
competition policy perspective (Harcourt 2006). The literature also reflects this gap, as 
‘audiovisual and media policy’ have typically been studied separately from EU cultural 
policy (see Collins 1994, Wheeler 2004, Harcourt 2006, Sarikakis 2007a, and Erickson 
and Dewey 2011). Much of the focus of this work is the Television Without Frontiers 
directive (TWF), established in 1989 and amended in 2007 to the ‘audiovisual media 
services’ directive (DIRECTIV E 2010/13/EU) and the impacts these policies have had in 
the Member States. 
 
Over the past fifteen years, supporting programs and actions have begun to receive more 
attention. European heritage, for example, is an area of growing importance for the EU 
(see Calligaro 2013, Lähdesmäki 2014). The EU promotes annual heritage days
64
 (started 
by the Council of Europe and co-organised with that body since 1999) and also has its 
own heritage label.
65
 Another important area of focus is the EU’s cultural funding 
programmes (see K andyla 2015 on the current one, Creative Europe). The impact of these 
funds is only just starting to emerge, so this is a growing area of study. 
 
The EU’s coordinative and communicative measures are still a growing area of study. 
This includes Structured Dialogue, which exists to foster exchange between the cultural 
sector and the EU via a series of transnational platforms and a biennial Culture Forum 
(Ecorys 2013, L ittoz-Monnet 2015); the Open Method of Coordination (see 
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 http://www.europeanheritagedays.com/  
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 http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/actions/heritage-label/discover_en.htm  
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Psychogiopoulou 2015b); and other transnational networking building and support. These 
initiatives are not as promoted nor are they as visible – they often take place behind closed 
doors – and it is perhaps for these reasons that they have not received much scholarly 
attention. They are also relatively new areas of involvement for the EU. However, the EU 
plays a key role in coordinating all of these initiatives, as well as distributing and 
disseminating information. As part of its dialogue with the sector, the EU even supports 
a transnational network of experts, the European Expert Network on Culture (EENC). 
According to its website, the group “contributes to the improvement of 
policy development in culture in Europe, through the provision of advice and support to 
the European Commission in the analysis of cultural policies and their implications at 
national, regional and European levels.” The Commission has also undertaken or 
commissioned a large number of studies about various issues relating to the cultural sector 
and cooperates with other European networks on information dissemination and 
networking. These activities are important to study because they illuminate power 
dynamics within both the everyday management of these initiatives as well as the broader 
picture of where the initiatives fit within European integration. 
 
3.5 CONCL USION: FIL L ING T HE  GAPS 
This chapter has shown the multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional nature of the study 
of the culture Open Method of Coordination. The culture OMC does not neatly fit into 
one particular box; rather, it is multi-faceted, with several ‘ways in’ from different 
disciplines and perspectives. This means that carving out tight theoretical and 
methodological frameworks are necessary.  
 
This chapter first situated the OMC within the broader contexts of the study of European 
Union governance. This demonstrated how policy coordination is different to legislative 
modes of governance, as coordination is voluntary and deliberative in nature. In order to 
overcome several of the weaknesses of the current literature on the OMC, I place primacy 
on situating the culture OMC in time and place and moving beyond a normative tone (the 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ OMC) and looking specifically and structures and actors within the 
system. Finally, the emphasis in evaluating outcomes is learning – placing learning at the 
forefront of analysis means that findings reveal who is learning, what is being learned, 
and under what conditions might learning be most ‘successful.’ 
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Section 3.3 located the study of the culture OMC within the literature on cultural policy. 
This is a disjointed ‘field’ marked by a great deal of theoretical and methodological 
pluralism. However, comprehensive in-depth knowledge of exactly how cultural policy 
is made and who it is made – a governance focus – is in general lacking in the literature. 
These questions are important ones, not only for the discussion of cultural policy in a 
supranational and global context, but also to deepen the understanding of the EU in 
cultural terms. The focus on the everyday, seemingly mundane tasks of policy 
coordination actually sheds light into where power lies in the system (Deganis 2006), 
what the competing positions and roles of various actors within policy coordination are, 
as well as how the institutional design of the OMC influences its outcomes.  
 
This research therefore addresses a ‘double gap’ in the literature: as the chapter shows, 
EU cultural policy has been left out of much of the work on the European Union and 
within the study of cultural policy itself. In addition, cultural policy as studied from a 
public policy approach has been a neglected theoretical perspective that is worthy of 
much more attention. Moreover, within existing literature on EU cultural policy, policy 
coordination has been side-lined for more visible aspects of the Commission’s activities. 
Coordination does not explicitly involve making policy; rather, the EU is as the facilitator 
of cooperation among Member States (and the sector). It is important to study not only 
because of its potential outcomes but also to more firmly determine the EU’s role in this 
cooperation.  
 
The next step is to outline a theoretical approach enables us to makes sense of this 
complex topic. This is the subject of chapter 4. 
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CHAPT E R  4: T HE OR E T ICAL 
FR AME WOR K S: AN APPR OACH TO 
ANALY SIS  
 
 
“EU policy-making is very messy because it is characterized by heavy doses of 
complexity. This is not to say that national policy-making is not messy, but rather 
the complexity of the EU renders policy-making difﬁcult to understand.”  
Nikolaos Zahariadis (2013, p.810) 
 
 
4.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline a theoretical approach to analysing the culture 
Open Method of Coordination. This project investigates two different aspects of the 
OMC: first, how it is organised and how it operates, and second, the outcomes of 
coordination. The overall aim is therefore to “reveal deeper understanding of processes 
occurring at the everyday level” (Ripoll Servent and Busby 2013, p.9). As such, the 
complex and multifaceted nature of the OMC requires a clear and robust theoretical base 
to make sense of what is going on. The chapter develops an approach rooted in 
sociological institutionalism theory, an established theoretical framework in the study of 
the European Union and public policy more generally. An institutional approach focuses 
on “the rules, norms and values that govern political exchanges” (Stoker and Marsh 2010, 
p.4) and it enables in-depth exploration of actors, roles, processes, and institutions. 
A longside this, the chapter also introduces two complementary theoretical frameworks 
that work with institutionalism to explain certain characteristics of European Union 
governance and the OMC: multi-level governance (MLG) and a constructivist approach 
to collective learning. 
 
The framework outlined in this chapter can be thought of as a ladder, with each ‘step’ 
(section) building on the foundations of the previous one. The chapter proceeds as such. 
Before I tackle the specific approach adopted in this work, section 4.2 first discusses 
theoretical pluralism in the study of policy and politics more generally. Section 4.3 then 
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outlines an institutionalist approach rooted in an interpretivist ontological perspective. It 
introduces sociological institutionalism as the backbone of the theoretical framework, 
starting with an overview of institutionalism and then going specifically into the 
sociological variety, including the main debates within it. Section 4.4 then tackles the 
theoretical approaches to the European Union, focusing specifically on situating 
institutional perspectives within the study of the EU. It also introduces multi-level 
governance as a complementary framework that helps to answer some of the questions 
that are specific to EU governance. Finally, section 4.5 brings together the discussion and 
looks at how the processes and the outcomes of the OMC are evaluated in this project. 
This section makes use of theories on learning from a constructivist perspective. 
 
4.2 PL URAL ISM AND T HE OR Y  
 
Before I delve into a theoretical discussion, it is worthwhile to briefly reflect on pluralism 
in the study of politics. There are many ways of ‘doing’ political science and policy 
studies. Stoker and Marsh (2010) put this down to the “complex, contingent and chaotic” 
(p.1) nature of politics itself, and argue that because of this it is not surprising that such a 
plurality of approaches exists.
66
 In the same vein that there is no one ‘general’ definition 
of ‘the political’, there is no one general way to study public policy. Rather, there are 
what one might term general approaches and subsequent further theories within these. 
Each theory has its own concepts, premises, variables, foci, and assumptions (Cairney 
and Heikkila 2014) and “contains a different logic of explanation and assigns different 
weight to relevant factors” (Zahariadis 2013, p.810). To explain what happens in the 
policy process, which is inherently complex, one needs to place emphasis on certain 
things and not others. This is a give-and-take dilemma: “[g]iven that we must simplify a 
complex world to understand it, which elements do policy scholars treat as crucial to 
explanation?” (Cairney and Heikkila 2014, p.364).  
 
One obvious ‘faultline’ is the divide between rationalist and constructivist explanations. 
As previously stated, the ontological position that this work adopts is 
constructivisit/interpretivist, which can be roughly defined as the view that reality is 
                                                          
66
 Of course, political science is not alone in this (Abbott 2001, in Stoker and Marsh 2010). 
87 
 
socially constructed.
67
 This perspective argues that individuals’ views are informed by 
political, social, and cultural factors (Furlong and Marsh 2010). This is in contrast to 
foundationalism, which posits that there is a “real world” which exists independently of 
one’s knowledge of it (Furlong and Marsh 2010); subscribers to this ontological position 
believe in objective and absolute truths.  
 
The advantage of a constructivist approach is the focus on 
“[t]he crucial role played by the contextualization of processes, i.e. the fact that they are 
embedded in a certain social, political or economic context, based on an important 
number of variables that cannot be reduced to a simple linearity between interests and 
outcomes, advocated by constructivist approaches, leads to a rather detailed research 
protocol and precise statements on policy processes” (Saurugger 2013, p.901). 
 
A constructivist point of view therefore holds that “social norms and frameworks on 
which reality is based are constructed and redefined through permanent interaction” 
(Saurugger 2013, p.890). In a sociological institutionalist perspective, institutions 
themselves are social constructs (Parsons 2010). A  constructivist approach thus more 
widely accounts for social elements and a wider set of influences rather than just 
presupposed choices or positions. 
 
Ultimately, there are many ways to explain politics and policy. This chapter provides one 
such account, based on informed choices and rooted in clear ontological and 
epistemological positions. 
 
4.3 AN INST IT UT IONAL IST  APPR OACH T O POL ICY  
COOR DINAT ION 
 
The term new institutionalism was coined by political scientists J ames March and Johan 
Olsen in their 1984 article, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
L ife.” A long with rational choice theory and behaviourism, new institutionalism (NI) is 
one of the main theoretical approaches in the study of political science and public policy. 
Whereas the former two view political outcomes as products of aggregate individual 
choice, institutionalism examines how and to what extent individuals’ behaviour is 
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constrained and enabled by structural factors. In their seminal work, March and Olsen 
(1984, p.738) differentiate their perspective from rational choice and behaviouralism 
theories by arguing that “political action is inadequately described in terms of rationality 
and choice.” NI’s premise is that institutions – defined as formal and informal rules and 
stable, regularly occurring patterns of behaviour – are the most important part of political 
life and that “seemingly neutral roles and structures actually embody values (and power 
relationships), and determine ‘appropriate’ behaviour within given settings” (Lowndes 
2010, p.65). The dynamism of the relationship between structure and agency is therefore 
at the heart of institutionalism.  
 
The origins of the so-called ‘new’ institutionalism go back to the development of post-
World War II political science. Students of politics have always been interested in 
institutions (Steinmo 2008); until the 1950s, “institutionalism was political science” 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p.1; emphasis in the original). Much of this early work in 
the field centred on the legalistic analysis of institutions, voting procedures, legislations, 
and executives. What is now sometimes referred to as ‘old’ institutionalism tended to be 
mostly descriptive in nature and was not primarily focused on theory. There also was 
little, if any, emphasis placed on informal institutions – unwritten rules and norms. The 
1960s and 1970s saw a departure from this towards a move to explain who governs and 
on what interests they act upon. This period was marked by the development of actor-
centred approaches, which in part emerged out of a need for quantifiable and measurable 
‘results’ if political science was to be taken seriously as a science. These theories were 
based on microeconomic theories of the rationality and utility-maximisation of 
individuals. What is now known as new institutionalism, in turn, developed out of a 
backlash to the rise of these models. The study of institutions had “come around again” 
into mainstream political science by the 1980s (Lowndes and Roberts 2013).  
 
Rather than one unified theory, new institutionalism is better thought of as an overarching 
term for many different approaches. Depending on whom one asks, there are at minimum 
three and potentially up to eight or nine different variants.
68
 The three most developed 
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 These are rational choice (Ostrom 1990, North 1990), historical (Hall 1986; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; 
Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Pierson 2004; Steinmo 2008), sociological (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991), discursive/constructivist (see Schmidt 2008, 2011), feminist (see K rook and Mackay’s edited 
volume, 2011 and Mackay, K enny, and Chappell 2010), empirical (see Peters 2012, ch.5), international 
(see K eohane 1989), and network (see Ansell 2006). Some scholars, such as Peters (2012) identify the 
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strands are rational choice, historical, and sociological. The strands differ in several 
fundamental categories, most notably in how an institution changes and how agency is 
conceptualised.
69
 Cairney (2012) helpfully suggests that the differences in variants is not 
so much to do with major contradictions, but to the relative attention given to certain 
factors.
70
  
 
There are some shared features between the variants. In general, institutions are 
acknowledged to be formal and informal; stable and dynamic; and constraining and 
enabling. Firstly, whereas ‘old’ institutionalism was exclusively devoted to physical 
institutions such as legislatures and courthouses (using organisation and institution 
interchangeably), the ‘new’ version has a broader interpretation and includes informal 
rules and norms. Informal institutions are those that may not be written down or 
formalised in any way, but are still followed (‘habitual actions’ [Thielemann 1999, 
p.401]). Secondly, describing institutions as stable yet dynamic seems contradictory, 
however, institutions do change – it is the contexts and processes of change that are of 
most interest to institutional scholars. Change can be conceptualised in two main ways: 
exogenously, referring to ‘shocks’; or endogenously, referring to the agency of actors in 
both creating change but also maintaining stability through repetitive behaviours 
(institutionalists believe that political systems are complex and open to influence from 
both internal and external sources, not closed and predictable [Hay 2002]). Finally, 
individuals are both constrained by institutions but through agency are also creators of 
change. Institutions are constraining in three respects: formally, through rules and 
sanctions; informally, through practices, repeated behaviours, and norms; and narratively, 
through spoken stories or symbolism (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). However, agents are 
also empowered by institutions and thus are have some “reflexive and strategic 
capabilities,” enabling them to learn and adapt (Ibid., p.44). In addition, institutions are 
not ‘accepted’ at face value – as was the case with old institutionalism; rather, values and 
power relationships are viewed critically (Ibid.).  
                                                          
institutionalism of March and Olsen (1989) as normative, but for the purposes of this particular research 
this is subsumed into the sociological strand. 
69
 March and Olsen (2006, p.4) argue that approaches to institutionalism differ in terms of the 
understanding of (a) “the nature of institutions, as the organized setting within which modern political 
actors most typically act; (b) the processes that translate structures and rules into political impacts; and (c) 
the processes that translate human behavior into structures and rules and establish, sustain, transform, or 
eliminate institutions.” 
70
 For an excellent analysis of institutionalism that moves beyond the strands, see Lowndes and Roberts 
(2013). 
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The theoretical framework for this project takes its cues from the work on institutional 
theory pioneered by V ivien Lowndes and colleagues (Lowndes 2010, Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013). This ‘third-phase institutionalism’ moves beyond pitting strands of 
institutionalism against each other and is a robust theoretical discussion of what unites, 
rather than divides, institutionalists. Lowndes’ work addresses head-on the tension 
between inductive and deductive approaches. She suggests a continuum, a constant re-
definition of the two ‘poles’; this “requires the researcher to reflect at regular intervals on 
the relationship between the two and respond sensitively to what they are finding in any 
particular context” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p.20). This approach stresses the 
importance of “a dialogue between theory and evidence” which the analyst must be 
constantly be renegotiating (Hay 2002, p.47). It “puts limits on knowledge claims” 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p.21) in the sense that the researcher is looking not for the 
truth, but a theoretically-rich explanation. A  clear ontological position is thus essential. 
 
4.3.1 Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism (SI) is one strand of new institutionalism.
71
 It originated in 
the study of organisations in sociology, most commonly associated with Philip Selznick 
(1957)’s work in the 1940s and 1950s.
72
 Selznick and his associates examined values and 
meaning within organisations and it is from this standpoint that the perspective began to 
evolve in a political science context. It is also closely associated with March and Olsen’s 
work, typically considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the reorientation towards institutions in 
the 1980s. While some scholars including Peters (2012) call March and Olsen’s work 
normative institutionalism, and name it so due to their emphasis on the importance of 
norms, many other subsume them within the sociological strand, which is the position I 
have also adopted. 
 
Sociological institutionalism ultimately 
“comprises a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent 
variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties 
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 This conceptualisation of sociological institutionalism is that which is used in the disciplines of public 
policy and political science. These have their origins in sociology, but are distinct from the sociological 
study of organisations as well as, more generally, sociological theoretical studies of of the EU (see 
Parsons 2010). Sociological positions are not analogous to constructivist ones, though they do share some 
similarities. 
72
 Selznick’s ideas in turn have their roots in the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. 
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of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct 
consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p.8) 
 
In SI, an institution is defined as both formal and informal cultural conventions, norms, 
cognitive frames, and practices. This is a somewhat broader definition than other strands 
of institutionalism because it includes influence from wider social and cultural contexts. 
Individuals are not presupposed to have self-serving desires and goals but rather act 
according to social norms, which are “culturally specific practices” (Hall and Taylor 
1996, p.14). Agency is ascribed to institutional norms rather than actors’ maximising their 
individual preferences: “institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what 
one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given 
context” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p.15). This is known as the logic of appropriateness, 
which says that there is an unspoken, implicit understanding of appropriate behaviour 
within institutional settings (March and Olsen 1989). Acts are thus interpreted as socially-
meaningful. Individuals accrue their values through membership in formal or informal 
institutions. Actors are thus not assumed to be fully rational but rather bounded: 
membership in an institution provides the context of appropriate behaviour. 
 
Sociological institutionalists believe institutional creation and change to be culturally-
specific phenomenon that has to do with enhancing social legitimacy. Institutions are 
“built through social processes rather than merely by rational intention or mechanical 
reproduction” (Jenson and Mérand 2010, p.82). Institutions can also be a pattern of social 
relations, “which can be competitive, oppositional and characterized by unequal power 
relations” (J enson and Mérand 2010, p.82). There are also varying opinions on 
institutional change within sociological institutionalism, ranging from the proliferation of 
professional communities and organisations and the isomorphism of behaviour to 
interactive processes of discussion among individuals within an organisation. The idea 
with the latter is that discussion stimulates ‘cognitive maps’ of solutions (based on 
institutional appropriateness) which in turn creates new rules (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
p.17).  
 
The main theoretical premises of sociological institutionalism are therefore: 
 An institution is defined as a collectively understood norm, routine, or rule. 
 It is institutional norms and values that explain behaviour – the logic of 
appropriateness. Individuals make conscious choices, but these will be 
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constrained by norms. Institutions “give order to social relations, reduce flexibility 
and variability in behaviour, and restrict the possibilities of a one-sided pursuit of 
self-interest or drives” (March and Olsen 2009, p.8). 
 Institutions are not static. With regard to how they change, this is a combination 
of factors over time that is predicated on learning and gradual adaptation. Actors 
also are able to act as change agents, seeking change based on appropriateness. 
The idea of change due to “historical efficiency” is rejected.  
 
4.3.2 Institutionalism debates 
As mentioned above, there are two main debates within institutionalism. The first 
concerns the role of agency and the second how institutions change. These will be 
discussed briefly in turn with a focus on setting out how the debates are treated within the 
sociological strand. Ultimately, “the most interesting puzzles lie at the nexus where 
structure and agency intersect” (Checkel 2001, p.62). Taking the lead from several 
scholars who wish to move past the structure versus agency debate, my focus is on 
understanding how they work together (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, Ripoll Servant and 
Busby 2013): 
“… if we accept that actors are engaged in a dialectic relationship with institutions, then 
what we most frequently observe in politics are the interactions between actors who are 
attempting to ‘square the circle’ of contemporary mixed motivational demands from the 
past” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p.13). 
 
I thus conceptualise the relationship between structure and agency as relational, not 
separate (Ripoll Servant and Busby 2013), taking into account formal and informal 
institutions. This moves away from a binary approach of either-or (J enson and Mérand 
2010) and also takes into account changes in attitudes and ideas via a method of learning 
and exchange such as the OMC. 
 
Agency 
Agency is defined as “the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing 
so to attempt to realise his or her intentions” (Hay 2002, p.79). The role of actors is one 
of the biggest debates within institutionalism: what kind of role do individual actors play, 
and do they act on their preferences or not? Human behaviour is complex and so too is 
theorising it. Whereas a rational choice perspective argues that individuals act according 
to their own preferences and seek change or stasis based on these, sociological 
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institutionalists see it as more complex than this; blanket rules and predictive behaviour 
can only go so far in explaining the diverse ways that humans act. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that “[t]here is a great diversity in human motivation and modes of action. 
Behaviour is driven by habit, emotion, coercion, and calculated expected utility, as well 
as interpretation of internalized rules and principles” (March and Olsen 2009, p.17). 
 
A  SI perspective on agency is guided by March and Olsen’s concept of the logic of 
appropriateness. In this perspective, individuals are not presupposed to have self-serving 
desires and goals but rather act according to social and cultural norms, seeking self-
definition and expression within a specific (social) context. Individuals are constrained 
by institutions in that they operate within and interact with them. To ‘act appropriately’ 
means “to proceed according to the institutionalised practices of a collectivity, based on 
mutual, and often tacit, understanding of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good” 
(March and Olsen 2009, p.4). Institutions thus “define a set of behavioural expectations 
for individuals in positions within the institution and then reinforce behaviour that is 
appropriate for the role and sanction behaviour that is inappropriate” (Peters 1999, p.30). 
There must be sanctions if behaviour is not followed; these may be formal, such as a 
disciplinary procedures, or informal, such as desocialisation from a peer group.  
 
To take forward the debate on the relationship between structure and agency, I employ 
the concepts of embedded agency (Ripoll Servent and Busby 2013) and the logic of 
practices (J enson and Mérand 2010), which link the notion of appropriateness with social 
norms and organisational practices. These concepts are rooted in sociology but have been 
used in the study of EU governance. Embedded agency can “unveil hidden processes and 
particular biases in the formulation and development” of policy (Ripoll Servent and 
Busby 2013, p.14), and produce fuller, more comprehensive understandings based on the 
inclusion of wider contextual elements in explanations: “[r]ather than focusing on 
whether and how much influence is exerted, more attention should be paid to how actors 
exert influence.” Influence, A’s ability to change B’s course of action, without threats, is 
therefore defined separately from power (Ibid.).  
 
This focus takes the logic of appropriateness even further, into a logic of practices. This 
approach places more emphasis on agency than some sociological perspectives do. 
Agents are conceptualised as “conscious and reflexive actors embedded in a given 
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(institutional and indeed social) context” (Ibid., p.6). They choose actions based on fit 
and appropriateness within a setting, which are based on social norms and thus grounded 
in a social context. This leads to the concept of change agent, an important one in the 
context of the OMC. Actors are not conceptualised as blind ‘rule followers’, but rather 
adopt strategies which are seen as appropriate. These in turn become routines that are 
reproduced in organisations (March and Olsen 1989). The extension of the logic of 
appropriateness to the logic of practices thus takes into account the importance of socially 
constructed roles influencing preferences, more so than individuals’ own preferences 
(From 2002). This thus overcomes one of the critiques of the SI perspective that actors 
simply ‘blindly’ following rules without thinking.
73
 
 
How institutions change 
A second debate within institutionalism is how actors create and change institutions. As 
Peters (2012, p.38) says, both relationships need to be made clear, or institutions will be 
“abstract entities.” However, change is a complex concept; even though nearly all major 
theories of the policy process incorporate some explanation of change, there is still a lot 
of room for theoretical and empirical advancement. Ultimately, change “is not likely to 
be governed by a single coherent and dominant process” (March and Olsen 2009, p.17). 
Sociological institutionalists believe change to be a culturally-specific phenomenon that 
has more to do with enhancing social legitimacy. This is to suggest that new practices 
may not be efficient or even functional (Hall and Taylor 1996). March and Olsen argue 
that organisations have a ‘garbage can’ of potential solutions to problems, and that in any 
given situation requiring change, actors pick from the ‘available’ choice in the garbage 
can. These choices are still norm-bound and institutionally-appropriate. 
 
As outlined above, the conceptualisation of agency I am using means that actors are not 
simply blind rule-followers but seek social and cultural legitimacy based on accepted 
practices. Change is therefore also associated with learning and change agents, as above, 
are able to adopt strategies to seek change based on appropriateness. According to 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013, p.129-130), change can be as the result of both endogenous 
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 ‘Precise’ prediction based on rule-following behaviour is not a feature of the SI or NI variants: “[w]hile 
rules guide behaviour and make some actions more likely than others, they ordinarily do not determine 
political behaviour or policy outcomes precisely” (March and Olsen 2009, p.10). However, (rule-driven) 
behaviour “associated with successes or survival is likely to be repeated,” whereas behaviour associated 
with failure is not (Ibid.). 
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and exogenous factors; gradual change can have ‘transformative effects’; and both change 
and stability are the product of agency. Taken together these go a long way in moving 
past the structure versus agency debate that has weighed down so much scholarship on 
institutions from all schools of thought. They argue that change and stability “must be 
understood simultaneously, not separately” (p.129). They place great emphasis on the 
temporal aspect of change; that is, that all change must be understood as relative and in 
the context of its political environment. In their cinematic analogy they cast the 
institutional environment as the background setting and the actors as the cast, “who are 
empowered and constrained in very specific ways by their institutional setting” (Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013, p.143). This is similar to the notion of embedded agency. Their final 
aspect is what goes on ‘offscreen,’ the exogenous aspects that can affect both shocks and 
gradual change. 
 
4.3.3 Sociological institutionalism’s critiques and weaknesses 
No theory can explain everything, and it is important to address the theory’s weak points 
in order to be clear on its limitations. One of the more straightforward criticisms is to do 
with terminology and the definition of an institution: if everything is an institution, what 
is an institution? The way around this is to use Peter Hall’s (1986) ‘standard operating 
procedures’ guideline: institutions should be viewed as rules that are agreed and generally 
followed, both implicitly and explicitly, by agents. This is a move away from a more 
anthropological “broader customs and habits” definition of institutions (Lowndes 2010, 
p.73), while still paying close attention to both formal and informal rules and 
behaviours.
74
 
 
A  second issue concerns the conceptualisation of power and strategy in politics. Some 
critics of the sociological variety (and indeed other strands of NI) argue that power is 
under-theorised in institutionalism, and, more specifically, that potential power clashes 
among individuals on the creation and change of institutions is not taken into account. 
However, this critique is somewhat unfounded, since institutions are not conceived as 
neutral; rather, they embody power relationships and give voice to some and not others. 
Institutions are structures of power in that by examining institutions we can see who 
controls them and where power lies in a particular setting. With regards to strategy, 
                                                          
74
 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.895) define norms as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors 
within a given identity.” 
96 
 
analytically, attention should be paid to the context within which strategic behaviour take 
place (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The concept of the logic of practices takes influence 
into account by outlining what is considered appropriate within a certain context; that is, 
based on appropriate norms and behaviour, some of which may be interpreted as 
strategic.
75
 Another concern is the claim that institutionalism neglects networking in 
politics. Politics is and has been influenced by a complex blend of internal and external 
actors, and it is important that this is taken into account. This is certainly an area that 
would benefit from being theorised in a more nuanced fashion, but can be incorporated 
into institutional analysis using insights from multi-level governance.  
 
A  final set of critiques of institutional perspectives are methodological in nature. These 
will be addressed more in the next chapter, but briefly outlined here. Since one of the 
main research questions of this thesis is how the structure of the OMC – how it is 
organised – affects its outcomes, it is important to be able to identify the institutions that 
make it up:  
“[t]he researcher claiming an ‘institutionalist’ approach needs to be sure that they are 
privileging institutions over other possible explanations of political behaviour, and indeed 
that they are able to identify clearly the institutions in question” (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013, p.199).  
 
How to recognise institutions is difficult, since institutions are invisible (Ostrom 1999). 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that researchers can only have indirect evidence of 
them; after all, like other political concepts such as motivation or interest, they are not 
tangible or measurable. The same authors say that while they cannot be seen, their 
evidence is everywhere and thus can be evaluated: “norms prompt justification for action 
and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998, p.892). These can be studied. Another methodological concern is that the logic of 
appropriateness is not falsifiable: “[t]here is no independent means of ascertaining 
whether it was values that produced behaviour, and no way of arguing that it was not the 
root of behaviour” (Peters 2012, p.45). Peters argued that as the theory cannot be 
disproved, there is no way of testing it. However, the objective in a sociological 
institutionalism approach, in line with constructivist epistemology, is not to make 
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predictions or blanket statements. It is rather to produce an in-depth theoretically-rich 
explanation of specific phenomena. 
 
At this point, I now turn to how we can apply a sociological institutional perspective 
specifically to the study of the European Union. 
 
 
4.4 T HE OR ISING POL ICY  COOR DINAT ION IN T HE  E UROPE AN 
UNION 
 
The objective of this section is to discuss how European Union governance, and more 
specifically policy coordination, is analysed from a sociological institutionalism 
perspective. It first briefly discusses the application of an SI approach to the EU, and then 
introduces a complementary theoretical framework, multi-level governance, which 
allows more analytical focus on the EU’s sui generis characteristics. 
 
4.4.1 Institutional approaches to E uropean Union governance 
Despite the increasing importance of EU policy-making in many sectors, a robust 
conversation on theoretical approaches to studying EU policy-making has only emerged 
rather recently. In an attempt to address this, a special issue of the J ournal of European 
Public Policy in 2013 was dedicated to this very topic, on the basis that “[f]rameworks 
dedicated to explaining EU policy remain for the most part theoretically underdeveloped 
and empirically incomplete” (Zahariadis 2013, p.809). The J EPP special issue 
represented the first systematic overview and comparison of policy frameworks as 
applied exclusively to analysing and making sense of EU integration and governance. It 
contained articles that addressed seven different frameworks, all with diverging 
ontological and epistemological groundings. Some models include those based on a 
rational choice or behaviouralist model of actors within the EU while others were based 
on constructivist approaches.  
 
In general, one of the biggest challenges in theorising EU policy-making is the sheer 
complexity and multi-level nature of the polity, and also that governance is sector- and 
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institution-specific.
76
 This is why there is no catch-all theoretical approach that will 
accurately explain everything that goes on in the EU: 
“the complexity of the EU policy process means that we must learn to live with multiple 
models and learn to utilize concepts from a range of models in order to help us describe 
it as accurately as possible” (Richardson 2006, p.25 in Zahariadis 2013, p.813).  
 
Institutionalism is a widely recognised theoretical lens from which to study the EU. In 
this account, institutions shape policy processes and policy outcomes. Institutionalist 
work has made distinct contributions to the study of the European Union and, with its 
focus on structure (and complex rather than parsimonious approaches to explain 
behaviour), it has been a favoured approach within the governance literature (Hix 1998, 
Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). Institutional approaches focus on routine procedures, 
rules and codes of conduct, and norms and values in everyday policy processes 
(Armstrong 2010). Typically, an institutionalist explanation does not attribute behaviour 
to utility-maximisation of individuals;
77
 behaviour is conceptualised as rather more 
complex than this and influenced by a combination of agential and structural factors 
within a specific institutional setting. It is important to keep in mind that 
“there is no single institutionalist explanation of the EU. ... Nevertheless, there is a 
common strand in these approaches: because the EU is so unique, with multiple actors, 
highly differentiated and changing preferences, and complex and uncertain outcomes, 
existing theories of preference-formation and strategic interaction, based on individual 
rationality in stable institutional settings, with perfect information about preferences and 
outcomes, can only ever provide limited explanations” (Hix 1998, p.48). 
 
One of the main advantages in an institutional approach to studying the European Union 
is that it is useful in “identifying diverging formal and informal decision-making rules at 
the national and the supranational level [and] can help to explain tensions in the 
relationship between the European, national and subnational actors” (Thielemann 1999, 
p.414). An SI perspective can thus help explain national preferences (as well as changing 
national preferences, via learning), Member State behaviour, informal rules and 
behaviours, vertical interactions in multi-level systems, and decision-making outcomes 
(Awesti 2007). One of the main challenges facing those who study the EU is how to 
explain how decisions are made and how preferences are formed (Checkel 2001). The 
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 ‘EU’ policy-making is in fact misleading, as there are so many different ways policy is made and so 
many different institutions involved in it. 
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 The exception is the rational choice strand of NI, which says that individuals maximise their own gain 
within a given institutional setting – the ‘rules of the game’ (Ostrom 1990). 
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advantage of an SI approach is that it is “a decision-making theory which includes in its 
analysis the ways in which preferences, beliefs and desires are shaped by participation in 
the decision-making process itself” (K erremans 1996, p.221, as quoted in Checkel 
2001).
78
 
 
An institutional perspective helps to explain actors’ roles and political outcomes, but as a 
general theory it does not specifically count for all of the sui generis characteristics of the 
European Union, in particular its multi-level nature, blurring the boundaries between 
domestic and international organisation. To help address this gap, I turn to a 
complementary framework within the study of the EU, multi-level governance (MLG). 
 
4.4.2 Making use of multi-level governance 
The concept of multi-level governance was developed initially by Gary Marks (1993), 
who used it in a study of the way the structural funds are allocated in the EU. MLG was 
a response to the “false boundary between the study of domestic and international politics 
in the EU” (Cairney 2012, p.163). Rather than a strict theory, MLG is a conceptual model 
to describe how the EU works. Its focus is the changing nature of boundaries and 
sovereignty between different levels of government – subnational, national, and 
supranational – and the challenges and changes in governance that this brings about. 
MLG’s uses and applications have evolved considerably since Marks’ initial paper (see 
Stephenson 2013). The concept has been used in relation to domestic federal systems as 
well but is one of the foremost approaches to studying the EU. Indeed, MLG has gained 
so much ground over the past twenty years that it used by the EU itself to describe the 
way policy is made. 
 
MLG has three main premises (Hooghe and Marks 2001). First of all, decision-making 
in the EU is more than bargaining among national governments – supranational 
institutions such as the European Commission exert their own influence (on the 
supranationalist-intergovernmentalist spectrum, therefore, MLG sits much closer to the 
former).
79
 The second premise is that this “involves a significant loss of control for 
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 For a comparison of rationalist versus constructivist analyses of decision-making in the EU, see Lewis 
(2003). 
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 However, this point is debated; Hooghe and Marks (2001) believe that MLG offers a move away from 
theories of integration, whereas others believe that this is a falsity and that MLG more supports a view of 
supranationalism (George 2004). 
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individual national governments” (Ibid., p.4). The final premise is that actors operate in 
both subnational, national, and supranational arenas and these are not nested but 
interconnected. Complex domestic relationships therefore extend to the supranational 
level, and the relationships within different levels of policy-making are contested 
(Piattoni 2010).
80
 Simona Piattoni’s (2010) work has brought more rigorous theoretical 
and empirical application to MLG. For example, she has developed a three-step ‘test’ to 
determine whether a policy area is multi-level ‘governed.’
81
  
 
Critics of MLG say that it is not a theory but merely an explanation – that it does not tell 
us anything new (for discussion, see George 2004). Using MLG does not, for example, 
shed any light why one decision might be made over another, nor does it explain why 
European integration happens. However, MLG is an effective way of explaining how 
decision-making occurs and how relationships are connected. The perspective enables 
researchers to address the complexities of diffused competences as well as the interactions 
between various levels of government (L ittoz-Monnet 2007). It is best approached as a 
characterisation and conceptualisation of EU governance in the face of “weakening state 
sovereignty” leading to many new challenges for nation-states (Piattoni 2010, p.1): there 
are changes and challenges that come about as a result of continuously changing 
sovereignty (Ibid.). Cultural policy embodies this multi-level nature perfectly: it is 
heavily guided by the principle of subsidiarity and the balance of power still rests with 
the Member States. In addition, it is also a policy area that tends to have large input from 
(or in some cases exclusive jurisdiction with) regional governments. 
 
4.5 ANAL Y SING T HE  OPE N ME T HOD OF COOR DINAT ION 
 
Now that the institutionalism and multi-level governance approaches have been outlined, 
it is time to apply these approaches directly to the analysis of the culture Open Method of 
Coordination. As touched upon in the previous chapter, much like the EU in general, there 
is no one ‘magic’ theory to explain the Open Method of Coordination. In fact, academic 
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 One of the ways that Piattoni (2010) distinguishes MLG from a networked governance approach is on 
this basis of consensus; she argues that in a networked governance approach, consensus is the glue that 
holds a network together. 
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 As a policy field, culture ‘passes’ the test. We find that (1) there are different levels of government in 
cultural governance; (2) non-governmental actors are also involved; and (3) that interrelationships can be 
non-hierarchical or defy existing hierarchies. 
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research on the OMC is marked by its variety of theoretical approaches; in their 2010 
literature review, Borrás and Radaelli identify at least eight different theoretical 
approaches that have been used to study it. Of 52 studies, five adopted a rational choice 
institutionalism approach and three an institutional approach other than the rational 
choice variety.  
 
The research questions for this project can be divided into two: those on process, 
including actors’ roles and organisational practices, as well as those on outcomes of 
coordination. This perspective is inspired by the need to create a richer, more 
comprehensive account of the OMC: 
“… policy coordination as ‘the OMC’ tends to be treated as a coherent entity with little 
attempt made to judge whether the different elements of the policy coordination 
architecture are fit for purpose; how well the elements interact; or what the relationship 
might be between seeking to strengthen ‘top-down’ substantive influences on the 
domestic strategic and policy environment, and seeking to enhance ‘bottom-up’ or 
‘horizontal’ mechanisms of accountability for the strategies states choose to follow. 
Detailed analysis of the intricacies, ambiguities and tensions within the policy 
coordination governance architecture was absent” (Armstrong 2010, p.288). 
 
This section therefore looks at a sociological institutional approach to 1) examining 
actors’ roles, both formal and informal, and the process organising and carrying out the 
OMC, and 2) examining the outcomes of the culture OMC with a focus on policy learning 
and mutual exchange. Both of these areas demand similar but slightly different theoretical 
tools. They are discussed in turn below. 
 
4.5.1 Analysing roles and process 
The first part of this study, the findings of which are presented in chapters 6 and 7, looks 
at the everyday operation of the OMC. This involves studying key actors’ roles as well 
as organisational and administrative practices, allowing for “a richer, more holistic 
picture of what happens day-to-day” (Ripoll Servent and Busby 2013, p.8). The 
theoretical backbone of this is a sociological institutionalism perspective on agency, 
outlined above. The chapters that look at roles and process therefore are theoretically 
framed around embedded agency, the logics of appropriateness and practices, and formal 
and informal institutions.  
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Analysing political processes involves looking at everyday procedures and actors’ roles. 
Theoretically this involves looking at the relationship between structure and agency. 
Actors are not blind ‘rule followers’ without agency, but adopt strategies which they view 
as appropriate, which, in turn, become routines that are reproduced in organisations 
(March and Olsen 1989). While institutional approaches emphasise rules – perspectives 
that assume self-interest and rationality tend to obfuscate the importance of rules and 
acting within them. In the logic of practices, socially constructed roles (which influence 
preferences) are an important theoretical factor (From 2002). With the concept of 
embedded agency, in which agents are understood as “conscious and reflexive actors” 
situated within a given institutional and social context, we can “think of them as choosing 
strategies which better fit or are most appropriate in a given setting” (Ripoll Servent and 
Busby 2013, p.6). This means that identities, attitudes, and role perceptions are intrinsic 
to social context, but that interaction can lead to a “redefined or expanded sense of self” 
(Lewis 2003, p.103) via learning. 
 
In addition, as one of the foci of the research project is the differences between formal 
roles, or what appears on paper and what happens in practice, informal institutions, which 
can “shape even more strongly [than formal] political behaviour and outcomes” (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004, p.725), are a key piece of the theoretical and empirical puzzle.
82
 The 
“policy-action relationship needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and 
negotiation” (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p.4; emphasis added), but this cannot always easily 
be captured by looking at formal institutions only. Indeed, ignoring informal aspects 
“risks missing much of what drives political behaviour and can hinder efforts to explain 
important political phenomena’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p.726). This gap between 
formal structure – the organisational ‘blueprint’ (Finnemore 1996, p.329) – and the day-
to-day goings on is one of the key target areas in studying informal institutions. It also 
demonstrates the value of ‘insider’ work showing what really goes on within 
bureaucracies. 
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 Christiansen and Neuhold (2012, p.4) distinguish between three types of usage: informal frameworks, 
informal processes, and informal outcomes. It is the second one that is of most relevance here. The 
framework within which decisions are made in the EU is a relatively formal one – it is elements of the 
decision-making processes that are key to understanding the institutional environment that there is not as 
much known about. 
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4.5.2 Analysing the OMC’s outcomes 
This subsection explains the theoretical frameworks used to make sense of the outcomes 
of the Open Method of Coordination (the subject of chapter 8). There is no agreement on 
the analytical tools to analyse the effectiveness of the OMC (Hamel and V anhercke 2009) 
and there are various approaches, from a variety of perspectives, as to how one might do 
so, involving a number of practical and conceptual concerns (Cairney 2012). Evaluating 
outcomes is a political activity.  
 
The conclusions of the March 2000 L isbon summit specify that the principal goal of the 
OMC is mutual learning (European Council 2000, para.37). I therefore focus on learning 
as a key analytical component and make use of theories of policy learning in a collective 
setting. While learning is taking place in a group setting, translating learning into 
outcomes depends on individual actors. So, although I am evaluating the system as a 
whole, the role of individual actors as outlined above is important. 
 
Much of the OMC literature has an implicit normative bias that learning is a desirable 
outcome (K röger 2009). However, the literature on ‘policy learning’ has exploded in 
recent years, and the term has come to mean an umbrella of many references in many 
different contexts (see Bennett and Howlett 1992, Freeman 2009, Dunlop and Radaelli 
2013). What is being learned? Who is learning, and why? How and when does it happen? 
It is present in one form or another in most major theories of the policy process. It is also 
a concept that is difficult to define, although “most accounts depict learning as the 
updating of beliefs based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction” 
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p.1). Beyond this, there is disagreement in the literature on 
who learns and how learning takes place, leading Dunlop and Radaelli (Ibid., p.2) to 
comment that “the field is struggling to produce systematic and cumulative knowledge 
on this topic.” 
 
There are two main ontological approaches to learning, one from a positivist tradition and 
the other from the constructivist. The latter conceives of policy as emergent; learning does 
not exist somewhere, but is “produced in the act of looking” (Freeman 2009, p.379). The 
advantage of constructivist approaches is that, in keeping with the epistemological views 
already outlined, constructivist explanations of learning allow for the changing of views 
through socialisation. Learning is a “process whereby actors, through interaction with 
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broader institutional contexts (norms of discursive structures) acquire new interests and 
preferences” (Checkel 1999, p.548). OMCs represent a “powerful learning instrument, 
insofar as they are expected to destabilise prior understandings of issues and thus lead to 
incremental changes via an ideational shift in framing policy problems” (de la Porte and 
Pochet 2012, p.340). Ideas, or “collective understands of social facts” (Béland 2009 in 
Saurugger 2013, p.891) help to construct the problems and frame basic assumptions 
(Saurugger 2013). K nowledge acquisition is therefore a socialised process “mediated by 
power relations” (Tucker 2003, in K röger 2004). In the OMC, learning involves multi-
level interaction among many different actors both horizontally and vertically. 
 
Both structural and agential effects must be considered in the analysis of policy learning 
and change. It is the structure of the OMC – how it is organised and run – that will in 
large part determine the conditions for learning; the environment must be “conducive to 
consensus-building and cost-sharing” (Börzel and Risse 2003, p.59) in order for learning 
to take place. This will impact upon how information is exchanged. However, experts 
from Member States also exercise their own agency. Experts therefore can act as ‘change 
agents’ who “mobilize in the domestic context and persuade others to redefine their 
interests and identities” (Börzel and Risse 2003, p.59). As de la Porte (2010, p.31) 
comments, “the OMC is effective only when actors use it.” 
 
The groups are composed of a diverse group of actors, each with their own professional 
norms, values, and systems of practice, heavily influenced by their membership in a 
domestic institution. The OMC meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. Actors are thus 
socialised in the first meeting into a particular context. For the majority of experts, it is 
their first time. This is where the multi-level nature of the OMC is important because first 
and foremost Member State experts will be ‘socialised’ by and familiar with their 
particular national political and administrative traditions, not the EU ‘way of doing 
things.’
83
  
 
Establishing norms early on is thus important both in terms of guiding behaviour (‘how 
should I act in this meeting?’) and the content of discussions – norms “provide actors with 
a particular understanding of their interests regarding a particular policy issue” 
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 The exception to this, of course, is experts who have participated in a previous OMC working group. 
This is discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
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(Thielemann 1999, p.402). Rules and norms therefore reduce ambiguity in a given 
context, and constrain and enable behaviour: an “institutional context can …  create 
expectation about what is considered ‘appropriate’ behaviour and legitimize particular 
categories of social actors” (Ibid., p.400). However, very quickly, the experts must learn 
to work together in order to complete the task they have set for them. This setting is 
largely determined by the Commission, as the OMC’s facilitator. A  highly 
institutionalised environment like the EU and in particular the OMC can be considered a 
self-policing environment, since “individuals who have become members have for the 
most part done so willingly, and may have even accepted the values of the institutions 
even prior to having joined” (Peters 2012, p.41).
84
  
 
Learning in a collective, intergovernmental setting 
The relationship between individual learning and collective learning is an area that the 
literature has grappled with. While theories of the latter are built on the former, it must 
be kept in mind that “collective decisions are not equal to the aggregate decisions of 
individual members” (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, p.486). Who ‘holds’ power and controls 
the learning process are questions that must be posed in any study of learning. In the case 
of the OMC it is particularly important because “the OMC not only sets a procedural but 
also a normative mechanism in motion, thereby advancing a particular vision of what 
appropriate policy is about, while other options are left out” (K röger 2009, p.12). It is not 
enough to discern power relations from treaties and law, or what is ‘on paper’; this “fails 
to offer a comprehensive account of the reality of the power games at play” (Deganis 
2006, p.33). 
 
Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) divide collective learning into process – comprised of 
acquisition, translation, and dissemination of information – and products, which are new 
shared ideas, rules, or policies. Acquisition refers to information being collected and/or 
received, which, importantly, is done through individuals. There are many mechanisms 
through which this happens, via formal and informal group dialogue (see Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2013, p.488-9). The second phase is translation, when new information is 
interpreted, translated, or applied to new contexts, and knowledge is created. Finally, 
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dissemination involves knowledge becoming embedded across a group, when individual 
learning is likely to spread across different members. 
 
 
F igure 4.1: Framework for Collective L earning 
 
 
Source: Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) 
 
 
It is also necessary to reflect on the OMC as a process within an intergovernmental setting 
such as the EU. The study of learning in the EU is on the rise (see for example Nedergaard 
2006; Bulmer et al. 2007; Egan 2009; Zito and Schout 2009; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, 
2016a), and this is particularly the case within the literature on ‘new’ modes of 
governance (Zito and Schout 2009). Indeed, “scholarly literature is trying hard to become 
more precise regarding conditions for learning” in the EU (Ibid., p. 1116), and this is a 
challenge because of the complexity of multi-level settings. The EU is an organisation 
ripe for learning because of its multitude of interactions between and among Member 
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States as well as its networked structure, but ultimately there is still debate in the literature 
as to the real potential of diffusion and transfer given the heterogeneity of national 
systems. 
 
Linking learning with outcomes 
Policy learning is closely linked with policy change (Zito and Shout 2009), a core 
competence of many studies of the OMC. This is not surprising given that the basic 
premise of the OMC – even though it is not always made explicit – is that Member States 
coordinate on certain themes, share ideas, and then ‘go home’ and implement some of 
them, based on the potential of policy transfer and lesson drawing.
85
 Many studies on the 
OMC make use of change extensively when analysing the results of the OMC, with 
‘visible’ policy change often the benchmark for ‘successful’ coordination. But how does 
learning theoretically link with outcomes? 
 
What options do Member States have when it comes to the outcomes of the OMC? In 
their 2010 report, Borrás and Radaelli outline different usages of the OMC: no usage, 
exploration, convergence, in combination with the Community Method, or ancillary 
(p.54). De la Porte (2010), meanwhile, distinguishes between downloading, where 
governments use OMC ideas and concepts, and uploading, which goes a step further than 
downloading and includes shaping of these concepts. Other scholars have come up with 
different ways of determining OMC effects. Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, p.203) for 
example distinguish between first order change, a change in policy instruments; second-
order, a change in policy objectives, and third-order, where “the core” of a policy 
paradigm shifts entirely.  
 
Another approach, and the one adopted in this thesis, is Jonathan Zeitlin’s categorisations 
of learning and change. Zeitlin’s approach is precise on the nature of learning and change 
and also captures a fuller range of outcomes than other models do. Zeitlin argues that to 
think about learning just in terms of measurable, ‘visible’ policy change is misleading 
and incorrect (indeed, as will be shown, if learning was thought of only in this way with 
regards to the culture OMC, it would more than certainly be viewed a failure). He has 
come up with three categories of OMC effects. The first category is substantive policy 
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change, which he has further broken down into 1) changes in national policy thinking 
(cognitive shifts), 2) changes in national policy agendas (political shifts), and 3) changes 
in specific national policies (programmatic shifts). The second category is procedural 
shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements. Again, there are four types of 
influence here: 1) increased horizontal and cross-sectoral coordination and integration, 2) 
increased steering and statistical capacities, 3) enhanced vertical coordination, and 4) 
increased involvement of non-state actors in domestic policy-making. Finally, Zeitlin’s 
third category is mutual learning, of which there are three types: 1) heuristic learning, 
referring to increased awareness of policies and practices in other Member States, 2) 
capacity-building, and 3) maieutic/reflexive learning, the most ‘gentle’ form of effect, 
which refers to increases in states’ abilities to rethink and re-evaluate policies and 
programmes.
86
 Given the discussion above, the role of change agents is important in 
linking learning with outcomes. Actors seek change based on appropriateness and 
legitimacy, which are derived from embedded practices.
87
  
 
4.6 CONCL USION 
 
This chapter has outlined a theoretical approach to examining the processes and outcomes 
of the European Union’s culture Open Method of Coordination. The chapter has 
explained an approach using sociological institutionalism theory, which is rooted in a 
constructivist ontology. This approach takes “a broader view of institutions, 
encompassing formal institutions, informal norms, shared systems of meaning, discourse, 
knowledge and routinized practices” (Idema and K elemen 2006, p.114) into account in 
analysis. It has demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of a sociological 
institutionalism perspective that conceptualises actors as having “a distinctly institutional 
form of agency” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p.201), embedded agency, leading to a 
logic of behaviour based on institutional appropriateness and existing practices. I have 
emphasised the dialectic relationship between structure and agency in an attempt to move 
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 The methodological challenges of studying policy learning and change will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
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 In addition, the literature on domestic level ‘uptake’ of EU norms often emphasises the importance of 
national norms and traditions in these differences: “… decisions from Brussels are likely to be resisted 
when the institutional logic of a particular EU policy clashes with key institutionally entrenched domestic 
traditions” (Thielemann 1999, p.402-3). This will be discussed in much more detail in Part II: the 
Empirical Contributions. 
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away from what is a weakness of some of the institutionalism literature – a tendency to 
treat actors as ‘blindly following rules.’ This conceptualisation also makes the link to 
theories of socialised and collective learning (and thus the OMC’s outcomes) much 
smoother. The discussion on learning, again theorised in a constructivist manner, has 
demonstrated the importance of actors as change agents who seek organisationally-
appropriate change. 
 
Schneider and Aspinwall (2001, p.178) recount the reaction of “heartfelt yawning” when 
‘institutions matter’ is mentioned at academic job interviews. Indeed, the assertion is 
banal, overly simplistic, and vague. Their point is well-made and demonstrates the need 
of the institutionalist researcher to go beyond stating that they matter and showing that 
they do. An institutional approach allows a focus on both formal and informal rules and 
norms. It prioritises the complicated interaction between institutions and individuals 
(Lowndes 2010); individuals are both constrained by institutions but through agency are 
also creators of change. This relationship is acknowledged – even embraced – as both 
political systems and human behaviour are complex. To help sift through the complexity 
of the European Union as a sui generis polity, I have also introduced the concept of multi-
level governance which is a conceptual framework that accounts for changes in 
sovereignty as a result of EU integration as well as the complex and multi-scale 
interconnectedness of actors. 
 
With this theoretical framework in mind, I now turn to the steps I took to answer my 
research questions, the subject of chapter 5. 
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CHAPT E R  5: R E SE AR CH 
ME T HODOL OGY  AND ME T HODS  
 
 
“Political structure simplifies a complex world for the individuals in it. It does 
not necessarily, however, simplify the problems of the political theorist.” 
J ames March and Johan Olsen (1984, p.741) 
 
 
5.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
The previous chapters have situated this study within existing literature as well as outlined 
the theoretical approaches to studying the culture OMC. This chapter discusses the 
research methodology and methods for this project, including an overview of the research 
design and process, a step-by-step record of what was done, as well as the methodological 
challenges and limitations of the study. The discussion also highlights novelty in the 
methods used, in both the study of cultural policy and the study of the Open Method of 
Coordination.  
 
The objective of this research is ultimately to determine how the OMC works as well as 
what outcomes it produces. It asks how the design of policy coordination influences 
mutual learning and exchange with regards to the policy themes in Priority A . In order to 
answer these questions, in-depth information about both the process and outcomes of the 
OMC is necessary. It is only possible to identify institutions, much less determine their 
relevance, with deep knowledge of the system. Relevant information therefore includes 
that on routines, roles, procedures, and contexts. Y et, the information that is publically 
available (in both the academic domain and otherwise) is limited – it does not begin to 
answer these questions. The culture OMC has not been the subject or any in-depth 
academic study to date, and the OMC reports and associated documents from the 
European Commission tell us a bit about the final outcome but little about the working 
methods or how the report was received in the Member States. Moreover, the gap between 
what is on paper and what happens in practice is of prime interest and is indeed where the 
richness lies in studying institutions. Other sources of information are therefore 
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necessary, and information has been gathered for this study from three different types of 
sources: desk research in the form of document analysis, in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key policy actors, and participant observation. 
 
This thesis seeks to determine the role that institutions play in the determination of 
political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). But it also goes beyond the assertion that 
‘institutions matter’ and seeks to explain the degree to which they do. As a common 
criticism of the institutional approach is that it is not theoretically robust enough – that 
institutionalism privileges description at the expense of critical analysis – the research 
design must be explicit about the limits of the study; credible qualitative work is 
transparent, consistent, and communicable (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Demonstrating a 
clear link between the policy environment and policy itself is also a difficult task. It is a 
challenge that depends on what material is available and what kind of access there is to 
it, and on the use of multiple methods and sources and triangulation where possible.  
 
Chapter five proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the study’s ontological and 
epistemological approaches. Section 5.3 explains the research design and discusses the 
case study approach as well as its limitations, while 5.4 looks at the research process and 
provides a step-by-step chronology of what was done. Finally, section 5.5 discusses how 
the data analysis was conducted. 
 
5.2 ONT OL OGICAL  AND E PIST E MOL OGICAL  APPR OACHE S 
 
In any research project, the methodology must be consistent to the object of study and to 
the research design and theoretical positioning. Ontological and epistemological positions 
are therefore important to clarify because they signpost the reader as to what can be 
expected in the results of a study. To borrow Furlong and Marsh’s (2010) analogy, 
ontological and epistemological positions are a skin, not a sweater, and thus ever-present. 
Ontology reflects what one believes about reality; an ontological position therefore is a 
‘metapolitical’ decision as it structures presuppositions and scope of the nature of inquiry 
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(K auppi 2010).
88
 It thus determines the content of analysis, as well as what one “regard[s] 
as an (adequate) political explanation” (Hay 2002, p.61). The ontological position of this 
project is constructivist. A lthough there are factions within this approach, it can be 
roughly defined as the view that reality is socially constructed and that individuals’ views 
are informed by political, social, and cultural factors. This is in contrast to 
foundationalism, which posits that there is a ‘real world’ which exists independently of 
one’s knowledge of it; subscribers to this ontological position believe in objective and 
absolute truths.  
 
Similarly, epistemological divisions in the study of politics often occur along the faultline 
of qualitative versus quantitative research, or research that seeks generalisations and 
predictive results versus research that is interested in understanding specific cases, the 
latter to “speak not of underlying attributes, objective observables and universal forces, 
but of perceptions and understanding that come from immersion in and holistic regard for 
the phenomena” (Stake 2000, p.21). Quantitative methodologies “often say relatively 
little about the processes by which decisions are made or implemented” (Peters, Pierre, 
and Stoker 2010, p.329), which is precisely what this research is interested in. An 
interpretivist epistemology, which often privileges qualitative methodology (Furlong and 
Marsh 2010), recognises that all political research is inherently political in itself, and 
seeks an informed interpretation. Explanations are based on a “narrative which is 
particular to that time and space, and partial, based on a subjective interpretation” 
(Furlong and Marsh 2010, p.202). 
  
One of the main epistemological concerns with political research is the place of the 
analyst/researcher in relation to what is being studied. As a researcher, I am not a neutral 
observer from the sidelines, but bring with me my own experiences and values – my own 
constructed vision of the world shaped by particular social, cultural, and political 
processes. I am not detached from the cultural conditions and positioning in the 
interaction (Rubin and Rubin 1995). 
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5.3 R E SE ARCH DE SIGN 
 
This section outlines how I have designed this project and expands on the introduction 
provided in chapter 1. Both the study of the Open Method of Coordination and the study 
of cultural policy are marked by a great deal of theoretical and ontological pluralism.  
 
When people study ‘the OMC’ they are studying many different things: effects of the 
OMC at the national level; effects at the EU level; effects on EU law; and effects on 
participation and state-society relations (Borrás and Radaelli 2010). Many studies of the 
OMC are within one policy field (see chapter 3). Exceptions exist, but studies do not tend 
to transverse policy areas in order that in-depth cross-country comparison, another feature 
of much of the literature, can be done. This design reflects what a large number of OMC 
studies aim to do, i.e. compare performance across Member States within one field, in 
order to determine whether any progress has been made with respect to a specific area of 
policy. In this respect, this project both follows the literature’s norms and departs from 
them. I examine the OMC in one policy area– culture – but do not adopt a particular case 
study (n<1) or comparative approach between Member States. Instead, I look at the 
system as a whole, focusing on how the OMC works and what outputs it produces. 
 
5.3.1 Case study approach 
In order to better focus and specify the area of inquiry, and to establish boundaries in 
research (Stake 2000), I have focused only on the 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture.
89
 
Concentration on this Work Plan forms a natural bookend for the research and provides 
organisational boundaries. This bookending will also be beneficial for any future 
comparative work. At the start of this project in fall 2012, the 2011-2014 Work Plan was 
in its second year and still ongoing, meaning that when interviews took place the 
information was fresh in people’s minds. The study also fits within the timescale of the 
second Barroso Commission (2010-2014), which was in power until November 2014. A ll 
fieldwork with EU officials was conducted before the introduction of the Juncker 
Commission, to ensure institutional continuity and stability. It thus also roots the study 
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 Where appropriate, some of the discussion makes comparative reference to the first cycle of the OMC 
(2008-2010), in particular changes reflecting ‘learning at the top’ (Radaelli 2008). 
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firmly in time and place, avoiding the decontextualisation of much existing literature on 
the OMC (Armstrong 2010).  
 
Priority A  of the Work Plan was chosen as a case study (see chapter 2). The case study 
approach is used to achieve greater in-depth knowledge about one particular area that is 
considered to be of importance in this policy community. A  case study approach is most 
advantageous when “the aims are understanding, extension of experience and increase in 
conviction in that which is known” (Stake 2000, p.21), making it ideal for this study. This 
is also a tangible focus for fieldwork with limited resources. Priority A  is composed of 
three different groups.
90
 At the time of the start of fieldwork in April 2014, group 1 was 
complete; they met first in March 2011 and the report was published in October 2012. 
Group 2 met for the first time in December 2012 and its report was published in May 
2014. Group 3 met for the first time in March 2014 and its final report was released in 
December 2015. These timelines thus allowed for varied reflections from participants at 
different stages of the OMC process.  
 
5.3.2 Methodological challenges 
This subsection discusses the methodological challenges of this research design, with a 
focus on the type of findings and their generalisability. It is split into two sections – 
methodological concerns regarding case studies and methodological concerns regarding 
studying the OMC from an institutionalist perspective. 
 
Methodological issues with case study research 
Choosing one policy priority as a case study has implications for the way fieldwork will 
be carried out as well as the end results of the thesis as a whole. What do findings tell us 
about the area of study, and to what extent are they generalisable?  
 
While the findings on outcomes (chapter 8) apply to Priority A  exclusively, findings 
concerning the roles of the Commission, Council, and Member States (chapters 6 and 7) 
can be reasonably extended to the culture OMC as a whole. The main reason for this is 
that all EU interviewees and some of the expert interviewees had not been only involved 
with Priority A  but had been part of previous culture OMC groups. While I made it clear 
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that my questions were to do with their experiences with Priority A  only, constructivist 
theory says that it is impossible to divorce ourselves from previous experience and be 
‘neutral’ or isolated from that other experience. Participants’ observations are thus 
concentrated on Priority A’s groups but cannot exclusively be applied only to Priority A . 
In addition, the treaty base and principle of subsidiarity applies to the entire Work Plan 
(and the entire field of cultural policy), not just in policy areas to do with identity and 
diversity. The working method is also the same for all culture OMC groups, and there are 
‘field-wide’ challenges that apply to all areas of cultural policy, not just Priority A  (see 
Gray 2009). It is my contention that if the same study was done taking any other priority 
area as a case study, very similar results would be achieved. Ultimately, chapter 8’s 
findings on outcomes are, however, only relevant to Priority A . While I believe that it is 
reasonable to expect similar findings with other priorities, this cannot strictly be said as 
the outcomes were only evaluated with respect to these three OMC groups and this 
priority area. 
 
Similarly, the study cannot be thought of as findings on European Union cultural policy 
in general, nor be applicable to the workings of DG-EAC. This is for two reasons. Firstly, 
the OMC is a non-legislative mode of governance; it cannot be analysed in the same 
manner as other parts of EU involvement in the cultural sector, such as, for example, the 
European Capital of Culture, which is agreed up using the traditional Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure. Secondly, with regards to the Directorate-General for Education and Culture 
(DG-EAC), the DG operates not only in culture but in education, youth, and sport policy, 
which have different treaty bases, historical trajectories, and working methods. It would 
therefore be inappropriate to apply these findings to other sectors. Finally, insofar as 
findings are applicable across the Open Method of Coordination in general, while there 
are definitely many similarities in findings across policy fields, findings correspond to 
the culture OMC only due to the unique aspects of its institutional architecture (see 
chapter 2). 
 
Methodological challenges of studying the OMC 
There are also specific methodological challenges in studying the OMC, empirical 
assessment of which is “extremely challenging” (Zeitlin 2009, p.214). Specifically, I will 
address the challenges in establishing causal relationships, the lack of formal goals and 
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thus before-and-after ‘goalposts’ in assessing change, and more general challenges in 
studying processes and informal behaviour. 
 
The first challenge is establishing causal relationships: even “if we observe policy change, 
how can we be sure that it is due to OMC and not other variables?” (Borrás and Radaelli 
2010, p.30). This is a concern in studying the OMC in all fields.
 
Establishing causation, 
even through careful process-tracing, is difficult. It is not easy to determine whether 
learning has taken place and if so whether it is due to the OMC (and not from other EU, 
international, or national processes). There is a “causal boundary” between the national 
and EU levels – ideas (and learning) come from multiple places (Zeitlin 2011). It is 
therefore difficult to isolate the OMC’s precise impact. Y et, it is important to ascertain, 
not assume, that “the contribution that these instruments can make to enhancing ‘policy 
learning’ as a major mechanism for advancing collective decision-making and regulation” 
(Citi and Rhodes 2007, p.6). This is very difficult, and is what Borrás and Radaelli (2010, 
p.30) term “the classic counter-factual problem,” or, what could have happened without 
the OMC? Pinpointing the exact nature of the OMC’s influence is therefore difficult, but 
triangulation helps to ensure as robust a picture as possible. 
 
This challenge has been discussed in the literature on Europeanisation, which is often 
split into ‘top down’ versus ‘bottom up’ approaches. The former starts at the top and looks 
as Europe as a ‘cause’ and then seeks to explain behaviour by Member States, whereas 
bottom up approaches start at a domestic effect and work up. In this manner, Europe 
becomes a possible variable. The approach taken in this study is a top down approach for 
two reasons. The first is that isolating a variable to ‘measure’ at the domestic level is 
difficult to do in an n=28 case. This approach is better suited to case studies with a smaller 
number of cases so that variable isolation is easier. Secondly, there is no one precise 
change, policy, or programme that I am ‘measuring’, but rather I am looking at the process 
as a whole; evaluating in-depth the impact of Priority A  in every Member State would 
require more resources than in this particular project, as well as a different research 
design. 
 
A  second and related challenge is to do with evaluating change. Typically, to study 
change there must be some sort of before-and-after goalpost. This is difficult in the case 
of the culture OMC for two reason. The first is that learning is occurring in over 25+ 
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separate national contexts.
91
 Speaking to everyone who might be a part of this learning is 
difficult to do, thus the Member State representatives are relied on. However, there are 
concerns about speaking to individuals about whole states’ experiences or positions. Most 
experts were the only spokesperson from their country in that OMC group. Experts tended 
to speak personally about themselves and more generally about their Member State (‘the 
way my country does it’), depending on the topic of discussion. Most did not speak with 
absolute authority (reflecting that most experts were not top-level officials in state 
governments), but about their own experiences.
92
 
 
The second reason that evaluating change is difficult is because the culture OMC’s goals 
and aims are not well-defined (see section 2.5). A ims such as fostering exchange of best 
practice and structuring cooperation around strategic objectives are difficult to evaluate 
and ‘measure.’ Citing Lodge’s (2007) critique, Armstrong (2010, p.286) argues that 
“OMC processes often fail precisely to define the standards that could form the normative 
basis for domestic policy influence and against which the extent of influence might be 
judged.” The culture OMC has its own additional challenges in conceptualisation 
goalposts, because, as the ‘softest of the soft’, the culture OMC does not produce any 
monitoring documentation as is the case with other OMCs. To take one example, in 
Armstrong’s (2010) analysis of the impact of the OMC on UK  social protection and 
inclusion policy, he is able to analyse National Action Plans, Common Objectives, J oint 
Reports, and Peer Review reports. A ll of these different sets of documentation, coupled 
with more sanctions and accountability (and systems to monitor progress) produce a more 
robust set of source material. In the culture case, the only document sources are the Work 
Plan and reports produced by each working group. Thus, in other fields where 
benchmarking is a feature, there is often a clearer idea of what target is to be achieved 
(despite problems with identifying and measuring targets) and therefore what ‘progress’ 
might look like. To address this, the focus of analysis in this project is not about labelling 
the OMC a success or failure but about digging deeper into its processes and outcomes, 
based around the aims that the EU has identified itself. 
 
A  final challenge is to do with studying a process. The OMC takes place within a highly 
complex multi-level context that is ever-changing (Bache and Flinders 2004). There are 
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a multitude of actors and interactions between these actors, but, with limited resources, 
the researcher must try to fully capture the richness (and messiness) of what is going on. 
This involves taking into account informal behaviour and procedures. By its very nature, 
informal behaviour is elusive. In effect, it is “an attempt at studying the invisible or at 
least the opaque” (Christiansen and Neuhold 2012, p.2). It requires knowing a particular 
institutional setting intimately in order to determine what is formal and what is informal. 
In this complexity it is difficult to isolate specific variables and to be precise about them. 
This requires the researcher to have detailed in-depth knowledge of a particular political 
setting before studying it. In order to mitigate these challenges are far as possible, I have 
followed Jonathan Zeitlin’s strategies. Zeitlin advises triangulation of data using diverse 
sources. I have done this using a combination of approaches: desk research, corroboration 
with a large-scale research survey on the OMC done in 2013, and my own fieldwork 
consisting of interviews and participant observation. I have also spoken to a wide cross-
section of actors involved in the OMC, in order to access as many viewpoints as possible. 
This leads on to the next section, in which I describe the research process and methods. 
 
5.4 R E SE ARCH PR OCE SS AND ME T HODS 
 
In this section, I discuss step-by-step how I gathered the data for this project. The research 
methods employed in this study form a triangulation – desk research, semi-structured 
interviews, and participant observation. Each method has its own purpose and goals and 
has produced a different type of material; taken together they aim for as robust a picture 
of Priority A  in the Open Method of Coordination as possible; or, what Stake (2000, p.22) 
calls “a full and thorough knowledge of the particular.”  
 
5.4.1 Desk research 
The first step was desk research, which involved a detailed review of relevant policy 
documents. Documentary analysis provides a basic source of information, which allows 
the researcher to become familiar with the main debates, historical trajectories, and 
progression of policy, as well as the language used. Relevant documents include 
legislation, in particular the Work Plan, the 2007 Agenda for Culture, and Europe 2020 
strategy; reports published by the Commission, including the 2014 report on the 
implementation of the Work Plan; and Conclusions from Council meetings. Two other 
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sets of documents are also pertinent: the two OMC reports themselves, as well as the 2013 
evaluation study on the OMC and Structured Dialogue, commissioned by DG-EAC and 
carried out by the international consultancy group Ecorys (McDonald et al. 2013a and 
2013b).
93
  
 
Access and availability of these documents varied and proved challenging at times. This 
is because EU cultural policy documents are not all collected in one place, requiring 
online digging. In addition, in spring 2014 DG-EAC’s website underwent a redesign. For 
many months documents were not available to the public, and even now, two years later, 
not all OMC reports are posted online. In addition, relevant documents are not all 
collected in one place, making searching for them time-consuming. One of the best 
sources of information, found at a rather late stage in the study, was the 2012 
commissioning background document provided by the Commission to Ecorys. This 
included the first-ever list of culture OMC objectives laid out as such, as well as a list of 
pertinent policy documents with links. To my knowledge this information is not available 
publicly elsewhere in this form. 
 
One source that is referenced repeatedly in this thesis is the 2013 Ecorys report 
(McDonald et al. 2013a and 2013b). This is a report that was commissioned by the 
European Commission in order to independently evaluate the OMC and Structured 
Dialogue. Ecorys is an international consultancy group which specialises in EU 
institutions and policy-making. Their report is useful because it deploys a robust 
methodology – combining survey, interview, focus group, and case studies – that takes 
on a much broader set of research questions. Where possible I have used it to corroborate 
my own findings. There is, however, a limit in using this source, as outlined by 
Christopher Gordon,  
“No consultancy wanting to obtain repeat contracts from the EU’s bureaucracy (vested 
as it is with a largely unaccountable monopoly of legislative and operational initiative) is 
going to use anything more robust or critical than neutered diplomatic language, let alone 
be candid about the emptiness of much Commission rhetoric or the gulf between its 
claims for the ‘European cultural space’ and actual reality” (Gordon 2012, p.188). 
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While pointed, Gordon makes a point that is worth remembering; even in ‘independent’ 
research there is bias and, while extremely useful, it is to be treated critically like any 
other source. 
 
Documents, as valuable as they are, only tell a small part of the story. This is particularly 
true in a system such as the EU which relies on bargaining and consensus to achieve 
results; official statements thus “represent both a compromise of internal diverging views 
and an attempt to nevertheless show that something is being done… ” (K röger 2008, p.81), 
lacking a richness.
94
 I now therefore turn to the empirical data I collected. 
 
5.4.2 Interviews  
Between April and December 2014, 30 semi-structured interviews were carried out 
among three categories of policy actors: European Union officials; Member State experts; 
and invited guest experts who were representatives of non-government organisations or 
civil society platforms (see full interview list in appendix 3). The purpose of the 
interviews was to learn new information that was not attainable elsewhere to a degree of 
depth that would not be possible using other methods such as a survey. Interviews add 
context to previously-known information (in this case, documentary analysis) and 
corroborate information from other sources.  
 
Interviewing is not “conducted with a view to establishing ‘the truth,’ in a crude, positivist 
manner” (Richards 1996, p.200). Nor can we expected interviews to ‘tell us everything.’ 
Rather, interviews serve as a key source of information on actors’ interpretations of events 
and roles: the objective was an in-depth understanding of how the Open Method of 
Coordination worked and what outcomes it produced. Nine interviews were conducted 
in-person, 14 on the phone, six via Skype, and one by email.
95
 While in-person would 
have been ideal for all interviews, the subjects were located in over fifteen countries and 
this was not possible due to limited resources. Most interviews lasted between 30 and 90 
minutes. 
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Sampling 
The relevant interview participants are individuals who had knowledge of the Open 
Method of Coordination: those who played a role in the creation of the Work Plan 
(Council), those involved in the administration and facilitation of the OMC 
(Commission), and the participants and invited experts in Priority A’s working groups. 
The sample is therefore a theoretical one. These three groups were targeted to achieve 
different perspectives on the same process for as comprehensive an analysis as possible, 
describing all stages and angles of the OMC. This range also sheds light on vertical and 
horizontal relationships within the OMC. The sample is thus sufficiently large in order to 
answer research questions, but small enough to be contained in a relatively small research 
project in terms of scope and resources.  
 
Access and gatekeeping 
EU officials 
The first step was accessing the European Union officials. While much research in many 
different fields has been conducted about and in the EU, there is remarkably little 
information available on how to access EU officials; the Union has no overall policy for 
researchers wishing to access its staff. According to a representative from the European 
Commission in the UK ’s office as well as an employee of the Commission, there are no 
official guidelines or protocol for members of the public wanting to access Commission 
officials. The only document of partial relevance is the Code of Conduct on Good 
Administrative Behaviour, which includes information on Commission staff’s rules and 
obligations in their contact with members of the public.
96
  
 
The first step was to identify the individuals in both the Council and the Commission that 
I thought would be able to point me in the right direction of who might be able to help 
me. The relevant officials in the Commission were located within one unit in the 
Directorate General for Education and Culture
97
 while in the Council of Ministers, culture 
is a part of the Education, Y outh, and Culture Configuration. Identifying who to contact 
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 This document is available online at the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/code/_docs/code_en.pdf  [accessed 4 June 2016]. 
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 There has since been a restructuring of the unit; in spring 2014, when the fieldwork for this project was 
undertaken, the units were called Culture programme and actions and Culture policy and intercultural 
dialogue, with the latter involved in the OMC. These have now been renamed Cultural diversity and 
innovation and Creative Europe programme. 
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proved challenging initially, as very little information about employees and roles is 
publically available. At that time, only the names of heads of units were posted online.
98
 
In addition, only mailing addresses were posted, not email addresses, although I managed 
to determine the format of the emails and so was able to contact the relevant heads of 
units in both the Commission and Council. I had an idea of the types of people I wanted 
to interview (policy officers), but did not know any by name nor did I have much idea of 
how the units were organised and who was responsible for what. I was thus reliant on 
these initial gatekeepers for access, although fortunately this proved fruitful for both the 
Council and Commission.
99
 Once I had names, initial participants were contacted by 
email. One surprising finding was just how few people at the Council and Commission 
were involved with the OMC/cultural policy. In the Council’s administrative body, there 
were only two people (a head of unit and policy officer), and in the Commission there 
was a handful of policy officers plus a deputy head of unit. These numbers were lower 
than I expected and reflect the DG’s small size as well as the low profile of culture as an 
EU competence (L ittoz-Monnet 2007). 
 
Interviewees were chosen based on gatekeepers’ initial responses and targeted to those 
identified to be influential or relevant to this policy priority area based on information I 
received. Subsequent interviews were achieved using the snowballing method whereby 
interviewees identified people they believed were important for me to speak to. 
Unfortunately, the policy officer who was assigned to Groups 1 and 2 had since left the 
DG and moved to another one. Despite numerous attempts to contact her, she did not 
reply to emails. This meant that some of policy officers I spoke to at the Commission had 
followed other OMC groups. 
 
National experts and invited external experts 
Each OMC group had roughly 25 participants and around 10 invited external experts.
100
 
To access the experts, two strategies were necessary because different information was 
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 Other sources have indicated that access is more guarded in higher profile DGs. For example, Hooghe 
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provided for the two groups.
101
 Group 1’s report simply listed the person’s name and 
country (no affiliation), while Group 2’s included name, Member State, and affiliation. 
However, in both cases, email addresses still had to be obtained.
102
 Some of these were 
easy to find – particularly with group 2 as I had their workplace – but many required 
serious ‘digging.’ The first port of call was a Google search, and if I could not find it that 
way, I emailed the country’s Ministry of Culture – sometimes to a generic email address 
and sometimes to a specific person if I could identify one who might be relevant. This 
still yielded very mixed results as emails often did not get responded to and I had to chase 
on many occasions. In the end, I was able to find 17/31 email addresses for group 1 and 
27/34 for group 2. 
 
Once I had all of the email addresses I could find, I sent out a mass-email to all 
participants at the same time. I sent another whole-group reminder (minus those who had 
already responded) two weeks after the initial email, and a final reminder six weeks after 
the initial email. In this way, I was not prejudging who would reply but used the same 
system in order to make the sample random within the groups. Responses varied: some, 
agreed to participate; some declined, for example for reasons of maternity/paternity 
leaves, a change of job since the OMC had taken place, and one or two said that they had 
only attended one meeting and did not feel sufficiently engaged with the process to 
respond. Some did not respond at all. There were also issues with the accuracy of the lists. 
One person, who was included in the report’s participation list, said she had never 
attended an OMC meeting and did not know what the OMC was. A Ministry of Culture 
representative from a different country, on enquiry for an email contact for a different 
individual, said that no one by that name had ever worked in the ministry. 
 
In the end, I interviewed five experts from group 1 and nine from group 2.
103
 The 
differences in these numbers and response rates can be explained by three factors. The 
first is that group 1 was the first to take place chronologically and so the most time had 
lapsed for this group. In addition, as already outlined, getting a hold of contact 
information for group 1 was much harder, so there were fewer people in the initial sample. 
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Thirdly, because of the time lapsed, group 1 had a higher percentage of experts who both 
did not respond and also did not want to be interviewed (either simply because they 
thought it was too long ago or they were not still sufficiently engaged enough in the OMC 
to care). 
 
For the external (guest) experts, a similar system was used: I gathered all of the contact 
details I could find and emailed everyone (BCC’ed) at the same time. For this category 
of interviews, I was able to interview five external experts from Group 1 and three from 
Group 2. In the end, there were numerous challenges to accessing all three groups. 
However it is my contention that the sample I achieved represents a pool that is reliable 
and from which numerous reasonable observations about the Open Method of 
Coordination can be made. 
 
Carrying out the interviews and interviewing ‘elites’ 
Interviews took place in three ‘rounds.’ EU officials were interviewed in April and May 
2014; experts between June and October, and external invited experts mostly in October 
and November 2014. A ll interviews were carried out anonymously, and participants 
understood that they may be quoted but that quotes would not be attributable. Participants 
were provided with a participant information sheet, detailing the project and their ethical 
rights, and were also required to sign a consent form. In the early data analysis stage, 
pseudonyms were given to all participants. Quotes throughout this thesis are therefore 
completely anonymous. 
 
In-person interviews were held in Brussels and all but two were recorded.
104
 The location 
of interviews was mostly the office of the participant (in one case, we met in a café). The 
workplace location added an element of formality as in all cases I had to register and 
show my passport before the interviewee was called up to get me, and in the case of the 
Council I also had to go through an airport-like security check as well. A ll phone and 
Skype interviews were recorded. A lthough in person interviews would have been 
preferable, I was able to establish rapport with participants for the phone and Skype 
interviews and did not notice any major detrimental effects of the different medium. In 
general, I was met with enthusiasm and support from all interviewees. Many individuals, 
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especially at the EU, were pleased that someone was taking an interest in their work. The 
Council employees in particular said that not even their counterparts in different areas of 
the Council ‘took an interest’ in culture. Most interviewees were genuinely curious about 
my research and some had questions of their own. 
 
The subjects interviewed for this project can be categorised as elites.
105
 ‘Elite’ is a 
problematic concept but despite reservations with terminology, there is a whole literature 
dedicated to interviews with this type of people.
106
 In Elite and Specialized Interviewing, 
one of the early books wholly devoted to the subject, L .A . Dexter (1970, p.5) defines 
elites as “… people in important or exposed positions may require V IP interviewing 
treatment on the topics which relate to their importance or exposure.” David Richards 
(1996, p.199) has critiqued this definition and suggests the following in lieu: “a group of 
individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, [… ] are 
likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the 
public.” This definition still includes a great degree of subjectivity with the use of 
‘privileges’ and ‘influence.’ 
 
The late sociologist David Riesman conceded that he was 
“not happy with the term ‘elite’ with its connotations of superiority. Y et I have found no 
other term for the point I want to make, namely that people in important or exposed 
positions may require V IP treatment on the topics which relate to their importance or 
exposure” (Riesman 1964, p.528). 
 
Why are these individuals different than other subjects? First of all, “by the very nature 
of elite interviews, it is the interviewee who has the power” (Richards 1996, p.201). In 
other words, I needed my interview participants far more than they needed me. This 
power dynamic was mostly implicit rather than explicit, but it can pose problems for the 
researcher in terms of trying to achieve the appropriate rapport within the interview, as 
well as with more practical matters relating to access, interview timings, and location. 
Secondly, elites may be much more difficult to access, and they may initially be difficult 
to identity given a lack of publicly-available information. A  third considerations is that 
individuals will often be under severe time constraints and may only have a pre-
determined short amount of time to devote to an interview. This was often the case for 
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me and the short time span stresses the importance of being flexible and well-prepared in 
order to make the most of the time available. 
 
Interviews are an “interactional process” (K ahn and Cannell 1957, p.23 [emphasis in 
original]) and communication is the most important aspect of any interview. K ahn and 
Cannell also argued that the process of interaction is constantly being renegotiated 
throughout the interview, as both parties respond to the cues of each other. One of the 
challenges I had was how knowledgeable to appear, and this conundrum continued 
throughout the seven months of interviewing. It was a double-edged sword: I was in the 
process of completing a doctorate on the subject, and therefore knowledgeable, but was 
relying on these individuals to help me with information I did not know. As Harvey 
(2010) discusses, the relative inexperience of a researcher can be both an advantage and 
disadvantage; young researchers may be viewed as vibrant and cutting edge, or 
inexperienced (p. 20). Subjects must feel and understand that their input is valuable and 
is being taken seriously. The dangerous case is if the person being interviewed gets the 
impression that the interviewer is trying to come across as more knowledgeable than the 
interviewee. This did not happen in my case. If anything, I downplayed what I knew in 
order to make sure that I was receiving the most information possible. However, it was 
always something to be negotiated as each participant was different.  
 
I had a guiding list of questions (see appendix 4) that were tailored for each of the three 
categories of interview participants. I allowed the direction of conversation to flow on its 
own as much as possible. Only in a few cases was major ‘steering’ necessary. I tried to 
seem neutral and avoided asking leading questions as well as simple yes/no answers. I 
continued interviewing until I felt that I was not learning anything new and that I had an 
in-depth understanding of the OMC from different viewpoints. 
 
5.4.3 Participant observation 
The third method employed in this project was participant observation, which took place 
over two days in March 2015. The purpose of participant observation was to explore the 
OMC in more depth and observe first-hand what goes on ‘behind the scenes.’ Observation 
has been under-utilised in the study of the OMC and similarly in the study of cultural 
policy. However, it has many advantages. It “gets below and behind the surface of official 
accounts by providing texture, depth and nuance, so our stories have richness as well as 
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context” (Rhodes 2014, p.326).
107
 It also served to triangulate information with other 
sources as it allowed me to further confirm whether the differences in what I have found 
between rules and practices in the interviews were in fact the case in observation, thus 
improving reliability of my data.  
 
Gaining access to this group – Priority A’s Group 3, the only group ongoing at this stage 
of the research – was relatively straightforward. From interviewing participants, I knew 
the name of the Commission policy officer in charge, and approached her first. She was 
very encouraging and helpful and agreed that it would be possible if and only if all experts 
consented. She also provided me with a list of remaining meeting dates. Only one worked 
within my personal timeline and the timeline of this research. Had time and resources 
been less constrained, it would have been ideal to partake in more detailed observation in 
order to observe the OMC at different stages. However, with the groups only meeting a 
few times a year, for two days at a time, I had to work within the constraints of the OMC 
itself. In order to get the approval of the group, I prepared a short description of who I 
was, what I was studying, and what I wanted to do, and the policy officer distributed this 
message to all of the experts. There was a bit of a time delay while I waited but eventually 
I was given approval to attend. From this point on I was also included in all email 
correspondence with the group which gave me great insight into what had been done to 
date as well as the practical factors involved in organising such a meetup. 
 
The OMC meeting I observed was Group 3’s fourth of six meetings, and was the group’s 
only study visit.
108
 Before the observation took place, I made a list of practical and ethical 
concerns. I was particularly concerned with protecting anonymity, as I had interviewed a 
few of the participants in this group (had met some in person and spoken to others on the 
phone). I was also concerned about the blurring of boundaries between being a silent 
observer and what I knew was inevitable that people would be naturally curious and ask 
questions about myself and my research. I anticipated that experts would be curious to 
know what my findings ‘so far’ were, and prepared in my mind a generic but not unhelpful 
answer beforehand which would satiate curiousity but not give too much away. 
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 For an excellent collection on elite government behaviour using observation methods, see Rhodes, ‘t 
Hart, and Noordegraaf (2007). 
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 The fieldtrip meeting was not chosen on purpose but was the only set of dates that worked with my 
schedule and the research project’s timing. 
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For most of the time I simply sat in a corner of the room and observed unobtrusively. 
When the larger group split into smaller groups, I moved around and sat with each group 
for a short period of time. I did not participate at any stage of the discussions and in fact 
I think most people forgot I was there. However, I was also kindly invited along to the 
group’s dinner and cultural activity (traditional folk music concert and dancing), held on 
the evening of day 1, and to the tour of an arts high school on the morning of the second 
day. On these occasions I spoke to many of the participants and on so was a ‘participant’ 
as well as an observer.  
 
This reflects the ever-changing nature of the positioning of the researcher and the blurring 
of boundaries in observational work: “[o]ne day you are the professional stranger walking 
the tightrope between insider and outsider. Next day you are the complete bystander, left 
behind in the office to twiddle your thumbs” (Rhodes 2014, p.323). I was a researcher, 
yet was also already part of this community. The gap between me and the experts felt 
very narrow in terms of formality. Since this was only over a period of 48 hours, it was 
not as extreme as Rhodes’ intense immersion, but it is still a reflection of the way 
positioning can change. As Gains says, “[i]mmersion within a group or culture creates 
challenges for the researcher in how to develop and maintain an understanding, and yet 
deliver a critical or neutral analysis” (Gains 2011, p.158). A  constructivist-interpretivisit 
ontological approach acknowledges this, and sees the researcher as part of the process. 
 
5.5 DAT A ANAL Y SIS 
 
This section explains how I analysed my data and translated it into findings. Analysing 
data requires making sense of the information in a way that is easily understood by others 
– making it accessible. This is not always a straightforward process due to the subjectivity 
of qualitative data. It is therefore up to the researcher to ensure that, above all, “[r]eaders 
must be able to see the evidence and the logic that led the researcher to his or her main 
conclusion” (Rubin and Rubin 1995, p.92).  
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5.5.1 Interviews 
First of all, interviews were transcribed as quickly as possible. Transcriptions also 
included notes on the time and location of the meeting, nonverbal indicators, and any 
comments I noted down before, during, and after the interview. As interviews were spread 
out over a period of seven months, I transcribed as I went. After all interviews were 
complete, a thematic analysis was carried out in three stages. In the first I identified broad 
themes that emerged from the transcripts. These themes/categories included categories 
such as ‘composition of the group participants,’ ‘unclear nature of OMC aims,’ 
‘dissemination,’ ‘good practice report,’ ‘roles of Commission,’ and so forth. I began to 
pull quotes from the transcripts and continuously reflected on each theme as I went.  
 
In a second phase, I refined these themes more comprehensively based on associations 
between interviewees. I also looked for connections and linkages across the themes, and 
began to identify illustrative examples to support the eventual explanations. In a third 
phase, I began to further reflect on signposting ‘before’ fieldwork and ‘after’ fieldwork 
reflections to determine how what I had found differed from what I had expected. 
 
I took anonymity very seriously in order to protect the individuals who had so willingly 
shared their thoughts and time with me. In writing up and selecting quotes, all identifying 
information was removed from participants’ answers, and each interviewee was given a 
pseudonym. I also changed some job descriptions (to make them more general) and 
deleted parts of sentences that would possibly identify anyone, including workplaces, 
jobs, and Member States. 
 
One of the challenges in qualitative interviewing is determining validity; as previously 
discussed, the purpose of interviews is not to achieve the truth, but rather a plausible 
explanation, which will by its very nature be subjective. In addition, “[a]ctors tend to use 
interviews to support a precise position, a precise interpretation of reality, in order to 
strengthen their own position” (K röger 2008, p.81). Qualitative study is fraught with these 
types of challenges.  
 
Part of the analysis also included interpreting some diverging views. Of the three groups 
I interviewed, this was most common among Commission officials. Hooghe and Marks 
(2001, ch.9) suggest that Commission officials may have divergent preferences, or view 
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their jobs differently, due to differences in, for example, length and history of career, 
previous transnational experience, country of background (small/large, federalist or not), 
national economic interest of EU integration, and in national control over officials’ 
careers. In other words, diverse experiences mean divergent views. I have included these 
where relevant and analysed discrepancies in my findings where possible. Another 
consideration is the ‘norm’ to conform to institutional pressure (a ‘bog standard’ 
response). In a private and confidential interview setting some individuals followed this 
and some went ‘off-piste’ and spoke much more personally. This only really occurred 
regarding the role of the Commission in ‘advancing’ the culture case. There is some 
diversity in response, but findings represent the general tenor of conversations. 
 
V alidity and reliability of the data can be augmented in a few key ways. The first is to 
ensure that prior knowledge is in-depth enough; it is only by knowing a policy 
environment intimately that one can begin to determine what goes beyond ‘formal’ 
architecture, or, what one might read in books. This was achieved by a rigorous 
examination of the policies, EU documents, and working group reports, as well as 
extensive secondary material. The second method is through triangulation and targeting 
different sources. When possible, therefore, responses were cross-referenced with other 
sources of data such as the Ecorys survey as well as material gathered from participant 
observation.  
 
5.5.2 Participant observation 
Over the two days of meetings, I took notes which included both procedural elements, i.e. 
what the group was doing, what type of discussions were taking place, how long each 
activity lasted, as well as my reflections and thoughts during this time. At the end of the 
second day I typed up my notes from these sessions. About a week after this I arranged 
my thoughts thematically based on the top ‘observations’ and how I thought this material 
worked with my previous findings. As the observation took place over three months after 
I had done my final interview, a considerable amount of reflection and analysis had been 
done by that time. I was this able to slot these observations into thematic areas that I had 
already identified.  
 
At minimum, participant observation corroborated the material I already had. However, 
it also deepened and extended my understanding of the OMC considerably and therefore 
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was an extremely valuable exercise. The project’s findings are therefore much richer and 
comprehensive as a result of the observation. It is a powerful research method that should 
be used much more in the study of public policy. 
 
5.6 CONCL USION 
 
This chapter has discussed this study’s research methodology and methods. It has shown 
how the research process can be a “messy and fraught business” (Burnham et al. 2008, 
p.38) and, through the discussion of epistemology, how “there is no such thing as a neutral 
or value-free political science” (Peters, Pierre, and Stoker 2010, p.327). It has 
demonstrated my approach of a reflexive research practice that acknowledges the 
weaknesses and strengths of the research design.  
 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the important of the methods of inquiry 
being “determined by the objects and the purposes of inquiry” (Isaac 2013, p.933; 
emphasis added). Research from an institutionalist perspective necessitates in-depth 
knowledge about the rules, processes, and behaviours being studied. In a complex and 
multi-layered system such as the OMC, this presents challenges. Access to EU officials, 
via the expected gatekeepers, proved relatively straightforward, but what was more 
challenging was access to certain documents as well as reaching the OMC experts 
themselves. While there are some weaknesses in the access I was able to achieve, the 
challenges in access illuminate several features about the European Union and the OMC 
itself – in particular the at times impenetrable, bureaucratically isolated nature of both. 
 
The chapter has set out the limitations of the study and outlined steps I have taken to 
corroborate and triangulate my findings. This was achieved by using a range of 
complementary but varied research methods – desk research, interviewing, and 
participant observation. A ll methods presented issues of access that were eventually 
negotiated. In particular, the use of participant observation – a method that has been used 
very little in both the study of the OMC and cultural policy – was a valuable exercise as 
it confirmed much of the information I had gathered via interviews and added an 
additional layer to my understanding. 
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The next chapter is the start of Part II: T he E mpirical Contributions. To start off, 
chapter 6 examines the Open Method of Coordination from the point of view of the 
European Union. 
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PART  II: T HE  E MPIR ICAL 
CONT R IBUT IONS 
 
CHAPT E R  6: T HE  CULT UR E  OPE N 
ME T HOD OF COOR DINAT ION AND 
E U INST IT UT IONS 
 
 
“Learning in a political context is eminently (albeit not exclusively) about 
power.” 
Claudio Radaelli (2003, p.13) 
 
 
6.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This chapter is the first of three findings chapters. It focuses on the process of facilitating 
the Open Method of Coordination and examines the roles of the two European Union 
institutions involved in the culture OMC, the European Commission and the Council of 
the European Union (Council of Ministers). The concentration on the roles of European 
institutions is an atypical lens of analysis in the study of the OMC, since most of the 
literature focuses on the outcomes in Member States (see chapter 3). However, in order 
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the culture OMC, an investigation of the 
roles that these two bodies play is essential; they cannot simply be thought of as neutral 
facilitators; the OMC is a Member State process, however “the central role is played by 
a supranational actor [… ] empower[ing] the European institutions with very specific tasks 
central to the whole process” (Regent 2003, p.191), and in order to fully capture this 
process in its entirely, it is necessary to study these tasks and responsibilities of both the 
Commission and the Council. Doing so helps to understand where power lies within the 
culture OMC (Deganis 2006), where the OMC fits within the broader picture of EU 
governance (particularly with regard to supporting competences), and where the ‘drive’ 
for increased coordination in the field of cultural policy comes from. 
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The goal of this chapter, then, is to analyse the roles and responsibilities of these two 
institutions:how is the OMC managed and facilitated? This represents a novel 
contribution to the OMC literature, which is mostly concerned with whether the OMC 
works rather than how. The chapter is organised around the differences between the 
formal descriptions of the Commission and Council’s roles, found ‘on paper’ in official 
policy documents, and what happens in practice – in other words, the gaps between what 
might have been expected at the start of this research (expectations) and the findings that 
emerged throughout my fieldwork, which raises questions regarding legitimacy and 
power relations within the culture OMC – what Deganis (2006) calls the “politics of 
consensus.” Information for this chapter therefore draws primarily on empirical material 
gathered throughout interviews with key policy actors, and the participant observation 
outlined in chapter 5. Where possible, it also draws comparisons and similarities with the 
2013 Ecorys survey and with the literature on the OMCs in other fields. This discussion 
is framed by the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism and multi-level governance; 
behaviour is theorised via the lens of the logic of appropriateness, whereby “[a]ctors seek 
to fulfill [sic] the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a 
political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions” 
(March and Olsen 2009, p.3). 
 
This chapter is split into two main parts, each which focuses on the role of an EU body. 
Section 6.2 addresses the European Commission and 6.3 the Council of Ministers. Both 
sections examine the roles of the respective institution in the operation of the OMC: who 
is responsible for the OMC’s organisation and how does it work? Both sections are 
organised the same way, starting with a general description of the institution in question 
and a brief analysis of how it can be conceptualised within the EU policy process, which 
properly sets the organisations in a wider context. Following this, the institutions’ formal 
and informal roles in the culture OMC are discussed, followed by a summary. This 
penultimate section of the chapter, 6.4, synthesises the findings to provide an overview 
of the EU’s role, which links into the next chapter looking at the role of the Member 
States and the OMC from their perspective. 
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6.2 T HE  E UROPE AN COMMISSION 
 
This section focuses on the role of the European Commission in the culture OMC.
109
 To 
begin with, it briefly discusses how we can conceptualise the Commission more generally 
within EU governance. This is important because it is not possible to fully understand the 
Commission’s role in the culture OMC without understanding to some extent the 
complexity of its responsibilities and roles within the wider EU policy-making system. 
 
6.2.1 Conceptualising the E uropean Commission’s role in the E U 
The European Commission is an institution “at the very heart of the EU system” (Nugent 
2010, p.105). It is acomplex bureaucratic organisation that occupies several different 
positions depending on what type of policy-making mode it is acting in. In general, the 
Commission’s role can be separated into six areas (Nugent 2010; for more information 
on these roles see his book, chapter 8). The Commission:  
1. Proposes and develops policies and legislation. It enjoys power of policy initiation 
within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP; previously known as co-
decision). 
2. Performs a variety of ‘executive’ politics functions to do with the “management, 
supervision and implementation of EU policies” (Nugent 2010, p.125), including 
making rules, managing the EU’s finances, and supervising the national-level 
implementation of EU policy. 
3. Guards the treaties, the EU’s legal framework. 
4. Represents and negotiates for the EU externally. 
5. Performs a degree of mediation in decision-making, particularly in the Council of 
Ministers. Nugent (2010) argues that because the Commission is present at almost 
all stages of the policy process, it is well-informed of the positions of other actors 
in the system and as a result is often looked to for advice. Egeberg (2010) argues 
that once a proposal has been put to the table, the Commission does its best to see 
that all parties agree and that it is put through. 
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 Although I am using ‘the Commission’ for the sake of simplicity, the culture OMC is the 
responsibility of one unit within the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG-EAC). 
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6. Promotes the general European interest. The Commission is seen as a politically 
neutral body that “should avoid partisanship and look to the good functioning and 
cohesion of the Union as a whole” (Nugent 2010, p.135). 
 
However, the Commission does not necessarily do all of these things for each policy area: 
its role depends on the treaty base and which of the five ‘policy modes’ is involved 
(Wallace and Wallace 2007), as each mode “reveals differences in the roles and behaviour 
of the various key actors, in their variety of approach to policy dilemmas, and in the 
diversity of instruments used” (Wallace and Wallace 2007, p.341). Within the OLP, the 
Commission’s role can be thought of as an agenda setter, a policy shaper, a decision 
maker, an implementer, and an evaluator of policy (V ersluis, van K eulen, and Stephenson 
2011). In the literature, the Commission has therefore been theorised as a policy 
entrepreneur, whereby it can strategically set agendas according to its particular 
circumstances and wishes: “[t]the Commission has specific policy preferences: like any 
bureaucracy it has an incentive to promote its own power and organizational 
development” (Hix 1998, p.52). By authoring the initial proposal, the Commission is able 
to “pre-decide” certain policy options and begin the process of a proposal coming into 
law (Christiansen and Larsson 2007, p.4). 
 
However, the Commission’s role in policy coordination, particularly in policy sectors 
where the EU has a supporting competence, has not been the subject of as much attention. 
On paper at least, the Commission’s role in policy coordination measures such as the 
OMC appears to be less prominent. It is not responsible for proposing legislation but 
rather facilitating the coming-together of Member States to exchange ideas and learn from 
each other. However, as Deganis (2006, p.22-3) reminds us, this is not a neutral activity: 
“[c]onceptualising the Commission as disinterested [sic] authority that simply overlooks 
co-ordinative initiatives taking place among Member States repudiates a substantial body 
of empirical work demonstrating how the Commission, since its inception, has 
continuously pushed to increase its powers within the EU and promoted a further 
integrationist agenda in line with its own interests.” 
 
The OMC is based on creating common understanding and mutual priorities. This process 
is facilitated by the Commission. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Commission’s democratic legitimacy, as an unelected body 
with considerable agenda setting power, has been a strong theme in the literature (Deganis 
2006). There is a dichotomy at play: the Commission is seen as the EU’s most expert and 
neutral body (in that it is working for the ‘greater European good’), and yet as an 
unelected body it has been criticised for its lack of legitimacy. For example, there are 
those who believe that the Commission has too much power as an unelected institution 
with almost sole power of policy initiation within the EU (typically, these come from the 
intergovernmentalist camp). There are others who perceive the Commission as a 
relatively neutral body working diligently towards a better Europe. However, rarely has 
the Commission’s role been examined in terms of its role as a coordinator of policy 
coordination mechanisms, such as the OMC. This is important to look at because of the 
OMC’s lack of treaty basis, weak institutionalisation (Laffan and Shaw 2005), and the 
post-OMC potential of shifting discourse and creating new norms. Even though 
legislation is not being created via the OMC, it still has ‘soft power’ potential to lead to 
change, and the Commission is at the centre of this process. 
 
6.2.2 T he Commission’s formal role in the culture OMC  
Having addressed the Commission’s role in the context of its overall position in EU 
policy-making, this subsection looks specifically at the European Commission and the 
culture Open Method of Coordination. It is split into two parts. In this subsection I discuss 
the Commission’s formal role, which is followed by a discussion on its informal role in 
section 6.2.3. Analytically separating these clearly delineates between expectations at the 
start of the research (formal) – what one might expect – and new knowledge relating to 
the roles and positions of key actors within the OMC (informal). This therefore highlights 
the gaps between expectations and what actually happens in practice. 
 
As explained in chapter two, one of the principles at the heart of the OMC is that it is a 
Member State process. It is for Member States to, 
“exchange good practice, experiences, and so on. They should come back home with 
more knowledge about what is done in certain fields, what can be done and what should 
be done and maybe impact it on national level” (Corrine, Commission, interview, April 
2014). 
 
However, while the OMC is a Member State process, in order to work properly it requires 
central coordination. This is the European Commission’s role. The 2001 White Paper on 
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EU Governance stipulates, as one of its four ‘circumstances’ for the use of the OMC, that 
“the Commission should be closely involved and play a coordinating role” (CEC 2001, 
p.18). However, it is not possible to find a more detailed overview of the Commission’s 
role in the OMC; to find other official descriptions of what the Commission does requires 
a policy sector-specific search of Work Plans and other documents. There is no ‘one’ 
OMC, and different institutional characteristics and setups mean that the Commission’s 
role is slightly different depending on whether the coordination is convergent or 
cooperative (Armstrong 2010; see also chapter 2). We simply cannot ‘deduce’ the role of 
the Commission in the culture OMC according to what happens in other fields, although 
many similarities do exist. Generally, the Commission “presents proposals on the 
European guidelines, organises the exchange of best practices, proposes indicators and 
benchmarks, and provides support to the process of implementation, monitoring, and peer 
review” (de la Porte 2002, p.44). 
 
As previously stated, the culture OMC was proposed and created by the Commission in 
2007 (CEC 2007; McDonald et al. 2013a). The 2007 Agenda for Culture states that, 
“The work plan now needs to be renewed and the Commission believes that the time is 
ripe for Member States to take their cooperation one step further, by using the open 
method of coordination (OMC) as a mechanism to do so, in a spirit of partnership” (CEC 
2007, p.12). 
 
This suggestion was then endorsed by the Council in a November 2007 resolution (see 
chapter 2). That the suggestion of an OMC and its drive into being came from the 
Commission is important. Though they are constricted by subsidiarity, the Commission 
has an interest in furthering EU cultural cooperation and aim to maximise the competence 
within the limits of the treaty:  
 “We always try to push for more competence because in this context and at EU level we 
think that it’s a good way to go, because it’s maybe not always so efficient to ‘go’ only 
national at this stage, so we think that it’s good to coordinate more and more together, 
which of course doesn’t mean imposing anything, or deciding anything, just trying to 
coordinate maximum [sic] and harmonise what can be harmonised … ” (Corrine, 
Commission, interview, April 2014). 
 
The ‘activist’ stance outlined by Corrine tallies with Littoz-Monnet’s (2012, 2015) 
findings of a body that has pushed to achieve further cultural action at the EU level within 
its remit (the possible reasons for this are developed further on in this chapter). 
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The Commission’s formal role in the culture OMC, as outlined in the 2011-2014 Work 
Plan for Culture, is to,  
“provide logistical and secretarial support to the work of the groups. As far as possible, 
it will support the groups by other suitable means (including studies relevant to their field 
of work)” (Council of the European Union 2010, p.9). 
 
The key words in this description are logistical and secretarial. The emphasis in the Work 
Plan is a managerial, facilitative role. Further information is found in the Agenda for 
Culture (CEC 2007), which describes that the Commission would be responsible for 
drafting a “joint [progress] report with high level representations of Member States” 
(p.12) as well as organising stakeholder participation via the biennial Cultural Forums 
and meetings with civil society. Here we see an overlap of the OMC with the DG’s other 
activities, namely the Cultural Forum it organises as well as its ongoing activity with civil 
society experts (see chapter 2 for more information on this). The DG is therefore 
responsible for monitoring progress on the Work Plan (and thus the OMC, as its main 
working method) as a whole, meaning that the Commission has an overview of how the 
policy priorities develop throughout the course of the three-year Work Plan. 
 
The formal descriptions give us some idea of what the Commission’s role is within the 
OMC, but they are vague on how precisely the organisation of the OMC is carried out. It 
is therefore necessary to dig deeper into the day-to-day practices of facilitating the OMC, 
and also more generally about how policy officers see their role, and to what degree of 
‘control’ and power the Commission has in the overall OMC process. We know that the 
Commission occupies a central position in the OMC, but what exactly does it do? 
 
6.2.3 T he Commission’s informal role in the culture OMC  
On paper, the Commission’s role appears to be one that it limited to facilitating, 
managing, and administering the OMC. It is presented in de-politicised way, because 
(political) policy priorities are set by Member States in the Council. However, findings 
suggest it is more complicated than this; they point to a more developed role than the 
Commission’s (limited) role description in the Work Plan suggests. 
 
The word that is most used to describe the Commission’s role in the culture OMC by the 
Commission itself is “secretariat.” One policy officer is assigned per OMC group, and 
follows that group from beginning to end (this fact alone is not intelligible from policy 
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documentation). That individual is responsible for coordinating with Member States on 
the appointment of experts, coordinating with group chairs, organising meetings, and 
distributing information to the group. Fatima, one such policy officer, described her role 
as such: 
“I hold the secretariat – all the basic administrative support, but also support in terms of 
contact. So my role is not only to disseminate information - the agenda, the minutes, all 
that - but give the group specific information on certain topics, of which we have some 
information, reports, studies, and so on, I provide this to them. But the work is done by 
them” (interview, May 2014). 
 
Fatima’s indication that she disseminates information to the OMC groups begins to show 
the gatekeeping and thus agenda-setting role that the Commission can play. However, 
others were even more frank about the way things work in practice:  
  
“The word used is secretariat. I would suggest it’s slightly more” (J ette, Commission, 
interview, May 2014).  
 
“…  the Commission – they’re doing [sic]  much more than it’s written in the documents, 
where it says simply ‘secretariat,’ sending the emails, etc. They do a lot more” (V iktoria, 
Member State expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
 
From the literature on institutions in public policy, we know that informal institutions and 
practices are just as important, and sometimes even more so, than formal rules (see 
chapter 4). From the primary data gathered during fieldwork, there are therefore two main 
points to develop with regards to the Commission’s central role. The first point is the 
DG’s monitoring responsibilities, meaning that it has a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the entire 
OMC process; the second is its responsibilities for the day-to-day operation of the OMC. 
Taken together, these informal practices exemplify the Commission as both a political 
and administrative leader of the culture OMC (Hix 1998, pp.45-6), not simply an 
administrative one as the literature suggests and as one might expect. These two points 
are expanded upon in turn below. 
 
Monitoring 
First of all, the Commission has a unique overview of the entire OMC process that neither 
the Council of Ministers nor the Member States enjoy. In order put this into better 
perspective, it is useful to draft a brief historical timeline, using the 2011-2014 Work Plan 
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as an example. This will show the Commission’s central role in the creation, carrying out, 
and evaluation of the Work Plan.  
 
First of all, the Work Plan and its policy priorities are set in the Council of Ministers. The 
Council, representing the Member States, is (in theory) “to be found at the top of the 
decision-making pyramid, setting the overall objectives to be achieved by the Union” (de 
la Porte 2002, p.44), because the policy priorities are agreed upon there. However, while 
the formal final decision on the Work Plan takes place there, in practice, the Commission 
was found to play a strong role in the creation of the policy priorities:  
“I have to admit that a lot of the drafting work came from the Commission side, as a sort-
of ghost writer. They drafted a lot, which was then amended by the presidency team, but 
not dramatically. It isn’t supposed to be like that! Because it’s a Council work plan, but 
in reality a lot of the preparation was done with intensive cooperation of the Commission 
[civil]  servants” (Darya, Member State representative, interview, April 2014). 
 
This is so because, at any one time, the DG has the most knowledge about progress on 
the Work Plan. The Commission also has a keen sense of what will be accepted in the 
Council, as a Commission official is present at the Council meetings. However, it also 
raises questions about legitimacy. Even though the Council must formally adopt the Work 
Plan, the advanced drafting that the Commission is involved in gives it scope to shape the 
content and direction of the policy themes by advancing certain proposals and not others: 
the “search for cognitive convergence, which is at the heart of the OMC, involves tasks 
the Commission is better able to accomplish that any other institution” (Dehousse 2002, 
p.14, as quoted in Deganis 2006, p.23).  
 
Secondly, the Commission is also responsible for monitoring progress during the period 
of the Work Plan, as well as disseminating the completed OMC groups’ work to the 
Council and any other relevant bodies. A fter each OMC group is finished, the policy 
report 
“… is presented to the EU Member States gathered together in a working committee in 
the Council [Cultural Affairs Committee] . There is a presentation of the report, and then 
at European level we can discuss, politically” (Jette, Commission, interview, May 2014). 
 
However, as will be extrapolated on further below in the discussion of the Council’s role, 
this presentation often occurs rather briefly and is a summary of what has happened rather 
than an opportunity for true dialogue. Therefore, while the Council is informed of what 
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is happening in the OMC groups, it is more of a one-way presentation than a discussion 
(see more on this below). 
 
Finally, towards the end of a three-year Work Plan cycle, the Commission is involved in 
evaluating progress in preparation for the next plan. Slightly ironically, the institution of 
rotating Council presidencies, designed to make the Council more geographically 
representative, equal, and fair in terms of agenda-setting, has meant an increase in the 
Commission’s role: 
“[W]e really feel that we’re holding all of that together as the Commission, because 
[Council]  presidencies come and go. We have the overview of the Work Plan, and we feel 
a bit of an ownership” (Jette, Commission, interview, May 2014). 
 
J ette’s comment highlights two important factors. First of all, the Commission feels 
ownership in part because it has an overview of the entire Work Plan in its role as an 
evaluator and facilitator. Given how the roles are divided up in practice, there is no other 
institution that has the knowledge or capacity to do this. Secondly, this is exacerbated by 
the fact that the presidency of the Council changes every six months, meaning, in the 
period of one Work Plan there will be six presidencies, and a further two or three in the 
period of drafting and evaluating it.
110
 This lack of continuity means that it is the 
Commission who assumes responsibility for evaluating progress. The Council’s Cultural 
Affairs Committee sees the evaluation documentation produced by the Commission, but 
ultimately determining progress on the policy priorities is monitored and determined by 
the latter. 
 
Therefore, due to their overseeing and monitoring responsibilities, the Commission finds 
itself at the centre of the operation of the culture OMC. While this is a less developed role 
than other DGs have in the OMC in other policy fields, this is a central role, giving the 
Commission rather a lot of scope to shape and influence the policy coordination agenda. 
 
Day-to-day management  
The second point to develop with regards to the Commission’s role is that not only does 
it play a role in the creation and overall monitoring of the Work Plan, the DG is also 
responsible for the OMC’s day-to-day management. These tasks include scheduling and 
                                                          
110
 The 2015-2018 Work Plan, released in December 2014, tries to link the policy priority areas more 
closely with the work of the rotating presidencies. 
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organising meetings, taking notes during meetings, coordinating the appointment of 
Member State experts, and supplying additional information when necessary: 
“… we also play a role in the management of the meetings in the sense that when they 
arrive, chairs are often quite new, often their first OMC meeting, so we explain what the 
OMC is, how it works, and we help with managing the meetings. [… ]  [W]e try to guide 
the management of the meeting” (Jette, Commission, interview, May 2014). 
 
On the whole, Member State experts interviewed for this research were of the belief that 
the OMC was administratively well-supported by the Commission. Most had positive 
things to say about the individual policy officers assigned to their group(s): 
“They do their job well. Usually they are highly-qualified people. In bureaucratic terms, 
they do an excellent job, whether it’s the minutes, or the agenda, or the information they 
share with you” (Oskar, expert, interview, J une 2014).
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Expanding on the description of the policy officer’s role above, J ette, an employee of the 
Commission, explained the unique ‘European’ perspective that the Commission’s policy 
officers bring to the OMC groups: 
“…  the people in charge of assisting the groups would also be policy officers so they have 
a deep knowledge of the policy. They also have a European overview – which Member 
States don’t always have, because they represent their country, and they know what 
happens in their country. So we bring in this knowledge and we are able to advise the 
chairs of the meetings with the way for example… typically, we would give advice about 
which external speakers would be very good, whether there was any university research, 
or museum research, or something which is really interesting that they may not always 
know about” (Ibid.). 
 
J ette’s comment is interesting for two reasons. The first is her assertion that the policy 
officers have a ‘European overview’ and expertise that is not shared by any other 
institutions, implying that there is value to be added at a European level and the 
Commission is working for the ‘greater good’ of the Union (Hooghe 1999).
112
 This is also 
the case within the wider EU policy-making picture; the main role that the Commission 
plays – as initiator of policy proposals – means that they often have a good idea of how 
                                                          
111
 This is consistent, for example, with the experience of the European Employment Strategy OMC as 
studied by Deganis (2006). Deganis found that the national representatives commended the Commission 
on their expertise and competence. 
112
 This was not the focus of my fieldwork, so it is impossible to come to a conclusive stance on whether 
this is the case of culture/culture OMC. However, I got the general impression from Commission staff 
that, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity, they want to achieve further integration in the field 
based on the underlying belief that it is in the Union’s best interest and that they were pursuing goals that 
benefit the entire EU. 
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consensus can be achieved via the different parties within the EU. The second is that, by 
directing and funnelling information to the OMC groups, the Commission is in effect 
acting as a gatekeeper, passing on the types of research they see as appropriate. No other 
member of the group has the resources to do so, putting the Commission in a strong 
position to influence the direction of discourse and norms of the groups. In this way, the 
Commission “socializes the players to internalize its conception of issues and objectives” 
(de la Porte 2002, p.44, referring to Goetschy 1999). 
 
The Commission also has another way of influencing the groups through its role in 
appointing an ‘independent’ external facilitator to work with the groups’ chairs, acting as 
facilitator and structuring the general framework of the discussions. Again, this varied a 
bit per group, but this facilitator was someone who the Commission believed to be an 
expert in the topic, and they were able to exert a certain amount of influence within the 
groups. Interestingly, the role of the group’s chair(s) was found to be a determinant in 
how much the Commission was involved: a strong chair with considerable organisational 
skill and capacity to achieve consensus in a heterogeneous group means that the 
Commission rarely has to intervene in the meetings themselves. Conversely, a weak chair 
means that the Commission has a stronger hand in the operation of the meetings. Wasil, 
a Member State expert, described his experience as such:  
“… at the last meeting [the Commission]  took a very …  a big role in steering us; I guess 
they saw that if they don’t, it will be a report with no target group. They were kind of 
editors, which I guess was good. Some of us wanted to be stronger in some 
recommendations, and they said that that’s not our role. There was a discussion within 
the group what [the Commission’s]  mandate was, what our mandate was. In the end it 
was clear to me that they weren’t only facilitating but also had the final say” (interview, 
October 2014). 
 
Wasil’s comments demonstrate just how much influence the Commission can have. In 
one group in Priority A , the Commission wrote most of the final report – typically, this is 
done or coordinated by the elected chair of the group or the external facilitator. This was 
due to the ineffectiveness of the chairs and not a case of the Commission ‘forcing’ itself 
upon the group, however, it demonstrates the centrality of the Commission’s role and just 
how far it can extend in terms of shaping ideas and advancing agendas. Findings from 
other OMCs show similar results. Writing in the case of the Employment OMC, Deganis 
(2006, p.29) found that “[w]hereas a strong Chair will direct Committee proceedings a 
weak Chair will inevitably allow the Commission to assert itself as a dominant actor 
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within EMCO.” Deganis also includes a quote from one of her interviewees, an official 
within DG Employment, who said “… the role of the Commission is sometimes co-chair 
and sometimes more behind the scenes” (2006, p.35, note #20). 
 
6.2.4 Summary of the Commission’s roles in the culture OMC 
The discussion above has demonstrated that the role the European Commission plays 
within the culture Open Method of Coordination is one that is more developed and 
stronger than what one might infer from a formal document analysis, thus demonstrating 
the value of insider work that looks closely at what is going on ‘behind the scenes.’ The 
Commission’s role as both an overseer and day-to-day manager have ultimately meant 
that it “enjoys a superior political presence and visibility” and also “is in a better position 
than others to manage the content and the directions of the information flows within the 
group” (Borrás 2007, n.p.). Not only does the DG play a hand in drafting the Work Plan’s 
overarching policy priorities – a role that, on paper, appears exclusively in the domain of 
the Council – it also has input into the final policy reports, “structures the framework in 
which different players are to interact, and contributes to the structuring of the discourse 
through the documents it prepares” (de la Porte 2002, p.44, referring to Goetschy 1999). 
We might therefore say that even though the OMC is ‘by and for’ the Member States, the 
Commission has a great deal of influence and plays, in the words of one commentator, a 
“situation-defining role” (Nedergaard 2005, p.12; emphasis in the original) in the culture 
OMC. 
 
Findings therefore show that the Commission occupies both a political and administrative 
leadership role in the administration and management of the culture OMC: 
 
T able 6.1 E uropean Commission’s roles in culture OMC 
Political Administrative 
 Drafting the Work Plan; 
 Monitoring progress of policy 
priorities in the Work Plan; 
 A iding Member States in the 
appointment of participating experts; 
 Appointing the external facilitator; 
 Writing the report;* 
 Evaluating progress of the Work Plan 
in general; 
 Organising meetings; 
 Taking notes at OMC meetings; 
 Distributing minutes. 
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 Distributing material such as case 
study information, studies, and other 
such reports; 
 Disseminating groups’ outputs to the 
Council’s Cultural Affairs 
Committee. 
 
*Note that this role was only performed once in 
the three OMCs studied. 
 
 
This assessment raises crucial questions about the balance of power dynamics in the 
culture OMC and by extension in EU policy coordination in general: while the OMC is 
meant to be by and for the Member States, in reality it is driven by the Commission (as 
we will see in the next chapter, some Member State representatives do not understand the 
purpose of the OMC and do not know why they are at the meetings). No other actor in 
the process has as much knowledge about or involvement in the OMC at any one time 
than the policy officer(s) in the Commission, nor does any other actor have the 
Commission’s policy expertise and its ability to achieve consensus through knowledge of 
Member States’ positions. The Commission’s central place in this process is therefore 
one that enables it to influence and set certain terms of reference, and the OMC’s political 
objectives “represent a powerful learning instrument, insofar as they are expected to 
destabilise prior understandings of issues and thus lead to incremental changes via an 
ideational shift in framing policy problems” (de la Porte and Pochet 2012, p.340). 
 
This makes the Commission a powerful actor in the culture OMC. Taken together with 
literature on agenda-setting in EU cultural policy and on the Commission’s agenda-
setting power in general, it shows that the Commission is a driving force behind continued 
policy coordination in the field, and not simply an apolitical facilitator. This reinforces 
the need for more studies of the OMC to probe into the roles of EU institutions in 
facilitating policy coordination in more detail, since  policy coordination exercises imply 
the (re-)construction of norms. In this case, these norms are in large part constructed by 
the Commission, in its role in the creation and evaluation of the policy priorities and in 
the management of the OMC groups, which enables the Commission to influence the 
platform for discussion and exchange in what is meant to be a Member State process. I 
now turn to the other important EU organisation in the culture OMC, the Council of the 
European Union. 
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6.3 T HE  COUNCIL  OF  T HE  E UROPE AN UNION 
 
This section addresses the role of the Council of the European Union, also known as the 
Council of Ministers, in the culture OMC. As with the Commission, the analysis of the 
Council’s role in the culture OMC is split between formal role and informal practices. As 
above, I first start with its general position with the European Union. 
 
6.3.1 Conceptualising the Council’s role in the E U 
This subsection situates the Council of Ministers within the broader framework of EU 
governance. The Council is the body that represents the interests of the Member States 
and is composed of current ministers from Member States’ national governments. In the 
Community method, the Council shares legislative power with the European Parliament, 
making it “more or less a permanent negotiating forum and recurrent international 
conference” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, p.2). Broadly, the role of the Council is 
to evaluate legislation from the point of view of perceived benefits or losses to citizens in 
their Member State. The workings of the Council are additionally complicated by the 
institution of the rotating presidency, which changes every six months.
113
  
 
The Council’s organisational structure is highly complex. It is composed of: 
 National ministers, who sit in one of ten Council configurations; 
 the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER I and COREPER II); 
 Working committees and parties; and 
 the General Secretariat, the body of 3,500 civil servants responsible for 
administratively supporting the Council and the work of its rotating presidencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113
 Trio presidencies were implemented with the 2007 Treaty of L isbon, which means that three Member 
States cooperate together in terms of political priorities, although the presidency is only held by one state 
at a time. 
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Figure 6.1: Decision making in the Council 
 
 
 
Source: University of Portsmouth
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Within the OLP, proposals (dossiers) come to the Council and are sent to one of more 
than 150 working parties and committees (in the case of cultural matters, it is the 
aforementioned Cultural Affairs Committee). From the working committee, points that 
have not reached agreement or consensus are flagged to be dealt with at COREPER level. 
This means, as shown in Figure 6.1, that if agreement is reached at working committee 
level, the item is formally adopted in the Council without discussion among the EU-28 
Culture Ministers. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is a 
network of permanent ambassadors and Member State representatives in Europe and is 
the next ‘level’ of hierarchy in the Council. The ‘permreps’ are a combination of senior-
level diplomats from the Member States as well as seconded representatives from national 
ministries. COREPER is split into two bodies, COREPER I and II (with only the former 
concerning cultural policy, as a part of social policy). Proposals that have not reached 
consensus in working parts are debated within COREPER and then finally presented to 
the relevant Council. The Council system is thus one that, 
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 Available online at http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-1-understanding-eu-
institutions/the-council-of-the-european-union/the-legislative-function-of-the-council/ [accessed 4 June 
2016]. 
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depends on a crucial assumption that there is give and take between the positions of the 
member states, and that, whatever the starting positions of the members, there is both 
scope for those positions to evolve and a predisposition to find agreement (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006, p.17). 
 
A high percentage of decisions are ‘settled’ at committee and COREPER level,
115
 
meaning that the vast majority of decisions are taken without a formal vote, since these 
bodies operate by consensus.
116
 Of the issues that reach ministerial level in the Council – 
those that are not settled at working party or COREPER level – only 14% of these are 
“explicitly contested” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, p.259).
117
 It is via this 
complicated system that EU legislation is passed in the Council. 
 
The Cultural Affairs Committee, composed of seconded permanent representatives from 
the Member States (typically individuals who have extensive experience in their national 
ministry of culture or equivalent), “prepares the work of EU ministers for culture in a 
wide range of areas relating to EU cultural cooperation and to cultural cooperation 
between the EU and non-EU countries” (Council of the European Union 2015b, n.p.). 
One member of CAC describes her role as such: 
“I am trying to coordinate all cultural files that have a European angle to them, and 
trying to be the mediator between the European policy and [country]’s policy” (Darya, 
Member State representative, interview, April 2014). 
 
The committee meets roughly once a month (Corrine, Commission, interview, April 
2014). These meetings are also attended by at least one Commission official, as well an 
administrator from the Council’s General Secretariat (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
2006).
118
 Permreps in the CAC operate “on the basis of instructions emanating from their 
respective national capitals” (Ibid., p.97).
119
 Achieving consensus is an important 
principle at the committee level as well. 
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 Calculations on this exact percentage vary: Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006) suggest 90%; 
K uosmanen (1998), quoted in Nugent (2010), suggests 75-85%; and Häge (2008)’s calculations are 65%. 
116
 It is not until proposals reach the minister stage that formal votes are taken. 
117
 Half of these are on agriculture and fisheries (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
118
 Culture in the General Secretariat is represented by a small unit in DG-E. It is composed of one head 
of unit, three policy officers, and two assistants. These individuals view themselves as independent and 
impartial and describe their role as one of advising and supporting (Alfred and Beatrice, Council, 
interviews, April 2014). 
119
 Unfortunately, the innerworkings of the CAC are still rather elusive. The committee would benefit 
from more academic attention, since it is difficult to ascertain exactly what goes on in practice as the 
meetings are closed and the minutes are not made public (common problems those studying the Council 
face). Analytically, we can only extrapolate from what is known generally about the working committees 
in that their role is to “reduce the number of problem areas to be dealt with by Coreper and subsequently 
by the Council” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, p.99). 
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6.3.2 T he Council’s formal role in the culture OMC 
This subsection introduces the Council’s formal role in the culture Open Method of 
Coordination. As discussed in chapter 3, the roles of the EU institutions have not been 
the focus of much research on the OMC. The Council has received even less attention 
than the Commission. It is usually only referred to in passing as the body that sets 
common policy priorities. Given this main role, this omission is somewhat surprising. As 
the first ‘principle’ of the OMC is to jointly identify and define objectives (adopted by 
the Council), in theory at least, the Council’s role is very important. 
 
‘New’ methods of governance pose an analytical challenge because “they occupy an 
unsettled constitutional space” (Armstrong 2008, p.416, quoted in Puetter 2014, p.45). It 
is difficult to determine the Council’s overall role within the OMC as first of all, it is 
sector-specific, and secondly, much of its activities are done behind closed doors and not 
easily accessible by the public, making it difficult to determine exactly how decisions are 
made and according to what criteria. The obvious place to turn to for a formal description 
of the Council’s role in the culture OMC is the 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture. 
However, it is not clear from the Work Plan exactly what the Council is responsible for. 
It is mentioned in the body of the document as well in one point in the “Principles relating 
to the setting up and functioning of the working groups”: 
 
“INV ITE THE PRESIDENCIES OF THE COUNCIL  TO:  
—  take into account, in the context of the trio Presidency, the Work Plan priorities when 
developing their programme, to report on the implementation of the Work Plan and to build upon 
the results achieved,  
—  in particular, organise, when appropriate:  
—  a meeting of senior officials of Ministries of Culture with a view to discussing and 
taking up the results obtained in the Work Plan,  
—  a joint informal meeting of senior officials of Ministries of Culture and senior officials 
responsible for culture in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with a view to developing a 
strategic approach to culture in external relations and enhancing cooperation in this field,  
—  consider organising, in the context of the implementation of the Work Plan, meetings of senior 
officials of Ministries of Culture and senior officials from other policy domains” (Council of the 
European Union 2010, p.2) 
 
In addition, the Work Plan also specifies that the chairs of the OMC groups will report 
“as necessary” (Ibid., p.9) to the Cultural Affairs Committee regarding progress in the 
various groups. It also says that the CAC will be allowed to “give guidance to the working 
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groups in order to guarantee the desired outcome and the coordination of the groups’ 
work” (Ibid.). In addition, the Council presidencies are invited to incorporate the Work 
Plan’s priorities into their programmes, exchange results and findings with senior officials 
in EU-28 Ministries of Culture, and create dialogue with other policy fields. From this 
description, we would expect there to be a certain amount of dialogue between the 
Presidencies, Member States, and Commission.  
 
On paper, then, the Council’s main activity is during the creation of the Work Plans as 
well as evaluating progress afterwards (in preparation for the next one). With the 
exception of the points outlined above, they do not have much to do with the carrying out 
or implementation of coordination, which is the shared responsibility of the Commission 
and Member States. The Council’s role appears to be limited but crucial – to establish 
themes and sub-topics within the Work Plan and monitor progress on these themes so that 
it can prepare the next Work Plan. In the words of a manager in the Council Secretariat, 
the Council of Ministers “act[s] as a platform to set out a strategy” for the Work Plan’s 
policy priorities (Alfred, interview, April 2014). Identifying common aims and objectives 
thus “shows a consensus on certain things, certain priorities” (Fatima, Commission, 
interview, May 2014), since the Council represents the interests of Member States.  
 
6.3.3 T he Council’s informal role in the culture OMC 
I now turn to what happens in practice. Section 6.2.3 above outlined the timeline of the 
2011-2014 Work Plan, and indicated that while the Council is technically responsible for 
drafting the policy priorities, in practice this is largely steered by the Commission. One 
member of the CAC described the process as such: 
“The Commission based their drafting on the experience of the previous Work Plan and 
the results and recommendations that resulted from the OMC groups that worked in that 
framework. So it was just a matter of selecting the recommendations that were more or 
less realistic and then trying to put them into a coherent framework” (Darya, Member 
State representative, interview, April 2014). 
 
Similarly, Corrine, a policy officer in the Commission, described the lead-up to the 2015-
2018 Work Plan
120
 and how the process operates: 
                                                          
120
 The 2015-2018 Work Plan was in the process of being negotiated as I undertook fieldwork in Brussels 
in spring 2014. 
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“The Commission is proposing something to the CAC for them to discuss, and we’ve done 
a consultation of the CAC members [… ]  about what they want for the next Work Plan” 
(Corrine, Commission, interview, April 2014). 
 
Corrine further specified that timing (duration) of the OMC groups, the selection 
procedure for experts, and policy themes, as three main topics of discussion. Her insight 
demonstrates once again that the Commission has more involvement in the setting of 
priorities than what one might assume, although this is in the form of influence rather than 
absolute control over the process. 
 
During the operation of the groups, the outputs, a best practice or policy manual, are 
presented to the Cultural Affairs Committee. V iktoria, one expert who was interviewed, 
had participated in an OMC group but was also a member of the CAC, said that, 
“There is not such a strong relation between OMC groups and the Council. For me it 
was easier because I was a member of both! But at the end of the day, it’s very different 
how Member States coordinate their work with regards to the OMC groups, their 
contacts, and their relation to the decision-makers. I believe here there could be a lot 
more done” (interview, October 2014). 
 
Asked why there was a disconnect between the work of the OMC groups and the CAC, 
V iktoria expanded, 
“It’s mainly because of lack of time. Some from the group – usually chairs – come to the 
CAC and present the work, but it’s one of the point on the agenda, and it’s done once. A 
lot of workload, other things you have to deal with – sometimes members of the CAC 
simply do not have time to read everything. The reports are long. [… ]  Maybe it would be 
fine if the work was closely connected, if chairs of the working groups would come to 
CAC more often – maybe in between and during their work, to present what they’ve done 
[so far] . Afterwards, we don’t have a system to check what has been done” (Ibid.). 
 
Therefore, while the CAC is informed of the outputs of the groups, this is done post-OMC 
only, and not during the operation of the groups. In addition, as V iktoria indicates, there 
is not much opportunity for back-and-forth dialogue between the OMC groups and the 
CAC. This was also raised by Edward, a Commission staff member, who said that: 
“The Council is set up to be a decision-making body and whether it works well as a forum 
for non-decision-making exchange, which OMC is all about, is a good question” 
(interview, April 2014). 
 
Edward’s comment highlights the fact that the ideas raised in the reports often do not 
‘travel’ as far at the EU level (and, by definition, to the Member States – see chapter 7) 
as they could, due to a lack of opportunity for discussion.  
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This leads onto the next crucial point, which is that the results of the OMC work do not 
reach the ‘high politics’-level politicians (in this case, the ministers of culture for EU-28). 
As will be further discussed in chapters 7 and 8, the current method of dissemination and 
lack of feedback and linkages to national cultural policy means that visibility of the OMC 
beyond the invited experts is poor. There is a sense that the work done in OMC groups 
remains there, and that the dissemination that is done in the Council could be more robust, 
linking the work of the OMC groups more strongly to both the priorities of Council 
presidencies, but also to the national level. The work done in OMC groups should be 
relevant for all ‘levels’ – working parties, COREPER, and the ministers – in the Council, 
as well as national ministries (ideally for regional/local bodies as well).  
  
Despite this, according to one member of the CAC,  
“There is a very very strong participation in the debates in the Council, very alive. 
Member States are really are in favour of continuing this exercise and changing and 
learning from past experiences” (Ulla, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
Ulla’s comments challenge some of the difficulties in governing cultural policy in a multi-
level setting and of the OMCs: culture is a politically-sensitive competence, and the work 
of the OMC lacks a robust system of dissemination in the Council to ensure its relevance 
to the national level. Y et, it is an exercise that seems to be is appreciated and favoured 
within the Council. The Commission has therefore succeeded at institutionalising the 
OMC, at least to some degree. However, while there is a degree of engagement at the 
committee level, there is a lack of dissemination within the EU-28’s top cultural officials, 
meaning that instead of vertical and horizontal policy dialogue, the visibility of the OMC 
and the ideas it produces does not translate into all levels of the Council. This is in part 
due to the loosely defined goals of the OMC, which will be expanded on in more detail 
in chapter 8. 
 
6.3.4 Summary of the Council of Ministers’ role in the culture OMC 
The discussion above has highlighted the differences between the Council’s formal role 
in the culture OMC and what happens in practice. The Council is a complex, multi-
layered body that operates on the norm of consensus-seeking. I have demonstrated how 
the Council plays a more limited role in practice than what might be assumed from 
reading the Work Plan. While the Council is still the institution responsible for formal 
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adoption of the Work Plan, it does not occupy a leadership role in the operation of the 
culture OMC. 
 
Therefore, while the Work Plan is officially a Council document, the Council does not 
play a major role in managing the OMC groups or creating the policy priorities. This is 
facilitated by the European Commission, although the Council, via the Cultural Affairs 
Committee, is informed of the results of the OMC work. The consensus among the 
Commission and Member State experts, however, is that there is space for a more hands-
on role in the Council, “through the promotion of well-defined dissemination and 
communication strategies on behalf of national ministries” (Psychogiopoulou 2015b, 
p.46). 
 
The second finding is that the culture OMC has low visibility among top cultural policy 
officials in the Council/Member States. The extent to which OMCs have been visible and 
politicised varies across policy fields. Radaelli (2003, p.8) has argued that the 
preconditions are there for both a low and high level of politicisation, as “on the one hand, 
[the OMC] works on innovation and improvement on a case-by-case basis,” which 
“should keep politicisation at low levels.” However, “the aim in the OMC is to promote 
convergence and coordination at the highest political levels, notably at the European 
Council. This makes politicisation unavoidable” (Ibid.). As a supporting competence 
restricted by the principle of subsidiarity, in theory this is a necessary enough condition 
for the ‘high politicisation’ of culture: Member States do not want to transfer more powers 
to the EU and do not desire more European integration in this field (Littoz-Monnet 2007). 
That makes it sensitive and controversial. On the other hand, the OMC in general has 
been criticised for its political irrelevance at the national level (K röger 2009, Borrás and 
Radaelli 2010) due to low visibility and low adaptation pressures. 
 
Findings indicate a similar situation for culture. However, there is a paradox: the strict 
adherence to the principle of subsidiarity means that Member States keep a close eye on 
what happens in the EU in the field of culture, yet, there is low visibility of the OMC 
among the EU’s top cultural officials. Most obviously, this is because the ‘results’ of 
policy coordination are never presented directly to national top officials, meaning that it 
is harder to connect the OMC work back to the national level (nationally-appointed 
experts are relied on for this; see chapter 7). The linkages to learning, to be addressed in 
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chapter 8, begin to emerge at this point: has any learning taken place? If so, is it being 
‘passed on’ and/or effectively communicated to the national level? Or is the OMC simply 
a technocratic exercise? 
 
6.4 SY NT HE SISING T HE  CUL T UR E  OMC FR OM T HE  POINT  OF 
V IE W OF T HE  E U 
 
In thinking about the EU’s role in the culture OMC, the findings presented in this chapter 
highlight a paradox: the OMC is a Member State process, but was created by and is 
coordinated by and heavily dependent on EU institutions, specifically the European 
Commission. If it were not for the Commission, would a culture OMC exist? Evidence 
points to no, as the impetus for implementing the OMC came heavily from the 
Commission and has been steered by them since. The roles described in this chapter 
indicate differences between formal role descriptions and what happens in practice in the 
culture OMC, a key finding that also became an organising principle in this chapter. From 
this, conclusions can begin to be drawn about the roles of these key actors and how these 
practices impact the overall outcomes of the culture OMC. 
 
The European Commission has a more prominent role than its formal description would 
suggest. The Commission is responsible for not only the day-to-day operation of the OMC 
groups but also an overview of the Work Plan. It therefore sits at the epicentre of 
coordination. As the central body responsible for drafting policy priorities, facilitating the 
OMC, and monitoring progress of the Work Plan it is in a position to shape many of the 
terms and conditions of coordination. In doing so it enables the Commission influence 
the direction of policy coordination, “advancing a particular vision of what appropriate 
policy is about” (K röger 2009, p.12). A  related angle to this, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the chapters to come, is some invited experts’ confusion surrounding the 
purpose of the OMC and the Commission’s role. For example, Nils, one expert, 
proclaimed that, 
“… if we want to make more clear the role of the Commission in the process, we need to 
understand the Commission’s idea [with the OMC] and why they give us the subject to 
work on” (interview, J une 2014). 
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From this comment alone we can see that for Nils, despite participating in an OMC group 
that was finished, is not clear on why the group got together in the first place. It shows 
not only that the logic of policy coordination is not always made clear to the participants, 
but it is an example of how the Commission is perceived by experts as the driver of 
coordination. It has led one scholar to rename the OMC the Open Method of 
Centralisation (Smismans 2004). 
 
Conversely, the Council of Ministers, the ‘voice of the Member States,’ was shown to 
play a less prominent role than what one might expect. The body has final approval on 
the Work Plan and thus approves the policy priorities, but these have been largely shaped 
by the Commission as ‘ghost writers.’ In addition, the Cultural Affairs Committee is 
informed of the OMC groups’ conclusions, but they do not play any role during the OMC 
meetings, nor does there appear to be time for true dialogue about the policy themes and 
issues. This demonstrates a disconnect between the policy priorities outlined in the Work 
Plan, their relative importance at the national level, and how the OMC works in linking 
them. This is a complex topic that will be further expanded on in chapters 7 and 8.  
 
The link between the OMC and national level policy is weak and not well understood 
(Borrás and Radaelli 2010, Zeitlin 2011). However, as the body representing the direct 
interests of Member States, there is more that could be done in the Council to support the 
OMC work and communicate it more widely at the Member State level – dissemination 
that goes beyond simply that which is done by the expert (see chapter 7). Why this is not 
done was attributed to a lack of time and resources to properly address the OMC reports 
within the CAC. In the 2013 Ecorys survey, out of 93 respondents, 51.6% said that 
programming the OMC work through the Council Work Plans was relevant “to a great 
extent,” with 35.5% saying “to a modest extent” (McDonald et al. 2013a, p.26). However, 
most experts that were interviewed for this research were not familiar with the Council’s 
role. This is because they had no interaction with anyone from the Council, but also 
because the institutional complexity of the Work Plan, and how and why it is created, is 
poorly understood among the experts, and was not explained to participants: 
“It wasn’t quite clear to me how the OMC was interconnected with the CAC, the group 
from the Council of Ministers. So I think they were kind of informed, but if they did 
anything with it? To me it’s not totally clear” (Markus, Member State expert, interview, 
June 2014). 
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Markus’ comments further reflect the sense of disconnect between the work of the 
Council and OMC groups: there is a role for increased involvement from the Council in 
connecting the work of the OMC more clearly to national cultural ministries where it 
could be made clearer to the designated experts what is expected of them and how their 
work feeds into national policy processes (see more on this in chapter 7). 
 
The Commission has consistently, both in the evaluation of the 2008-2010 and 2011-2014 
Work Plans, recommended that the work of the OMC groups be more closely tied to the 
Council’s rotating presidencies (McDonald et al. 2013a, 2013b; CEC 2014). However, 
this connection was made clearest in the 2015-2018 Work Plan, published in December 
2014; one of the guiding principles is: 
“To build on the achievements of the previous Work Plan for Culture (2011-2014) while 
adding to it a more strategic dimension in order to reinforce the link between the Work 
Plan and the work of the Council and its rotating presidencies” (Council of the European 
Union 2014, p.4). 
 
This suggests that the Commission recognises that there needs to be a stronger link 
between the OMCs and the Council – also a finding of this work and a point that will be 
developed further throughout the remaining chapters. 
 
From the literature on EU cultural policy, we know that the Commission has pushed, 
perhaps tentatively at times, for further coordination in the field since the early 1990s 
(Littoz-Monnet 2012, 2015). As formal guardians of the treaty, the Commission’s first 
responsibility is consideration for the principle of subsidiarity. This means that while the 
Commission cannot create an ‘EU-wide’ cultural policy, it can and does maximise its 
power within the narrow remit of the competence. One commentator has speculated that 
by positioning itself as the institution with the most knowledge and expertise on the policy 
issues in question, the Commission has been able to make up for its lack of formal 
leadership role within non-legislative modes of governance (Jabko 2004, in Deganis 
2006). This is an interesting perspective and one that appears to be the case here, given 
comments made by J ette, a mid-level civil servant in the Commission, above concerning 
the ‘added value’ and ‘European overview’ that the Commission brings to the process.  
 
The Commission therefore takes the position that it is acting for the greater good of 
Europe in advancing(further) policy coordination. Appropriate action is based on a logic 
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of practices centred on knowledge, experience, and authority (March and Olsen 2009). 
As the Council operates around consensus, the more ‘radical’ viewpoints on either side 
can usually be mollified with small changes in the wording or focus of the documents.
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In addition, the linkage of the Work Plan’s goals with Europe 2020 objectives gives them 
greater legitimacy, and it is the Council who is involved with the management of Europe 
2020 (Laffan and Shaw 2005). Ultimately, “[i]t seems unlikely [… ] that [the 
Commission’s] autonomy …  is of such strength and breadth as to dictate directions that 
go against the will of the member states” (Psychogiopoulou 2015b, p.45). In other words, 
the Commission will not propose anything drastic that is knows would not be accepted in 
the Council, is rather maximising potential within the competence in ‘by stealth’ (Edward, 
Commission, interview, May 2014), or in a ‘creeping’ manner (Princen and Rhinard 
2006). The Commission thus has a great deal of influence, but not absolute power: “[t]he 
Commission is simply not strong enough to lead the EU, regardless of who its president 
is. But the Commission remains the straw that stirs the drink when it comes to advances 
in European policy cooperation” (Peterson 2015, p.206).  
 
6.5 CONCL USION 
 
This chapter told the story of the culture Open Method of Coordination from the 
perspective of the two European institutions involved in its operation, the European 
Commission and Council of the European Union. The primary purpose of the chapter was 
to investigate what exactly these institutions do in the organisation and facilitation of the 
culture OMC. This perspective, as previously mentioned, is often overlooked in the study 
of the OMC: impacts (or lack thereof) of the OMC at the national level are the primary 
area of focus of much of the existing literature. However, examining their roles is just as 
important as determining whether the OMC has had any effect domestically, and even 
more so in the case of policy coordination where the policy areas in consideration are 
those that the EU occupies a supporting role only. This approach thus represents a novel 
contribution to the literature. 
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 The vagueness and looseness of the policy priorities and OMC groups has been attributed to greater 
potential for achieving consensus in the Council. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
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Prior to fieldwork, all knowledge about these roles came from official documentation; 
one would assume from that that the Council played a strong agenda-setting role and the 
Commission a facilitation role. The chapter thus has a particular focus on the ‘gaps’ 
between formal and informal institutions, roles, and practices – the added insight and new 
knowledge that has come from fieldwork. This has demonstrated the value of ‘insider’ 
information gained from interviews and participant observation. 
 
One of the paradoxes in the culture OMC is that it is articulated repeatedly as a Member 
State process, driven by the Member States themselves in the Council. However, it is one 
that is was created by and is now steered heavily by the Commission in both a political 
and adminstrative role. While the Commission’s policy officers say that they are 
facilitating and adding value, a majority also believe that more can be done in terms of 
EU cultural cooperation – within the treaty’s legal limits – and are advancing an agenda 
that aspires to this. The Council has acted in a more restrained manner, aware and attune 
to the principle of subsidiarity, yet has ultimately agreed to further cooperation in the 
spirit of consensus and under the narrow remit of the EU’s powers in the field. 
 
At this point it is now necessary to tackle the OMC from the perspective of the Member 
States. This is the subject of the next chapter, which analyses the complex and multi-level 
role of the Members States in the culture OMC. Chapter 8 then links chapters 6 and 7 and 
discusses the goals and aims of the OMC in the context of policy learning and mutual 
exchange. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
CHAPT E R  7: T HE  CULT UR E  OPE N 
ME T HOD OF COOR DINAT ION AND 
T HE  ME MBE R  STAT E S 
 
 
“PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: The Union must renew the Community method by 
following a less top-down approach and complementing its policy tools more 
effectively with non-legislative instruments.” 
Commission of the European Communities (2001, p.2)   
 
“… diversity is the founding principle of the European Union.” 
Robert Picht (1994, p.278) 
 
 
7.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
Having examined the culture Open Method of Coordination from the perspective of the 
European Union institutions in the previous chapter, this chapter tells the story of the 
OMC from the point of view of the Member States. This is therefore the second of two 
chapters that work together to outline the process of the culture Open Method of 
Coordination – the roles of the key actors and institutions involved in the OMC’s setup, 
organisation, and operation.  
 
As previously explained, it is the Member State level that has been most commonly 
studied within the existing body of OMC research (Borrás and Radaelli 2010), with the 
most common research design being the examination of whether or not policy learning 
and/or change has occurred in individual Member States as a result of the OMC. 
However, as this chapter argues, the role of the Member States is complex, and must be 
studied from a more holistic approach so that the multi-level, fragmented nature of 
Member States’ participation is able to be taken into account. This complexity emerged 
throughout my fieldwork; in the literature, the ‘Member States’ tend to be treated as a 
singular unit of analysis. The objective of this chapter is not to evaluate the OMC in terms 
of success in Member States – that will be discussed in chapter 8 – but to rather, as in the 
previous chapter, explore the various roles involved. Through this, the complexity of 
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Member States’ participation is shown. While one might expect there to be many 
differences in Member State approaches to the OMC among the EU-28, there are also 
factions within and among the different levels of participation within a Member State, 
and this must be reflected and incorporated into the analysis. 
 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 7.2 conceptualises the Member 
States’ role in the OMC process and argues that their participation is more complex and 
multi-layered than what the literature suggests. It introduces three categories of levels of 
nested and interconnected Member State participation: the Council, ministry, and expert 
levels. Section 7.3 builds on the arguments advanced in chapter 2 and expands on the 
logic of policy coordination – why might Member States want to coordinate cultural 
policy? Sections 7.4 and 7.5 look at what exactly the Member States do before, during, 
and after the OMC.
122
 It is divided temporally because of the distinct roles involved – 
particularly in the appointment of before an OMC round and the dissemination 
afterwards. This section goes into minute detail on the types of experts and how the 
meetings themselves operate. Finally, section 7.6 synthesises the role of the Member 
States in the Open Method of Coordination. As with chapter 6, the sources of information 
for this chapter mainly come from the empirical information gathered during fieldwork. 
This is supplemented by the OMC literature in other fields and by the Ecorys survey. 
 
7.2 CONCE PT UAL ISING T HE  R OL E  OF T HE  ME MBE R  ST AT E S 
 
This section picks apart the role of the Member States in the culture Open Method of 
Coordination. This is essential in order to fully set the multi-faceted role of the Member 
States in context. At first glance, this might seem obvious – in much EU governance 
literature there is a common distinction between ‘European Union’ and ‘national’ levels 
of governance. However, I found this was too simplistic to accurately reflect the complex 
dynamics of policy coordination. It is not easy to ‘pin down’ the role of the Member 
States because of the multi-faceted and multi-level nature of their participation, and 
treating the Member States as a single unit of analysis is misleading.  
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 By ‘OMC’, I mean a specific group’s cycle (5-6 meetings), with a completed report at the end, not 
each meeting individually or the whole Work Plan period (three years) as a whole. 
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Instead, I have categorised Member States’ participation into three different spheres 
which more accurately encapsulates the different roles involved. First of all, via the 
Council, Member States are responsible for creating the three-year Work Plans for 
Culture, in which the policy priorities and specific themes for the time period are outlined. 
As detailed more in the previous chapter, the Council and its committees are composed 
of representatives from Member States whose job it is to act in the interest of their 
country. However, we also know that the Commission plays a stronger role in the setting 
of priorities than what appears on paper. This is the first ‘level’ of Member State 
participation. Secondly, Member States are also responsible for coordinating 
participation and participating in the OMC groups. This involves two different levels of 
actors: the ministry level, where the decision is typically made about which expert will be 
appointed per group, and the expert level, the individual(s) who represents their Member 
State in the group.  
 
The role of the ‘Member States’ can therefore be broken down into these three nested and 
interrelated categories, typifying the ‘multi-level’ nature of European governance and the 
OMC: 
1. Council level: Comprised of the ministers for culture of national governments, as 
well as national representatives in COREPER and the Cultural Affairs 
Committee;
123
 
2. Ministry level: National-level ministries of culture, which are responsible for 
coordinating the appointment of the expert and dictating the nature of 
participation; and 
3. Expert level: The appointed expert(s) participating in the working groups’ 
meetings.  
 
Given that this system exists in 28 different Member States, the role of the national level 
in the OMC is therefore very complex. Treating it analytically as one is dangerous as it 
implies congruence among these levels. The significance of this complexity is to do with 
the communication and interaction between these levels, and the necessity of clear 
dialogue and direction among them. In the EU the “co-ordination chain extends from that 
within each ministry and interministerial co-ordination (of both a vertical and horizontal 
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 Given that the Council itself is such a complex institution, this could, in fact, be broken down even 
further (see chapter 6). It is the working party committee level that has the most to do with the OMC. 
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nature) at domestic level, to co-ordinating the domestic-EU interaction and then to co-
ordinating within Brussels” (Wright 1996, p.149 as cited in K assim, Peters, and Wright 
2000, p.6). This is a great deal of coordination. The more layers of participation, the 
greater potential for divergence between them. Therefore, if policy coordination is to be 
‘effective,’ there is a need for visibility, awareness and clarity, and ownership of 
participation of among all three levels. 
 
7.3 T HE  MOT IV AT ION BE HIND CUL T URAL  POL ICY  
COOR DINAT ION 
 
Before detailing the roles of the Member States, it is necessary to first ask some basic 
questions about why states participate in a policy coordination exercise in the first place. 
This discussion builds on section 2.5 in chapter 2, which looked at the development of 
the culture OMC in 2007/2008. We know how the culture OMC was created, but this 
section concerns how and why Member States take part in it. A lthough the OMC “is 
designed to help Member States progressively develop their own policies” (Regent 2003, 
p.210), it is not always self-evident why states participate in this voluntary process. This 
is particularly important given that the balance of power in cultural policy matters still 
rests with the Member States. In addition, it is a voluntary process, so what are the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of participating? 
 
As previously discussed, the European Commission was instrumental in initiating the 
OMC in this field. As one Commission policy officer describes,  
“…  there was some reluctance to establish an OMC in culture. Some Member States 
didn’t want that. Now they are happy with it, but they are always very …  attentive …  to 
what we are doing and why, and any formulation that could give the impression that 
we’re trying to take the lead or do something is immediately raised and erased. Because 
of the subsidiarity principle” (Corrine, interview, April 2014). 
 
Though the OMC is coordinated and managed by the Commission, the benefits of 
coordination should be clear to Member States; it is, after all, a Member State process. 
The policy priorities have been approved in the Council and therefore in theory at least, 
have some political weight behind them. Corrine’s comments regarding subsidiarity also 
reinforce this assumption: Member States retain control over their own cultural policies 
and are particularly attentive to any attempt to further cooperation. 
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Participation in OMC groups is voluntary – Member States decide themselves whether 
they want to join. The Commission does not have the authority to command or force states 
to participate. This is also the case with the OMC in other fields; it is a process “respecting 
legitimate national diversity… without seeking to homogenize [Member States’] inherited 
policy regimes and institutional arrangements” (Zeitlin 2005c, p.218). However, the 
participation rate in the first two cycles of the culture OMC (2008-2010 and 2011-2014) 
has been relatively high, with 20-25 Member States participating regularly (McDonald et 
al. 2013a). There are many reasons that states and experts choose to take part in the OMC. 
Analytically it is difficult to separate these two because, when interviewed, experts tended 
to speak of why they personally, in a professional capacity, participated, or why they 
thought their state would. In other words, experts did not say “[my country] participates 
because… ” – they generally did not authoritatively speak for their Member State in this 
manner, reflecting that most experts are not high-ranking public employees with a lot of 
responsibility for decision-making.  
 
Motivations and reasons for participation typically are around awareness, learning, and 
curiousity. Some responses include: 
 “You get an organised sharing of expertise and knowledge between different EU 
countries” (Hanna, interview, May 2014). 
 “It’s …  interesting because you can see a [policy]  panorama of Europe” (Julita, 
interview, October 2014). 
 “I went because I was curious” (Timo, interview, September 2014). 
 “[In participating]  you can really understand well how systems work in other 
countries” (Ulla, interview, October 2014). 
 “I only went because I was asked by the ministry. Somehow they found my name. 
They thought probably ‘[name of museum]  is the biggest cultural institution in 
[country] , let’s have them say something’” (Zafar, interview, November 2014). 
  “I had high hopes of bringing something back to [country] , to [my arts 
organisation]” (Wasil, interview, October 2014). 
 
Darya, a representative of a Member State who sat in the Council’s Cultural Affairs 
Committee, summarised the unknown and experimental nature of the OMCs: 
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“I think we, from a Member State [perspective] , we see it as give-and-take; sometimes 
the OMCs are worth the investment and others are, in the end, less interesting. They 
might be interesting in [as]  a networking …  opportunity. They do give people some 
feedback on at least how they are doing in their field” (interview, April 2014). 
 
Interestingly, when the Commission asked Member States to reflect on the ‘added value’ 
of the OMC in social protection,  
“… respondent states and stakeholders gave rather general accounts, tending to emphasize 
more the manner in which the process had placed social issues on the European agenda 
than in explaining the value of then co-ordinating such issues, with few direct references 
to the impact on domestic policy development” (Armstrong 2008, p.421). 
 
This is also the case for the culture OMC: no Member State representative that I spoke to 
expressed an interest in attending in order to change or influence policy at the domestic 
level. Reasons tended to be more experimental and while quite a few were related to 
personal professional development, none linked to substantive policy development in the 
Member State. 
 
On the other hand, why might states choose not to participate? This is an under-explored 
issue within the study of the OMC, as, practically, this is a much harder group to reach. 
However, some tentative responses can be gleaned from participants who knew why their 
Member State did not participate in previous OMC groups, or simply ‘imagining’ why 
they would not participate. Commission officials also had some insight. The first reason 
was a pragmatic one, a lack of funding. The Commission funds the transport and 
accommodation for experts to travel to meetings, usually held in Brussels, but this means 
that the expert is taking time off his or her own ‘normal’ work which may not be feasible, 
either financially or otherwise. The second reason is policy cycles. The policy theme in 
question may either not be on the radar in some Member States, it may be already well-
developed in that particular country, or it may not politically salient at the time. A  final 
reason that states may choose not to take part in an OMC is to do with 
election/government cycles: some experts mentioned that they knew of their state not 
sending people in previous times as there was about to be a change of government or there 
had recently been one, and political priorities were in flux or had not yet been set. These 
issues will also be addressed in more detail in chapter 8 in the context of policy learning. 
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7.4 T HE  R OL E  OF T HE  ME MBE R  ST AT E S – BE FOR E  AND 
DUR ING T HE  OMC 
 
With motivations of participation outlined above, this section tackles the day-to-day roles 
and responsibilities of the Member States before and during the OMC. This discussion 
keeps in mind the multi-level and fragmented nature of Member State participation 
highlighted above. It is broken down into three parts – the national ministries of culture 
(7.4.1), the individual appointed experts (7.4.2),
124
 and how these comes together in the 
meetings (7.4.3). To my knowledge, this breakdown is novel in the study of the OMC but 
is important because it highlights the diversity of and incongruence between these levels 
of participation.  
 
7.4.1 National ministries of culture 
The first stage of Member State involvement, after the Council of Ministers, is the 
national ministries of culture (EU-28). It is the job of the cultural ministries, in 
cooperation with the Council’s Cultural Affairs Committee, to coordinate the 
appointment of an expert. The CAC representative is responsible for contacting the 
national ministry of culture and outlining the theme of the OMC group. He or she may 
have an expert already in mind, or they may leave it to the ministry to decide. How this 
is organised and carried out differs from Member State to Member State and will be 
determined by institutional structures within the ministries. For example, some Member 
States’ culture ministries have a designated individual responsible for European cultural 
affairs and in others expert appointments are much more random.
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At this stage, ideally, the benefits of OMC participation should be clear to the ministry, 
and the CAC representative and ministry representative should work together to find the 
most appropriate expert. However, what often happens in practice is that there is 
confusion somewhere along the way: some experts reported that they were not sure why 
they had been chosen and many did not know the purpose of the OMC. Communication 
of the aims and overall goals of the OMC is poor in general. However, it is difficult to 
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 The role of the Council, as the ‘voice of the Member States,’ having been discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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 In general, not much is known about how European participation is structured within the EU-28 
ministries of culture. This is an interesting area for future research. 
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determine why exactly this is the case: is the CAC representative not clear in outlining 
what the OMC is or what its benefits might be to the ministry, or is something lost in the 
communication between the ministry and the expert?  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, visibility and awareness of the 
OMC at the national level are very important, but results of this study show that in many 
states – although not all – this tends to be concentrated among a small group of 
individuals. Caroline de la Porte (2010, p.10-11) has developed an OMC visibility and 
awareness scale to measure engagement at the national level, that is, within public 
institutions such as the cultural ministries. High institutional visibility is defined as “heard 
of the OMC and aware of how it can be used” and no institutional visibility/awareness is 
“never heard of the OMC” (low and medium are in between). In general, (national) 
institutional visibility and awareness of the OMC, along with public/media visibility and 
awareness (which will be discussed more in chapter 8) is poor. For example, in Frazer 
and Marlier’s 2008 study of the OMC in social inclusion, they conclude that the OMC is 
known nationally among only a small group of actors. Similarly, Idema and K elemen 
(2006, p.114) found that “OMC networks do not extend deep into national bureaucracies. 
Only a small fraction of any Member States’ policy makers actually participates in the 
OMC.” The picture regarding the culture OMC is very similar. Many experts told me that 
within their ministries, in general not much is known about what the OMC is or even 
indeed what the EU does in the cultural field. Many also said that they found it difficult 
to get others interested in the work because their day-to-day work concerns domestic 
cultural activities, not what is happening at the EU.  
 
Levels of OMC engagement at the national ministry level were therefore generally 
considered to be low. If the OMC is generally not considered a priority, this means that 
there is often not a cohesive and purposeful justification for participation. The expert 
therefore ‘goes along’ with it, but there is rarely a wider strategic element of attending 
(although, the individual expert may have personal goals for attending that have nothing 
to do with advancing cultural policy in their Member State). What this means is that 
experts sometimes do not understand why they are participating in an EU-wide policy 
coordination process. In theory, national ministries should specify to their experts exactly 
what they want out of the OMC and why the state is participating. In practice, this does 
not always happen. This means that not only can the experts be unclear about why they 
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are being sent, it can also lead to a lack of post-OMC follow-up, which is dependent on 
linking OMC work with national policy (see more on this in section 7.5 below). 
 
7.4.2 T he experts 
The next step in analysing the role of the Member States is looking at the individuals who 
participate in OMC meetings.
126
 Who are these experts? What kind of background do 
they have and what motivates them to participate? The micro-level issue of actors and 
participants has not received much attention in the wider OMC literature. This omission 
is surprising because non-hierarchical modes of governance place “high demands” on 
their participants: they rely “on the voluntary provision of meaningful information, 
voluntary adjustment as well as the presence of (outcome-) directing standards” (Lodge 
2007, p.359). It is the individual experts that are responsible for defining and providing 
information and meaning: “cooperative and participative interactions” (K röger 2004) 
define the nature of the process, and the experts themselves are the participants in these 
interactions. There has been little probing into the notion of expertise in the OMC 
literature, surprising because “despite their non-binding nature, alternatives to the classic 
Community Method entail a process of choice, selection and interpretation of specific 
norms and values” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.43). It is the experts themselves, along 
with the Commission, that are involved in determining these norms and values. It is 
therefore surprising that individual participants have not been studied in more detail. 
While a couple of studies have looked at the democratic and participative legitimacy of 
the OMC (see chapter 3), the role of the experts and how their actions may impact the 
overall effectiveness or outcomes of the OMC has been under-studied. 
 
Each individual that participates in the OMC comes with their own particular experiences 
and economic, social, political, and cultural positionings (Bourdieu 1992, as cited in 
K röger 2004). However, the OMC is also a particular institutional setting, with many 
formal and informal rules of behaviour in operation. There is therefore an unspoken, 
implicit understanding of appropriate behaviour within this institutional setting: “[t]o act 
appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, 
based on mutual, and often tacit understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, 
and good” (March and Olsen 2009, p.4). Information gathered from the different sources 
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 Please see a full list of experts and civil society platforms in appendix 6. 
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in this project supports the proposition that there is a strong notion of adherence to 
behavioural norms within the highly formal institutional setting of the OMC. These norms 
help to “set actors’ common frame of reference and help shape not only actors’ 
perceptions and preferences, but also their modes of interaction” (Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004a, p.197). As we know from the previous chapter, the Commission has a great deal 
of influence in shaping these ‘rules of the game.’ 
 
Who are the experts? 
In the Work Plan, it is stated that members of national administrations are the preference 
for experts (Council of the European Union 2010, p.9). However, there is only minimum 
guidance on who should be selected; it is specified that the individual should have (a) 
practical experience and (b) effective communication capabilities with decision-making 
national authorities (Ibid.). Expanding on this rationale, Fatima, a policy officer in the 
Commission explained that,  
“[the Commission]  has recommended …  that the participants belong to public 
administrations, or at least they have a ‘channel’ to administrations and decision makers 
because it’s important that the output of their work… is being reported and disseminated 
to the right people – the decision-makers and policy-makers, and the appropriate 
stakeholders” (interview, May 2014). 
 
Similarly, Quentin, a ministry representative and participating expert, explained the 
thinking in sending experts from public authorities, and linked it directly to enacting 
change:  
“…  we choose to send people from the national authorities so that we have the ability to 
implement certain recommendations in the law. If we sent experts from other institutions, 
it’s more difficult to do this” (interview, J uly 2014). 
 
The norm for the OMC is that there is one expert appointed per Member State, and this 
individual is expected to attend all meetings of that particular working group for 
continuity. However, sometimes states send more than one expert, or a colleague may fill 
in for someone who cannot make a meeting. The main responsibilities of the experts are 
to participate in discussions and, along with the rest of the group, to help produce the final 
report. Typically, participating experts are either direct employees of the Ministry of 
Culture, or employees of arm’s length/affiliated agencies or publically-funded arts 
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institutions such as museums.
127
 The names of all Member State experts participating in 
Priority A  working groups, with affiliation information where available, can be found in 
appendix 6. 
 
Usually, the expert is previously known to the permanent representative in the Cultural 
Affairs Committee, and usually, although not always, has some experience in the policy 
area (either policy experience or practical, ‘on the ground’ experience). There is in general 
an absence of elite policy actors in the OMC (K röger 2009, Dawson 2009, McDonald et 
al. 2013a); those that come from public authorities are usually low- to mid-level civil 
servants. 
 
What does an ‘ideal’ OMC expert look like? There is little information provided by the 
Commission and no critical reflection of how expertise might be defined in this situation. 
However, some characteristics emerged over the course of  my interviews: he or she is 
experienced in the field, not only in terms of knowledge of policy history and context but 
also practical experience; has some degree of influence in national cultural policy-
making; comes to the meetings ready to learn and share and open to new ideas; and shares 
and disseminates the findings widely. 
 
When experts were asked about how and why they were appointed, responses varied: 
 
“… the [country’s]  ministry knew that I’d been active in these platforms before, so when 
I changed my job to [a non-profit] , they asked me to be a national expert, to be part of 
the OMC, which is more government-driven” (Markus, interview, June 2014). 
 
“We are cooperating [sic]  mostly in the region, but I’m involved in a cooperation with 
the Ministry of Culture, and they asked me to be their representative. That’s how it 
happened” (Nils, interview, June 2014). 
 
“…  at the end of 2012, or autumn, the ministry of culture from [country]  called me and 
nominated me – proposed to me the possibility of taking part in the OMC group. And I 
confirmed… . I’ve been in touch with the Minister of Culture for 6-7 years because I am 
the Artistic Director of [organisation] ...” (Salma, interview, July 2014). 
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 Not that it also occasionally happens, depending on the theme of the OMC group, that experts come 
from other ministries such as Education or Industry. This was especially true for Group 3 of Priority A 
where there was some crossover with education ministries. Please see appendix 6 for a full list of 
participating experts. 
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“[The CAC representative]  put forward names to our Ministry of Culture. …  He gave the 
reason why – it would be very cost-effective, and a good chance for us to contribute as 
part of the European Union. He identified all of the [OMC] groups, and that’s how I 
came up, because I’d met him in 2008, and because I’m head of education at an 
organisation that primarily works with diverse communities in [country]” (Paulina, 
interview, J une 2014). 
 
“I was chosen to participate because my field of work is related to the topic of the working 
group. …  And also speaking English was one of the factors that contributed to me being 
chosen. …  In the third group, it was because of the experience I had with the other 
working groups and again because part of the topic was related to cultural institutions, 
and I work for a museum” (Quentin, interview, July 2014). 
 
“Ok, well, I work in the museum of [X] . …  The museum belongs to the [country’s]  
Ministry of Culture. We are directly managed by the ministry. That’s how I got to 
participate in the OMC group: the Ministry of Culture always represents [country]  in the 
OMC groups, and last year they asked me if I’d like to represent [country]  …  They knew 
of my work here in the museum, specifically some things related to the programme that 
was going to be developed by the [OMC] group” (Julita, interview, October 2014). 
 
These responses showcase a range of different approaches. Some ministries are much 
more purposeful about who they are selecting, reflecting more ‘ownership’ of and 
purpose behind participating in the OMC, and some are much more random. 
 
What were the characteristics of the experts? 
Though one would assume from the Work Plan that the experts mostly come from public 
authorities and have similar professional backgrounds and knowledge, in practice, the 
experts in the OMC groups surveyed were much more diverse. Some came directly from 
ministries of culture, some from public cultural/arts institutions or arms-length agencies, 
and others from more varied places such as embassies, other state ministries, or were 
independent experts known to their national ministries. Three key areas of difference 
among the experts emerged: they differed in their experience and expertise on the 
subject(s); their connections, particularly to national decision-makers; and their degrees 
of socialisation towards European-level coordination, the EU, and the OMC itself.
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These factors were found to be significant with regards to the way experts participated 
and what they got out of the process. They are discussed in turn below. 
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 Work done by Horvath (2009) in the context of the Social Protection OMC shows, similarly, that 
experts differed in terms of their experience, expertise, seniority, available resources, and administrative 
capacities. 
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1. Expertise and knowledge 
The experts interviewed for this research, despite being named as experts by their 
Member State, varied considerably in terms of their experience and knowledge. For the 
purposes of the OMC, there are two types of expertise that is pertinent. The first is policy 
expertise or knowledge of the state of current policy priorities in the Member State. The 
second, because the themes have a practical application to arts and cultural sectors, is 
whether the individual has any experience working in the field. The levels of experience 
among those surveyed was far-ranging. For example, some participants had never worked 
in an arts or cultural organisation. Others were not familiar with how policy is made in 
their state or what current policy priorities are. This wide range of backgrounds and 
professional experience had ramifications for the meetings, in particular with “conceptual 
confusion” (Oskar, expert, interview, June 2014). Groups at times spoke at cross-
purposes and discussions lack direction because of the heterogeneous nature of 
participants, which limited the depth of discussion as experts were not always able to 
relate to each other or understand certain concepts (see more on this in chapter 8). This 
raises important questions about how ‘expertise’ is defined and applied in the case of the 
OMC (and, more broadly, in cultural policy more generally [Schlesinger 2013]). 
 
For example, Nils, who works for a regional cultural development agency, considered 
himself very experienced, but found that he could not participate effectively with regards 
to policy matters: 
“I couldn’t use my experience in the work for OMC. …  [M]aybe it would be better if 
someone from the Ministry of Culture participates in the group. … I wasn’t prepared for 
being aware of everything that was going on in the Ministry of Culture, and what are 
their main problems” (interview, June 2014). 
 
The quote highlights the difficulties he faced because Nils did not have the knowledge 
required to fully participate in discussions. 
 
2. Connections to (national) decision-makers 
Another area that participant experts differ in is in their connections to decision-makers. 
One of the main reasons that the Commission is keen for representatives from state 
administrations to participate is that these people in theory have a clear channel to 
decision-making. If they are not responsible for making decisions themselves, they know 
who to contact. One can easily understand the Commission’s thinking here, but in practice 
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it is more complicated. For example, some individuals who are outside official channels 
may well have an informal direct link to them, and those that are a representative of a 
ministry of culture may go home and not share the work that has been done. The notion 
of sharing through networks is an important one in the OMC; networks “are a central 
notion upon which the participation ideal of the OMC is based” (Borrás and Radaelli 
2010, p.44). Through dissemination, the assumption is that policy learning, and possibly 
change, will occur as a result of Member States’ participation in the OMCs. At the very 
least, reading the reports represents a communication of ideas. However, not surprisingly, 
experts varied in terms of their professional connections and in their degree of 
responsibility with regards to policy-making at the national level; some had decision-
making powers themselves. Some had one-degree of separation from an actor with 
considerable power, such as a minister of culture. Others felt comparatively powerless to 
amend policy, transpose and communicate ideas, or effect change. 
 
3. Degrees of socialisation 
Another key variance that emerged from interviews was the degree of institutional 
socialisation that experts had to the OMC. As detailed above, the institutional setting of 
the OMC is highly contextual, bureaucratic, and specific: the process has its own norms 
and expectations of behaviour (institutions, in institutional theory language). For those 
that are at an OMC meeting for the first time, this can take some getting used to, 
particularly as it is a very formal setting.  
 
What emerged from the interviews and participant observation is that there are different 
‘degrees’ of socialisation to European-level cultural initiatives and to the OMC itself. 
Based on this I have come up with a categorisation based on a spectrum of socialisation: 
previous participation in other OMC groups indicated a high degree of socialisation; 
previous participation in other EU-wide meetings and schemes (outside of the OMC) or 
previous participation in other pan-European cultural initiatives (outside of the EU) 
indicated a medium level; and for those participating in the OMC for the first time who 
had not previously taken part in any European-wide cultural policy platforms, there is a 
low degree of socialisation.  
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T able 7.1: OMC and expert socialisation 
L evel of socialisation Indicator 
Low First time participation in the OMC and no previous 
experience in European-wide cultural platforms 
Medium Previous participation in other EU meetings (outside of 
the OMC) or previous participation in other pan-
European cultural initiatives (outside of the EU) 
High Previous participation in other OMC groups 
 
 
This spectrum means a wide range of knowledge about the way the OMC works. Those 
with a high or medium level of socialisation had a much better idea of what to expect in 
terms of the formal way the meetings would be run and were more comfortable with the 
formality of the process. Some respondents who fit into the low category expressed 
intimidation by the ‘official’ nature and confused about the goals of the working 
groups.
129
 This also has important ramifications for the outcomes of the groups: those 
with a higher level of socialisation have a better idea of what (if anything) is expected of 
them post-OMC, and, if they have participated before, may have set established networks 
that they disseminate the information to. 
 
Reflections on the heterogeneous nature of experts 
The experts participating in OMC working groups are therefore a heterogeneous group 
who differ in (1) their policy and practical expertise, (2) their connections to national 
decision-makers, and (3) their socialisation to European policy coordination. The 
discussion above naturally leads to the issue of the effects of mixing policy makers and 
practitioners in the OMC working groups. The variance of participants is identified by 
the experts themselves as both a strength and a weakness, while in the Ecorys survey, 
37.1% indicated that the expertise of participants was satisfactory “to a large extent” and 
52.9% “to some extent” (McDonald et al. 2013, p.29).  
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 Confusion about the aims and purpose of the Open Method of Coordination will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8. 
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When discussing this issue in interviews, experts often prefaced their responses by saying 
that a mixture in theory is preferable, but in practice it has mixed effects. For example, 
expert Luise summarised both sides of this debate as such: 
“… sometimes I can see that the experts that have been sent by the Member States are not 
homogenous – coming from different fields. So it’s sometimes difficult to speak in one 
language and to understand each other. …  Sometimes coming from a ministry and sitting 
in the working groups does not mean they have the possibility to [sic]  really spread the 
word within the Ministry, or to their superiors, so it depends really on the people sitting 
in the group. I think on the one hand it’s really good that the Member States decide who 
they want to send and who they consider the experts for the group, but on the other this 
makes the group very inharmonious” (interview, June 2014). 
 
Another expert, Nils, felt strongly that the group he participated in was too heterogeneous 
to achieve truly useful dialogue: 
“…  this is the main problem, I think – delegates didn’t really have any common 
denominator. We were representatives of very different agencies, organisations. Some of 
us were practitioners. Others were just clerks. Others were people from ministries of 
culture. Some of them were more aware of global policy, some more in their own 
problems and contexts. We didn’t really extend it. Because then creating a common 
‘answer’ to problems, in my opinion, wasn’t possible. [… ]  F inding common ground was 
very, very difficult. [… ]  Probably, we should work in groups of people who have more in 
common” (interview, June 2014). 
 
Georg, a policy advisor and participating expert, agreed with Nils’ point of view, and felt 
that all participants should be policy-makers because there are already other pan-
European platforms to communicate with people from cultural organisations (interview, 
May 2014). Markus, another expert, called on the Commission to be clearer on who they 
would like to see as experts: 
“…  the composition of the group is somehow problematic in the sense that the 
Commission has not been very clear about what kind of people they would like to see. So 
it was a very mixed group in terms of either governmental representative that usually 
don’t really tend to be very much into content issues, and experts. So I think it needs to 
be more decided on what the Commission really wants – if it’s going to be only experts 
or only governmental people. Because if you put them both together there might not be 
the same depth of discussion, and also the outcome might not always be as clear as you’d 
want” (interview, June 2014). 
 
Markus’ comment is an interesting one because the Commission, at least in the Work 
Plan and relevant policy documents, is clear on who it would like to see: representatives 
from national ministries. It is not evident whether the mixed nature of the groups is due 
to the Commission not being clear enough about who it expects, or whether the Member 
States take liberty with their choice of expert. 
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In sum, there is clearly a debate to be had on the balance between participants who are 
well-informed on policy issues and are, in theory at least, able to effect change through 
proper channels, and a more diverse group of experience including representatives from 
other cultural bodies, who have more ‘on the ground’ practical knowledge. This issue is 
something that many experts felt strongly about, as evidenced by comments such as Nils’ 
above. In its ideal form the OMC “was designed to be an open, participatory and network-
based procedure aiming to be socially responsive” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.42). 
However, many of these expectations are ideals only and have not been met in practice 
(K röger 2007). The groups instead operate with a diverse range of participants which has 
a wide range of effects on the outcomes of the groups – there is great diversity in the way 
that the work of the OMC groups is ‘used’ at the national level. The expert’s position, 
networks, socialisation level, and level of expertise are all important factors in 
determining how the exchange of views will happen and whether learning will take place. 
Of course, ideally, the national ministry must also be clear on expectations and appoint a 
qualified expert.  
 
7.4.3 T he meetings 
This subsection describes the operation of the meetings themselves. This is important 
because the format and organisation of the meetings is important to their effectiveness 
and to the eventual outcomes of the OMC round. Each round of the OMC typically has 
five to six meetings. Most of these are held in Brussels over a period of 18 months to two 
years. Meetings are typically held once every 3-4 months and take place over two days 
(week days). Experts must therefore take time out of their ‘day jobs’ to attend them. As 
previously mentioned, the Commission funds travel and accommodation for attending 
experts. Time and logistics permitting, there is also effort made to have one ‘study trip’ 
to a different Member State per OMC group. On the study trips, the schedule differs 
slightly as it often includes excursions to local arts and cultural organisations. 
 
The styles of leadership and the format of meetings vary depending on the group and 
more importantly the chair. Typically, they take on different formats throughout the day 
depending on the task at hand. In general, the style of meetings is formal and structured. 
There are both lecture-style presentations from invited guests (with opportunity for 
questions and answers), as well as discussions, some of which are done as a whole group, 
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and some in the format of small group discussions.
130
 These are led and guided by the 
chair and the Commission-appointed independent facilitator (see chapter 6). An important 
factor in the format of meetings is what stage the group is in the timeline. For example, 
meeting 4 of 6 will typically have more concrete dialogue and more opportunities for 
discussion than meeting 2 of 6, when it is very likely that definitions and basic reference 
points are discussed.  
 
In the first meeting, a chair is elected for each OMC group, by the group members 
themselves, and he or she is crucial to the effectiveness of the meetings. J ette, a 
Commission official, explains the process behind choosing chairs: 
“The way it works is that when we invite Member States to send experts, we also invite 
them to say whether someone wants to be the chair or not, and then those candidacies 
are put forward to the group at the first meeting. I mean, I’ve been here three years, so 
I’ve seen most of the implementation of the second Work Plan, and [the selection of the 
chair has]  always been easy” (interview, May 2014). 
 
The chair works together with the appointed external facilitator and performs a key 
leadership role throughout. The chair also does a lot of work in between meetings in order 
that there is a semblance of coherent thought and ideas for the group to discuss when it 
comes together – with months between meetings, this is crucial. In general, the more 
organised and focused the chair, the more effective the meetings will be, an observation 
mentioned by both participating experts and EU officials. As discussed in chapter 6, a 
stronger chair means that the Commission is able to take more of a ‘back seat’ role: 
“…  some chairs are extremely clear in [what they want to do and the direction they want 
to take]…  and some are happy to have a bit of assistance in that respect. We will draft 
the agenda, for example, and send it to the chairs, that kind of thing” (Jette, interview, 
May 2014).
131
 
 
This quote from Salma, an expert, describes some elements of what makes a good chair: 
“Our chair [name] was great, in my opinion. She always tried to make the aim very 
concrete …  and also she differentiated between policy-makers and directors from arts 
institutions, for example. This was very important in our topic, always to ask ourselves 
who it’s for” (interview, J uly 2014). 
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 As whole-group discussions with upwards of 35-40 people are challenging, ‘discussion’ is sometimes 
facilitated through the chair posing a question such as “does anyone disagree with [this point of view]?” 
131
 J ette’s comment once again reinforces the key role that the Commission policy officer can play. 
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The purpose of the meetings is to work together as a group to produce the eventual output, 
the best practice report. In this respect, while a lot of discussion takes place, most of it is 
directed in a specific way, that is, with the purpose of creating the manual. It is less for 
advancing individuals’ own thoughts, improving their own practices or policies, or 
engaging in any type of larger narrative beyond the manual (although, this of course does 
to varying extents happen): one participant likened the meetings to a school setting 
whereby the teacher sets the students a diligent task to be completed. This is not to say 
that ideas were not generated from discussion, but the purpose of the group was not a 
platform for policy innovation or creative discussion – it was to create the manual. This 
will be discussed in more detail in the context of the OMC’s outcomes in chapter 8. 
 
Now that the role of the Member States before and during the OMC has been discussed, 
I turn to what happens once a group’s cycle has finished. 
 
7.5 T HE  R OL E  OF T HE  ME MBE R  ST AT E S POST -OMC 
 
In its ideal-form, the role of national governments does not end at the conclusion of the 
last meeting of that particular OMC group. This section addresses the role of the Member 
State post-OMC. The idea is that, having sent an expert, there are benefits accrued from 
participating in such an exchange and that these benefits will continue after the group has 
finished. In this respect, national ministries act as gatekeepers in that it is largely down to 
domestic institutional arrangements as to what, if anything, will be done in terms of policy 
learning and change post-OMC (K röger 2009). The main tasks for Member States to 
perform after the OMC group has finished are the dissemination of the best practice 
report, integration of the results into national conversations about programmes and 
policy-making, and medium- and long-term follow-up. These three tasks are discussed in 
turn below. 
 
7.5.1 Dissemination of output 
In a process such as the OMC, one of the most basic questions to emerge among those 
who are not familiar with the process is what is the end result? This is an important 
question. In the OMC literature, ‘output’ is rarely discussed in such micro-level terms; it 
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is rather treated much more generally as the effectiveness of the particular OMC group.
132
 
In the case of the culture OMC, without the benchmarks and targets of EU policy 
coordination in other sectors, the ‘output’ of the OMC is conceived in rather narrow 
terms: it is a policy report, usually in the form of best practices, produced at the end of 
each round of meetings. The reports are 100-plus-page documents composed of best 
practice examples and some analysis, with questions and talking points for consideration 
sprinkled throughout. There is also a section at the end of the reports devoted to 
recommendations (in group A, there is one set of recommendations; for group B, the list 
has been separated into recommendations for cultural institutions and those for policy 
makers). 
 
The policy report and any learning or change that occurs are of course linked: if the report 
is sub-par or ineffective, it is much less likely that it will shared and/or result in any 
impacts or changes. The issue of the reports was a divisive and popular discussion point 
throughout the fieldwork for this project. Indeed, the concept of “best practices” raises a 
number of questions: who decides what a best practice is? And what criteria is it judged 
on? Should best practices be geographically representative?
133
 How is consensus 
achieved in identifying them and in writing the report? If these issues are not addressed, 
questions of relevance and legitimacy begin to be raised. 
 
As discussed above, findings indicate that there is a strong link between the expert, the 
report (and the expert’s opinion of the report), and its dissemination. Dissemination refers 
to the spreading and circulation of the report and thus the ideas and solutions it 
propagates. Ideally, it should be read by as many different stakeholders as possible, not 
just those that participated in the group. The OMC is set up this way. But how far does 
the groups’ work actually ‘travel’? Do experts share the report, and if so who else is it 
read by? Are there institutionalised systems within Member States to ensure this, or is it 
done on an ad hoc basis? Importantly, the Work Plan does not specify how the work of 
the OMC is meant to be disseminated to a wider audience, only that the attending expert 
should have means to do so (Council of the European Union 2010, p.9). It is worth noting 
that in the Ecorys evaluation, the system of dissemination and a goal for concrete and 
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 ‘Effectiveness’ or ‘success’ of the Open Method of Coordination is very difficult to conceptualise; this 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
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 In the first round of OMCs (2008-2010), this was th
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useable results was improved for the 2011-2014 Work Plan after the 2008-2010 one was 
criticised as too vague (McDonald et al. 2013a). 
 
The subject of dissemination was one that proved to be one of the most reflective topics 
throughout discussions with OMC actors. Many experts expressed they could have done 
more.
134
 Corinne, a policy officer in the Commission, explained that, 
“I think this is one element that is ‘less’ achieved is that we would hope that the results 
of the OMC discussions are really impacted at national level and they may not always 
be” (interview, April 2014). 
 
In general, methods of dissemination and post-OMC action among Member States varied 
considerably. They range on a scale from no action taken (i.e. the expert does not share 
the report with anyone) to multi-day conferences organised around the publication of the 
report in the Member State, and many more varied methods in between. A  couple of 
participating states also had extensive dissemination plans for the periods in between 
meetings, before the working group came to an end. The most common mode of 
dissemination is the e-mail circulation of a link to the final report to colleagues (ministry 
or arts organisation) with some also holding internal meetings on the report. 
 
Throughout my fieldwork an important link between the expert, the report, and the 
report’s circulation began to emerge. This connection is raised by Corrine, a policy officer 
at the Commission: 
“… sometimes the Member State sends someone from the Ministry, and sometimes they 
send an expert from [other public or private organisations] . So, the discussions can be 
very professional and advanced, but when they come back, sometimes [the latter type of 
experts]  miss the link with policy-making representatives. Of course, you can also work 
in the Ministry, come back, and not communicate with your colleagues. That’s another 
problem” (interview, April 2014). 
 
Corrine’s comments make logical sense, but the real imperativeness of this linkage is 
evidenced by comments such as Nils’: 
“I personally wasn’t interested in sharing the document with, for example, people from 
my region. Because I couldn’t tell them ‘look this is a fantastic document and it will be 
really helpful for you.’ It wasn’t like that” (expert, interview, June 2014). 
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 It is difficult to say whether the experts believed this or whether this was a result of reflecting on what 
they had done after being asked by a researcher, sometimes over a year since the report had been released. 
One reason suggested for not disseminating more extensively was, in the case of one group studied, the 
length of time between the last meeting and the publishing of the report, which was close to a year. 
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Quite simply, if the expert does not believe that the report is of good quality (and thus has 
less inclination to share it), it is much more likely that the report will ‘sit on the shelf’ and 
not be used by anyone. The expert is a key variable in the dissemination of the report. 
Experts must take ownership of the findings and perceive them to be appropriate and 
legitimate in order for the ideas to travel. If this does not happen, as in Nils’ situation 
above, the report will simply not be shared. 
 
However, as briefly discussed above, variables also go deeper than the expert themselves; 
institutional norms of Member States and national ministries are also important. If a 
Member State has a history of participating in OMC groups and has implemented 
measures to keep regularly engaged with the work of the EU in the field, there is a higher 
chance that the report will be disseminated widely due to greater commitment. 
Importantly, because the OMC is a voluntary process (and until recently, there has been 
no formalised follow-up; see below), it is easy for national governments to ignore the 
report, as Trubek and Trubek (2005, p.359) explain in the case of the OMC in 
employment policy: 
“[g]overnments may treat the [National Action Plans] as a routine administrative burden, 
not an opportunity for real debate and deliberation; peer reviews and benchmarking may 
be paper exercises; social partners may be unwilling to participate actively; some 
countries may resist change because they think the [European Employment Strategy] 
model does not fit their labour markets; other may feel they need not change because they 
have largely met EES goals.” 
 
This quote shows once again the importance of the positioning of the OMC at the national 
level, and shows the crucial role of national ministries of culture before and after 
participating the working groups. An important factor in the relative ‘action’ taken at the 
national level thus depends on rules and norms within that particular national ministry.  
 
For example, one expert, V iktoria, expressed frustration that she wanted to do much more 
with the report’s findings but that she was in opposition with more senior colleagues in 
her ministry, as there had recently been a new government come to power: 
“I know that it’s quite different in some Member States – some ‘finish’ their work by 
publishing the report on the internet, but some of them are very active and work together 
with the civil society, also something I wanted to do but I was not able to, I have to admit” 
(interview, October 2014). 
 
Similar frustrations were echoed by Wasil, an expert from a different Member State: 
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“[For]  the previous report we didn’t really put a lot of effort into dissemination. We said 
at the beginning that depending on the quality of the report, we will disseminate it. When 
it came, my idea was that we could definitely arrange events on the report. In itself, it has 
qualities, and it’s a good starting point for discussions to show that these are important 
issues. However…  I am having a struggle at [my place of employment] , getting my 
superiors interested in these issues. [… ]  We could quite easily find a way to disseminate 
this in a structured manner. From our perspective I think it’s a matter of will” (interview, 
October 2014). 
 
Wasil’s comments demonstrate that national ministries really do act as ‘gatekeepers’ 
(K röger 2009) and that ultimately it is the down to the senior members of public 
authorities, the decision-makers, that decide what happens with the OMC’s findings. 
 
Ultimately, dissemination therefore depends on two key factors. The first is whether the 
participating expert is able to ‘get behind’ the results – i.e. the expert finds the results 
credible and appropriate and is therefore disposed to sharing them widely. In instances 
when this is not the case, such as Nils’ above, it is unlikely that the report’s findings will 
travel far. The second factor regards the ministry of culture itself. If little or nothing is 
expected from participation in the OMC group, the expert will have to work harder to 
‘push’ for any change (this is assuming he/she finds the recommendations credible). If an 
expert has been sent but not given any direction, it is less likely that participation will 
lead to outcomes unless the expert ‘pushes’ hard for them to be taken into consideration. 
In addition, the predisposition for wide dissemination also occurs if the Member State has 
an institutionalised history of being open and receptive to the idea of policy coordination 
and cooperation at the EU level – of incorporating European policy themes into national 
frameworks. In these states, the value of participation in the OMC is higher and the 
dissemination plan tends to be more robust and institutionalised. 
 
In its current form, dissemination is therefore a weak spot in the OMC’s institutional 
design. There is the sense that the OMC is a rather closed process that is not easily 
penetrated at the national level. The weaknesses of dissemination is an issue that the 
Commission knows could be improved, as demonstrated from this quote by Commission 
official J ette: 
“… in terms of the output, certainly the dissemination at the national level has to be 
improved. Sometimes you’ve got the impression that the reports end up on the shelves 
and aren’t used anymore” (J ette, Commission, interview, May 2014). 
 
183 
 
J ulita, an expert, suggested a more institutionalised system of dissemination at the EU 
level:  
“I think maybe it’s better to develop some strategies in Europe – in the Council, 
Parliament, wherever – to disseminate even more the results of the work of these groups. 
If we only trust the members [of the group] , you can’t achieve as much as if they could 
do something [there was a coordinated effort]  from Brussels” (interview, October 2014). 
 
J ulita’s comment is an interesting one but problematic from the point of view of 
subsidiarity. The OMC is a process for the Member States, and the Commission cannot 
and does not ‘force’ the use of any recommendations. This is perhaps why they have not 
recommended more robust modes of dissemination. The OMC is a ‘soft’ tool, designed 
as a flexible system that allows Member States to give and take as little or as much as 
they want from participation. It exists “not to constrict actors within a prescriptive 
framework” (Regent 2003, p.198), but to allow each state to adapt as it sees fit: it is “open 
as regards state actions, the policy outcomes or the degree of states’ involvement that 
could be considered as an involvement a la carte” (Ibid., p.210).  
 
7.5.2 Medium and long-term follow-up 
Policy learning will be discussed in much more detail in the next chapter, however, within 
the context of the Member States’ roles, medium and long-term follow-up is an important 
issue to address now. In the spirit of subsidiarity, there is considerable leeway for states 
to interpret and implement change as they see fit – or not. One of the criticisms of the 
OMC, mentioned by several experts, is that until recently there was little formal 
centralised post-OMC follow-up. After the disbanding of the group in the final meeting, 
that was it; the group did not meet again or discuss later down the line whether any 
learning and change took place. This was an issue of concern in the 2013 Ecorys 
evaluation – they concluded that a lack of benchmarking “may not be conducive to strong 
follow-up actions, including dissemination of results” [McDonald et al. 2013a, p.26) – 
and was also mentioned by several actors in interviews, both EU officials and experts. 
Many experts felt that it was a shame that they never came back together as a group, either 
in person or via electronic communication, after the cycle had ended.  
 
However, this has recently changed. Group 2, which released its report in early 2014, held 
a one-off follow-up session in Brussels in J anuary 2015. Experts were invited to Brussels 
and also to complete an online evaluation on topics such as the content of the report, its 
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dissemination, implementation of the report’s recommendations, and on their opinion of 
the OMC process more generally. As the institutionalisation of follow-up is only in its 
infancy, dissemination and follow-up remain two critical issues going forward.  
 
7.6 CONCL USION: SY NT HE SISING T HE  ROL E  OF T HE  
ME MBE R  ST AT E S IN T HE  OMC 
 
This chapter has examined the Open Method of Coordination from the point of view of 
the Member States. Taken together, chapters 6 and 7 examine the process of organising, 
managing, and running the OMC. This chapter has highlighted the varying dimensions of 
Member State participation in the OMC, which has too frequently been characterised in 
the literature as a single unit of analysis. This assumption has been challenged: 
acknowledging that the true picture is more complex and fragmented is necessary in order 
to avoid (at best) an overly-simplistic and (at worst) an incorrect and misleading 
conceptualisation of the Member States’ position. The participation of Member States 
was therefore split into three different spheres: the Council (discussed in chapter 6), the 
ministry level, and the expert level. The chapter has argued that it is crucial to understand 
the fragmentation among these different levels in terms of understanding of the OMC, the 
visibility of the OMC, and what is expected from participation. 
 
The chapter has highlighted the roles of the national ministries of culture and discussed 
the individual experts appointed by Member States. The experts were shown to be a 
heterogeneous group who differ in three key ways: in their policy and practical expertise, 
raising important questions about the notion of expertise in the OMC; in their connections 
to national decision-makers; and in their socialisation to European policy coordination. 
The heterogeneous nature of the group was found to be preferred in theory but very 
complex in practice, making finding common reference points difficult. On the other 
hand, the role of national cultural ministries was found to be imperative in the operation 
of the OMC: national ministries must take ownership of their participation in policy 
coordination: 
“… EU policy-making is becoming sectorally significant, more politically salient, and 
more complex, and has set up convergent pressures for greater and more effective co-
ordination. However, these convergent pressures continue to be mediated by national 
needs, ambitions, and capacities which are, in turn, shaped by domestic political and 
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administrative opportunity structures” (K assim, Peters, and Wright 2000, p.18; emphasis 
added). 
 
The mediation role played by domestic institutions is crucial. Overall, the chapter 
demonstrated that in practice there is wide variation in the way that Member States 
approach the OMC. They differ in terms of the experts appointed, the expectations of 
participation, and what is done with the OMC work after the group has come to a close. 
Some states take it very seriously, with an institutionalised history or path dependence of 
European culture cooperation. Others participate on a more ad hoc basis and the logic of 
participation might not be known to anyone. The chapter also demonstrated how experts 
and states rarely enter the OMC with the goal of changing national policy. This happens 
by accident, if at all (see chapter 8), even with the states that are purposeful about their 
participation. 
 
Now that the processes of operating the Open Method of Coordination have been 
illuminated, chapter 8 tackles the outcomes of cultural policy coordination. 
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CHAPT E R  8: PR IOR IT Y  A AND T HE  
OUT COME S OF POL ICY  
COOR DINAT ION: L INK ING 
PR OCE SS AND CONT E NT IN T HE  
DE SIGN OF POL ICY  
COOR DINAT ION 
 
 
“The OMC should be rescued from its supporters as well as from its enemies.” 
Susanna Borrás and Claudio Radaelli (2010, p.52) 
 
 
8.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This chapter, the third of three analysis chapters, evaluates and discusses the outcomes of 
European Union cultural policy coordination. This is a departure from the focus of the 
previous two findings chapters which focused on the process and specifically the roles of 
the key actors in the culture OMC. This chapter brings together the empirical material 
gathered and explained in these two chapters and, referring back to the overall research 
questions in chapter one regarding the results of coordination, addresses the OMC’s 
outcomes. The chapter therefore builds on the previous two and links findings on the 
process of the culture Open Method of Coordination with outcomes. It asks whether the 
OMC has resulted in any furthering of dialogue or progress in these policy areas. 
 
The link between working methods and outcomes is a theme that has run through this 
entire thesis. It is a dialectic relationship: structure influences outcomes, but the aims of 
coordination will in large part determine the way that coordination is structured (Harcourt 
2013). The design of policy coordination is thus a central theme of this chapter. As 
explained in chapter 1, interview subjects had much more to say on the process of 
participating in the working groups than on their thematic content, even when the subjects 
were quite controversial, and even if they had an intense personal interest in them. The 
policy themes were tangential and secondary; the process of participating in the OMC 
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was paramount to the policy content. Despite this, it is still necessary to determine 
whether the OMC in its current setup encourages mutual learning and exchange and 
indeed whether any furthering of dialogue has occurred in these policy areas. 
 
Since the emphasis of the culture OMC is on the exchange of best practice and mutual 
learning, not policy harmonisation, the chapter focuses on assessing these, in the context 
of Priority A  of the 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture. Has the OMC resulted in any 
furthering of dialogue or progress in these policy areas? How are the ideas and norms 
created in the context of the OMC being used by national actors? Are they altering 
national discourses? Overall, the chapter demonstrates that while little ‘observable’ 
policy change has occurred as a result of coordination, there is a complex set of other 
outcomes, including the building of networks, different usages of the policy reports, 
concept usage, and heuristic learning. It also shows that the outcomes of the culture OMC 
are more complex than what might be expected, and that it suffers from basic conceptual 
design problems.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 addresses the importance of discourse 
and its development in a supranational policy coordination exercise such as the OMC. 
Section 8.3 examines the prickly concept of ‘success’ in relation to the culture OMC. In 
section 8.4, the outcomes of the OMC are discussed, in three main subsections: the good 
practice report; networking and socialisation; and national-level policy learning. Section 
8.5 then looks at the culture OMC in its broader context of European Union agendas and 
also situates it within broader dialogue on cultural policy. Finally, section 8.6 evaluates 
the design of the culture OMC. Information for this chapter comes from a combination of 
desk research and fieldwork, and, where possible and applicable, findings have also been 
corroborated with the Ecorys survey, as well as literature on the OMC from different 
fields. 
 
8.2 DE V E L OPING CUL T URAL  POL ICY  DISCOURSE  IN T HE  
E UROPE AN UNION 
 
Before the outcomes of policy coordination are discussed, this section addresses the 
important role that discourse plays in policy coordination as well as, building on part of 
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the discussion in chapter 2, the logic of supranational policy coordination specifically 
regarding Priority A’s themes. 
 
8.2.1 T he importance of discourse 
Even among a diverse literature, often highly motivated by normative statements about 
whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ one thing that scholars of the OMC tend to agree on is the 
OMC’s ‘soft power’ potential to shift discourses (see Schmidt and Radaelli 2004a, 2004b; 
V anhercke 2009). Discourse in this case is conceptualised, as in Schmidt and Radaelli 
(2004a), in terms of both content (policy ideas, language, and values) and in terms of use; 
it therefore has both an ideational and an interactive dimension (Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004b). Why does discourse matter? Quite simply, the OMC “seeks to influence, through 
mutual learning processes and thus in a discursive manner, the development first of ideas, 
then of …  policies in member states” (K röger 2008, p.63). The OMC thus “may serve to 
reconceptualise interests, chart new institutional paths and reframe cultural norms” 
(Schmidt and Radaelli 2004a, p.206). Discourse is the central factor in all three of these; 
it frames a debate and topic, and can include or exclude certain ideas, making something 
visible or not. Discourse therefore matters not only because of its potential to change the 
course of the discussion, but also because of the power of those that are able to set the 
terms of reference, as discussed more in chapter 6. 
 
In theory, one of the major advantages of the OMC is that it is a system that allows for 
development of ideas while respecting each state’s individual circumstances. However, 
each Member State is at a different stage of development with regards to the concepts and 
values articulated in these policy themes.
135
 At the beginning of an OMC group there is 
thus a division between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’– insiders know the meaning of certain 
vocabularies (in many ways a vocabulary of European integration), and outsiders do not. 
Through processes such as the OMC a particular ‘EU’-specific language is developing: 
there is an “expansion of a unique vocabulary into increasingly common knowledge” 
(Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001, p.15). After all, concepts such as intercultural 
dialogue, cultural expression and awareness, and cultural diversity are contested ideas 
with multiple meanings. Recognising the importance of discourse helps to bridge the gap 
between the ‘power of ideas’ and national-level learning and change. 
                                                          
135
 There are numerous web-based resources for cross-national cultural policy comparisons. See, for 
example, http://www.culturalpolicies.net/   
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8.2.2 A  supranational conversation 
Aside from the importance of discourse, it is also worthwhile to reflect on the thematic 
content of Priority A . The themes were outlined in chapter 2, but this subsection considers 
their thematic relevance as topics for supranational policy coordination. Does it make 
sense to talk about “Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and accessible and inclusive 
culture” in an intergovernmental setting? 
 
Participating experts, unsurprisingly, were in favour of these policy areas being addressed 
by the European Union. Markus, one expert, said they are “absolutely critical… these are 
absolutely the things we should be talking about, much more than we are doing right 
now” (interview, June 2014). Salma, another expert, said that they are “highly important 
…  because intercultural dialogue also means peace” (interview, July 2014). And an 
invited guest expert, Frederick, thought that “collaboration [on these issues]  is 
indispensable” (interview, December 2014). Meanwhile, in the Ecorys survey, 31.7% 
surveyed believed that the thematic area of cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and 
an inclusive Europe was relevant “to a great extent” and 43.6% “to a modest extent.” 
 
These themes are even more relevant in a post-financial crisis Europe where migration 
and austerity are key political issues and right-wing populism/nationalism is increasing 
in many EU states. This was made explicit by several participants (without prompting), 
with one going so far as to say that the EU needs to address these themes as “a 
counterforce” to the rise of nationalism (Oskar, expert, interview, June 2014). Therefore, 
despite conceptual difficulties in talking about these sensitive subjects, and their 
subjectivity, it was still agreed that these are important priorities: 
 
“It’s a ‘soft’ subject, if you want to say, but it’s hard-hitting as well. The other priorities 
really do tie in more with the EU 2020 plan. I call priority A the softer subjects, but once 
you start looking at it more closely, it has as much priority as any of the other groups” 
(Paulina, expert, interview, J une 2014).  
 
“… it’s now very important to speak about public art institutions because everyone is 
paying taxes, but society has totally changed, in all European countries. It can’t be that 
large cultural institutions like the Tate Modern don’t speak about intercultural dialogue 
– they have to” (Salma, expert, interview, July 2014). 
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“Europe has no idea how to deal with this topic now. It’s only a very small percentage 
of the people [of the world]  are in Europe and we have so many conflicts and so many 
people trying to reach Europe. [Intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity]  are huge 
challenges for our societies, we have to learn how to speak about these topics and solve 
these problems” (Ibid.). 
 
In discussing these policy issues, there is a crucial added factor that needs to be taken into 
account, which is – with experts agreeing on the importance of the issues generally – is 
it appropriate to be tackling them as an EU coordination exercise? This is an important 
point because of the principle of subsidiarity. To borrow phrasing from Armstrong (2010, 
p.1), it is “less than self-evident that tackling this issue ought to be a core mission of the 
EU rather than a fundamental responsibility of its constituent Member States.” Armstrong 
is talking about social inclusion and welfare policy here, but his statement applies to 
culture too. It is in fact not obvious that the EU, built on the principles of economic 
integration, should tackle social and cultural issues. 
 
While all actors believed that the policy themes were appropriate ones, they differed on 
whether the present structure of the OMC was optimal for debate, and here is where, in 
many interviews, the content of OMC discussions began to be completely sidelined. This 
reflects concerns about the conceptual design of the OMC, tying in strongly to the finding 
presented throughout this thesis that process dominates content. In addition, the resilience 
of the nation-state (and the principle of subsidiarity) emerged strongly throughout 
discussions. Experts viewed European Union involvement as supplementary, and it was 
overwhelmingly felt that while action at the European level was important, cultural policy 
(and particularly that to do with cultural identity and diversity) was still very much a 
competence of the nation-state, despite the relevant actors acting and having a stake in 
supranational coordination: 
“Identity can be multi-dimensional. So it’s ok that there is a part [that is European] , and 
it’s very good that intercultural dialogue is promoted, but we shouldn’t be one-
dimensional with the identity part. It’s too much to over-accentuate European identity, I 
guess” (Darya, Member State representative, interview, April 2014). 
 
Georg, another expert, thought that the Priority A’s themes stood out as ones that 
demanded a European or even global solution, arguing that the other priorities are more 
technical (interview, May 2014). Many experts also believed that the challenges of these 
topics are truly global. For example, expert Salma said that, 
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“…  when I was sitting in Brussels, I was thinking worldwide. In my work, I always think 
worldwide, but I act locally. In Brussels, I occasionally felt unsatisfied that we only spoke 
about Europe, but the topic is an international one. [… ]  Brussels is not enough” 
(interview, July 2014). 
 
In sum, everyone interviewed for this project felt that Priority A’s themes were important 
and worthwhile ones to be tackling at the supranational level, as an ‘added-on’ 
supplement to Member States’ efforts. This shows both the political saliency of the 
themes as well as the continued importance of subsidiarity, with EU/OMC involvement 
adding value to Member States’ individual policies and programmes, not replacing them. 
However, it also begins to raise questions about the effectiveness of the OMC, and its 
connection to the rest of the wider ‘European project.’ I therefore now move on to how 
we can conceptualise success and evaluate the OMC’s effectiveness. 
 
8.3 IDE NT IFY ING T HE  GOAL S AND E V AL UAT ING T HE  
‘SUCCE SS’ OF T HE  OMC 
 
This section addresses the tricky concept of ‘success’ and how it applies to the culture 
Open Method of Coordination. It presents a number of conceptual and methodological 
challenges (see also chapter 5). This is one of the main issues in the study of the OMC: 
how do those studying it recognise and evaluate success? What does success look like in 
OMC terms? ‘Success’ is a contested concept, and often, especially in the case of the 
OMC, discussed in normative terms. As Borrás and Radaelli (2010, p.54) so simply put 
it, “[t]he literature is polarised between those who think that using the OMC is a good 
thing and those who do not.” There is also no agreement on the analytical tools to analyse 
the effectiveness of the OMC (Hamel and V anhercke 2009). Another crucial factor to 
take into consideration is time: learning and chance do not happen quickly, particularly 
in politics, and therefore effects of participating in an OMC might be felt only years later. 
 
Evaluating success, of course, depends on what one is looking for and by what criteria an 
OMC is considered successful. But in order to determine effects, one needs a starting 
point. This is not self-evident in the study of the OMC, but logically it makes sense to 
first ask what the culture Open Method of Coordination sets out to achieve. This is a 
deceptively tricky question because one must dig deep to find an articulation of the culture 
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OMC’s aims and goals. As explained in chapter 2, the aims are not clearly articulated in 
the Agenda for Culture or Work Plans for Culture. Rather, they appear in the 
commissioning document that the Commission signed with Ecorys in 2012: 
 Foster exchange of best practice between Member States with a view to improve 
policymaking; 
 Structure cooperation around the strategic objectives of the European Agenda for 
Culture, as defined in the Council Work Plans for Culture 2008-2010 and 2011-
2014; 
 Generate policy recommendations to feed EU and national policy-making. 
 
Additional insight can also be gained from Commission officials: 
“…  the interest is clear for [Member States] . They have to exchange good practice, 
experiences, and so on. They should come back home with more knowledge about what 
is done in certain fields, what can be done and what should be done and maybe impact it 
on national level” (Corrine, interview, April 2014).  
 
The culture OMC therefore emphasises fostering exchange, structuring cooperation, and 
generating policy recommendations. The discussion of outcomes and ‘success’ will 
therefore focus on these elements. However, identifying the goals does not make 
evaluation any easier because it is never articulated what a successful OMC might look 
like; there is no obvious ‘yardstick.’ Does success mean the production of a good best 
practice manual? (And what would this look like?) Is a group successful if the experts 
themselves are happy with the outcome of the group? Or should the focus be the national 
level – has policy learning occurred? But, since not all states participate, is a simple 
majority who ‘do’ something with the report enough to deem it successful? What is ‘doing 
something’? One can easily see the challenges of this prickly concept.  
 
Because of the fundamental conceptual challenges of determining success in such a soft 
process, this study focuses on identifying outcomes of the OMC and exploring the factors 
that contributed to these outcomes. Simply asking whether an OMC group has been 
successful is not helpful due to the challenges highlighted above. While a parsimonious 
yes/no answer might appeal to some, the picture of the culture OMC is too complex to 
reduce it to such rationality. Instead, how might we think about the outcomes? While the 
evaluation of the OMC in other fields often has an explicit focus on policy change, this is 
not a yardstick that is appropriate in the case of culture. This is because change has been 
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typically narrowly defined as an observable change in law or programme (Zeitlin 2011). 
This is limiting and does not accurately reflect the weak nature of the culture OMC to 
produce significant convergence or change, largely due to the absence of indicators and 
targets (Laffan and Shaw 2005). The second reason is that nowhere in official documents 
relating to the culture OMC is policy change or convergence mentioned. The purpose of 
the OMC is to provide a platform for exchange and learning, not to make or change 
policy; solutions to policy problems are sought “either in their domestic systems or by 
learning from the experience of others” (Armstrong 2010, p.9). Finally, the consensus 
among Commission and Member State representatives is that the culture OMC is still too 
much in its infancy to be at the stage where substantive change is a realistic expectation; 
this was suggested by Commission officials as something that would likely not happen 
now but is an ‘ideal’ aim for the future. With this in mind, I now turn to a discussion of 
the outcomes of coordination; these were not determined ex ante but rather emerged over 
the course of my fieldwork. 
 
8.4 T HE  PRODUCT S AND OUT COME S OF POL ICY  
COOR DINAT ION 
 
This section addresses in some ways the true crux of this research project: well, what 
happened? Or, to put it differently, does the design of the culture OMC facilitate mutual 
learning and exchange? This section identifies the outcomes of Priority A’s working 
groups. A fter all, “… it is not just the capacity of the OMC to develop genuine policy 
debate which is important, but equally, the capacity of the policy debate to lead to 
concrete outcomes (solutions to issues of conflict)” (de la Porte 2010, p.20-1). This 
section therefore looks at what has occurred – the ‘products’ of learning and exchange – 
and links them with processes and roles as described in the two previous chapters. 
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T able 8.1: E xcept from E corys survey on usefulness of outputs 
 
 Source: McDonald et al. (2013a, p.32) 
 
 
Table 8.1, taken from Ecorys’ survey, sheds some light on how experts viewed the overall 
usefulness of the OMC. It shows that “to learn about good practice” is the most valued, 
with “to inform national policy-making” second. Ultimately, in the OMC groups studied, 
the level of direct, substantive policy change occurring in Member States was low. 
However, to those that know the OMC well, this is not surprising, nor is it to suggest that 
no learning or other outcomes took place.Findings indicate  somemulti-level learning and 
exchange. I will discuss these in three separate categories: the good practice policy report 
(section 8.4.1) andnational-level policy learning and change (8.4.2).  
 
8.4.1 Good practice policy report 
The first ‘product’ of EU cultural policy coordination, conceptualised in the narrowest 
sense, the formal output of Priority A’s groups, is the policy report produced at the end 
of each group’s cycle – three in total for Priority A . The reports represent a useable, 
tangible record of what has been achieved during the course of the OMC discussions:  
“[t]here is a specific mandate, concrete outputs – there is a result in the end – and this 
is very useful” (Fatima, Commission, interview, May 2014). 
 
The reports are collections of good/best practices. They are meant to communicate what 
the group has agreed on over the course of their discussions and also to recommend 
particular courses of action based on the identified practices. As the report is made public 
and experts are encouraged to disseminate within their Member State and personal 
networks, in theory the report is useable to a much wider audience than those who took 
part in the OMC (Luise, expert, interview, June 2014). The target audience for the reports 
is not clear; Group 1 and 3’s reports have one set of recommendations (the latter also 
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including action points), while; Group 2’s has two sets, one for policy-makers and one 
for practitioners. 
 
I asked all experts what they thought of the report, who they shared it with, and how they 
used it. These questions provoked a great deal of discussion and reflection, with 
interviewees divided on how effective they found the reports to be. Overall the consensus 
was that while they were useful in some cases, the reports suffered from some conceptual 
problems. Some experts gave me examples of how they were using them in their own 
practices. For example, Salma, a director of a cultural institution, said that her 
organisation was in the process of writing a handbook on their own practices and that she 
was using and referring to the OMC report as it was being written (interview, July 2014). 
Others said that although the reports might not have much impact in the immediate 
aftermath of the groups, one could see a trend that more and more of the OMC reports are 
being referred to in other cultural policy documents. 
 
However, many experts were also critical of the report. These criticisms were wide-
ranging, from micro-level aspects of the report to major conceptual problems – a few 
believed it was an inappropriate ‘output’ for an exercise such as the OMC. Specifically, 
there were concerns with the report’s purpose, target group(s), and its quality. These are 
discussed in turn below.  
 
Target audiences 
First of all, it is not clear who the reports’ target audiences are. Since the Commission has 
specified that it prefers representatives of public authorities as experts, it is logical to 
assume that the report is targeted at policy-makers. However, this is not the case, because 
they also target cultural practitioners. The good practices are wide-ranging: some are from 
arts and cultural institutions, some are Member State-wide policies, and some in between. 
A lthough the information from the Commission indicates policies and good practices, it 
is not clear how this division is meant to work in practice. Several experts raised this point 
during interviews and highlighted various challenges for a ‘one size fits all’ approach: 
“it’s a very hard task to address both [policy makers and cultural practitioners]  equally” 
(Luise, expert, interview, June 2014).  
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The two groups have very different, although often overlapping, challenges. For the 
report to be of use to policy-makers (whether national or sub-national), it needs to go 
beyond examples of good practice from cultural institutions and look as, as one expert 
said, “which policies were the base [of the good practices]” (Wasil, interview, October 
2014). On the other hand, as many of the practices are examples of cultural institutions’ 
practices, these may be more easily transferrable for some organisations as they are often 
on a more micro scale. Despite this, the reports’ focus is not how to implement (and 
ideally evaluate) policies or programmes or on how specifically lessons are drawn across 
Member States and institutions. This means that the reports contain “very few examples 
of coherent policy frameworks at the national level” (Camilla, invited guest expert, 
interview, October 2014). They lack pragmatic details on implementation, particularly to 
do with the financial costs associated with various programmes. 
 
Nils, one expert, summarised many of these problems when he asked, 
“…  how can we make good practices useful for other people? How should we describe 
them in a way that’s not about a ‘situation’ but about [policy]  mechanisms? We aren’t 
aware enough to analyse what is going on, and then take a situation [in another country]  
and adapt it as our own. [… ]  J ust describing is not enough” (interview, June 2014). 
 
To maximise policy transfer possibility across jurisdictions, there needs to be more 
emphasis on institutional arrangements and specific instructions for policy 
implementation (Radaelli 2003), not descriptions. This is especially true given the 
heterogeneity of cultural policy in the EU Member States (Pratt 2009b). A  strategic, 
practical guide on how to connect policies with programmes and performance (K röger 
2009) is missing from the reports: “best practice exchange is not enough in itself” 
(McDonald et al 2013a, p.48). 
 
Good practices 
A  second critical issue with the report is the concept of ‘good practices,’ which raises a 
number of questions. Who determines what is ‘good’, and how is this done? What criteria 
are used to determine these practices, and how is success of policies and programs 
measured? Bartek, a guest expert, captured many of these tensions in his thoughts on the 
misconceptualisation of best practices:  
“… sharing best practices and discussing: it’s important. But you do not demonstrate the 
importance of your activity with best practices. [… ]  Good practices, I often say, that in 
their best dimension, it is testimony; in their worst dimension, it’s just publicity. [… ]  We 
197 
 
have too many best practices reports. I think the cultural field in Europe, post-crisis, will 
die with their best practices!” (interview, November 2014). 
 
Choosing best practices is a political decision (K erber and Eckardt 2007), and it raises 
important questions regarding who sets the parameters, frameworks, and terms of 
reference. We know from the discussion of the roles of the EU institutions in chapter 6 
that this is largely done by the Commission and to varying extents the groups’ chair(s), 
which affords them a lot of say and input in the overall product. 
 
In the culture OMC’s first generation (2008-2010), the groups tried to make the examples 
geographically representative. This presented challenges of equitability and 
comparability and so was done away with for the second generation.
136
 The challenge of 
good practices among 25 or more Member States with vastly differing political systems, 
cultural policy models, policy priorities, and funding structures is exacerbated by the 
constraints of the operational design of the OMC. The OMC is meant to be a collective 
group view, but, quite simply, there are practical constraints when the groups are usually 
minimum of 25 people, and time is very limited. Nearly all experts believed the timescale 
was too short and did not allow enough time for adequate discussion, meaning that 
decisions are made rather quickly without sufficient time for debate about the 
examples.
137
 Given the groups’ heterogeneity (see chapter 7), there are also difficulties in 
agreeing on norms and terms of reference.  
 
Ultimately, the good practices are self-selected among the group. They are not tested, 
debated extensively, or measured against each other for style or type. For example, in the 
introduction to a section on best practices “from audience to actors” (how to encourage 
more people to participate in the creation of arts and cultural practices), Group 1’s report 
says “Below are a few examples of initiatives that were indicated by the members as 
interesting” (p.93). This shows the randomness of the choice – is being interesting a good 
enough criteria to be included in an EU-wide report on good practices? For Group 3, in 
order to compile a compendium, the chair asked everyone to bring two examples to the 
next meeting, one on awareness and expression in a cultural example and one in an 
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 The differences in geographical representation are in fact stark. In Group 1’s report, for example, 15 
examples came from Germany, eight from Italy, and none from Cyprus, Estonia, L ithuania, or Malta, 
despite experts from these countries having participated in the group. 
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 Once again, the chair is crucial on this point – a well-organised chair can better facilitate discussion. 
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education example. While many experts consult other relevant actors in their individual 
Member State, the examples are limited to what that expert, as a ‘bounded’ actor, is aware 
of. The overall report, then, is self-selected, with very strong ‘curational’ input by the 
chair, sub-group, Commission policy officer, and/or an external guiding expert. 
Oftentimes, the final selection for inclusion in the report is done behind the scenes. What 
this means is that while the reports are a novel and in some cases useful collection of good 
practices, they suffer from a lack of practical information to transfer policies and practices 
between countries or institutions, and the selection of these practices is rather random and 
does not adhere to any particular criteria. 
 
Quality of reports 
A  final issue with the reports concerns their quality, in particular their ‘obviousness’, 
length (too long), and lack of critical analysis. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
quality of the report directly impinges on its dissemination, as evidenced by this quote 
from expert Markus: 
“…  the report is as it is, I would immediately hesitate to send it around the world as a 
kind of important outcome of this group, because it’s not the kind of quality I would like 
to have to show the experts in the field” (interview, June 2014). 
 
Markus’ comment highlights the importance, discussed already in chapter 7, of the expert 
finding the report to be appropriate and thus taking ownership of it. Because he does not 
‘stand behind it,’ there is much less chance that Markus will disseminate this report 
widely. Similarly, another expert, Georg, said that he was not inclined to show the report 
to his boss because it did not contain anything new (interview, May 2014). This 
corresponds to what Miriam Hartlapp, in an analysis of the European Employment 
Strategy OMC, found that guidelines and recommendations did not encourage learning 
because they “seldom alter the information pool” (Hartlapp 2009, p.11). This was also 
found to be the case in culture. 
 
Other concerns voiced regarded the lack of critical analysis in the report: 
“I was left with the sense that it was more about logistics – making paths for certain kinds 
of knowledge to circulate, but not criticising that knowledge. Like constructing a pipeline 
of knowledge that goes from one place to another, but not about critiquing it” (Timo, 
expert, interview, September 2014). 
 
“I think that all of these OMC groups should have a little bit of budget so that some 
people could be hired to collect data, and make the outcomes a bit more substantial. 
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Because the outcomes of my group in the end were okay, but I don’t know if they had that 
much impact because they were not really based on much substantial research” (Markus, 
expert, interview, June 2014). 
 
Timo’s and Markus’ comments directly concern a fundamental feature of the culture 
OMC’s design: the lack of emphasis on problem-solving. The reports represent a collation 
of ideas, but they lack critical analysis and moreover because they are not based on 
solving a clearly defined problem, the practices are simply too random, vague, and 
disjointed to be useful for a wide target group. This finding corresponds with Ecorys’, 
who found that one “potential weakness” in the culture OMC is outputs that are too 
generalised (McDonald et al. 2013a, p.ii). The same report also found that while one third 
of respondents categorised the reports as being high quality, two-thirds rated it 
‘reasonable’ (p.32).
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 In invited expert Bartek’s opinion,  
“[I] t’s a pity that there is no …  that those [groups]  do not consider having systematically 
one academic working with them. Someone specialised in the question, who could give 
orientations, share academic results, help them to build the final report. It’s not [the 
chair’s]  job – they’re not specialists in writing. They’re not professional about writing in 
that way. They try to do what they can within a very very limited time” (interview, 
November 2014). 
 
Overall, then, the good/best practice reports represent, in theory, a tangible and useful 
guiding manual that has the potential to be widely disseminated to ministries and arts and 
cultural organisations across the EU. Many experts in fact do use them this way. However, 
the reports also highlight conceptual difficulties with good practices in that the 
randomness of the practices selected risk a haphazard, self-selected list with little 
analysis. With most of the reports’ word counts devoted to examples rather than analysis, 
and even the policies vague on details, there is a debate to be had on whether this is the 
best option to showcase the groups’ work. Because of these qualities, the reports seem to 
be more useful in Member States where discourse and policy development of the 
particular theme is lagging behind the majority of Member States. In these states where 
there is considerable room for development, the basic recommendations in the reports 
may be more useful.  
 
How can we explain these findings on the good practice report? 
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 These findings were for all OMC groups, not just those in Priority A. 
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What explains the findings about the good practice report discussed above? Below I tackle 
some of the main reasons. The factors identified are the timescale and structure of 
meetings; difficulties with language, definitions, and meaning; and the vagueness of 
discussions and absence of dialogue. While they are discussed one-by-one, they 
compound and work together to highlight the broader more general misconceptualisation 
of the good practice report and loose guidelines and recommendations. 
 
a) Timescale and structure of meetings 
A  common proclamation by several experts was that there is not enough time for real 
debate within the way that the OMC is organised. The ultimate functioning of the OMC 
is based on task completion – the report must be completed eventually. These difficulties 
are in part highlighted by the group on access to culture (Group 1). In the introduction of 
their report, the group explains how difficult their task was: 
“Even though the Work Plan for culture asked the group to produce a ‘manual’, both the 
time made available for this work and the scope and heterogeneity of challenges for 
culture across Europe would have made it difficult to produce a document providing 
guidelines that would prove valid across Europe. Therefore this document is not a 
manual, but rather a structured set of deliberations… ” (European Union 2012, p.6; 
emphasis added). 
 
This extract confirms that in many ways the scale and scope of the task set for them was 
too much; this group chose a less-authoritative-sounding, more exploratory ‘set of 
deliberations’ as opposed to a manual. The difficulties are in part due to the short 
timescale, which leads to focused sessions that do not allow for enough debate. The 
meetings are not open-ended discussions but rather have a very focused purpose – to 
create the manual.
139
 A  related issue is that as every participating expert has a ‘day job’, 
the work done in the OMC often falls to the bottom of the priority list. This led Georg, 
one expert, to express doubts about whether the OMC was the best method or tool for 
discussion and dialogue – according to him, there were not enough opportunities for 
meaningful discussion in the working groups. This is a finding that has been found in 
other analyses of OMCs in other fields as well (see for example K röger 2009). 
 
b) Difficulties with language, definitions, and meaning 
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 The external appointed expert of Group 3 several times had to remind the group that “we are here to 
create a manual.” 
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The discussion earlier in this chapter highlighted the importance of discourse and the 
meanings of ideas and terminology. Agreement on definitions presents numerous 
challenges in a context with 25 or more Member States. The difficulties are both language 
barriers in terms of the pragmatic challenge of understanding each other (K röger 2009, 
Armstrong 2010), but also in terms of the translation of ideas and discourses. These 
challenges have both narrow and wide consequences. In a narrow sense, the clarification 
of definitions took up a lot of time and was a source of frustration for some participants 
(McDonald et al. 2013a, p.22). This quote from expert Timo, recounting his group’s 
discussion of the meaning of cultural diversity, highlights some of the difficulties: 
“… racism, immigration, this discourse is very Nordic. Others …  were explaining their 
definitions of diversity, which has more to do with internal inclusion, marginal groups in 
a local context. Their history of diversity is different. This was really obvious and 
important. I thought ‘ok, I don’t know how this will go,’ because it’s such a multitude. It 
was too wide a subject” (interview, October 2014).
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Nils’ comments reinforce this: 
“[The diversity of the group]  could be a very valuable thing – but then the aim of the 
group should be created in another way. Because if we should create a manual, then we 
need a common denominator” (interview, June 2014). 
 
In a wider sense, it is an indication of what Armstrong (2010, p.24) refers to as “the slow 
and painful process of giving the EU a social identity.” Given the lack of treaty bases for 
cultural (and social) issues, as well as the conceptual difficulties in establishing basic 
normative frames for discussion, the role of language cannot be underestimated:  
“…  rules and situations are related by criteria of similarity or difference through 
reasoning by analogy and metaphor. The process is mediated by language, by the ways 
in which participants come to be able to talk about one situation as similar to or different 
from another; and assign situations to rules. The process maintains consistency in action 
primarily through the creation of typologies of similarity, rather than through a derivation 
of action from stable interests or wants” (March and Olsen 2009, p.9). 
 
These ‘typologies of similarity’ are exactly what is lacking in the case of culture. As a 
result, there is a great deal of divergence on definitions and ideas, which means that a lot 
of time is spent discussing meaning. 
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 Interestingly, this is not particular to the cultural sector; evidence from, for example, de la Porte 
(2010)’s findings on the discussion of ‘homelessness’ in the social protection OMC indicates that it is an 
issue in other OMCs as well. 
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c) Vagueness of discussions and absence of dialogue 
Finally, many experts believed that the groups’ discussions and final reports were 
imprecise. This has been a known problem since the first generation of culture OMCs: 
the 2010 report on the implementation of the Agenda for Culture noted that “… the 
process of agreeing more specific fields proved challenging for the groups and, in some 
cases, delayed the effective start of their activities” (CEC 2010a, as cited in McDonald et 
al. 2013a). In an attempt to rectify this, in the second Work Plan (2011-2014), the 
subthemes were much more concrete. However, vagueness and ambiguity are still 
problematic. This issue was also highlighted in the Ecorys survey as well: “Imposing 
clearer targets and benchmarks would strengthen the process, but a balance would need 
to be struck to avoid reduced participation” (McDonald et al. 2013a, p.26). This suggests 
that Member States in the Council would not accept more specific themes. 
 
Policy development on Priority A’s themes is at various stages in the EU-28, and 
participants come from very different approaches, creating challenges for achieving quick 
consensus on such broad and sensitive topics. This links in with the discussion of 
discourse above:  
“… it is a sensitive area and you don’t have a long tradition. [… ]  There’s still a lot of 
work to do. I think it should be more focused though, on specific issues, because otherwise 
one ends up collecting too much general information (Quentin, expert, interview, July 
2014). 
 
This was echoed by an invited expert, Frederick, who thought that there was not enough 
emphasis put on the thematic content of cultural policy:  
“But the content is what should be emphasised. [… ] There is a gravitation without a 
serious push or pull. Not even by the Commission. [… ]  It was a diligent task – the teacher 
gives a task to a group and solves it” (interview, December 2014). 
 
 
The exchange of ideas is sometimes difficult in this setting, largely because of the 
practical issues outlined above, but also because of the lack of time devoted to getting to 
know one another:  
“We did not start work as an engaged group of people who knew each other. It takes 
time, two or three meetings – only after the third or fourth meeting did we know people, 
and then it’s a real working atmosphere. [  … ]  This was – especially for this topic, 
intercultural dialogue – not very clever!” (Salma, interview, J uly 2014). 
 
When asked whether he kept in touch with anyone from his group, Nils replied, 
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“No. Because since the meetings were mostly in Brussels, they were very official. There 
is emotion in culture – [… ]  spending time together, it is important. But we were present 
only during roundtables, which were mostly presentations of invited guests. Meetings 
weren’t formed for us to create links [with each other] . We were an audience, invited 
guests, who gave some inspiration. But if we want to create links and reasons to be in 
touch afterwards, there should be opportunities to know each other!” (interview, June 
2014). 
 
 
Timo, meanwhile, went further to describe the way that experts are supposed to be ‘the 
voice’ of their Member State: 
“…  the structure of the room, the tables, microphones – all of that increases the pressure 
as well, to be more and more conscientious about what you’re saying. …  There is this 
aesthetic of sovereign states inside this room. You represent a sovereign state – you speak 
into a microphone, as a representative of a structure. It puts a lot of pressure on you. It’s 
not about dialogue really; it’s about representation” (Timo, expert, interview, October 
2014).  
 
As Timo indicates, the basic issue of the meeting room layout does not optimise dialogue. 
This is compounded by the aforementioned constraints of the formal and bureaucratic 
nature of the process which lead to a task-based system and fewer opportunities for 
exchange. The task-based approach encourages the gathering of practices, but not 
substantive discussion on the broader policy issues, leaving some to comment that there 
was simply too much consensus: 
  
“There is a certain risk, although, that the real political debate on these issues does not 
take place in this process. Because there is maybe too much agreement on these issues – 
if you don’t watch you can create a ‘false reality’ that misses the discussions about 
populism and nationalism, because these populist and nationalistic voices aren’t present 
[in OMC groups] . I think that is the weak spot” (Oskar, expert, interview, June 2014). 
 
“OMC working groups’ final reports run the risk of becoming rather bland documents. 
The first imperative seems to be that no one takes offense and that everyone agrees” 
(Elin, invited guest expert, interview, November 2014). 
 
Borrás and Radaelli (2010) argue that ambiguity and broad-brush goals to achieve 
maximum political agreement are built into the institutional design of the OMC. This is 
certainly the case in the cultural field and has been identified as an issue in many others 
as well. The exchange of views and ideas is identified as a goal of coordination, however 
this is constrained due the task-based approach. In addition, there is no real ‘problem-
solving’ involved. To use an example from Group 1, rather than a solution-finding 
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discussion on how to get under-represented groups to visit more art galleries and 
museums, discussion is about what has already been done, in vastly differing 
circumstances and scenarios: the ‘problem’ is de-emphasised.
141
 As a result, discussions 
can become vague, unfocused, and lose their practicality.  
 
8.4.2 Policy learning and change 
The second category of policy coordination outcomes concerns policy leaning and change 
in the Member States, relevant at both the national and subnational levels. As previously 
explained, this is the ‘outcome’ that has received the most attention in the OMC literature 
in other fields. It is a crucial one to study since it directly concerns why the OMC was 
created in the first place – in order to effect change without legislative or hard law 
procedure (a “risk-free method of path finding” [Laffan and Shaw 2005, p.19]). However, 
the common research design of assessing policy convergence and/or direct transfer 
between Member States is not an appropriate yardstick for the culture OMC. Learning 
and change are therefore discussed below according to Zeitlin’s (2011) categorisations 
(see chapter 4), which is a wide and comprehensive approach that takes into account many 
different types of learning. This section shows once again how the importance of the 
Member States’ cultural ministries in determining what, if anything, will be ‘done’ with 
the OMC. 
 
In the Ecorys survey, mutual learning was found to be one of the main benefits of the 
culture OMC: 76.3% of respondents indicated that one of the key reasons for their 
Member State to participate was that they were “interested in improving national policy-
making through exchanges of good practice with other countries” (p.23). 50% said they 
wanted to learn from others, and 59.2% said they were interested in sharing national good 
practice (p.23). However, the picture of learning when connected to outcomes does not 
quite match up: 56% of respondents indicated that the OMC had some influence on 
national policy-making and 22% said no influence.
142
 25.3% also said that the OMC had 
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 The OMCs in other fields suffer from this problem as well. However, there are usually more statistics 
available allowing the research at least to start with a ‘problem,’ For example, K enneth Armstrong’s 2010 
book on the social policy OMCs starts with a clear statistic: in 1997, 18% of the EU population lived 
below the poverty line.  
142
 56% indicating ‘some’ influence is a number that seems high in the context of this project’s findings. 
However, this percentage is across all nine OMCs in 2011-2014. Additionally, it is imprecise as ‘some 
influence’ is a normative distinction. 
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no influence on structured debate on national policy priorities. However, one of the main 
findings of the evaluation was that, 
“The European added value of the Culture OMC lies primarily in providing opportunities 
for mutual learning on issues of common interest, which would not otherwise be available 
to participants. It allows knowledge to be made available at the national level more 
effectively than would be the case through other channels, and helps to link a wider cohort 
of governmental representatives to the EU policy-making level” (McDonald et al. 2013a, 
p.28; emphasis my own). 
 
This suggests that while the OMC may be successful at creating opportunities for 
exchange, this does not always translate into outcomes. 
 
Learning is difficult to identify, much less ‘measure.’ As previously mentioned, there has 
been little substantive policy change as a result of the OMC groups in Priority A : policy 
convergence and transfer are the exceptions rather than the rule.
143
 This finding is 
consistent with findings from other OMCs and reflects the critical lens of much of the 
research; there is a “highly limited role for the EU common objectives, acting as a general 
normative context generating little adaptation pressures” (Armstrong 2010, p.186). 
Indeed, given the loose design of coordination in the cultural field, it is not designed to 
do so. 
 
Political shifts 
There was one example of a political shift, a change which place new issues on the 
domestic agenda (Zeitlin 2011): Lithuania launched a cultural diversity policy in 2015. 
The policy comprised a Strategy for Development of National Minorities and an Action 
Plan for Integration aimed at ‘increasing public tolerance through intercultural dialogue’ 
(Ministry of Culture of L ithuania, 2015). This was an extension of the previous national 
strategy (2012-2014) and focused on the integration of the Roma population into 
L ithuanian society. The policy encompasses a broad range of areas including education, 
health, labour market participation, and cultural measures. It is in the latter section 
where the OMC’s influence can be seen. 
 
As a part of the launch of the new policy, the country hosted a national conference on 
diversity and intercultural dialogue, to which several members of the OMC group on 
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 A couple of interviewees mentioned that other culture OMC groups – those outside of Priority A – had 
resulted in policy change, often specific and technical, but this was rare. 
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that subject contributed: the chair of the OMC group on that topic, from Slovenia, 
delivered a presentation on the group’s report, and two other members presented 
examples of ‘policy in practice’ initiatives from their Member States (Paulina, expert, 
interview, June 2016). This same foursome also went on to present  
 
A lthough it is impossible to isolate the OMC’s impact among a large range of potential 
influences (including other EU influences such as the EU Framework for National 
Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 [Council of the European Union 2011b]), 
experts indicated that participation in the OMC group played a part with regards to the 
section of the policy on intercultural dialogue (Paulina, expert, interview, June 2016; 
V iktoria, expert, interview, October 2014).
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Increased vertical coordination 
Zeitlin’s second major category of change is procedural shifts in governance and policy-
making. This category is not as relevant in the case of culture as the shifts often have to 
do with increased horizontal and vertical capacity building and coordination, due to 
reporting statistics and gathering information, which the culture OMC does not demand. 
However, there was one example of enhanced vertical coordination in a country that 
hosted a study trip. Activities organised during the study trip meant that people who 
worked for the national ministry of culture met employees from regional authorities and 
arts organisations. These people were brought together for the first time because of the 
OMC and subsequently began to cooperate on other initiatives because of it. Due to new 
connections made over the course of the study trip, there is now more formal and informal 
coordination between that national and regional government.  
 
Socialisation and the emergence of new networks 
The second identified outcome of the culture OMC is socialisation and the emergence of 
new networks. Several experts reported that the best thing about taking part in the OMC 
was meeting new like-minded people and expanding their personal and professional 
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 Influence is very complex to determine. For example, in a recent article on the integration of the 
‘access to culture’ discourse into Croatian national cultural policy (a country that did not participate in the 
OMC in this topic), Primorac et al. (2015) conclude that while recent national strategic cultural plans 
have implicitly incorporated this discourse, it is impossible to determine whether this is from EU 
influence and even if so it is impossible to isolate the OMC’s influence among a range of other processes 
such as ascension pressures, cultural funding, and competition from the ECoC programme.  
207 
 
networks. The Ecorys survey found that 51.4% of surveyed group reported that 
developing new networks was relevant “to a great extent” and 42.9% “to some extent” 
(p.39). However, interestingly, this occurred mainly in an informal fashion, as many 
experts criticised the formal OMC process for what they saw as too little focus on getting 
to know one another. A  social programme is not automatically built into the meetings 
(with the exception of the study visits),
145
 but those who made an effort to for example 
go out for a meal or connect afterwards experienced benefits. One expert, Timo, describes 
how he had a few hours before he boarded his flight, and so he and a few other participants 
visited a local arts institution: 
“And the chance to spend some free time with some colleagues – we had a few hours 
before the flight …  it was a good chance to talk. It was useful. [In the meetings 
themselves] , it was impossible to achieve this level of interaction” (interview, October 
2014).  
The extent to which these partnerships and friendship continued on past the OMC groups 
varied considerably, as one might expect. However, there is no doubt that many experts 
find this the most satisfying part of the entire OMC process. This was especially true for 
people who are not involved in any other European cultural networks and may not have 
much interaction with cultural professionals from other Member States. In this respect 
the OMC represents a unique meeting place for like-minded individuals. 
 
In addition to increased socialisation and networking, there were also examples of new 
networks created as a result of OMC connections. These occurred in both cross-national 
and sub-national contexts and in both formal and informal ways. In one example, an 
expert who was in the process of establishing a pan-European cultural network invited 
new members who she met through the OMC to participate in the project. Similarly, it 
also inspired at least one expert, in a Nordic country, to operate an OMC-type exchange 
within their Member State, among regional arts organisations 
 
Networking with people who shared the same professional values and norms was thus 
considered a very positive and desirable added outcome of the process: 
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 Several experts believed the discussions to be much more fruitful during the study visit, when the 
atmosphere was more relaxed and site visits to local cultural institutions allowed for more specific 
discussion and application of ideas. There is also an evening social programme organised on the study 
visits where the experts are able to relax and socialise together. 
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“But for myself it was very interesting to come in contact with all of these people, 
especially now as I’ve been invited [by them] to all of these conferences” (Salma, expert, 
interview, J uly 2014). 
 
“[T]hrough these working groups we’ve gotten to know each other quite well and gotten 
to know their work. So there’s a behind the scenes dialogue taking place within these 
groups” (Paulina, expert, interview, June 2014). 
 
Paulina’s use of “behind the scenes” reinforces the unintended nature of this outcome. 
The goal of the OMC is not to create networks, yet they are being created. Paulina went 
on to say that collaborations that come out of the OMC groups are the “hidden” part of 
the OMC. The joining-up and “matching of identities” in group settings may have to do 
with experience, (shared) expert knowledge, or intuition (March and Olsen 2009, p.4). 
This is more likely to be the case among those experts who feel that they fit in well with 
the ‘identity’ of and familiarity with the group. 
 
These findings demonstrate just how important professional development and network 
and community expansion was to many people. It was also a finding in the Ecorys survey: 
“[c]ommunities of practice, interest and knowledge networks are also developing as a 
result of the OMC process” (McDonald et al. 2013a, p.28). This is personal and varied 
immensely among the experts I spoke to; some did not create partnerships at all and did 
not engage whatsoever in the continuing of the group when it was finished, as evidenced 
by Salma: “[T]he engagement was very diverse. In our case there was a highly engaged 
inner group within the group. These people are still in contact” (interview, July 2014).  
 
Heuristic learning and concept usage 
Most commonly, the culture OMC has been shown to lead to what Zeitlin calls heuristic 
learning – an increase in awareness of policies and programs in other Member States and 
the EU, as evidenced from these comments from experts: 
 
“No. I can’t see that policy has changed much, but actually – it’s a big but – the OMC 
consultations, meaning all the various groups and their outcomes – have really 
contributed to raising awareness, both within the administration in [country]  and also 
outside in the field” (Luise, interview, June 2014) 
 
“What you learn in the working groups are not about big developments, but how you do 
it in little steps, and about learning what ideas are out there” (Ruth, interview, July 
2014). 
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“I gained knowledge on networks in Europe that have been helpful for me when I’m 
looking at grant applications. There have been applications for European projects that 
involve parties that I’ve come to know through the OMC work” (Wasil, expert, interview, 
October 2014). 
 
“…  because I don’t work for the Ministry of Culture, I don’t know whether these reports 
will feed back into the overall workings of the ministry – I’m not too sure. I haven’t seen 
any results yet. But there was a press release last week for a new national cultural policy 
towards 2025.  I get a sense that aspects of [the OMC report]  will feed back into the 
national cultural policy” (Paulina, interview, June 2014). 
 
Darya, a member of a national government, spoke more generally and said that, 
“We had some examples of OMCs that saved us a lot of work. [… ]  [One in particular]
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was for [the policy officer]  a fast-forward trip, and very useful. So that was absolutely 
worth the investment and even paid back more than it cost. But that might be the 
exception. Mostly it’s a lot of uninteresting ‘blah blah blah’ and then maybe a few sparks 
of inspiration” (Darya, interview, April 2014). 
 
Heuristic learning means that even if policies or programmes do not change, there is an 
increased awareness of what prospective changes might look like, even if they “remain 
subject to controversy and debate” (Zeitlin 2009, p.229). In addition, increased awareness 
as a result of OMC participation may also lead to seeking information from other sources 
such as other EU venues, platforms, or NGOs. One of the main advantages of the OMCs 
is that recommendations coming from the EU often lend credibility to discourses that may 
not be well-established in a domestic context. This is known as the leverage effect, 
whereby EU discourse is used “as a tool to advance their own domestic political agenda, 
promote desired reforms, and overcome entrenched veto positions” (Zeitlin 2005b, 
p.480). This allows experts, as change agents, to promote ideas with more political weight 
behind them. This reflects the most common use of the culture OMC, the “strategic use 
by national and subnational actors as resource for their own purposes” (Zeitlin 2005b, 
p.480). 
 
This, of course, can only happen if, as detailed in the previous chapter, the expert 
perceives the recommendations or ideas to have a high degree of legitimacy. No matter 
what job or connections the expert holds, if he or she does not find the findings 
appropriate and take ownership of them, there is much less of a chance that they will 
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travel far within national networks. There is no impact of the OMC without usage by 
domestic actors (Zeitlin 2009). Expert Wasil remarked on this in his case: 
“One good thing from this OMC work was that I came home with arguments that I could 
use when it I try to get our agency to work more with [statistics] . The report is pretty 
clear that this is a leadership issue, that you really need to engage, to realise that it takes 
time, etc. These are arguments that I’ve taken home” (interview, October 2014). 
 
In Wasil’s case, he clearly finds the arguments persuasive. This does not necessarily mean 
that he will be successful in pursuing change, but it does increase credibility, particularly 
in cases where a particular discourse may not be particularly well-developed in a national 
context. “… a discourse, however ‘good’ or compelling in its arguments… can 
nevertheless fail if certain policy actors with veto power remain unconvinced” (Schmidt 
and Radaelli 2004b, p.370). This is because action relies on senior officials. Since most 
experts are not senior members of national cultural administrations, very rarely do they 
have the ‘final say’ on policy priorities or programmes.  
 
In general, Member State takeup of the ideas and recommendations in the OMC report is 
likely to be higher the more appropriate and legitimate the recommendations are 
perceived to be. This is dependent on the expert and also on the norms within domestic 
institutional settings: “[t]he story the discourse tells and the information it provides must 
also appear sound, the actions it recommends doable, the solutions to the problems it 
identifies workable, and the overall outcomes appropriate” (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004a, 
p.201). The OMC’s findings are the most likely to travel and be implemented if,  
“the discourse …  contains cognitive arguments that demonstrate the policy programme’s 
relevance, applicability and coherence; and normative arguments that resonate with long-
standing or newly-emerging values, and that complement rather than contract the 
cognitive arguments” (Ibid.). 
 
The more appropriate ideas are perceived to be – institutionally, administratively 
(Harmsen 1999), and politically – in relation to current cultural policy goals and priorities, 
the more likely that ideas in the reports are going to be used. Writing of the OMCs in 
social policy, Zeitlin (2005b) identified “the perceived legitimacy of the 
recommendations, national sensitivity to criticism from the EU, and the domestic 
visibility of the process, including media coverage” (p.477) as important factors 
influencing outcomes. ‘National sensitivity to criticism from the EU’ is not a factor with 
respect to the culture OMC, since there is no bench-marking or target-setting. However, 
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the other three, in particular the perceived legitimacy of the recommendations and 
domestic visibility, are relevant. 
 
National ministries thus become ‘gatekeepers’ and determine what, if anything, will 
happen with the findings post-OMC. Nearly every expert mentioned the importance of 
this and said that changes in government and national politics more generally influenced 
what they could do as follow-up. Issue attention and electoral cycles (Downs 1972 in 
Egan 2009) are crucial in this respect. For example, Hanna, a policy advisor in a regional 
government, said that in the first of three OMCs she had participated in, there was more 
domestic interest one in particular as of the theme was “very much in accordance with 
what we were doing at the time” (interview, May 2014). Therefore, if the policy theme is 
in harmony with current policy priorities (or impending changes in them), and if political 
circumstances are optimal (for example that there is not an election going at the time), 
there is a higher chance that a) the ministry will read the report and b) it will have an 
effect. This also reflects the cyclical nature of the OMC work and policy lags in that it 
takes time for things to change: J ette, of the Commission, also pointed to policy cycles as 
a barrier to simultaneous change:  
“you’d never manage to do it [policy change]  at the same time, because all policy cycles 
are different. But I do believe that [we’re]  building a body of experience” (interview, 
May 2014). 
 
Given the long-term and complicated nature of policy learning and change, it is 
impossible to come to a definitive answer regarding these processes with regards to the 
culture OMC. The OMC can certainly be considered successful in heuristically increasing 
awareness of policy and institutional contexts in some states. However, by and large, there 
have not been significant policy developments in the Member States. This is not the case 
when the micro-scale of the individual experts is considered though, because many of 
them do use and share the report and incorporate what they have learned into their own 
practices. This is done to varying scales. These conclusions are similar to those found by 
Sandra K röger in the evaluation of the OMCs in social policy: “the OMC inclusion can 
hardly be said to have been integrated in a meaningful way in the existing policy-making 
cycles, but instead remained a stranger only known to a few insiders” (K röger 2008, 
p.135). These insiders, however, have demonstrated a wide range of usages and show that 
while the culture OMC has not led to major policy learning or change, there is a complex 
set of ‘appropriation’ by domestic actors. Therefore, “by embracing OMC concepts, 
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categories, and metrics …  domestic actors at a minimum acknowledge and reinforce the 
discursive legitimacy of common European objectives and policy approaches” (Zeitlin 
2009, p.233). 
 
8.5 T HE  CUL T UR E  OMC IN BR OADE R  CONT E X T S 
 
At this point in the discussion, the Open Method of Coordination has been referred to in 
relative isolation without a proper grounding as to where it ‘fits’ within other European 
Union processes and policy fields and European and global cultural policy debates. The 
purpose of this section is thus to flesh out these connections and examine the culture OMC 
in wider contexts. This is multi-faceted as it requires looking at the relationship between 
the OMC and broader EU agendas and at the OMC’s relevance among other international, 
national, regional, and local levels that encompass non-governmental organisations and 
other platforms.  
 
The OMC’s wider connections are important to address as the OMC has been criticised 
for its low visibility and awareness among not only among members of the public (even 
among the ‘initiated’) but national-level authorities, as demonstrated in earlier sections 
of this chapter. For example, Frazer and Marlier (2008) found “virtually no media or 
public awareness” of the social OMCs. This is all the more important given that the 
incorporation of civil society into decision-making was one of the key aims of the OMC 
in the first place (European Council 2000, CEC 2001). The overall consensus in the 
literature is that the OMC is rarely mentioned in the media and due to its poor 
incorporation into national processes, is often not even known about among domestic 
policy-makers (K röger 2009). This was also the finding for the cultural case; in general, 
the OMC is poorly integrated into wider contexts, including even other culture OMC 
groups from other priority areas. 
 
8.5.1 T he culture OMC and broader E U agendas 
The first category to tackle is the culture OMC’s place within the broader ‘European 
Union’ agenda. This is a vital question in terms of European integration although the 
question is much bigger than the Open Method of Coordination and extends to questions 
about where all supporting competences fit within European governance. It is even more 
213 
 
important given that all culture OMC groups are linked to a specific broader goals within 
both the Agenda for Culture and Europe 2020. 
 
Most experts interviewed for this project did not have much of an idea of how the OMC 
ties into (or does not tie into) the bigger picture. In fact, many experts actually asked me 
this, reflecting that setting the OMC in its wider context is not being made clear to the 
experts who participate in the meetings: 
“I remember back then I was very confused – I couldn’t see the bigger picture. I come 
from a really local structure into something bigger than I realised but it’s just the same 
mess – no one has strategies, we are pushed to do ‘logistics’ – building this pipeline” 
(Timo, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
 “What is the strategic value of this whole OMC process? [… ]  It shouldn’t just be about 
the Work Plan, it should be more about why at this moment do we have these groups, and 
what connections does the work of this group have to the broader EU agenda?” (Oskar, 
expert, interview, June 2014). 
 
 
Even experts who have participated in an OMC group beforehand are not clear on why it 
was formed in the first place: the logic of policy coordination is not made clear to the 
participants (and, following on from this, dissemination and use of the reports and 
embedding of the OMC work into national policy is more challenging). Given the key 
role of the expert, it is vital for them to have a better sense of how their work ties into the 
broader picture: 
“[w]hat is more important is to link with the priorities of the presidency, to link with the 
political priorities…  It’s important that the work that’s been done is endorsed at the 
political level” (Ulla, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
The failure to make explicit and deeper connections to wider contexts is in part 
contributing to the depoliticisation and ultimate effectiveness of the groups, particularly 
in connecting the OMC to national-level policies and programmes.  
 
There is also a wider concern regarding the culture OMC’s place within the ‘European 
project.’ The OMC grew out of the ideology associated with the L isbon Strategy, and the 
OMC in culture is linked to the Europe 2020 strategy, an economic strategy that also has 
embedded within it social and cultural goals (Dawson 2011). In the Council’s conclusions 
on culture’s contributions to Europe 2020, it states that “culture can make a significant 
and multidimensional contribution to the measures proposed by the Europe 2020 
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integrated guidelines and flagship initiatives aiming at turning the EU into a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy” (Council of the European Union 2011a, p.2). In 
particular, Priority A  can contribute to inclusive growth,  
“through promoting intercultural dialogue in full respect for cultural diversity. Cultural 
activities and programmes can strengthen social cohesion and community development 
as well as enable individuals or a community to fully engage in the social, cultural and 
economic life” (Ibid., p.3). 
 
This articulation may appear in official documentation but this is not being transferred to 
the experts representing Member States. Not only are the goals of the OMC unclear to 
many participants, they also do not understand more broadly where cultural cooperation 
fits within the European project, nor in how the OMC links with other OMC groups, the 
Creative Europe programme, or other EU cultural actions. This highlights what is a deeper 
problem of under-conceptualisation of the OMC and indeed a broader issue of a lack of 
articulation of why Member States cooperate on cultural matters. Where does culture fit 
in terms of “the realization of shared social values, common social objectives and the 
protection of fundamental social rights”? (Armstrong 2010, p.294). There is a 
fundamental paradox in that even though states are participating in a policy coordination 
exercise, this cooperation is piecemeal and fragmented. There is thus not a true sense of 
creating an overall European cultural project because power still remains with the nation-
state. 
 
8.5.2 T he culture OMC and broader conversations about cultural policy  
A longside situating the OMC within the European context, there is also the question of 
where it fits within broader discussions on cultural policy, be these global, European, 
national, or subnational. Given the complexity of these conversations, this is difficult to 
truly determine. However, a few basic points can be made.  
 
The first is that there has been an effort made at integrating ‘external’ voices to the OMC 
groups – all three Priority A  groups had a fairly broad spectrum of participation in the 
form of other cultural platforms, societies, and individual invited experts (please see full 
lists in appendix 6). The participation of civil society was outlined specifically in the 
conclusions of the March 2000 L isbon Summit (European Council 2000), and is typically 
discussed in the literature in terms of participation, deliberation, and representation 
(K röger 2009, Harcourt 2013). However, the Commission, at the centre of the OMC, acts 
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as facilitator and thus gatekeeper to this process. In opening up to new sources, the OMC 
is ‘re-bound’ by these same sources (Armstrong 2010). The effects of external 
participation are “a controversial point in the literature” (Harcourt 2013, p.669), since 
many have found that the system is actually a closed method of coordination (K röger 
2009, Armstrong 2010). In addition, the format of the meetings means that instead of 
dialogue with invited experts, their contribution usually takes place as a presentation-
style, with not as much opportunity for discussion. There is room for more work on 
examining with more nuance the type of contribution civil society platforms lead to. 
 
It therefore seems that while many of the Member States experts personally made an 
effort to share the report within their professional networks, the culture OMC is a rather 
closed process. Camilla, an invited expert, summed it up when she said that “what 
happened inside the room was barely known to the other people in the building!” 
(interview, November 2014). 
 
A  second issue is to what extent conversations that happen in the context of the OMC are 
translatable and relatable to wider cultural policy debates. Dissemination, already 
discussed extensively, is key here. Results from the Ecorys survey found that, for the 
2011-2014 Work Plan, 65.7% of participants surveyed disseminated results to cultural 
organisations at the national and regional level and 76.7% disseminated to decision-
makers at national level. While both numbers are more than half, there is still room for 
improvement. Effort has to be made to avoid what Juliet Johnson (2006) calls ‘wormhole 
effects’ whereby specific national policy actors are linked in a transnational network but 
do not engage with other domestic actors, meaning that findings do not travel. There is 
also a great deal of complexity with regard to what extent subnational actors have a say 
and/or have the opportunity to participate in the OMC (López-Santana 2009). Because of 
the wide variety of jurisdictions and cross-cutting nature of cultural policy, this is 
different in every case. For example, Belgium typically sends an expert from both the 
Flemish- and French-speaking communities. German participation in one group had a 
representative from one of the Länder, and good practice examples came from both the 
Land and the central government.
147
 However, given that the system is designed so that 
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 Note that this information about Belgium and Germany is publically-available. Other countries’ 
strategies regarding subnational participation are not, and thus I will not discuss them here in order to 
protect anonymity. 
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only one (or in some cases two) individuals participate in the group, true ‘representation’ 
from that Member State ideally requires much dialogue between national and subnational 
governments. In practice this only happens in a minority of cases. 
 
The overall impression is that the OMC makes a low impact on broader cultural policy 
conversations. There is not much emphasis placed on connecting the work of OMC 
groups to wider discussions going on in the cultural policy world, including to previous 
OMC groups. Many experts believed that it should be the Commission officials 
themselves who should put more effort into disseminating and promoting the OMC 
groups’ work more prominently. This makes sense, in that they have the easiest access to 
both the Council and the Parliament, but it raises questions concerning subsidiarity. 
 
8.6 T HE  INST IT UT IONAL  DE SIGN OF T HE  CUL T URE  OMC 
 
This section addresses the institutional design of the OMC, bringing together information 
from chapters 6 and 7 on process as well as this chapter’s discussions on the outcomes of 
coordination. The design of policy coordination has been a theme running throughout 
these chapter but has not been explicitly addressed until now. It is important because 
“legitimacy has come to depend on how things are done, not solely on substantive 
performance” (March and Olsen 2009, p.6). The culture OMC, like findings from studies 
on the OMC in other fields, faces complex issues of “institutional coherence and 
institutional design” (Armstrong 2010, p.287). Ultimately, as in Casey and Gold writing 
in the case of OMCs in employment, “whilst a learning process has been established, its 
impact has been limited” (Casey and Gold 2004, n.p, as quoted in Nedergaard 2005, p.15). 
In order to evaluate the institutional design of the culture OMC, a deliberative, non-
hierarchical, and consensus-oriented mode of governance, I draw on Martin Lodge’s 
(2007) three components of non-hierarchical coordination. 
 
Lodge’s first component is standard-setting, which he says requires “clear direction of 
normative intent” and “agreement on the purpose of objectives” (p.348). This requires 
“clear knowledge as to what preferred state of the world one seeks to achieve or maintain 
– and what sort of processes need to occur in order to attain such an outcome.” The 
responsibility for these two areas lies largely with the European Commission. However, 
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national ministries must also be clear on why they choose to send delegates and they hope 
to achieve with policy coordination, making a link between coordination at the EU level 
and policies and programmes at the national or regional level. In doing so they must take 
the OMC ‘seriously’:  
“[i] t’s up to the ministry to take advantage, be clear on what is expected, and use the 
expertise gained” (Ulla, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
However, as demonstrated with the findings in this project, effective standard-setting is 
not taking place. There is a great deal of conceptual confusion as to what the purpose and 
normative intent of the OMC is, as confirmed from this exchange: 
 
Kate (interviewer): “Do you think that the aim and the purpose was clear from the 
beginning?” 
Salma (expert): “No. It was absolutely not clear. There was a short introduction from 
the Commission and from our chair, “what is the aim of an OMC?” It was a powerpoint 
and I was very ‘awake’ but it wasn’t possible to grasp what our role, our challenge, was.” 
 
This lack of articulation means that the OMC is not focused on problem-solving, because 
there is never a problem clearly defined. Nils, another expert, lamented this when he said  
“… whose need[s]  are we answering? Begin with that. Not just ‘people don’t participate 
in culture as much as we’d like them to participate.’ [… ]  at the beginning we should 
extract a few key points to work on – to see what the problem is and what tools we have. 
The general topics don’t work – I can’t understand it, and can’t have it clearly in my 
mind. And if I can’t, other participants may have the same problems” (interview, June 
2014). 
 
Because they lack clear definition of a problem to be set, the time the group is together is 
both (paradoxically) more loose/exploratory (in the sense of there is not a clear and/or 
obvious direction that the conversation will go in), but also task-based. There is not 
enough time for discussion, but that which does take place is based on working towards 
what is actually a rather abstract task due to a loose and vague articulations of the policy 
theme to be worked on and thus a lack of ‘problem’ to be solved. However, in many ways 
this is the design of the OMC: it is designed with “sufficiently vague” (Lodge 2007, 
p.350) objectives to allow for maximum Member State agency. There is very little 
pressure to adapt, and in the case of culture there is none. However, it also means that 
ultimately, “[t]he absence of commonly agreed indicators in key policy fields means that 
meaningful exchange is limited” (Laffan and Shaw 2005, p.31) because the group is 
working on such an abstract task. 
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The second element of non-hierarchical governance is information-gathering, or 
receiving information regarding the state of the world, which Lodge says relies on the 
voluntary provision of information from Member States. The situation in the culture 
OMC is slightly different, since there is no benchmarking, and states are not directly 
comparing themselves in the traditional ‘naming and shaming’ manner. I thus interpret 
information-gathering to mean two separate activities in the case of culture. The first is 
the supplementary and background information on the topics at hand that is provided to 
the groups by the Commission. This includes reports, studies, and statistics that are 
relevant to the themes. The second part of information-gathering refers to the information 
about good practices that the experts bring to the meetings; these examples then form the 
base for the standard of good practices that ultimately end up in the report.  
 
On the first aspect, opinions were divided as to whether the Commission provided 
sufficient information. Some felt that this was done well, and others commented that there 
was not enough information provided and that which was was of poor quality. Ultimately, 
once again, this is not a neutral activity because it refers to ways in which systems and 
individuals “generate their knowledge about the current state of the world” (Lodge 2007, 
p.354), which is filtered via the Commission. In terms of the information provided by 
Member States, the objective is not to evaluate it in terms of quality (which is beyond the 
scope of this particular project) but rather to understand the process by which this is done. 
As mentioned above, this is filtered by the expert representing the Member States and 
ultimate inclusion in the report is self-selected, often with very strong input by the chair, 
external facilitator, and/or Commission policy officer (see chapter 6).
148
 The examples 
are not representative because there simply is not enough time to discuss how they might 
be. In addition, because the word count for the examples is short, they do not go into 
detail on how to implement programmes or strategies.
149
 
 
Lodge’s final component is behaviour modification. Once again, the interpretation of this 
component must be altered in order to take account of the extraordinarily ‘soft’ nature of 
                                                          
148
 For the group I observed, this was done in mini-groups in a rather structured manner: the whole group 
was split into five groups, each of which had 5-6 people. Each group shared and then discussed/evaluated 
the good practices in turn, according to a set of criteria that had been prepared by the chair and the 
facilitator, with a goal of starting to evaluate which ones would good for inclusion in the final manual. 
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 In one of the mini-groups I observed, one example was rejected as it was “too complex,” meaning, in 
other words, that there was too little background information about the policy context. 
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the culture OMC. Lodge uses it in the sense that in most cases Member States are 
compelled to change behaviour in order to ‘close the gap’ between expectations and 
reality. He writes that peer pressure and learning “encourage voluntary adjustment rather 
than coerced” (p.348). However, he says that for this type of internal pressure to succeed, 
“a certain amount of interaction intensity is require to develop among participants” 
(Ibid.). Lodge and indeed many others are critical when it comes to evaluating the OMC’s 
overall capacity to produce impacts. In the pensions and information society OMCs that 
he evaluated, he determines there has been “no noticeable impact.” Meanwhile, Zeitlin 
(2005b, p.460) calls the OMC a “narrow, opaque, and technocratic process” involving 
Commission and national officials in a closed policy network. In the cultural case, this 
was also found to be true and is in large part due to the poor visibility of the OMC among 
top cultural policy officers in the Member States as well as a lack of bottom-up pressure 
for learning or change. Interestingly, Sandra K röger suggests that “… politicians might 
have been attracted to it because the OMC clearly focuses on processes instead of 
outcomes (thereby leaving future possible negative outcomes to future governments” 
(2004, n.p.). With the design of the culture OMC as it stands, most attention is placed on 
the process rather than achieving any substantial outcomes. 
 
8.7 CONCL USION 
 
This chapter set out to examine the outcomes of policy coordination. It has linked findings 
on the process with the products and outcomes of the culture Open Method of 
Coordination’s Priority A  groups. It has found that while there is very little observable 
policy change that has occurred as a result of the OMC, nor has there been much progress 
on intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, and access to culture policies, the culture 
OMC has produced other outcomes that are invisible to evaluation by the yardstick of 
looking only at observable change in policies or programmes. These include network 
building, concept usage and heuristic learning at the national level, and limited examples 
of political shift and enhanced vertical coordination. On an individual level, and by far 
the most common outcome of coordination, is personal usage of the policy reports and 
ideas, which may translate into small-scale impacts within specific local contexts. 
Overall, then, the culture OMC was found to have a low impact on cultural policy in the 
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EU-28, raising important questions about the effectiveness of its institutional 
architecture.
150
 
 
The discussion throughout has shown the difficulties in how themes such as cultural 
diversity and access to and participation in culture are approached, defined, and discussed 
in a highly structured, formal framework such as the OMC. The discussion confirms that 
the manner in which these issues are talked about – the setting of the discussion – matters. 
The range of outcomes as well as the nature of the policy lag means that labelling these 
findings as ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ is not terribly useful; rather, they should be 
understood in a more contextualised manner in terms of the logic and design of policy 
coordination. After all, “learning is not deduction, but the outcome of a process of 
communication, persuasion and invention” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p.9-10). 
Understanding this process is crucial to any evaluation of the Open Method of 
Coordination.  
 
To a scholar of other fields of the OMC, the findings in this chapter will likely not be 
surprising. The discussion highlighted concerns about the design of policy coordination 
and issues such as under-conceptualisation and de-politicisation are ‘OMC-wide’ 
critiques and known problems. The finding that the OMC is not very visible in the 
national arena – particularly at the ‘high politics’-level of the Council – and that it “lacks 
the strength to provide a stimulus for domestic reform” (V anhercke 2009, n.p.) is one of 
the more common criticisms of the OMC. K eeping in mind that the yardstick for the 
culture OMC is not to change policy but rather to provide a platform for learning and 
exchange, a more positive outlook might say that the OMC has eventual potential to 
evolve into something more concrete and output-oriented, whereas a more negative one 
would say that the culture OMC will never live up to its ‘ideal-type’ due to several 
fundamental conceptual problems. However, ultimately, for the case of culture,  
“given the ongoing variations in national interpretation and implementation of European 
concepts and policy approaches, OMC processes [… ] should be viewed less as 
mechanisms for producing ‘cognitive harmonisation’ [… ] than for the creation of a 
common language and categorical framework to discuss and evaluate different solutions 
to similar problems.” (Zeitlin 2005b, p.457; emphasis added). 
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 Another point to consider is the cost effectiveness of the OMC. This is something that I did not 
explore in much detail, but would be an alternative if crude approach to examining the value of the 
culture OMC. 
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Zeitlin’s argument highlights one of the advantages of the OMC and the most common 
outcome in the case of culture. By heuristically raising awareness and also starting to 
create a common framework of discourse, there is a potential not that it will lead to 
changes in national strategies or programmes but rather that a more implicit shift in 
discourse may take place over several years. 
 
What does it mean for cultural policy? Ultimately, the chapter has shown the resilience 
of the nation-state in terms of cultural policy. As a voluntary process, learning and change 
via the OMC happens on an ad hoc basis. However, the findings clearly show a disconnect 
between the EU and Member State levels: communication about the OMC between the 
EU and Member States levels is not always clear, and Member States do not necessarily 
ascribe as much importance to the OMC as documentation would leave one to believe. In 
addition, while Priority A’s subject matter is highly political – issues that are appearing 
in the media, subjects that national elections are being decided on, the discussions within 
the OMC are depoliticised: 
“[W]e have a compendium, Council of Europe, on the practices and legislation in 
Member States. But we don’t have political vision of ministers of culture published: where 
do they see the role of culture in the European Union? …  [It shouldn’t be]  that when the 
president of the Commission doesn’t know what to say [about culture]  that he says 
‘culture is the heart of Europe’ – we’d really like to see concrete actions in the field” 
(V iktoria, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
There is also a fundamental tension between the overall goals of injecting politics into the 
problem-solving and creating space for ideology, versus a milder depoliticised version: 
“… there was the potential to say something very political in this venue, …  push for a 
certain agenda. Others didn’t see this potential, saw it more as learning from others” 
(Timo, expert, interview, October 2014). 
 
 
In sum then, is the culture OMC more than a “bureaucratic nightmare merely involving 
experts and technocrats” (V anhercke 2009)? Let us revisit the Commission’s aims with 
the OMC. The first is to “foster exchange of best practice between Member States with a 
view to improve policymaking.” While exchange certainly does take place, it is 
constrained due to the short time-span of the meetings as well as the task-based approach 
of the groups. As the groups lack a clear articulation of a problem to be solved, 
discussions are often imprecise and make translation of ideas into national policy-making 
more challenging. There are also concerns with best practices, which, while a unique and 
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sometimes useful compilation, run the risk of decontextualisation due to a lack of analysis 
and precise target group.  
 
The second aim is to “structure cooperation around the strategic objectives of the 
European Agenda for Culture.” This one is a bit more difficult to evaluate because of the 
difficulties in determining quality in structured cooperation. The OMC is certainly a 
structured system with opportunity for exchange, but without an overarching explicit 
narrative about the contribution of the Work Plan to larger goals, both at the domestic and 
EU levels, the potential for true dialogue and exchange is limited.  
 
The third goal is to “generate policy recommendations to feed EU and national policy-
making.” Again, the evaluation here is mixed because of the large variety of ways that 
the OMC is used. Certainly there is some evidence, as this chapter has shown, to suggest 
that there has been some policy learning and change, but this is haphazard and the 
exception rather than the rule. The contribution of the OMC to EU policy is also not clear. 
The OMC reports are occasionally referred to in other DG-EAC policy documentation, 
but there is no one source addressing specifically and definitively how the OMC impacts 
other work in the DG, nor is there much continuation of dialogue once a report is released. 
 
Despite these conceptual problems, the Commission is keen to stress that the OMC is still 
rather in its infancy: 
“Change, best practice, and so on – it starts in the OMC groups. [… ]  Of course, changes 
do not always happen from one moment to the next, it may be a year or two years later, 
but how much this collective work, experts, has fed into national and regional policies, 
to what extent, that is something to see in the future” (Fatima, Commission, interview, 
May 2014). 
 
There is a sense that communities of practice are being created and that ‘influence’ may 
appear in different forums in the future. However, with the OMC in its current form, this 
is much more likely to be on an individual, localised scale rather than Member State-wide 
learning or change. 
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CHAPT E R  9: CONCL UDING 
R E FL E CT IONS 
 
 
“The challenge for Europe is not culture but politics.” 
Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2005, p.66) 
 
 
9.1 INT R ODUCT ION 
 
This thesis has investigated cultural policy coordination in the European Union. This is a 
subject that is marginalised within cultural policy research, the study of EU policy 
coordination, and indeed the study of EU cultural policy itself. Guided by the theoretical 
frameworks of sociological institutionalism, multi-level governance, and policy learning, 
the thesis generated findings on both the processes and outcomes of coordination. The 
purpose of this final chapter is to bring together this research contribution, summarise its 
main findings, and outline its contributions to academic literature. The chapter also 
discusses the policy implications of the thesis’ findings as well as directions for future 
research.  
 
9.2 SUMMAR Y  OF MAIN FINDINGS AND CONT R IBUT IONS 
   
This section both summarises the main findings of the thesis as well as offers its 
contributions to what this means for various conversations in academic research. The first 
part of the section directly summarises the answers to the two main research questions. 
This is followed by a breakdown of subsections addressing specific contributions this 
study makes to literatures: contributions to the study of cultural policy, to the study of EU 
cultural policy, to the study of the Open Method of Coordination, to the study of EU 
governance and integration, and finally to the study of policy learning. 
 
This thesis’ main research question was how is cultural policy coordinated in the 
European Union and what are the outcomes of EU cultural policy coordination? 
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Findings were split into three different chapters; chapters 6 and 7 addressed part one, and 
chapter 8 part two. Findings on process were split into two chapters in order to focus on 
the OMC from both the point of view of EU institutions and the Member States. Below, 
I provide a summary of my findings pertaining to each part of these research questions. 
 
How is cultural policy coordinated in the European Union? 
EU policy coordination in the field of culture is programmed through triennial Work Plans 
for Culture, which are agreed on in the Council of Ministers. The Work Plans outline 
policy priority areas as well as more concrete sub-priorities within each priority. Each 
sub-priority is assigned a ‘jurisdiction’ and is either in the domain of the Commission, 
the Member States, or both. The Open Method of Coordination is the main working 
method for those in the Member State jurisdiction. 
 
Each OMC group consists of experts appointed within the Member States. There is 
typically one expert per Member State, but sometimes two, depending on the Member 
State and theme of the group. Each group meets approximately six times over the course 
of approximately 18 months. The meetings are usually held in Brussels although there is 
typically one ‘study trip’ per group which takes place in a Member State. The operation 
of the OMC relies heavily on its central coordinator, the European Commission. The 
Commission was found to be a key player, rather than a facilitator: it created the culture 
OMC and plays a key role in monitoring and evaluating the progress of the Work Plan, 
although not always the reports of the groups themselves. Here, the role of chair of the 
group was found to be crucial: the chair was shown to be instrumental in the groups’ 
efficiency and a stronger chair meant that there was less involvement from the 
Commission policy officer in both the operation of the meetings and the writing of the 
final report. Conversely, findings show that the Council of Ministers plays a less 
prominent role than what one might expect. The Council has final approval on the Work 
Plan and thus approves the policy priorities, so does have final power, but the 
Commission, as the ‘ghost writers’ of the Work Plan, retains a great deal of influence 
over the culture OMC. 
 
On the side of the Member States, one of the key contributions was to unpack the various 
levels of Member State participation, which has too frequently been characterised as a 
single unit of analysis. Separating this into three spheres (the Council, the ministry level, 
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and the expert level) allowed for a more comprehensive and nuanced representation of 
the reality of Member State involvement in the OMC, and showed the tensions and 
differences that exist between these levels. Results show that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in how Member States ‘approach’ participation in the OMC. As a voluntary 
process some Member States are closely involved with participation, others are much 
more ‘hands off’ and the expert has a great deal of flexibility, making it much more of an 
individual professional endeavour. Some states take participation seriously, with an 
institutionalised history or path dependence of European cultural cooperation in EU 
platforms and outside of the EU. Others participate on a more ad hoc basis and the logic 
of participation might not be known to anyone. The experts were also shown to be a very 
diverse group, contrary to what the Work Plan suggests, who differ in three key ways: in 
their policy and practical expertise, in their connections to national decision-makers, and 
in their socialisation to European policy coordination. While a heterogeneous group was 
found to be preferred in theory, it was found to be less than ideal in practice, due to 
difficulties in finding common reference points in discussions. 
 
One of the strongest findings to emerge was that process dominated content for all 
interviewees, despite the sensitive nature of Priority A’s themes. Why this was so is 
because many participants were of the opinion that the ‘end product’ – the best practice 
report – was not as useful as it could be, which raises several fundamental questions about 
the task-based nature of the OMC and the type of outcomes. The best practice reports 
raise important questions around representation and usefulness as the best practices are 
bounded by experts’ own networks and experience and their selection for inclusion into 
the final manual is haphazard. 
 
Ultimately, the OMC was found to be a largely bureaucratic exercise with little 
opportunity for true dialogue. This is for two reasons. First of all, the nature of the OMC 
is task-based: at the end of the cycle, the groups must produce a best practice report – that 
is their task, and the meetings are structured in a way that works towards that goal. This 
means that there is little room for policy innovation or free idea generation, although some 
of that does take place. Secondly, there is a huge constraint of time and to some extent 
resources for topics that are very broad. Experts have full-time jobs elsewhere and rarely 
does the OMC take ‘top bill’ in their professional life. Additionally, there is a lack of 
problem solving; the OMC was set up to deal with “‘tricky’ policy domains that require 
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European-wide approaches, but not uniform policy responses (given legitimacy and 
national diversity concerns)” (Lodge 2007, p.344). However, at least with Priority A , the 
policy ‘problems’ are de-emphasised; there is no specific question to be answered or 
problem to be ‘solved’, rather the groups work on a generic theme. Discussions are much 
more exploratory and therefore paradoxically task-based but vague.  
 
This links strongly with another finding, which is the depoliticisation of the culture OMC. 
The ‘messy’ world of politics is not visible throughout this process; it seems to exist in 
isolation, outside of present-day ‘real’ happenings in the world and wider contexts. There 
is, in fact, a lack of political support among ‘high-level’ politics, i.e. the EU-28 Cultural 
Ministers, as most likely they are unaware of the content of discussions taking place 
within the OMC groups. Finally, the vagueness of the policy themes was also identified 
as a concern throughout. This illuminates another paradox: the Work Plan’s priorities are 
loosely-defined in order to garner maximum support in the Council, as any further 
attempts at coordination or convergence would not be accepted by Member States. 
However, the ‘one size fits all’ best practice manuals have unclear target audiences, which 
means that they have varying levels of usage for the EU, Member States’ cultural 
ministries, and arts institutions – it is difficult to be relevant to everyone, particularly with 
such broad themes. 
 
What are the outcomes of EU cultural policy coordination? 
The main finding with regards to the second research question is that the products or 
outcomes of coordination are limited. There were very few examples of ‘direct’ change 
(political or programmatic shifts), however findings did indicate examples of multi-level 
learning and exchange, including increased vertical coordination, socialisation and 
networking, and heuristic learning and concept usage. These findings demonstrate the 
need to have an expansive view of learning outcomes and influences and not simply only 
examine changes that can be observable such as a change in law. The OMC’s main 
potential at this stage is that it is enabling a particular ‘EU’-specific language to develop 
(alongside the EU’s other cultural activities) (Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001). 
Ultimately, the low level of policy learning and change is due to the OMC’s institutional 
architecture, explored in detail in chapter 8. The thesis has raised critical questions about 
the effectiveness of the OMC and, due to the way it is set up, whether it is realistic to 
expect much concrete policy learning and change to come from it. This is reflected in 
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comments from various members of the Commission interviewed throughout the project 
saying that follow-up 
 
The roles of both the appointed expert and national cultural ministries were found to be 
key in the link to post-OMC outcomes. First of all, experts must find the report’s 
recommendations legitimate and appropriate. If this is not the case, they will be much 
less likely to disseminate it. If they do find the report legitimate, as ‘change agents,’ they 
are able to promote ideas with more political weight behind them. However, national 
ministries play the most important role: if they do not take ownership of their participation 
in policy coordination, very little will likely happen within the Member States. This is 
because experts that take part in the OMC are rarely in a position to implement any 
changes themselves, and the OMC is rarely a priority for most ministries: Member States 
and experts rarely enter the OMC with the goal of changing national policy. This happens 
by accident, if at all, even in the case of states that are more purposeful about their 
participation.  
 
There is a weak connection between OMC work and national and subnational politics. 
This corroborates with findings in other fields as well; two of the most common criticisms 
of the OMC are its weak integration into national policy-making and a closed, 
bureaucratic structure of operation (Zeitlin 2011). There are a few reasons for this. First 
of all, there tends to be a weak linkage between OMC experts and national decision-
makers, as discussed above. The second reason is that somewhere along the way, the 
purpose and aims of the OMC are ‘lost’ to the Member States. Few experts attending an 
OMC meeting for the first time know what to expect, and the OMC has low visibility in 
domestic institutions. Thirdly, there is also no domestic adaptation pressure. This is to 
some extent reflective of the culture OMC’s ‘softness’ (“softest of the soft”) but also a 
problem with the OMC as a policy coordination tool in general.
151
 The OMC is in fact 
designed so that Member States are able to do exactly what they want – and this includes 
nothing.
152
 This means that there is a “highly limited role for the EU common objectives;” 
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 While OMCs in other fields have more reporting responsibilities and methods of measurement, this 
does not (necessarily) translate into adaptation pressure. 
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 The Ecorys survey found that only 12.1% of respondents believed that the OMC contributed to 
structured debate on key policy priorities at national level to a large extent while 50% believe to some 
extent (McDonald et al. 2013a). 
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instead they act “as a general normative context generating little adaptation pressures” 
(Armstrong 2010, p.186). 
 
In general, findings indicated that the more appropriate the ideas contained in the OMC 
reports were perceived to be – institutionally, administratively, and politically – in 
relation to current cultural policy goals and priorities, the more likely that they would be 
noticed and used. This was also a finding of Idema and K elemen (2006)’s study of the 
employment and social inclusion OMCs in Italy; they reported that that “the OMC is used 
in areas where it is in harmony with domestic policy priorities (employment), but 
practically ignored in areas where it conflicts with these priorities (social inclusion)” 
(Ibid., p.110). Another important factor in determining the nature of outcomes was 
electoral and issue attention cycles: many experts said that changes in government and 
national politics more generally influenced what they could do as follow-up. If a policy 
theme is in harmony with current policy priorities (or impending changes in them), and 
if political circumstances are optimal (for example that there is not an election going at 
the time), there is a higher chance that the ministry will take note of the report. Overall, 
Member States taking ownership help to ensure the OMC’s relevance for policy-makers 
and cultural institutions.  
 
Consider this finding: “Opponents of a powerful ‘social Europe’” have not been willing 
to allow any EU competence in this arena; they have, however “been willing to allow the 
operation of the OMC in this field, as they see the OMC as a rather innocuous exercise 
that entails no binding commitments” (Idema and K elemen 2006, p.117). Is this also what 
we see in the case of culture? A  convincing ‘yes’ argument can be made. Subsidiarity is 
a key concern, with the consensus being that a firmer style of coordination would not be 
accepted by the Member States in the Council. However, while problems of 
underconceptualisation remain, it is also important to remember that the culture OMC is 
still relatively young, and that the Commission is constantly learning and adapting to try 
to improve it. There is a sense that it may be the beginning of something – communities 
of practice are being created, and an EU-wide discourse forming. Learning and chance 
do not happen quickly, and therefore effects of participating in an OMC might be felt 
only years later. However, in its current form, learning and change resulting from the 
OMC are much more likely to happen on an individual, localised scale rather than 
Member State-wide. 
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9.2.1 Contributions to the study of cultural policy 
As articulated several times throughout this thesis, cultural policy is most commonly 
studied at the national or sub-national level. Despite the increasing importance of 
institutions such as the EU, Council of Europe, and UNESCO, findings from this research 
indicate that while the European Union has become an important actor in cultural policy, 
the nation-state still matters greatly when it comes to culture. What William Wallace 
wrote in 1999 still holds true: 
“The central paradox of the European political system in the 1990s is that governance is 
becoming increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while 
representation, loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the tradition institutions 
of the nation state” (Wallace 1999, p.521). 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is as important in the OMC as it is in other facets of EU 
cultural policy (L ittoz-Monnet 2007). Despite a place in the treaty, cultural action is 
subject to restraints and contradictions, making a robust programme at the European level 
difficult to achieve. Harmonisation is explicitly prohibited and there is no indication that 
this will change.  
 
However, given that international organisations such as UNESCO and the EU are 
increasingly setting international standards for directions of cultural policy, it is sensible 
to continue to investigate the impact of intergovernmental cooperation, both the effects 
this has supranationally and at the domestic level. This is particularly true when it comes 
to the discursive potential of the OMC and other types of intergovernmental coordination, 
in that this type of cooperation can “advance[e] a particular vision of what appropriate 
policy is about” (K röger 2009, p.12). In short, discourses, in the form of policy priorities 
and recommendations (in the case of the OMC) convey meaning and representations, 
which can “bring about changes in our knowledge… our beliefs, our attitudes, values and 
so forth” (Fairclough 2003, p.8). 
 
The thesis has also demonstrated that more generally, more attention needs to be paid to 
the processes of cultural policy-making, rather than just the ideas and ideologies 
contained in policies’ content or evaluating policies’ effects. Despite the nuances and 
particularities of the sector, cultural policy faces the same fundamental issues as other 
sectors. As such an under-researched sector and one that is rarely considered important 
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(see Gray and Wingfield 2011), cultural policy should much more often become a ‘test 
case’ to examine the politics of present-day policy-making, in the EU and elsewhere. 
 
9.2.2 Contributions to the study of E U cultural policy
153
 
Policy coordination in the form of the OMC is only one part of the EU’s activities in the 
field of culture, and the findings of this thesis cannot be generalised to EU cultural policy 
in general due to its fragmented nature. Indeed, policy coordination seems to sit in relative 
isolation to other EU cultural policy activity. However, some basic comments can be 
made about what this research adds to the literature on EU cultural policy. 
 
It is first of all part of the small body of work that focuses not on narratives of EU cultural 
policy or European identity, but how policy-making actually works. This is an area that 
needs to be developed further (see more below). The inter-institutional dynamics that I 
have identified in this research lend support for the need to more deeply understand the 
dynamics of inter-institutional relations and agenda-setting in the field, and indeed this is 
a fruitful direction for future research. Focusing on how programmes and actions operate 
not only reveals more about the EU’s priorities, specifically relating to cultural value, but, 
by tracing their genesis, also about the development of the competence and how particular 
agendas are advanced within the EU.
154
 
 
Conclusions can also be drawn about the heuristic potential of the OMC to contribute to 
the development of cultural policy discourse more generally. The very existence of an 
OMC involves ‘uploading’ concepts to the EU level via the definition of common goals 
(Borrás and Radaelli 2010). Thus, despite the fact that the OMC is a voluntary process, 
there is some sense that concepts such as intercultural dialogue and access to culture are 
gaining ground within Member States, as they have been key themes in EU cultural policy 
since 2007, and intergovernmental cooperation in the field has only increased since then. 
This is evidenced by several experts who mentioned that the OMC, alongside work done 
by, for example, the Council of Europe, has contributed to awareness-raising of these 
concepts. The Agenda for Culture is now almost a decade old and it will soon be time for 
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 Part of this section draws on Mattocks (2017). 
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 On cultural value and economic framing, see L ittoz-Monnet (2015), who argues that culture has been 
positioned in line with broader EU-wide frames of economic competitiveness, growth, and skills of 
Europe 2020. 
231 
 
reflection on what has been achieved. Its first of three priorities is cultural diversity and 
intercultural dialogue: “cultural diversity needs to be nurtured in a context of openness 
and exchanges between different cultures” (CEC 2007, p.8). Indeed, in the Commission’s 
report on the implementation of the 2011-2014 Work Plan, the first line reads that 
“[c]ulture and the diversity of cultural expression are among Europe’s greatest strengths” 
(CEC 2014, p.2). It will be interesting to see the evaluation on these themes, since 
coordination at least through the OMC has not shown any major results. This is even more 
important to consider moving forward as intercultural dialogue only appears in the 2015-
2018 Work Plan as a ‘stock-taking meeting’ and report, and this falls to the responsibility 
of the European Commission, not the Member States.  
 
Another contribution focuses on the multi-level nature of cultural governance, which is 
perhaps an obvious confirmation and contribution, but warrants direct acknowledgement 
because of a tendency in the cultural policy literature to study ‘levels’ of governance in 
isolation. Culture confirms, to varying degrees, to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’ 
(2001) three conditions of multi-level governance. First of all, findings certainly indicate 
that supranational institutions such as the European Commission exert their own 
influence. This, along with evidence from previous studies, confirms the Commission’s 
key position in EU cultural policy since Maastricht; the Commission’s policy officers do 
what they can within the legal limitations of the competence. A lthough the Council is still 
an important institution, the system still results in a loss of control for individual Member 
State governments, the second premise of MLG, because they must compromise to 
achieve agreement. Finally, MLG also means that there is a plethora of actors who operate 
in interconnected relationships involving local, regional, national, and supranational 
levels of government. This is very obvious in the OMC – experts participate in 
coordination with two hats on, as do the members of the Council and to some extent the 
Commission’s civil servants as well. Complex and interconnected domestic relationships 
also extend to the supranational level, meaning that there are always questions regarding 
the exact nature of cultural policy, about its jurisdiction (particularly in those Member 
States where culture is a regional competence), and the extent to which the EU should be 
involved in it. 
 
Findings from this project also lend support to the argument that EU cultural policy is 
complex and fragmented. There is no one place to turn to for an overall picture of what 
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the EU does in this field, nor the impacts it has.
155
 Programmes are piecemeal and 
fragmented, having been developed at different times throughout history, reflecting 
bargaining and consensus-seeking, various justifications for EU interventions, and 
different goals. Indeed, this fragmentation is in large part due to the sensitive nature of 
culture as an EU competence. As Patel (2013a) outlines, there is a paradox at play: 
cultural cooperation is desired in order to further European integration and unity, but its 
development is constrained by subsidiarity and Member States’ wishes to keep culture a 
national competence. Part of the reason that it is so fragmented is because of the 
complexity of EU governance and the number of actors involved in decision-making and 
their competing positions. 
 
Despite the assertion that “culture is an indispensable feature to achieve the EU’s strategic 
objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security” (CEC 2007, p.3), there is a lack of 
understanding of how exactly this works in practice, both in general and when considering 
specific actions such as the OMC. One of the problems is the vague language that is used 
throughout the treaty and in many policy documents. Writing of article 151 (now 167), 
Craufurd Smith (2004b, p.53) argues that “even a cursory examination reveals that many 
of the terms are vague or open-ended.” We see this in the Work Plans as well as the 
Agenda for Culture. As Staiger (2009, p.12) argues, the “presumption of congruence 
between territory, culture and polity” as well as the instrumentalisation of culture for 
integration, have meant that some of the EU’s most “fundamental political 
challenges… are… displaced onto the cultural realm.” And yet, this highlights another 
fundamental paradox in that there is a gap between what culture can achieve, articulated 
on paper and in speeches by elites, but in practice there is a lack of political will to come 
together. 
 
9.2.3 Contributions to the study of the Open Method of Coordination  
One aim of this research was to contribute to the literature on the Open Method of 
Coordination by exploring it in a different policy sector and thus adding another empirical 
case study. I have aimed to contextualise the OMC via the collection of first-hand data, 
as per Dawson’s (2011) call for a ‘third wave’ of OMC literature that is rigorous and 
empirically-based. This has meant an analysis that focuses on micro-level details about 
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 This role is not even fulfilled by DG-EAC’s website, which is confusing and not well-designed. 
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process and outcomes. This attention to detail has meant that power dynamics between 
EU institutions and between the EU and Member States have come to the forefront, and 
the Commission has been identified as the institution responsible for driving deeper 
integration in the cultural field.  
 
The three-level model that I have developed to analyse Member State participation is an 
example of this attention to detail; it has shown that conceptualising the (or a) Member 
State(s) as a single unit is misleading. This acknowledgement of complexity moves away 
from the presumption of rational choice models that the Member States and Commission 
are unitary actors (Borrás and Radaelli 2010). It would be interesting to see how this 
compares in other policy sectors and is something to focus on in future research. In terms 
of outcomes of coordination, findings from the culture OMC reveal that ‘observable’ 
changes in policies or programmes in the Member States are in the minority. However, 
this is not to deem the OMC a ‘failure’ or unsuccessful. As I have argued throughout the 
thesis, we need to understand the OMC’s outcomes in a much more holistic and 
comprehensive way.  
 
While European Commission officials were quick to point out the ‘special qualities’ of 
culture, the remarkable finding is that many problems are shared across the OMC, 
ultimately demonstrating issues in its conceptualisation as a method of coordination. To 
borrow from Sandra K röger (2009), it is underconceptualised, depoliticised, and 
overdetermined. It contains fundamental paradoxes in its logic: “on the one hand contains 
incentives towards participation and deliberation, and on the other tries to push actors 
towards compliance and convergence” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.47). These are not 
new findings, but lend support to existing ones about the design of policy coordination in 
the EU. 
 
Ultimately, “in the absence of a single European public space, there are myriads of 
European niches, each providing a distinct meeting place for participants from all member 
states with shared interests” (de Swaan 2007, p.137). The OMC is one such niche. 
However, while a community of practice is emerging, this community is not necessarily 
being replicated at the domestic level (or if it is, there is only a small number of actors 
involved) – thus it truly is a niche, and there is a “de-coupling between the EU networks 
operating in the OMC processes and the domestic networks that decide on policy reforms” 
234 
 
(Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.46-7). The OMC’s impact on domestic cultural policy is 
uneven and localised (sometimes only individual) rather than on a grand scale. 
 
The OMC remains an ‘unidentified political object.’ Ultimately, ‘policy coordination’ has 
different meanings in different variations of the OMC. We are still no closer to delineating 
exactly what the OMC is and its aims. Is the goal mutual learning and inspiration or 
convergence? (Borrás and Radaelli 2010). The OMC rather remains not a “fixed recipe 
that can be applied to whichever issue” but “a kind of cookbook that contains various 
recipes, lighter and heavier ones” (V andenbroucke 2001, as quoted in Twena 2012, p.28). 
Here, distinguishing between convergent and cooperative coordination (Biagi 1998, 
Armstrong 2010) is a useful dividing point, and makes clearer for researchers and 
practitioners alike and thus explicit identification of an OMC as one or the other is 
encouraged. 
 
A  final comment on contributions to the OMC literature concerns theory and 
methodology. A  sociological institutionalism framework reveals insights about process 
and practice that other approaches do not; more specifically, this approach allowed for an 
analysis that focuses on the EU’s political and legal character and the embedding of 
structures within an overarching structure (Bulmer 1998). Institutions cannot be thought 
of as neutral arenas. The focus on actors as change agents has meant that we are wiser 
about the motivations for participating in transnational policy coordination as well as how 
learning in this collective setting translates into outcomes, thus achieving a deeper 
understanding of the interplay between structure and agency. 
 
Methodologically, the thesis has been made richer by incorporating observational 
methods into the data collection. Generally, ethnographic methods are, within “the 
established toolkit of political science …  [considered] unconventional and odd” (Rhodes, 
‘t Hart, and Noordegraaf 2007c, p.207). However, the benefits associated with this 
method are numerous, and it is genuinely surprising that it has not been used much in the 
study of the OMC. Access as well as resources are crucial issues, but if negotiated 
properly the advantages of using this method mean an added layer of richness to findings. 
In my case, attending a meeting more deeply confirmed what I had found throughout my 
interviews. It specifically allowed me to observe how crucial the group’s chair was in 
operating the meetings and also how difficult it is for the groups to come to agreement on 
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such broad topics. Given that I am interested in the interplay between formal and informal 
institutions, and that this requires knowing a political system intimately, being there in 
person ultimately added much to my understanding of how the OMC operated; it opened 
up a previously closed world. 
 
9.2.4 Contributions to the study of E U governance and integration 
The complexity of EU policy-making means that in no way can this thesis’ findings be 
generalisable to policy-making on a wider scale. However they do lend support and make 
an empirical contribution to findings on policy-making in sectors where the EU has a 
supporting competence and engages in policy coordination (such as health, education, 
and research and development). Here, the key focus I have drawn out is the differences 
in procedures and process between the Community method and soft coordination such as 
the OMC. An institutional focus has drawn attention to complexity that moves away from 
the parsimony of rational choice approaches. It provides a connection between studying 
institutions and how they operate but also to “develop a more systemic link between the 
insights of policy analysis and integration theory” (Christiansen 1997, p.74). It has also 
demonstrated the continued need to look at both formal and informal behaviour and more 
importantly the interplay between them and what this means for EU governance (K leine 
2014). 
 
The thesis has produced findings on the nature of policy coordination in the field of 
culture and has shown that the boundaries between technocratic, decision-making based 
on expertise, and political coordination, based on values (Radaelli 1999), are increasingly 
blurred.
156
 Indicators, as a basis for coordination, are often presented in a neutral, 
administrative-focused fashion. However, my findings show that they are anything but. 
As Hooghe and Marks (1997, n.p.) comment,  
“EU decision making has become less technocratic and more contentious. Fewer 
decisions are resolved by rational-scientific methods, [… ] while more decisions involve 
political contention concerning fundamental goals of European integration.” 
Thus, guidelines on the policy themes “appeared technocratic, but were highly political” 
(Lodge 2007, p.353), and, in the OMC, “examples of hidden political contestation and 
conflict abound” (Dawson 2011, p.14). The “neutral language of procedure, soft law and 
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 See also Fouilleux, de Maillard, and Smith (2005) on technocratic versus political decision-making in 
the Council of Ministers’ working groups. 
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‘indicators’, has the capacity to hide conflicts between substantive visions” (Ibid., p.15); 
the choice of policy themes and subthemes in fact reveals fundamental questions about 
the nature of European intervention into the cultural field, and policy coordination cannot 
be considered a merely administrative activity. 
 
This thesis did not set out to explicitly achieve a deeper understanding of European 
integration. Indeed, a research design examining policy coordination in only one sector 
is poorly set up to comment on the general direction of European integration (Bickerton, 
Hodson, and Puetter 2015). However, because of the nature of the competence as well as 
the partial focus on agenda-setting, some general comments concerning integration can 
be made.
157
 One of the most current (and yet ancient) debates in EU governance studies 
is the debate on supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism and to what extent the 
Member States ‘dominate’ EU institutions. This has been of particular interest since the 
2008 financial crisis where the importance of the European Council has grown. Cultural 
policy is an altogether different beast, sitting on the sidelines of EU governance: it is not 
the stuff that heads of state debate long into the night about. However, this research has 
demonstrated the continued importance of the European Commission’s influence in 
agenda-setting in the cultural policy sector, which lends support to a supranational view 
of European integration. While one case cannot ‘prove’ anything, my findings speak more 
broadly to integration dynamics in policy sectors where the EU has a supporting 
competence. 
 
On this subject, it is important to distinguish between influence and power. My findings 
indicate that the Commission is “a political organization at the international level in which 
decision-makers’ behaviour significantly transcends an intergovernmental logic” 
(Egeberg 2012, p.946, in Peterson 2015, p.207): in other words, the Commission has 
considerable influence in cultural policy coordination, but it does not have absolute power 
(Golub 1996) because of the Council.
158
 Despite this, the ubiquity of the Commission 
cannot be denied: “[t]he Commission is simply not strong enough to lead the EU, 
regardless of who its president is. But the Commission remains the straw that stirs the 
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 Avoiding Sabine Saurugger’s criticism that “some constructivist public policy approaches are in 
danger of becoming so concentrated with small-scale case studies that they forget to be interested in the 
bigger picture of European integration” (Saurugger 2013, p.902). 
158
 I have developed these thoughts on inter-institutional dynamics of the culture OMC further into a 
forthcoming journal article that is currently under review. 
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drink when it comes to advances in European policy cooperation” (Peterson 2015, p.206). 
Expanding on this, Peterson writes that: “It appears that the Commission mostly gets on 
with its work and that most of it is focused on closer European policy coordination” (Ibid., 
p.207; emphasis added).  
 
The autonomy of the Commission is not absolute, due to the presence of the Council, 
although a process such as the culture OMC does involve a loss of power for the Member 
States due to the amount of bargaining, compromise, and cooperation involved (Marks et 
al. 1996). The Commission has shown to be a powerful player in post-Maastricht EU 
cultural policy; this demonstrates that “incremental transfers of competencies have 
systemic implications for the structuration of authority” (Hooghe and Marks 1997, n.p.), 
in that the extension of a formal competence in this area has meant that the Commission 
has been able to increase its influence since 1992. 
 
The bigger question of culture’s role in achieving an ‘ever-closer’ Europe is a difficult 
one. Culture is still emphasised a vehicle to forge popular support for European 
integration and to foster a sense of common European identity.
159
 Indeed, cultural policies 
in the EU “cannot be understood outside of the wider context of the political project for 
European integration” (Shore 2001, p.107). However, there is a disconnect between what 
is presented in policy documents compared to what happens in practice. Culture has 
become “a multi-dimensional sector” that can be co-opted for a number of policy pursuits, 
be it employment, social cohesion, or urban regeneration (Barnett 2001, p.412). It is more 
difficult, if nigh on impossible, to operate a full EU cultural programme for cultural 
purposes due to a lack of political will: a “consensual approach to European culture… is 
simply unreachable” (Calligaro 2013, p.29). In addition, despite efforts that have taken 
place, “there has been no corresponding shift in popular sentiment or political loyalty” 
(Shore, 2000, p.18) in the EU. 
 
Y et, it seems logical to suggest that if we want the cultural (and the social) to play a role, 
they need to be not only more robust but better articulated; former European 
Commissioner V iviane Reding said exactly this at the launch of a New Narrative for 
Europe in 2013: “If we want Europeans to truly identify with the European Union as a 
                                                          
159
 One recent example is the EU’s Culture Forum in April 2016. The first plenary session was “Can 
culture help to overcome the fragmentation of society?” 
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political entity, more is needed” (Reding 2013, p.32). There is thus a paradox that “culture 
is everywhere but nowhere in Europe” (Pratt 2015, personal communication). The OMC 
is a relatively unique way of coming together supranationally and discussing 
contemporary cultural policy issues. But “[t]he collective experience of successive cycles 
of policy co-ordination and the potential limits to the utility of co-ordination has not 
translated into a serious debate about extending EU competence” (Armstrong 2008, 
p.420). There is little sense, in the current political system, that policy coordination will 
transform into deeper cooperation on cultural matters – it has certainly not led to a ‘push’ 
from the Member State side, and whether it will result in a ‘pull’ from the Commission 
remains to be seen, but is unlikely. Due to the legal limitations of the treaty, the cultural 
field is restricted to negative integration, as opposed to positive measures to create 
harmonisation (Scharpf 1999).
160
  
 
Given the decoupling of the economic and the social in the European project (Scharpf 
2002), difficult questions need to be asked about culture’s role, particularly given the 
many challenges the EU is currently facing. What the culture OMC – and EU cultural 
policy more broadly – is lacking is an overarching narrative about why Member States 
are coming together in the first place, and along with this, what the role of culture and 
cultural cooperation is in the future of the European Union. There is “… no coherent 
European narrative …  emerging” (Wallace 1999, p.521). K röger (2009, p.6) has 
suggested that a lack of a “shared political vision of the ‘social’” has been a barrier to 
learning in this social policy OMCs. This can be extended to thinking about the culture 
OMC: not only is there great divergence among Member States when it comes to what 
culture’s ‘role’ should be in achieving various economic, social, and political goals, there 
is perhaps more fundamentally a lack of this shared political vision at the EU level as 
well. The narrative of culture’s ‘place’ in the European Union has been a subject of 
controversy from the beginning and remains so. The reality of European cultural policy 
is still rather at odds with the view that Europe needs a robust, imaginative cultural 
programme in order to tackle the current and future challenges facing the continent. 
 
 
 
                                                          
160
 Thank you to Dr Amandine Crespy who probed me on this point at our panel in the 2015 Political 
Studies Association conference. 
239 
 
9.2.5 Contributions to the study of policy learning 
This thesis has sought to put policy learning at the forefront of the analysis of the 
outcomes of coordination, trying to open up the processes of learning, an aspect of policy 
literature that is often mentioned in passing but rarely studied in great detail (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2016b). Policy learning is a key element of the OMC: it is “a forum of 
information exchange, and therefore those involved will learn from each other” (Idema 
and K elemen 2006, p.114). But the exact relationship between exchange and learning 
(and then possibly change) – the causal logics of learning – still remains an issue in the 
literature (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016b).  
 
A  sociological institutionalism approach to policy learning has allowed me to expose how 
and when policy learning and change are most likely, adding to what we know on policy 
learning in the context of the OMC and how and if that translates to domestic-level 
impacts. My approach was based on the argument that “scholars can achieve greater 
analytic leverage by beginning with institutions rather than with individuals” (Peters 
2012, p.174), and that learning is a socially constructed, emergent, and ongoing process. 
 
The first finding related to policy learning is that within the culture OMC it is not clear 
exactly what is meant to be learned and how. Because the experts taking part in the 
meeting are typically not highly-ranked officials with the capacity to make key decisions, 
they typically rely on instructions ‘from above’ as to the nature of their OMC 
participation. However, in general there is little pressure to learn and ‘bring back’ lessons. 
This means that where learning occurs it is most often on an individualised basis which 
does often not translate into broader influences within the Member States. The OMC’s 
overall impact on learning, then, is low. As discussed above, the vague policy themes 
coupled with a task-based approach means that there is very little room for policy 
innovation or creative thinking. In addition, the reports do not have a clear target 
audience, so this is further diminishes the potential for learning. 
 
The second finding is that ultimately, in the OMC there is a tension between bottom-up 
and top-down learning. The former is often cited as an ideal-type, but, without the 
Commission’s central coordination, an exercise such as the OMC would not exist. 
Therefore, “learning as exploration, experimentation and innovation has been hindered 
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by target, prescriptions, and attempts to monitor from the top” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, 
p.46). I discuss this further in the section below on policy implications. 
 
9.3 POL ICY  IMPL ICAT IONS 
 
One important concern for policy scholars is the degree to which political science and 
public policy engage with ‘good’ ways of doing politics. Stoker and Marsh (2010, p.6) 
advocate that “[p]olitical science should not interested not only in understanding ‘what 
is’, it should also be concerned with the normative issues of ‘what should be.’” The thesis 
has revealed a great deal regarding the design of EU cultural policy coordination and, 
despite challenges of the tensions between being both an ‘insider’ and ‘critic’ 
(Schlesinger 2013),it feels only right to offer some normative comments on the OMC as 
a method of coordination.  
 
Many of the fundamental tensions with the culture OMC were discussed in section 8.6, 
which looked specifically at the design of policy coordination. I have also shown that the 
OMC has mixed results in terms of achieving its own self-determined objectives. Many 
of these issues stem from vague aims of the culture OMC. However, the likelihood of the 
culture OMC adopting a ‘stricter’ approach is low, due to a lack of political will; further 
guidelines, targets, and peer review or benchmarking are likely to be refused by the 
Member States in the Council. There are also questions about the groups’ outputs, the 
reports. There is a debate to be had on the extent to which ‘best practices’ are useful. 
Certainly, findings from this research indicated very mixed views.  
 
Effectiveness of the OMC is very difficult to measure, and depends to a great extent on 
the value placed on the exchange of ideas which may not lead to concrete outcomes. If 
this exchange is not valued the temptation to abolish the OMC may be strong. However, 
there no signs that the culture OMC will stop. To most effectively remodel it, the best 
practice reports should either be done away with or become much more focused and 
concentrated, towards more of a policy focus, targeting policy-makers who are able to 
implement change. In the case of the former, notes from meetings could still be 
disseminated to wider audiences, but they would be of an exploratory rather than 
prescriptive nature. 
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Related to this, there is also a real need for more ownership at the ministry level. This, 
however, is politically tricky, since it cannot be mandated by the Commission, which can 
only recommend a particular category of expert or dissemination plan. However, a frank 
conversation within the ministry about what exactly it wants to achieve out of 
participating in the OMC would seem to be the exception rather than the rule. If Member 
States decide to send an expert, this is an indication of a minimum ‘commitment’ (Meyer, 
L insenmann and Wessels 2007b), however their post-OMC behaviour suggests a 
diminished ‘implementation’ – implementation here interpreted more broadly than 
implementing recommendations but engaging stakeholders and having conversations 
about the reports’ recommendations.  
 
Borrás and Radaelli’s (2010) recommendation of incentivising participation through 
mobilising of (domestic) stakeholder networks seems reasonable in this case. If there is 
greater visibility of the OMC at domestic level, there is more likelihood that it will have 
an impact:  
“[s]olid networks of stakeholders press for more incisive implementation of OMC 
measures, raise the awareness of professional communities, and aid institutionalisation 
of new modes of governance beyond the layers of civil servants involved in Brussels and 
national capitals” (Ibid., p.65).  
 
Improving the OMC’s visibility involves, as Mark Dawson (2011) argues, the further 
opening-up of the OMC, expanding the potential for further bottom-up intervention. This 
can only come about through deeper engagement between national and subnational 
stakeholders, which requires more clarity and consistency from Member States’ national 
cultural ministries as to the nature and structure of participation in the OMC.  
 
Ultimately, the OMC should play to its strengths: the most unique and positive aspect of 
the culture OMC is that it is a transnational collective of similarly-minded individuals. In 
order to improve its effectiveness, the OMC should be both looser (as in less task-based) 
to allow room for true policy innovation and dialogue, and simultaneously more focused 
to be useful to policy-makers. In general it would benefit from a redefinition of aims to 
ensure a stronger connection to the Member State level, as well as a redefinition of how 
the OMC – and the EU’s broader cultural activities – fits in with the bigger ‘European 
project.’  
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9.4 DIR E CTIONS FOR  FUT URE  R E SE ARCH 
 
Because it is so under-researched, EU cultural policy leaves a lot of scope for future 
development. This is true for both the culture OMC as well as EU cultural policy more 
generally. There is certainly space to take the study of the culture OMC in this field in 
other directions. One possibility is to look at impacts in the Member States in-depth to 
understand more about domestic processes and the way European participation is 
structured within domestic systems.
161
 This research design would involve looking 
systemically at process tracing within certain case study countries (including sub-
nationally) to see what had happened as a result of the OMC. This design would add depth 
while sacrificing breadth, while I have adopted the opposite approach in that while I have 
not found out in detail what has gone on in Member States (I did not speak to enough 
Member State representatives in the ministries themselves, beyond the expert and CAC 
members), I have a good overview of what happens in a general context. 
 
Another direction is to look at networks and the OMC, something that I only touched on 
tangentially but which are an important focus of the EU governance and multi-level 
governance literature. Governance networks “formed by active and dense interconnected 
social and public partners are a central notion upon which the participation ideal of the 
OMC is based” (Borrás and Radaelli 2010, p.44). Indeed, networks are key to 
understanding how the OMC results travel and are important to understand, particularly 
in the cultural field given links between the sector and government and the 
‘multipositionality’ of key actors in the field based on prestige (Marx 2016). Future 
research could look at networks and endeavour to understand their role in dissemination 
in the OMC but also more generally within the multi-level governance of EU cultural 
policy. 
 
Within EU cultural policy, there is a lot of room for the development of research that 
looks at how exactly programmes operate and their impact, moving away from a focus 
on European identity. With the exception of the European Capital of Culture programme, 
                                                          
161
 There is also scope to do comparative work between different OMCs, focusing particularly on how 
European participation is structured at the national level. 
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we have little knowledge on how other parts of EU cultural policy work. This includes 
decision-making, implementation, and evaluations of other programmes such as the EU’s 
arts and cultural prizes, its heritage label, Structured Dialogue with the sector, biennial 
Culture Forum, and its funding programme Creative Europe.
162
 Similarly, cultural 
mainstreaming, in the context of European integration, is also an area about which more 
could be discovered (although see Psychogiopoulou 2006). 
 
L ikewise, while we know quite a bit about the role of the European Commission,
163
 the 
role of the EU’s other institutions in cultural policy-making is still rather a mystery; there 
is thus considerable scope, despite challenges in access, to examine the institutional 
practices of the Parliament, Council of Ministers, Committee of the Regions,
164
  as well 
as to understand in more detail the role of civil society groups such as Culture Action 
Europe.
165
 A  related topic is the notion of expertise and how exactly the Commission 
makes use of its Experts Network (see Patel 2013b)). Given findings in chapter 7 on 
expertise and the OMC, there seems to be room to expand this line of research. Another 
fruitful area of research is to examine the relationships between the European Union and 
regional and local cultural policy – the multi-level governance of culture. The MLG 
thesis has mostly been applied to regional and cohesion policy but there is scope to 
develop it further sectorally. I have tangentially referred to the participation of 
subnational actors in the OMC, but this could be developed much more concretely in 
more depth as well as looking more comprehensively at the EU’s other cultural 
programmes.
166
 
 
                                                          
162
 One particular focus is the emphasis that the EU has put on the economic potential of the cultural and 
creative industries, which has over the past five or so years taken centre stage in discussions surrounding 
cultural policy (see L ittoz-Monnet 2015). 
163
 Although, while we know a lot about the Commission, I would argue that dynamics within the 
Commission are still under-researched. For example, when I say that “the Commission” has advanced an 
agenda, I am not clear on who exactly in the Commission this was. My findings do not concentrate on 
bargaining at a micro-level (this was not terribly important for what I wanted to find out). This could be 
interesting for future research agendas. 
164
 Recent research by Hönnige and Panke (2016) finds that while the CoR and European Economic and 
Social Committee are consulted, the Parliament and Council do not always read their opinions. V isibility 
and effectiveness of these bodies moving forward is crucial. As a supporting competence, culture could 
prove an interesting test case to examine these dynamics further. 
 
 
165
 On lobbying more generally, see a recent special issue in the J ournal of European Public Policy 
(K lüver, Braun, and Beyers 2015). 
166
 This is even more important in a post-financial crisis arts and cultural funding world, where support 
from national governments has decreased and the sector has been looking to EU funds to make up the 
difference. 
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In general for cultural policy research, research designs that make use of speaking to 
policy-makers are important to deepen our understanding of ‘how cultural policy works.’ 
It is only by moving beyond policy documentation that the impacts of formal and informal 
institutions can be seen. There is also the need to adopt greater methodological and 
theoretical pluralism from a variety of ontological perspectives. This research highlighted 
only one such example with the use of sociological new institutionalism. However, it is 
only by combining approaches that we can achieve a greater understanding of culture as 
a sector of public policy as well as the dialectic between structure and agency. 
 
In terms of future research on the Open Method of Coordination, it could be argued that 
the ‘heyday’ of the OMC has past; a 2012 article asked “Why and how (still) study the 
Open Method of Co-ordination?” (de la Porte and Pochet 2012), and indeed most research 
on the OMC is now over a decade old. Despite this, there is still room for development 
of studies on policy coordination in the EU, particularly those that respond to Dawson’s 
(2011) call for deep contextualisation. There is a role for longer term studies looking 
particularly at the development (or not) of particular EU discourses. Here, a approach 
such as V ivien Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism could be useful to interpret 
“meaning-based frameworks of communication” within which agents and structures are 
located (Schmidt 2011, p.107). Some fields have operated with OMCs for 10-15 years, 
and so there is an opportunity for a longitudinal lens, looking at the development of 
discourse not only via the OMC but also in fields where there is a parallel Community 
method. Related to this, there is also the need to continually probe ‘the’ OMC by 
comparing OMCs in different fields, in particular in light of the decoupling of social and 
economic policy in the EU. The OMC and other policy coordination processes also 
represent an opportunity to study agenda-setting dynamics (particularly between the 
Council and the Commission) in the cases where the EU holds only a supporting 
competence, often considered controversial due to issues of subsidiarity.  
 
Finally, more generally, there is also room for a lot more dialogue, both ways, between 
the disciplines of cultural policy and public policy. Cultural policy deserves more 
attention within the general body of work on public policy, both in the EU and elsewhere, 
but also, cultural policy can learn a great deal from the established theoretical frameworks 
of public policy. Y es, cultural policy often sits uncomfortably within public policy 
frameworks (Hesmondhalgh 2005; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005; Pratt 2005, 2012). 
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Y es, ‘culture’ will always remain tricky to define and its various definitions open to 
critique (Gallie 1956, Dubois 1999). But, like social policy, cultural policy is “an ethical 
and political project” (Bell and Oakley 2015, p.7) in that deciding its ‘remit’ remains a 
difficult task for policy-maker and researcher alike (Ibid.), and here is where the richness 
lies in studying it. It is a sector that offers almost endless possibilities for those interested 
in institutions, governance, identity, and values. This thesis has illuminated how these 
interact in the case of one particular policy coordination process, but there remain many 
more ‘corners’ of cultural policy, in different geographical scales and contexts, as well as 
many more general public policy questions to be answered using cultural policy case 
studies, to be discovered. 
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Appendix 1 
Article 167, T reaty on the Functioning of the E uropean Union 
 
Article 167 
(ex. Article 151 TEC) 
 
1. The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, 
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing 
the common cultural heritage to the fore. 
 
2. Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member 
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following 
areas: 
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of 
the European peoples, 
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance, 
- non-commercial cultural exchanges, 
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector. 
 
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular 
the Council of Europe. 
 
4. The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other 
provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the 
diversity of its cultures. 
 
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article: 
- the European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall 
adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States, 
- the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations. 
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Appendix 2 
Council of the E uropean Union Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV 
(Notices) 
NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND 
AGENCIES 
COUNCIL 
Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, on the Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014 
(2010/C 325/01) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPRESENТ
TATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES, 
MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL, 
1. Recalling the objectives assigned to the European Union in 
the field of culture by Article 167 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union; 
2. Recalling the Resolution of the Council of 16 November 
2007 on a European Agenda for Culture ( 1 ) and its 
strategic objectives, namely the promotion of cultural 
diversity and intercultural dialogue, the promotion of 
culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the 
Lisbon strategy for growth, employment, innovation and 
competitiveness, and the promotion of culture as a vital 
element in the Union's international relations; 
3. Having regard to the Commission Report of 19 July 2010 
on the implementation of the European Agenda for 
Culture ( 2 ) and the accompanying Staff Working 
Document ( 3 ); 
4. Convinced that culture can contribute to the achievement of 
the objectives of Europe 2020, a strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth ( 4 ); 
5. Considering that the Council Work Plan for Culture 2008- 
2010, in particular through its use of the open method of 
coordination (OMC), constituted a new and important stage 
in the development of Member State cooperation on culture, 
improving the coherence and visibility of European action in 
this field, while underlining the horizontal role of culture; 
6. Taking note of the results of the work carried out in the 
framework of the Council Work Plan for Culture 2008-2010 
and notably the identification and sharing of good practices 
by the working groups established by the Member States as 
well as the recommendations of these groups; 
7. Sharing the view that the work plan in Annex I should draw 
on this work and the resulting recommendations and cover a 
period of four years, allowing for a mid-term review, 
AGREE: 
— To adopt, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, 
the Work Plan 2011-2014 as set out in Annex I as well as 
the principles relating to the setting up and functioning of 
the working groups established by the Member States as set 
out in Annex II, 
— To establish working groups composed of experts 
nominated by the Member States on the basis of the prinТ
ciples and mandates defined in Annexes I and II and to 
follow their work, 
— To pursue the priority areas of the Work Plan as set out in 
Annex I: 
— Priority area A: Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue 
and accessible and inclusive culture; 
— Priority area B: Cultural and Creative Industries; 
— Priority area C: Skills and mobility; 
— Priority area D: Cultural heritage, including mobility of 
collections; 
— Priority area E: Culture in External Relations; 
— Priority area F: Culture Statistics.
EN 2.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 325/1 
( 1 ) OJ C 287, 29.11.2007, p. 1. 
( 2 ) COM(2010) 390 final. 
( 3 ) SEC(2010) 904. 
( 4 ) European Council Conclusions, 17 June 2010 (EUCO 13/1/10 
REV 1).
These priority areas will focus on the achievement of concrete 
and useable results, in particular as regards the working groups. 
INVITE THE COMMISSION AND THE MEMBER STATES TO: 
— regularly consult and inform the stakeholders on the 
progress of the Work Plan, the results achieved and the 
implementation of the recommendations of the working 
groups in order to ensure the relevance and visibility of 
the activities, 
— undertake a mid-term review of the implementation of the 
Work Plan with a view to possible adaptations or reorienТ
tation in the light of results achieved and policy develТ
opments at EU level, 
INVITE THE COMMISSION AND THE PRESIDENCIES OF THE 
COUNCIL TO: 
— update the Member States on initiatives in other policy areas 
of the Commission and/or the Council impacting on culture, 
INVITE THE PRESIDENCIES OF THE COUNCIL TO: 
— take into account, in the context of the trio Presidency, the 
Work Plan priorities when developing their programme, to 
report on the implementation of the Work Plan and to 
build upon the results achieved, 
— in particular, organise, when appropriate: 
— a meeting of senior officials of Ministries of Culture with 
a view to discussing and taking up the results obtained 
in the Work Plan, 
— a joint informal meeting of senior officials of Ministries 
of Culture and senior officials responsible for culture in 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with a view to developing a 
strategic approach to culture in external relations and 
enhancing cooperation in this field, 
— consider organising, in the context of the implementation of 
the Work Plan, meetings of senior officials of Ministries of 
Culture and senior officials from other policy domains, 
INVITE THE COMMISSION TO: 
— regularly inform, on the one hand, the Member States of the 
work of the civil society structured dialogue platforms and, 
on the other, inform these platforms of the work carried out 
in the context of the Work Plan, 
— organise an annual meeting with candidate countries, 
members of the European Free Trade Association and 
other countries participating in the Culture programme, in 
order to inform them of the work carried out in the context 
of the Work Plan and to allow a discussion with Member 
States, the chairs of the working groups and the 
Commission, 
— adopt, before the end of the first half of 2014 and on the 
basis of voluntary contributions from Member States, a final 
report on the implementation and relevance of the Work 
Plan. This report will be the basis for the preparation of the 
next Work Plan during the second half of 2014, 
WELCOME 
The intention of the Commission to support Member States’ 
actions in implementing the Work Plan as set out in Annex I.
EN C 325/2 Official Journal of the European Union 2.12.2010
ANNEX I 
Priority Area A: Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and accessible and inclusive culture 
European Agenda for Culture — Promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (strategic objective 1) 
Europe 2020 — inclusive growth (priority 3) 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States Topic No 1: 
The role of public arts and cultural institutions 
in the promotion of: 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
(i) better access to and wider participation in 
culture 
Experts will identify policies and good practices of public arts and cultural institutions to promote 
better access to and wider participation in culture, including by disadvantaged groups and groups 
experiencing poverty and social exclusion (2 ). 
2011-2012 
Identification of policies and good 
practice manual for public arts and 
cultural institutions. 
(ii) cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue Experts will identify policies and good practices in creating spaces in public arts and cultural 
institutions to facilitate exchanges among cultures and between social groups, in particular by 
highlighting the intercultural dimension of the heritage and by promoting artistic and cultural 
education and developing intercultural competences. 
2012-2013 
Identification of policies and good 
practice manual for public arts and 
cultural institutions. 
Member States Topic No 2: 
Development of the key competence ‘Cultural 
awareness and expression’ (3 ) 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ) 
Experts (4 ) will identify good practices for the development of this key competence and its inteТ
gration into education policies, on the basis of knowledge and attitudes identified in the RecomТ
mendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key 
competences for lifelong learning (5 ). 
2013-2014 
Good practice manual for culture and 
education authorities at national and 
European level. 
Commission Promotion of culturally inclusive cities The Commission will identify good practices and instruments to promote culturally inclusive cities, 
building on the results of projects co-funded by the EU on management of diversity in cities (6 ). 
2011 onwards. 
Identification of good practices. 
Commission Promotion of multilingualism Study on the potential of subtitling to encourage foreign language learning: the study aims to 
assess the way(s) and degree to which the use of subtitles encourages and facilitates foreign 
language learning and contributes to the mastery of foreign languages, thereby leading to a 
more language-friendly environment, notably by highlighting the cultural dimension. 
Final report expected during second 
quarter of 2011. 
(1 ) The principles relating to the setting up and functioning of the working groups can be found in Annex II. 
(2 ) See also Council conclusions of 18 November 2010 on the role of culture in combating poverty and social exclusion (15448/10). 
(3 ) Building on the June 2010 recommendations of the OMC Working Group on developing synergies with education, especially arts education (Work Plan for Culture 2008-2010). 
(4 ) The composition of the group will be a key factor in ensuring that its results can be taken up in the context of a future work cycle under the ET 2020 (strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training); the 
participation of experts from ministries of education will therefore be recommended. The group will be supported by relevant Commission services. 
(5 ) OJ L 394, 30.12.2006, p. 10. 
(6 ) Including Intercultural Cities (co-funded by the Culture Programme), OPEN Cities (co-funded by Urbact II) and CLIP (Cities for Local Integration Policies — co-funded by Eurofound) network.
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Priority Area B: Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs) 
European Agenda for Culture — Promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity (strategic objective 2) 
Europe 2020 — smart and sustainable growth (priorities 1 and 2) 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States Topic No 1: 
Strategic use of EU support programmes, 
including structural funds, to foster the 
potential of culture for local and regional develТ
opment and the spill-over effects of CCIs on the 
wider economy 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will identify, compare and model good practices in this field for the attention of both 
managing authorities and cultural sector operators, including in particular CCIs, building on the 
Council conclusions of 10 May 2010 (2 ) and on the study on culture's contribution to regional 
and local development. 
Experts will also examine the spill-over effects of the CCIs on the wider economy, particularly in 
terms of innovation, and the potential for making better use of EU support programmes to foster 
these effects. 
2011 
Policy handbook. 
Reflection on a joint EU-wide 
awareness raising initiative by the 
Commission and Member States to 
promote the integration of culture 
in regional and local development 
policies and to support smart specialТ
isation strategies. 
Member States Topic No 2: 
CCI export and internationalisation support 
strategies 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will identify good practices on export and internationalisation support for CCIs. 
2012-2013 
Good practice manual. 
Member States Topic No 3: 
Good practices on financial engineering for 
SMEs in cultural and creative sector 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will develop a manual for the attention of both CCIs funding providers and the users of 
funds, based on an analysis of existing funding mechanisms and tax measures prepared by two EC- 
commissioned studies (3 ). This work will take into account other actions launched in this field at 
European level as announced in the Commission Green Paper ‘Unlocking the potential of cultural 
and creative industries’ (4 ). 
2013-2014 
Good practice manual with case 
studies. 
Commission Follow-up to the Green Paper ‘Unlocking the 
potential of cultural and creative industries’ 
The Commission will examine the results of the public consultation and will publish by the end of 
2010 an analysis of the contributions received with a view to proposing during the first semester 
of 2011 an initiative on the promotion of, and support for, CCIs. 
2011 onwards. 
Commission Establishment of the ‘European Creative 
Industries Alliance’ 
The Commission will establish the ‘European Creative Industries Alliance’, based on close collabТ
oration between its services, including Enterprise DG. 
2011 onwards. 
Commission Promotion of cultural tourism as a driver for 
sustainable social and economic development 
In the context of the Commission Communication on the new policy context for tourism in 
Europe (5 ), the Commission will establish close collaboration between its services, including 
Enterprise DG, in order to promote the development of cultural tourism and related industries 
and to identify good practices in sustainable management of cultural tourism, including tangible 
and intangible heritage, in an integrated regional development strategy. 
2011 onwards. 
(1 ) The principles relating to the setting up and functioning of the working groups can be found in Annex II. 
(2 ) Council conclusions of 10 May 2010 on the contribution of culture to local and regional development (OJ C 135, 26.5.2010, p. 15). 
(3 ) ‘The entrepreneurial dimension of the cultural and creative industries’, Utrecht School of the Arts, October 2010, and ‘Access to finance activities of the European Creative Industry Alliance’, Jenny Tooth, January 2010. 
(4 ) COM(2010) 183 final. 
(5 ) COM(2010) 352 final.
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Priority Area C: Skills and mobility 
European Agenda for Culture — Promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue and promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity (strategic objectives 1 and 2) 
Europe 2020 — smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (priorities 1, 2 and 3) 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States Topic No 1: 
Mobility support programmes 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will screen and assess mobility support programmes and schemes in order to identify 
barriers and problems faced in particular by small-scale culture operators and by young artists and 
culture professionals, building on the 2008 ‘Mobility Matters’ study. Experts will also identify good 
practices to overcome these difficulties. 
2011-2012 
Screening results, identification of 
barriers and good practices. 
Member States Topic No 2: 
Promotion of creative partnerships (2 ) 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will identify and model the types of successful partnerships and practices, including their 
positive impacts. 
2012-2013 
Policy handbook. 
Reflection on a joint EU-wide 
initiative by the Commission and by 
national, regional and local partners 
in the Member States, to encourage 
creative partnerships. 
Member States Topic No 3: 
Artists’ residencies 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ) 
Experts will identify the success factors in preparing, carrying out and following up artists’ 
residencies with a specific focus on building capacity and on the goal of reducing imbalances 
in incoming/outgoing residencies. The good practices identified should help build capacity both 
inside the EU and when developing residencies in third countries, as well as facilitating networking 
at EU level. 
2013-2014 
Good practice manual on preparing, 
organising and following-up 
residencies, establishing networks 
and support mechanisms. 
Commission Identification and development of skills through 
culture sector councils (3 ) 
The Commission will explore, based on close collaboration between its services, including 
Employment and Social Affairs DG, the possibilities of establishing culture sector councils at 
EU-level. These councils will support development of policies in the sector concerned by 
providing analysis of likely developments on the sectoral labour market and by better meeting 
the skills needs of this sector. 
2011 onwards. 
Exchange of information and good 
practices. 
Commission Promotion of media literacy Study on media literacy: the study will test and refine criteria to assess media literacy levels in all 
Member States, in accordance with the requirement in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (4 ) 
for the Commission to report on media literacy levels in Member States. 
2010-2011 
Commission Further development of proposals for 
information standards in the field of mobility 
A Commission-convened expert group will develop proposals for information standards on the 
basis of the recommendations produced in June 2010 by the OMC Working Group on mobility of 
culture professionals (Work Plan for Culture 2008-2010). The Commission will submit a proposal 
for a Council Recommendation on Mobility Information Services in 2011. 
2011 
Detailed proposal of information and 
advice service content and standards.
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Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Commission Analysis of administrative practices on artists’ 
mobility (including visa, tax, social security) 
The Commission will organise thematic seminars bringing together Member States’ authorities, 
Commission services and ‘end users’ and will facilitate exchange of information and of good 
practices. 
2011-2014 
Good practice manual for national 
authorities. 
(1 ) The principles relating to the setting up and functioning of the working groups can be found in Annex II. 
(2 ) ‘Creative partnerships’ between culture and sectors such as education and training, business, research or the public sector, help transfer creative skills from culture into other sectors. 
(3 ) Sector councils on employment and skills at EU-level are composed of key stakeholders of a particular economic sector including representatives from trade unions and employer organisations, members of education and training systems 
as well as other actors such as those involved in economic development. 
(4 ) OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1. 
Priority Area D: Cultural heritage including mobility of collections 
European Agenda for Culture — Promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (strategic objective 1) 
Europe 2020 — sustainable and inclusive growth (priorities 2 and 3) 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States Examination of ways and means to simplify the 
process of lending and borrowing 
Working group of Member State experts (OMC) (1 ). 
Experts will identify good practices on all relevant issues in the context of mobility of collections. 
2011-2012 
Toolkit (including good practice 
guidelines, templates and ‘user 
guides’) on state indemnity provision. 
Good practice manual for national 
authorities on other relevant issues. 
Member States 
and Commission 
Follow-up to the digitisation of cultural 
heritage, including film heritage 
The Commission's Reflection Group (comité des sages) will by end 2010 present recommendations 
for the digitisation, online accessibility and preservation of Europe's cultural heritage in the digital 
age. 
Report by end 2010, follow-up in 
2011. 
Member States’ Expert Group on Digitisation and Digital Preservation will continue its work on 
issues related to governance and financing of Europeana post-2013. 
2011-2012 
The Commission will propose by 2012 a sustainable model for financing Europeana in accordance 
with the Digital Agenda for Europe (2 ) and its key action 15 and with the Council conclusions of 
10 May 2010 on Europeana: next steps (3 ). 
2012 
Cinema Experts Group (sub-group Film Heritage) will exchange best practices in relation to the 
follow-up to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2010 on European Film Heritage, including 
the challenges of the Digital Era (4 ). 
2011 onwards. 
Member States 
and Commission 
Implementation of the European Heritage Label 
Decision (5 ) 
The Commission will prepare the application form and guidelines to assist with the selection and 
monitoring procedures in close cooperation with the European panel. 
2011-2012 
First selections of sites under the transitional procedure. 2013-2014
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Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Commission Prevention of and fight against illicit trafficking 
of cultural goods 
Following the outcome of the ongoing study on prevention and fight against illicit trafficking of 
cultural goods (report expected mid-2011), the Commission will intensify collaboration between 
its services. Commission-convened expert group(s) (6 ), in cooperation with the Member States, may 
propose a toolkit including European good practice guidelines and a code of ethics on due 
diligence in the fight against illicit trafficking and theft, building upon existing documents and 
codes, and considering relevant EU instruments in this area. 
2012-2013 
Toolkit on fight against illicit trafТ
ficking and theft. 
Commission Analysis of systems for valuation of works of 
art 
Comparative research on systems for valuation of works of art will be conducted for insurance, 
state indemnity and share liability purposes. 
Report by 2012. 
(1 ) The principles relating to the setting up and functioning of the working groups can be found in Annex II. 
(2 ) COM(2010) 245 final/2. 
(3 ) OJ C 137, 27.5.2010, p. 19. 
(4 ) 14711/10. 
(5 ) Subject to the adoption of the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Union action for the European Heritage Label. 
(6 ) As a combination of expertise is essential in this field, the group will consist of experts from ministries of culture, museums, judicial authorities, customs authorities and law enforcement agencies. 
Priority Area E: Culture in external relations 
European Agenda for Culture — Promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations (strategic objective 3) 
Europe 2020 — Deploying our external policy instruments 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States 
and Commission 
Development of a strategic approach and coopТ
eration 
The Presidencies of the Council are invited to organise, when appropriate, a joint informal meeting 
between senior officials of Ministries of Culture and senior officials responsible for culture in 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with a view to developing a strategic approach to culture in 
external relations and enhancing cooperation in this field. The senior officials will themselves 
define the calendar of work, topics to explore and target outputs. 
2011-2014 
Development of information sharing tools Following the May 2010 Mallorca meeting of DGs for Culture in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the 
Commission will provide a web space for information sharing, based on the agreed template. 
Member States and the Commission will keep their content regularly updated, so that this material 
can be a basis for practical cooperation and discussion. 
Set-up information tool in 2011. 
Member States 
and Commission 
Promotion of ratification and implementation 
of the UNESCO Convention on the protection 
and the promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions 
Further promote the ratification of the Convention and of its objectives in relations with third 
countries. 
Continue implementing the Convention and include its objectives in relevant European and 
national policies. 
Ongoing.
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Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Commission Promotion of cultural relations with third 
countries 
The Commission will convene expert groups, when necessary, to feed into work on a specific issue 
and to facilitate the definition of strategies regarding the cultural relations with third countries. 
These groups (1 ) will be notably invited to address specific tasks on a regional basis, e.g. Culture in 
the Neighbourhood (Euromed, Eastern Partnership, Danube Region etc.), Culture in emerging 
economies, Culture and development. 
From 2011 as necessary. 
(1 ) As appropriate, other EC services will be closely associated with these tasks. 
Priority Area F: Culture statistics 
Actions by Topics Instruments and working methods Target outputs and indicative timeline 
Member States 
and Commission 
Improvement of methodologies for culture 
statistics 
The end 2011 report of the ESS-Net on cultural statistics will be the basis for discussion of take-up 
of recommendations, future priorities and working methods. 
2012 onwards. 
Proposal for a methodological 
framework. 
Commission Improvement of information on culture 
statistics 
New edition of Eurostat ‘pocket book’ on culture statistics. Publication in 2011. 
Commission Improvement of mobility statistics A Commission-convened expert group (1 ) will propose a shared ‘sampling’ approach to collecting 
data on the mobility of artists and culture professionals. 
2012-2013 
Toolkit for culture administrations 
and institutions on how to ‘sample’ 
data on mobility. 
(1 ) The group will include members of ESSnet and representatives of relevant pilot projects.
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ANNEX II 
Principles relating to the setting up and functioning of the working groups established by the Member States in 
the framework of the Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014 
— The participation of Member States in the work of the groups is voluntary and Member States can join them at any 
time. 
— Each Member State interested in participating in the work of the groups will nominate an expert as a member of a 
working group. The Member State will ensure that the nominated expert has practical experience in the relevant field 
at national level and will ensure effective communication with competent national authorities. The Commission will 
coordinate the nomination exercise. In order to identify the most suitable expert profile for each theme, the Member 
States may nominate, if necessary, a different expert for each thematic area. 
— The groups are to address successively the objectives defined in the Work Plan, complying as far as possible with the 
timeline identified in Annex I. 
— The definition and timeline for the objectives may be revised during the mid-term review in the light of results 
achieved and policy developments at EU level. 
— Each working group will be responsible for appointing its chair or co-chairs for each thematic area among its 
priorities. 
— Each working group can decide to invite independent experts from other fields to contribute to the work of the 
group. 
— Each working group can decide to invite representatives of the civil society structured dialogue platforms to take part 
in its work on specific topics as needed. 
— The chairs of the working groups will report as necessary to the Cultural Affairs Committee on the progress of work 
in the respective working groups. The Cultural Affairs Committee will be given an opportunity to give guidance to the 
working groups in order to guarantee the desired outcome and the coordination of the groups’ work. 
— For each objective mentioned in Annex I, the groups will submit a report on the work carried out, containing 
concrete and useable results. Depending on the objective, these results may take the form of a good practice manual, a 
policy handbook or recommendations for action. The reports may also recommend the development of any relevant 
instrument, in any appropriate form, which may be used by the Commission or by the Member States. 
— The meeting agendas and minutes of all groups will be available to all Member States, irrespective of their degree of 
participation in a given area. The reports of the groups will be published. 
— The Commission will provide logistical and secretarial support to the work of the groups. As far as possible, it will 
support the groups by other suitable means (including studies relevant to their field of work). 
— The above reports will feed into the final report by the Commission on the implementation of the Work Plan.
EN 2.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 325/9
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Appendix 3 
L ist of interviews 
 
Alfred 14.04.14 Council of the European Union official In person, Brussels 
Beatrice 14.04.14 Council of the European Union official In person, Brussels 
Corinne 15.04.14 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Darya 22.04.14 Member State representative In person, Brussels 
E dward 24.04.14 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Fatima 20.05.14 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Georg 22.05.14 Member State expert In person, Brussels 
Hanna 22.05.14 Member State expert In person, Brussels 
J ette 23.05.14 European Commission In person, Brussels 
L uise 04.06.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Markus 16.06.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Nils 24.06.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Oskar 27.06.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Paulina 30.06.14 Member State expert Skype 
Quentin 11.07.14 Member State expert Telephone 
R uth 14.07.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Salma 28.07.14 Member State expert Telephone 
T imo 18.09.14 Member State expert Skype 
Ulla 06.10.14 Member State expert Telephone 
V iktoria 13.10.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Wasil 17.10.14 Member State expert Skype 
J ulita  17.10.14 Member State expert Telephone 
Y vette 05.11.14 Invited guest expert Skype 
Zafar 06.11.14 Invited guest expert Skype 
Alain 11.11.14 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Bartek 14.11.14 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Camilla 14.11.14 Invited guest expert Skype 
Delores 21.11.14 Invited guest expert Telephone 
E lin Oct/Nov 
2014 
Invited guest expert Email 
Frederick 03.12.14 Invited guest expert Telephone 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
Appendix 4 
Interview schedules
167
 
 
Interview schedule (1): E U officials (Commission and Council of Ministers) 
 
 What is your role here in [institution]? 
 Could you tell me a bit about your responsibilities regarding the Open Method 
of Coordination and the 2011-2014 Work Plan?  
 Could you tell me a little bit about how this document [Work Plan for Culture 
2011-2014] was created? 
 The divisions of power are split on the list between Member States and the 
Commission, and the priorities agreed on by the Council. How do these 
divisions work in practice? 
 Who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the Work Plan’s priorities are 
carried out? 
 How exactly does OMC work? What role do you play in its operation? 
 How much interaction do you have with the groups themselves?  
 What types of outcomes does the OMC produce? 
 Why isn’t there any benchmarking in the cultural field? 
 How successful do you think policy coordination via the OMC is?   
 Is there anything else you can think of that might be relevant to understanding 
the way the OMC and the Work Plan is governed/administered? 
 Is there anyone else you recommend I speak to regarding the OMC? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167
 Please note that these schedules acted as guides only. In most cases conversations developed on their 
own and I only needed to refer to these very minimally. 
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Interview schedule (2): Member State experts 
 
 What is your everyday job and how did you become involved in the OMC 
group? 
 What did you hope to get out of it/what were your motivations for participating? 
 What do you think the purpose of the OMC is? 
 Why might Member States want to collaborate in the field of culture? 
 What are the advantages/disadvantages of participating in the OMC? What 
about the fact that it is voluntary? 
 Do you think it was successful, from your point of view of participation? 
 Why do you think there isn’t any benchmarking in the cultural field? 
 What happened was the system of dissemination – what did you do with the 
output? (Best practice manual) 
 Are there any specific examples of policy learning or change in your country? 
 What role did the European Commission play? 
 What do you think is the future of EU cultural policy and policy coordination? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260 
 
Interview schedule (3): Invited external speakers 
 How did you become involved in the working group(s) and in what way did you 
participate? (Give a talk, presentation, etc.) 
 What do you think is the purpose of the OMC?  
 Why might Member States want to collaborate/coordinate in the field of culture? 
  What do you think is the added value of the participation of experts such as 
yourself? 
 Did you have any specific motivations for participating? 
 What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of the OMC, in your opinion? 
 What role did the European Commission play in the OMC? 
 Why do you think there isn’t any benchmarking or target-setting in the culture 
OMCs (this differs, for example, from other fields such as social protection and 
employment)? 
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Appendix 5 
E thics application and letter of approval 
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Appendix 6 
L ists of OMC participants
168
 
Group 1 
 
E xperts 
 
Country Name 
Austria Barbara Neundlinger 
Belgium  Elien Gillaerts 
Belgium  France Lebon 
Bulgaria S. Hacheryan 
Czech R epublic Barbora Novotna 
K aterina Dolezalova 
Cyprus C. Giangkou 
Germany Gabriele Pfennings 
Annette Schwandner 
Meike Ziegenmeier 
Denmark Thyge Moos 
E stonia Asta Trummel 
Tonu Lensment 
Spain Pilar Barraca de Ramos 
Carmen Zamora del Castillo 
F inland Lea Halttunen 
Greece Stella Chryssoulaki 
Hungary Ivan Ronai 
Gyorgy Erdős 
Gabor Balogh 
A. Balasz 
Ireland Jenny Siung 
Italy Erminia Sciacchitano 
L ithuania P. Ramune 
V . Grazieme 
Malta C. Serracino 
Netherlands Jan Jaap K nol 
Martin Prchal 
Poland Joanna Orlik 
Portugal Manuel Rocha 
Sweden Anna Sellvag 
Slovenia Nataša Bucik 
 
 
Invited representatives from civil society platforms 
 Platform Access to Culture: Miguel Angel Martin Ramos, Eva Nunes, Giannalia 
Cogliandro, K atherine Heid, Luca Bergamo  
 Platform Intercultural Europe: Sabine Frank. 
 
Invited guests 
                                                          
168
 Please note: all of this information is public and is copied from the three OMC reports themselves. 
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 Anne Bamford 
 Anne K rebs, Musee du Louvre 
 Mireille Guerre, Theatre des Bernardines, France 
 Monika J eschko, Wiener K onzerthaus 
 Caroline Rota, SUPERAR, Austria 
 Cristina da Milano, ECCOM 
 Birgitta Englin, Riksteatern, Sweden 
 V anessa Rawlings-J ackson, Cultivate, UK  
 Sari Salovaara, Culture for all, Finland 
 Anne Godenir and Catherine Stercq, L ire et ecrire, Belgium 
 J esus Maria Carrillo Castillo, Reina Sofia Museum, Madrid 
 Anja van K eulen, Amsterdam Concertbouw 
 Teunis Ijdens, the Netherlands 
 Ulrike Giesner-Bogner, K ultur-kontakt, Austria 
 Peter Inkei, Budapest Observatory 
 Laura Lugg, AHRC, UK  
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Group 2 
 
 
E xperts 
 
Country Name Organisation Function 
Austria 
 
 
Monika K ALISTA Regional 
Government 
of Salzburg 
Head of Unit Culture, 
Society, Generations 
Austria  
 
Heidemarie 
MEISSNITZER 
 
Permanent 
Representation of 
Austria to the EU 
Counsellor for 
Cultural 
Affairs 
Austria Anne WIEDERHOLD Brunnenpassage Artistic Director 
Belgium Sabine DE V ILLE  ASBL  Culture 
et Democratie 
et Consultante en 
Mediation culturelle 
Presidente 
 
Belgium Andre 
SOMMERLATTE 
 
Abteilung fur 
kulturelle und 
soziale 
Angelegenheiten 
(Medien) – 
Ministerium 
der 
Deutschprachigen 
Gemeinschaft 
Media Officer 
 
Belgium Pascal 
V ERSCHUERE 
 
Department for 
Culture, Y outh, 
Sports & Media 
(Flemish 
Government) 
Policy Officer 
 
Bulgaria Silva HACHERIAN Ministry of Culture Head of Unit 
Regional 
Activities, Cultural 
Policy Directorate 
Germany Gabriele 
PFENNINGS 
 
Federal Government 
of Germany 
Federal Government 
Commissioner for 
Culture and Media 
Denmark Annette 
K ORNERUP 
Danish Ministry 
of Culture 
Head of Section 
 
E stonia A iriin LEHTMETS Estonian Ministry 
of Culture 
- 
E stonia  Jevgeni 
ŽURJARI-OSSIPOV  
 
Estonian Ministry 
of Culture 
 
Senior Specialist 
of Cultural Diversity 
Department 
Spain  Guillermo K URZ Regional 
Government 
of Extremadura 
 
Director, Museo 
Arqueologico 
Provincial de 
Badajoz. 
Spain  Pilar FATAS Spanish Ministry of 
Culture 
Deputy Director, 
Museo de Altamira 
Spain  Ana AZOR 
LACASTA 
 
Spanish Ministry of 
Culture 
 
Counsellor. 
Directorate 
General for Fine Arts 
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and Cultural Assets 
F inland  Ahmed AL-NAWAS Culture For A ll – 
Service 
Cultural Diversity 
Advisor 
F rance  Helene HATZFELD Ministry of Culture 
and Communication 
 
Policy Officer, 
General 
Secretary, Research, 
Higher Education and 
Technology Board 
Greece Maria FAK IOLA Ministry of Culture 
& Sports 
(Directorate of 
Modern Cultural 
Heritage Department 
of Intercultural 
Issues) 
Expert 
 
Croatia  Deborah HUSTIC Ministry of Culture Senior adviser, 
Head of Department 
for Cultural Policy 
Coordination 
Hungary  V eronika TOTH Ministry of Human 
Resources 
Chief Counsellor 
 
Ireland  Derval O'CARROLL  Chester Beatty 
L ibrary 
Head of Operations 
Ireland  Jenny SIUNG Chester Beatty 
L ibrary 
Head of Education 
Services 
Italy  Emilio CABASINO Ministry for Cultural 
Heritage and 
Activities 
and Tourism 
Government Official, 
General Secretariat, 
National Contact 
Point for 2005 
Unesco 
Convention 
L ithuania  Birute 
K AZLAUSK IENE 
 
Ministry of Culture Chief Specialist, 
National Minorities 
Affairs Division 
L atvia  Dagnija BALTINA Latvia National 
Commission 
for UNESCO 
Secretary General 
 
Netherlands  Femie WILLEMS Cultural 
Participation 
Fund 
Programme 
Coordinator 
 
Netherlands Mirjam SHATANAWI Tropenmuseum, 
Amsterdam 
Curator 
 
Poland Hanna JĘDRAS Ministry of Culture 
and National 
Heritage, 
International 
Cooperation 
Department 
Head Expert 
 
Poland Marcin K OMOSA Ministry of Culture 
and National 
Heritage, 
State Patronage 
Department 
Head Expert 
 
Portugal  Lurdes CAMACHO Ministry of Culture Head of Department 
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R omania  Andrei 
DIACONESCUANDREI 
 
Ministry of Culture 
and National 
Heritage 
Public Manager 
 
R omania  Raluca CAPOTA Ministry of Culture 
and National 
Heritage 
Expert 
 
Sweden Marten LEMPERT Swedish Arts 
Council 
Administrative 
Officer 
Slovenia Sonja K RALJ  
BERV AR
169
 
Ministry of Culture Secretary 
 
Slovenia Lydia SUCHOV A Ministry of Culture Expert 
United 
K ingdom 
Hillary BAUER Former Head of 
Cultural Property 
and International, 
UK  Department for 
Culture, Media and 
Sport 
Cultural Expert 
 
 
 
Independent expert 
Chris TORCH, Intercult 
 
Guest experts 
 Nick L IV INGSTON (IE) Director of Strategic Development, Arts Council of 
Northern Ireland 
 Roisin MCDONOUGH (IE) [sic] Chief Executive, Arts Council of Northern 
Ireland 
 K rzysztof CZY Ż EWSK I (PL) The Borderland Centre 
 Simona BODO (IT) Independent researcher and advisor Creator and editor of 
‘Patrimonio e Intercultura’ 
 Regis COCHEFERT (UK ) The Paul Hamlyn Institute, Roundhouse Studios 
 Antonis PANAY IOTOU (UK ) The UK  Arts Council – Decibel Performing Arts 
Showcase 
 Sophie ALEX ANDRE (BE) Manager/coordinator of the Reseau des Arts a 
Bruxelles 
 Danny OP DE BEECK  (BE) K V S 
 Willy THOMAS (BE) TokTockK nock 
 A lexandre CAPUTO (BE) Theatre National 
 Marc TRULLEMANS (BE) Actiris 
 Nasseem K HAN (UK ) Independent expert 
 Leen DE SPIEGELARE (BE) Manager/coordinator of Brussels K unstenoverleg 
 Marta STRAHINIČ (SI) Metlika Library 
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Group 3 
 
E xperts 
 
Country Name Organisation 
Austria Barbara Neundlinger K ulturK ontakt Austria 
Austria Heidi Meissnitzer Standige V ertretung Osterreichs bei 
der EU | Permanent Representation 
of Austria to the European Union 
Belgium - F landers Christine Debaene Department of Culture, Y outh, Sports 
and Media 
Belgium - F landers 
 
Brecht Demeulenaere
170
 Flemish Ministry of Education and 
Training 
Belgium - F landers Wouter V an den Driessche Department of Culture, Y outh, Sports 
and Media 
Belgium - F landers Marijke V erdoodt Department of Culture, Y outh, Sports 
and Media 
Belgium - F rench Isabelle Letawe Ministere de la Communaute 
francaise 
Belgium - F rench Nicolas V an De V elde Ministere de la Communaute 
francaise, cellule Culture-
Enseignement 
Cyprus Andri Hadjigeorgiou Ministry of Education and Culture 
Cyprus Chrystalla Petridou Counsellor for Education, Y outh, 
Culture, Sports and audiovisual, 
PR of Cyprus to the EU 
Czech R epublic Michaela Přilepkova National Information and Consulting 
Centre for Culture 
Czech R epublic K ristyna Žůrkova Ministry of Education, Y outh and 
Sport 
Germany Angela Murr Centre for Art and Intermedia Design 
in Schools Baden-Wuerttemberg 
(ZK IS) 
Germany Gabriele Pfennings Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 
fur K ultur und Medien 
Germany Matthias Wolf Ministerium fur K ultur, Jugend 
und Sport 
Denmark Ole Winther Danish Agency for Culture 
E stonia Asta Trummel Estonian Ministry of Culture 
Greece Stella Chryssoulaki 26th Ephorate of Prehistoric and 
Classical Antiquities/Hellenic 
Ministry of Culture and Sports 
Spain Maria Angeles Gil Blanco Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sport 
F inland Mikko Hartikainen Finnish National Board of Education 
F inland Elisse Heinimaa Aalto University of Helsinki 
F rance Elizabeth Ladrat Ministry of Culture and 
Communication 
F rance Francois Marie Ministry of Culture and 
Communication 
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Croatia Deborah Hustić Ministry of Culture of the Republic 
of Croatia 
Croatia Maja Zrnčić Ministry of Culture of the Republic 
of Croatia 
Hungary Edina Elter Permanent Representation of 
Hungary 
Hungary Zoltan Pompor Hungarian Institute of Educational 
Research and Development 
Hungary Borbala Pribay Ministry of Human Capacities, 
Department for Cultural Relations 
Ireland Jenny Siung Chester Beatty L ibrary, Dublin 
Italy Giuliana De Francesco Ministry of Cultural Heritage and 
Activities and Tourism 
L ithuania V aiva Lankelienė Ministry of Culture 
L ithuania Dalia Šiaulytienė Ministry of Education and Science 
L atvia Jolanta K lišāne Latvian National Centre for Culture 
L atvia Baiba Moļņika Latvian National Commission 
for UNESCO 
Malta John Attard Department of Curriculum 
Management, Directorate for Quality 
and Standards in Education, Ministry 
for Education and Employment 
Netherlands Jan Jaap K nol
171
 Netherlands Fund for Cultural 
Participation 
Netherlands Ronald K ox National Centre of Expertise for 
Cultural Education and Amateur Arts 
(LK CA) 
Netherlands Ocker V an Munster National Centre of Expertise for 
Cultural Education and Amateur Arts 
(LK CA) 
Poland Magdalena Ozimek Ministry of Culture and National 
Heritage 
Poland Danuta Pusek Ministry of National Education 
Portugal Elisa Marques Arts Education Team of the 
Directorate General of Education, 
Ministry of Education and Science 
Portgual Maria de Assis Swinnerton Gulbenkian Foundation 
 
R omania Rodica Diana Cherciu Ministry of Education and Scientific 
Research, Department of 
Preuniversity Education 
R omania Marlena Minea Ministry of Culture of Romania, 
Directorate for Cultural Heritage 
Sweden Anna Dammert Swedish Ministry of Education 
and Research 
Sweden Carin K hakee Swedish Ministry of Culture 
Sweden Margareta Wiman Swedish Ministry of Education 
and Research 
Slovenia Nataša Bucik Ministry of Culture, Creativity 
Directorate 
Slovenia Nada Požar Matijašič Ministry of Education, Science 
and Sport 
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Slovenia Barbara Rogelj  Cankarjev dom, Culture and 
Congress Centre 
Slovakia Zuzana K omarova Ministry of Culture of the 
Slovak Republic 
Slovakia Jaroslava Markofova National Curriculum Board, 
National Pedagogic Institute 
Slovakia K alman Petocz National Institute for Education 
  
  
E xternal experts who have supported the work of the group throughout the whole 
cycle 
 Mr Ernst Wagner, Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair in Arts and Culture in 
Education at the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
 Mr Lode V ermeersch, Senior Researcher, HIV A – Research Institute for Work 
and Society (University of Leuven), Department of Educational Sciences (V rije 
Universiteit Brussel) 
 
Other experts who have been invited to meetings on an ad hoc basis 
 Ms Anne Bamford, Director, Engine Room and Professor at the University of 
the Arts, London 
 Ms Annemies Broekgaarden, Head of Public and Education, Rijksmuseum 
Amsterdam and President of the International Association for Children in 
Museums 
 Mr Jonzi D., Artistic Director, Breakin’ Convention, London 
 Mr Pedro De Bruyckere, Educational Scientist, Teacher and Researcher 
 Ms Caroline K earney, Education Research Analyst, European Schoolnet 
 Ms Joan Parr, Chair, ACEnet network 
 Mr Henry Thomas, Head of World Arts and Cultures (1997-2012), United 
World College of the Adriatic 
 Mr Barend van Heusden, Professor and Researcher, University of Groningen 
 Mr Michael Wimmer, General Manager, EDUCULT 
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